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Beyond the shock: electoral cycles in the UK House of Commons revisited

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Abstract

In many democracies, politicians accumulate mandates and, by doing so, undertake extra-parliamentary activities alongside their principal parliamentary mandate. This way of accumulating mandates is referred to as moonlighting. The overall aim of this thesis is twofold: the first goal is to provide an update of the original analysis performed by Geys (2013) on politicians' additional employment activities and election cycles (i.e. period of time over which an elected government holds seat). The second goal of this paper will also compromise the first analytical comparison of moonlighting within the UK House of Commons and the Belgian Chamber of Representatives. To test our hypotheses, using a multi regression function, data from the UK House of Commons Register of Members' Financial Interests was gathered and analysed for the complete legislative term from 2011 until 2015 to complete the research done for the previous legislative term from 2005 until 2010. Our main finding revealed, similar to Geys' (2013) conclusions, the existence of electoral cycles where outside activities decrease prior to elections in district-based systems such as in the UK. As this subject only focuses on the first multi-country comparison between the UK House of Commons, a district-based voting system, and the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, a list-based voting system, we hope this study will incite the further extension of research and analysis on a European, or even global, level. This paper combines, expands and consolidates the moonlighting literature, but there are indeed still many opportunities for further research.

Keywords: Belgium, Election Cycles, Extra-parliamentary politics, Moonlighting, Politicians, United Kingdom

JEL classification: J20, J45, H8, K42

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Chapter 1

Introduction

This master's thesis deals with a specific group of the active population, namely parliamentarians, and investigates the number of extra-parliamentary mandates they perform while being in public office. In most democracies, Members of Parliament (later referred to as MPs) can legally engage in either paid or unpaid extra-parliamentary activities to help them to secure their Election Day outcome. They do so in order to achieve as much visibility towards the voters as possible, but also to expand and maintain their expertise and knowledge. Additionally, engaging in extra-parliamentary activities will often result in earnings beyond their parliamentary wages. These motives are at the basis of parliamentarians' activities referred to as moonlighting. Moonlighting describes a person's activity performed in addition to his main employment, peripheral to his main mandate. Hence the reference to working under the moonlight, at night (Burrick, 2015). Still a brief definition, but more applicable to the political context of this paper goes as follows: the involvement of a parliamentarian in supplementary work engagements, paid or unpaid, besides his or her political principal mandate (Geys and Mause, 2013). The relationship between elections and the number of extra-parliamentary mandates is the central theme of this research. Studies showed that moonlighting has on the one hand an impact on the performance in Parliament and on the other hand on voter's perception of the politician in question. The first aspect means that high levels of moonlighting activity are likely to cause conflicts of interest and distractions from parliamentary work, due to a time allocation trade-off between extra-parliamentary activities and their principal parliamentary responsibilities. Therefore, and leading to the second aspect, being involved in outside interests can either influence the performance of a Member of Parliament in an upcoming election period positively or negatively because of the time trade-off as explained above which emerges due to this situation. Such a time allocation issue represents a political risk due to the lack of focus.

Although limited research was done in the past, the presence of strict disclosure rules means that a lot of data on the revenues of politicians is publicly available, facilitating research on moonlighting behaviour of parliamentarians (Arnold *et al*., 2014). In the

existing body of literature, research concerning the Parliaments of Belgium, Italy, Germany and the UK is available. However, general research on many countries, and certainly a comparative analysis of countries, is still lacking. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first multi-country study on moonlighting behaviour of politicians. This paper compromises a dual comparison: on the one hand a geographic perspective between the UK and Belgium, and on the other hand an voting system comparison between the Anglo-Saxon tradition, a district-based system, versus the Roman tradition, a list-based system. The comparison is further elaborated in section 2.2.3.

The recent scandals of Publifin[1], Electrawinds[2], Telenet[3] and others in Belgium, as well as the "Penelopegate"[4] scandal in France are good examples of intertwined private and public interests, and artificially created financial benefits for politicians (L'Echo, 2017). Politicians interweave, both officially and unofficially, visibly or hidden, different interests by accumulating several mandates in a broad range of businesses and activities. This creates hybrid public-private myriad constellations of activities, often ending up with conflicts of interest. The public and authorities question the legitimacy of these behavioural patterns.

Election and referendum outcomes are increasingly unpredictable. The outcome of the UK referendum on its EU membership and the US elections of October 2016 are examples of such unexpected outcomes. 2017 is a high-voltage year in the make with regard to electoral scenes as in three core countries of the European Union (France, Germany and the Netherlands) elections are being held (Trends, 2017). For this reason, there is no better time to research on the behaviour patterns of politicians in general, of which moonlighting is an important aspect. Political debate and electoral uncertainty have never been more an international issue with important impact on the overall economy and trust of the citizens than today (Trends, 2017). This raises fundamental

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[1] The Publifin scandal took place in 2017 with Mr. Moreau, mayor of Ans, as key player.
[2] This scandal took place in 2012 and handles about Mr. Vande Lanotte, mayor of Ostend.
[3] The Telenet scandal involving Mr. Bracke, President of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, took place in 2017.
[4] The "Penelopegate" scandal took place in early 2017 and handles mainly about fictional jobs of Mrs. Fillon.

questions about how such extra-parliamentary employments and earnings should be regulated, controlled, ceiled, restricted and/or publicized in an obligatory manner.

The main source of inspiration for this research is the paper on moonlighting in the UK House of Commons by Geys (2013). He was the author who revealed the connection between moonlighting activity and election cycles. Using information about MPs of the UK House of Commons for the period from 2005 until 2010, Geys (2013) investigated whether the election cycle influences MPs' outside interests. He concluded that extra-parliamentary employments decrease in the wake of the elections and this relationship being particularly more explicit for directorships and long-term remunerated (i.e. continuous) employments. In his paper, Geys (2013) also showed this effect to be stronger for politicians in (the most) vulnerable seats and for female MPs. He also observed that standing for re-election plays an important role and that an MP will readjust the number of outside interests downwards in order to show a better image to the public. Nevertheless, since the examined period covered only one electoral term, which was characterized by several shocking scandals, Geys' (2013) analysis must be approached with caution. These scandals might have influenced MPs' attitude with respect to their moonlighting activities, underlining the importance of this new research with additional updated data for the 2011-2015 period, representing one legislative period. Apart from reconfirming the existence of an electoral cycle in MP mandates, it also seemed interesting to analyse specific differences in moonlighting behaviour of female MPs versus male MPs in the context of this study.

This brings us to the statement of the two major objectives of this research paper. The first research goal is to update the original analysis performed by Geys (2013). We study whether changes occur in MPs extra-parliamentary activities throughout the election cycle over a longer time frame. The main motivation of this first research goal is that the original analysis by Geys (2013) was likely influenced by a political crisis centred on moonlighting, which occurred in the UK House of Commons from 2005 until 2010. We first tested the new 2011-2015 data, obtained from the UK House of Commons Register of Members' Financial Interests, representing a complete legislative term. Then, a combination of this new data with the old data, resulting in the 2005-2015 period, could confirm or disprove the earlier results on the electoral cycle analysed by Geys (2013). One minor drawback of using the 2011-2015 data period is that it wasn't a typical legislative period in the UK. Different from previous governments, during the

period from 2011 to 2015, the UK was governed by a coalition government and not by a single party majority (Quinn *et al*., 2011). This new analysis based on data of the 2011-2015 legislature is useful because the period's data is not influenced by big scandals like during the 2005-2010 period with respect to mandates and therefore this study shall yield into reliable results. This is also why the paper is entitled *Beyond the shock*. We intent to assess whether these scandals had a shocking effect on the research results. The second purpose of the paper is to analyse if the findings for the UK House of Commons also apply to different institutional contexts, more specifically the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, and to point out similarities and differences between these two countries, each with their own traditions and election-voting systems. Geys and Mause (2013) already indicated that no such comparison exists, inciting the extension of their research. Moreover, in 2015, a study was done for moonlighting activities by Belgian Federal Parliament members (Burrick, 2015; Van den Abbeele, 2015) and for the Brussels Regional Parliament and Government (Goedbloed, 2016) a year later. Especially the data of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, collected by Karel Burrick, can easily be used for our comparison between the district-based (UK) and list-based (Belgium) systems. Furthermore, with respect to Belgium, the period between 2005 and 2015 wasn't entirely free from crises neither. Even though it was not directly related to moonlighting, the global financial crisis and the longest Belgian Government formation period ever (541 days) are events and circumstances, which make the reference period exceptional in Belgium too. During that period, there were no problems with moonlighting in Belgium. We are aware of these limitations that ensue from the introduction of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives data for the comparison between a district-based (UK) and list-based (Belgium) voting system.

In chapter 2, we outline a general literature review of both moonlighting and the UK House of Commons. In the first part of the chapter, we discuss moonlighting activities' extent and determinants, and continue with a discussion on gender, performance, voter perception and cyclical behaviour of moonlighting. The second part of chapter 2 covers an overview of the UK House of Commons, followed by a section covering the political reality in the UK for the period 2011-2015, and a comparative analysis between a district-based (UK House of Commons) and list-based (Belgian Chamber of Representatives) voting system where the similarities and differences between both

voting systems will be elaborated. Throughout this second chapter, the hypotheses for the study will be stated. Chapter 3 starts with a presentation of the collected data. Whereas chapter 4 compromises the used methodology and research outcome, chapter 5 provides a reality check based on a list-based voting system. We conclude in chapter 6 and suggest further research possibilities.

Chapter 2

Literature review

2.1. Moonlighting

2.1.1 *Extent*

This research paper analyses how moonlighting behaviour of government representatives in Belgium and the UK influences their activities in Parliament. Moonlighting can be described as paid or unpaid sideline employment activities (Geys, 2012). In the context of this study, we link such moonlighting behaviour to the theme and issues in politics where MPs engage beyond and besides their main political mandate in outside professional interests and activities. Such outside occupations can be either remunerated or unremunerated, occurring continuously or being one-off, take different contractual forms and can constitute any kind of professional activity (Gagliarducci *et al.*, 2010). Examples of such extra-parliamentary activities are practicing medicine for physicians, managing law cases for lawyers, running business for entrepreneurs, performing research for economists, business consulting, writing for journalists, radio and television program participation, academic lecturing for teachers and educators, etc. (Geys and Mause, 2011; Varga, 2017). Intra-parliamentary activities include attending plenary sessions of Parliament and committee meetings, delivering speeches, organising consultation sessions for citizens, etc. (Arnold *et al.*, 2014).

Parliamentarians' outside interests have only recently started to attract academic attention, as mentioned in the previous chapter. The lack of scientific literature is due to the considerable amount of time needed for data collection, analysis and evaluation. In many, mainly European, countries government-organised and published databases of parliamentary members' activities are gradually becoming available. However, they often merely offer static data without versatile analytical or statistical features and many of them are not mandatory or imposed by law. Thanks to the increasing public transparency of registers of members' interests, research was facilitated (Geys and Mause, 2013). The introduction of these disclosure rules made it possible to start research on these outside interests once large amounts of data became accessible,

enabling statistical analysis (Djankov *et al.*, 2010). In Italy and Spain, where very little information is made available due to the fact that reporting is not mandatory, media and other organisations mostly perform monitoring. In contrast with for example Italy and Spain, the UK government authorities oblige MPs to publish thorough and detailed information about not only their sources and levels of outside activities and earnings, but also about their assets (Geys, 2013).

Given that analysing national data and subsequently comparing country data is complex and requires pioneering, time-consuming data analysis, this study is the very first initiative for a multi-country analysis, comparing two different countries and their respective, different election and voting systems. This research further develops the insights, which were obtained in the limited existing literature about political moonlighting, and what drives parliamentarians to engage in such outside activities. The latter part of this chapter is devoted to an overview of these contributions. Studies about the determinants and extent of moonlighting behaviour are available for the activities of the politicians in the Parliaments of Germany, Italy, the UK (Geys, 2013), and since 2015 also for Belgium (Burrick, 2015; Van den Abbeele, 2015; Varga, 2017). Conclusions of Geys' analyses were that (i) partisan effects are found back in the Parliament of Germany (Geys and Mause, 2014; Mause, 2009; Niessen and Ruenzi, 2010) and the UK (Geys, 2013), but are not found in the Italian Parliament (Gagliarducci *et al.*, 2010). In Germany and the UK, members of right-wing parties (i.e. rather representing entrepreneurial persons) tend to have more outside mandates than left-wing parties (i.e. rather representing labourer background persons) in Germany and the UK. (ii) Moonlighting behaviour is in part determined by the politician's gender. Female politicians perform less outside jobs and have less additional income compared to their male counterparts. Especially in Germany it is found that socio-demographic characteristics (age, family situation and parliamentary experience) have bigger weight on ancillary work engagements for women than men. In the next section, we investigate possible reasons of moonlighting engagement as it unclear from previous research why (iii) the professional background plays an important role on whether an MP engages in extra-parliamentary activities. For example, in Germany and Italy (and to a lesser extend in the UK) experience in law indicates more supplementary employment and earnings. MPs with an economic background engage more in outside jobs in the UK and Italy, but not in Germany. People with teaching or blue-collar background show less moonlighting

behaviour compared to the general population in Germany and Italy. (iv) Being directly elected or appointed by their party can also have an effect on the moonlighting behaviour of MPs. Being elected shows commonly that politicians behave in a more accountable and responsible way, however Geys and Mause (2011), Mause (2009), and Niessen and Ruenzi (2010) revealed the opposite for Germany.

2.1.2 *Gender*

Since this research is about active women and men, it is very interesting to have a closer look at the gender gap, the general disadvantage of women compared to men (The Global Gender Gap Report, 2008). Although many Western countries claim to bear gender equality, it is common for women to be judged differently than their male counterparts for their credentials on the work floor (Sandberg, 2013).

Before digging into the subject of women at work, it should also be kept in mind that even in modern times women are more likely to stay at home and perform the bulk of the household and childcare work (Yellen, 2017). Even if the research of Berardo *et al*. (1987) goes back to the end of the 80', their findings are still interesting to be taken into account. They say that the old-fashioned family household tasks allocation applies even more to conservative parties where the common practice is that men are the revenue earners and women the caregivers in a family. Borghans *et al*. (2008) found evidence on the fact that women tend to behave more risk-averse than men. In line with this attitude, women are also found to take on less extra-parliamentary mandates, especially in the private sector work because of the greater negative image associated with it, and hence also with regard to their political career (Geys & Mause, 2014). Research of Harris and Rosenthal (1985) confirmed very early on that women are less likely to take on sideline jobs simply because of the self-fulfilling effects of the above-referred stereotypes.

Thorough literature about women at work and the gender gap is available. An influential author that discusses stereotypes of professional women is Sheryl Sandberg (2013). In her book *Lean In* (2013), Sandberg addresses various aspects clarifying the shortage of women in the highest echelons of business organisations. (i) She covers the fact that people are more likely to find top men executives more sympathetic while top women with the exact same qualities are considered antipathetic. For this ascertainment, she uses psychological studies. Women are judged more strict, but viewed having less directive styles than men. Biernat and Fuegen (2001) say that women require a higher

set of skills to convince others about their capabilities and qualities to perform. (ii) The strong motherhood culture (i.e. the predominant domestic role of women in the family management) is likely to put women in doubt about their priorities. This might mean that investing time, effort and money in women working in business environments considered not a "good return on investment" as it is generally assumed that women have less time to focus on their career because of their primary role as mothers. (iii) The culture of some workplaces subordinates and puts women at a disadvantage. This discrimination applies even to the looks of women that are strictly and critically examined.

2.1.3 *Voters' perception*

The relationship between voters and politicians can be related to the principal-agent theory, used as an analytical framework (Besley, 2006). When applied to our case, the problem of asymmetric information exists between the voters-principals and politicians-agents (Geys and Mause, 2012). Once in Parliament, the elected MPs have to act in favour of public interest, but the 'electioneering' of MPs can lead to conflicts of interest where public interest is not the sole purpose of seat-holding in Parliament (see for example: Chappell, 1981; Geys and Mause, 2013; Norton, 2005; Young, 2006). In that context, moonlighting can be interpreted in both a positive or negative way.

On the one hand, voters can perceive outside employment negatively because accumulating mandates could be seen as a conflict of interest or distraction (Campbell and Cowley, 2015). Due to the time constraints and need of trade-off between their different activities, politicians can focus less on their primary parliamentary job. Therefore, outside employments could affect negatively their parliamentary undertakings and work. In the end, this could lead to diverging interests and objectives between the voters and parliamentarians. In other words, moonlighting politicians face issues with shirking and the creation of conflicts of interest, leading to a fall in the quality and qualification standards of parliamentarians, measured both factually and in terms of voters' perception. In this regard, both size as well as the source of outside income matters to voters. The public reacts differently to various forms of moonlighting earnings, but tends to show better acceptance for the entrepreneurial moonlighting approach (i.e. non-parliamentary engagements of a businessman) by politicians (Campbell and Cowley, 2015). In the UK, during the years 2006, 2007 and 2009, this

negative perception about moonlighting was reinforced by political turmoil involving money matters, referred to in section 2.2.2 (Allen, 2008; Geys, 2013).

On the other hand, allowing parliamentarians to keep their outside interests gives an incentive to highly-educated and experienced citizens to consider and take up a public service job in addition to their non-parliamentarian functions (Gagliarducci *et al.*, 2010). Under these circumstances, parliamentarians acquire real life experience from their private sector jobs that can benefit them and the electorate. This will undoubtedly lead to a rise of the average quality and qualifications of parliamentarians. Caselli and Morelli (2004) discuss the average levels of competence and honesty of the political class. Also, politicians are more likely to make rational policy decisions that benefit the society as a whole, not only the partisan party (Geys and Mause, 2012). Following Gagliarducci *et al.* (2013), Italian politicians elected according to the majority rule[5] show higher parliamentary commitment levels than their counterparts elected according to the proportional system[6]. They demonstrate, for example, lower absenteeism. Thus, experience and expertise from the real economy and business environments, independent from political selection, are benefits that could arise from moonlighting practice.

A recent study on voters' perception is also made by Clegg (2016). First, he confirms that there is a clear consent in the literature about the fact that near term, in the run-up towards an election, changes in the national economic situation have an important impact on election outcomes. Second, Clegg concludes that changes in the economic fundamentals (i.e. economic growth rate, inflation rate and unemployment rate) over the longer period, such as a whole legislative term, are often considered irrelevant, but Krugman (2015) asserts in his work that every year of the term is relevant and not only the period close to an election. The possibility for the electorate to assess its government's historic performance by making an assessment about changes in their prosperity and well-being is explained as the phenomenon of retrospective voting (Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1981; Kramer, 1971). Clegg's research (2016) indicates that by developing these backward-looking opinions, electorates develop their assessment about the performance of entire past terms of office. He also concludes that these long-term

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[5] A system where the party that wins has more than half of the votes and gets the whole representation. This is also called a *winner-take-all* system where the other losing parties get no representation. The majority rule is used in for example the UK.

[6] A system where the number of seats per party are proportionally represented with the number of votes each party received. Here, the several political parties that got votes are represented. The proportional system has been adopted in for example Belgium.

performances of Parliament, impacting national welfare, are of greater impact than beneficial popular legislative changes close to an election.

2.1.4 *Influence on performance in Parliament*

Research shows that the elections themselves are still the main incentive for parliamentary performance (Becker *et al*., 2009). Becker's research shows that re-election causes politicians to engage more in political obligations and less in outside employment. In the context of his findings, high electoral rivalry causes MPs to outperform the competition and by, for example, dedicating more time to political activities and less to extra-parliamentary ones. Rosenson (2007) examined what drives politicians to hold office and found that financial interests of politicians are an important aspect of their outside occupations. This financial self-interest was confirmed by Besley (2004). He states that the higher the total revenues of the parliamentarians, combining political and business mandates, the higher their performance at political level. This was also validated through research by Gagliarducci *et al*. (2010) demonstrating that attracting highly-educated and experienced citizens, earnings from outside activities positively affect the average political effort and thus the quality of politicians' performance.

The necessity to trade-off between the qualities and capabilities of elected politicians and their ultimate time allocation to political duties emerges when the mutually exclusiveness of political and business sectors disappears. No, or less, trade-off needs to be considered. (Gagliarducci *et al*., 2010). The observation is that as long as high-ability citizens can continue their private business whilst being in office, they are more inclined to run for election. This means that once they are elected, they will put less effort towards their parliamentary duties and their behaviour may tend towards a shirking attitude. This research was conducted on 1614 Italian parliamentarians for the period from 1996 until 2006. To study the level of commitment of the politicians, the time devoted to Parliament and their absences (without valid reason) in electronic floor voting sessions were considered (Gagliarducci *et al*., 2010). Important to mention is that as the focus of their research laid on the time devotion to parliament by the MPs, the conflicts of interest, where private interests take the upper hand on parliamentary interests, were neglected in this study. This trade-off between intra- and extra-parliamentary interests was on the other hand confirmed by the analysis of Geys and

Mause (2016) with evidence about the fact that politicians who do not stand for a next election eventually do not care any longer. If the pressure stops, they do not undertake much in Parliament anymore, because of their intention to leave Parliament.

The level of absenteeism, where a high absence rate indicates a poor performance, was used by Arnold *et al.* (2014) to measure performance. They investigated the link between outside work and absence in Parliament. His findings on moonlighting by German politicians for the 2009-2013 period show that on the one hand extra-parliamentary activities show no correlation with the degree of absence and the frequency of speeches, and show on the other hand an inversed correlation between outside employment and parliamentary duty fulfilment (such as contributions, interpellations and group initiatives) (Arnold *et al.*, 2014).

2.1.5 *Cyclical behaviour*

The cyclical effect of behaviour means that MPs engage in national involvement of public purpose and private interest according to a recurring fixed pattern. One part of the literature on moonlighting focuses on the political budget cycles. Political budget cycles is a term used to describe the fact that governments try to influence blind voters with short term policymaking that boost economic performance in the build-up to the Election Day (Clegg, 2016). The ambition of the politician to be re-elected motivates this cyclical behaviour. Such political budget cycles practices are: increases in public spending and deficit, tax decreases, etc. in an election year (Geys and Vermeir, 2008). The purpose of political budget cycles is to leave MPs' well-liked policy decisions in people's minds during the upcoming elections and allowing sufficient time to forget about unpopular and disliked measures (Franzese, 2002). This raises questions about the ethics of politicians looking after their own welfare rather than that of the general public. The implementation of unpopular policies such as tax increases at the beginning of a mandate, and tax reductions or public spending at the end of their legislative term, are common strategies of politicians (Ashworth *et al.*, 2006; Geys and Vermeir, 2008). Politicians apply these political budget cycles expecting that the tax increases applied at the beginning of their legislative term escape the voters' minds and that they will only remember the attractive policies implemented towards the end of their mandate, in the run-up of a new election (Geys, 2013). Shi and Svensson (2006) also confirm the existence of political budget cycles in their empirical analysis, which covered many

countries. Their findings revealed that generally a public spending deficit rises by almost one percent (as a share of the gross domestic product) during election years. Their research also showed that political budget cycles in developing countries are much larger compared to Western developed countries.

In the political economic literature, Geys (2013) was the first to point out the link between moonlighting and the electoral pattern in the UK for the legislative term of 2005-2010. His research shows that directorships are the highest in number during the third year of the legislative term and reduces as the end of their mandate approaches, during the fourth and fifth year. The situation is different for long-term outside earnings (continuous activities like practising physicians) where the reduction starts after two years, during their third year in office at the House of Commons. For the one-off employments, the situation is the opposite. Two years before elections, a rise is observed. Caution should however be taken when interpreting these results, since this could as well have been an effect of the legislative changes of 2009.

In the early stages of this research domain, Tufte (1978) already mentioned the electoral cycle in his work and notes: "When you think economics, think elections; when you think elections, think economics." In this work, he compared electoral cycles to a crime mise-en-scène with a motive, means (murder weapons) and an opportunity when the murderer eliminates someone. This context is applied to the situation where a politician wants to overcome the next elections. To be re-elected for the next legislative term is the politician's main motive. He hopes to achieve this motive by setting up different types of policies according to a time frame. These policy variables are the means or instruments (Franzese, 2002; Geys, 2013). In this research, the extra-parliamentary activities, which UK MPs hold in addition to their principal parliamentary work, are the means or instruments used. The opportunity consists of two parts: (i) information about the Election Day date, since this information may be used to choose the perfect timing for popular policy implementations near elections and (ii) the fact of holding the decision-making power over the instruments (Geys, 2013).

A recent study about whether moonlighting (MP's outside interests) influences the election cycle in the Federal Parliament of Belgium was performed by Kuehnhanss *et al.* (2016). Evidence shows that the moonlighting behaviour of MPs depends on their will to be re-appointed and the manner of acquiring their mandate (being elected vs. appointed by their party). Kuehnhanss *et al.* (2016) analysed the time and legislative effort

parliamentarians should dedicate to political commitments in order to be re-elected and assumed that, due to a time constraint, remunerated outside activities are likely to change during the electoral term because they are image damaging, especially in the run-up to an election. Caution should be taken when interpreting the results, as the results are likely to be influenced by the exceptional 541-day government formation crisis.

As previously mentioned, moonlighting is not viewed in a positive way by voters. In the context of political budget cycles, whenever elections are near, a decrease in unpopular policies and also in this case a reduction of outside activities is likely to emerge. The contribution of this study lays in the fact that the old data for the period 2005-2010 is affected by scandals during that period causing a distorted image of reality. We can develop the first hypothesis, in line with Geys' (2013) analysis and based on evidence found in the literature, as follows:

Hypothesis 1: *Outside activities decrease prior to elections.*

This hypothesis has already been examined for different countries, regions and periods of time. Geys (2013) in the UK for 2005 until 2010, and Burrick (2015) and Van den Abbeele (2015) for the case of Belgium for 2004 until 2013 have found results that support the hypothesis. Goedbloed (2016) and Varga (2017) did not found evidence in support for this hypothesis for the Brussels Regional Parliament and Government and Flemish regional parliament respectively. Nevertheless, given the relatively limited research performed to date, it will be interesting to see whether the conclusions made by the mentioned authors also holds for our case study.

When analysing partisan groups, the categorization is often made between right-wing and left-wing parties. Right-wing parties are very receptive towards own and private initiative. On the contrary, left-wing parties support social parity and equality, expecting an intervention of the government. Translated in terms of extra-parliamentary mandates, we assume that this means that an MP of a right-wing party will take on more outside activities, both public as well as private interests. Geys (2013) found the confirmation that right-wing parties, like conservative and liberal parties, engaged more in outside work during the 2005-2010 period. We hypothesise that this is still the case and consequently the following hypothesis has to be made:

Hypothesis 2: *Rather rightist parties gather more mandates, while left-wing politicians will avoid this in the case of the UK.*

In section 2.1.2, gender stereotypes are covered and we study the behaviour of female MPs regarding the accumulation of extra-parliamentary activities to see if their actions diverge from these of their male counterparts. We have discussed that females are in general more risk averse and more sensitive to the negative image that is linked to moonlighting behaviour. Studies have shown that women have significantly fewer outside jobs (in the private sector) and generally a lower income than men (Becker *et al.*, 2009; Gagliarducci *et al.*, 2010; Geys, 2013; Mause, 2009). They are generally in a weaker position on the work floor with regard to directive attitude. This gender-based influence on moonlighting behaviour should therefore also be tested on the new data that is analysed in this paper. Like previous authors (Geys (2013), Burrick (2015), Goedbloed (2016), Van den Abbeele (2015) and Varga (2017)), it will be stated that:

Hypothesis 3 (a): *Female MPs will have fewer outside activities than male MPs.*

If we apply hypothesis 3 (a) to the cyclical behaviour of MPs, women are expected to moonlight less than men, and even less before an election, as they want to show a positive image to the public. This brings us to the second part of our third hypothesis that implies that:

Hypothesis 3 (b): *The cycle effect is stronger for female MPs.*

Generally speaking, people with more political experience are able to participate simultaneously and successfully in more projects by taking advantage of their network and accumulated knowledge. This network can help them gain visibility, which is one of the most important factors in the run-up of elections. Also, their profound and huge expertise built up during the previous years make them more trustworthy to execute specific tasks inexperienced MPs couldn't perform. Therefore, the following hypotheses can be made:

Hypothesis 4: *The more political experience MPs have within Parliament, the more extra-parliamentary mandates they will hold.*

2.2 UK House of Commons

2.2.1 *Overview of the UK House of Commons*

Before the House of Commons and House of Lords were created, the rule- and decision-makers were the King and his barons. In 1215, King John signed the Magna Carta, which established the legal basis for the development of the governing laws and the set-up of the advisory council. In 1265, Simon de Montfort rebelled against Henry III forcing him to allow representatives from the major towns to access his Parliament. In 1332 these citizens met separately from the nobility to form the House of Commons (Mackenzie, 1963). Today, there are still two houses, namely the House of Commons and the House of Lords. As the population, and therefore the number as well as the influence of their representatives increased, the King and his nobility became less powerful and the balance of power eventually swung to the Commons (Harvey & Bather, 1963). Today, the lower house (House of Commons) is the main chamber of the British Parliament. As the UK Parliament is a bicameral system, the other room is the upper house (House of Lords). Across the UK, the voters of the 650 electoral districts elect for each district one Members of Parliament to the House of Commons. These members represent the citizens living in their respective districts.

The appointment of MPs has several objectives (House of Commons, 2017): (i) MPs are elected to represent the preoccupations of the public in Parliament. (ii) MPs deliberate and propose new laws around issues raised by the citizens. (iii) They debate important issues and ask ministers questions about concerns that also affect local voters in their electoral constituency. (iv) They monitor the governments' activity and hold the MPs accountable for their actions. For their intra-parliamentarian duties, MPs generally share their time between three activities related to their political work for: the Parliament, their local constituency, and the political party they belong to.

There are two sides within the House of Commons: the government that runs the country and the opposition that watches over attentively the government. The opposition questions and challenges the government (Blackburn *et al.*, 2003). Every week, for half an hour, the government is hold accountable on that occasion, the Prime Minister and his ministers come to the House of Commons to answer questions from MPs. Selected committees review and scrutinize the policies with the Ministers (House of Commons, 2017).

There are three main political parties in the UK, namely the Conservative Party, Labour Party and Liberal Democrats. In the 2010 election, these three parties, with 621 MPs, were complemented by 29 other party MPs. These other parliamentarians represent minor parties or are independent. To become an MP at a main political party, an aspirant must be authorised to do so by its party's officer and must subsequently win sufficient votes in its constituency. The United Kingdom Parliament consists of MPs from England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Normally, the party with the most MPs after a general election forms the Government and the next largest party becomes Her Majesty's Most Loyal Opposition (House of Commons, 2017). During the general election of 2010, the Conservative Party and Liberal Democrats were the governing parties, and the Labour Party was the opposition party. An overview of the political parties that are represented in the House of Commons after the 2010 General Election is given in the table below:

Table 1 Overview of the political parties in the UK represented in the House of Commons after the general election of 2010

Political party	Political position	Number of seats
Conservative Party	Centre-right	306
Labour Party	Centre-left	258
Liberal Democrats	Centre to Centre-left	57
Democratic Unionist Party	Right-wing	8
Scottish National Party	Centre-left	6
Sinn Féin	Left-wing	5
Plaid Cymru	Centre-left to Left-wing	3
Social Democratic and Labour Party	Centre-left	3
Green Party (England - Wales)	Left-wing	1
Alliance Party (Northern Ireland)	Centre to Centre Left	1

Note. Data on the May 2010 UK House of Commons election results (House of Commons, 2017).

2.2.2   *Political reality in the UK for the period 2011-2015*

In this research paper, new data is analysed for the 2011-2015 period. The data of the previous legislative term, the 2005-2010 period, is combined with the new analysis. As such, the data will cover the elections of 5 May 2005 and 6 May

2010, representing the 2005-2015 period. In the UK, large scandals took place in 2006, 2007 and 2009 with regard to outside interest activities of MPs. These scandals attracted the attention of the media and the public. Scandals over Cash for Honours (2006-2007) and MPs' expense claims (2009) had an important influence on the image of some MPs (Allen, 2008). Cash for Honours concerned the link between diplomatic donations (i.e. campaign finance, funds raised to cover expenditures of a political campaign) and the assignment of life peerages (i.e. MPs receiving titles that cannot be inherited for good actions they have undertaken) (The Economist, 2007). The expenses' scandal in 2009 in the UK refers to unjustified spending by MPs over the previous years. This scandal was perceived very negatively by citizens and resulted in the resignation of many of the involved parliamentarians. These events make it clear that the conclusions drawn from the paper by Geys (2013) are considerably affected by these scandals. Therefore, an update of the paper by Geys (2013) is important. The political period 2011-2015 was also quite unique in the British history, because of the coalition between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, resulting from a national crisis without a clear majority by any of the main parties. Although it was a politically turbulent period, the cause of such turmoil did not have any direct connection with moonlighting (Geys, 2013), which makes the data reliable and fit for analyse.

2.2.3   *Comparative analysis of the UK and Belgium*

Beside the update of the analysis done by Geys (2013), covering the 2011-2015 legislative term, the first cross-border comparative analysis on moonlighting will be performed in this paper. Alongside the fact of comparing data about extra-parliamentary mandates of two countries, the UK and Belgium, this comparative analysis also includes an inherent comparison between the voting systems of these two countries.

In Belgium, the voting system approach is based on the establishment of lists of candidates and successors per district. In general, the election districts in Belgium (150 seats spread over 10 provinces and a population of 11.35 million) are bigger and thus

have more citizens than the UK districts (650 seats spread over 650 districts and a population of 65.64 million). Different from the UK, Belgian voters can also simply vote for a political party, short of voting for specific candidate.

In the UK, MPs are elected in districts, called constituencies, where the candidates of the various parties compete against each other within each constituency. Each of these constituencies elects one single MP on the basis of a First-Past-the-Post voting approach. Consequently, only the MP that wins most of the local votes will be the representative of one of the 650 constituencies. The political party with the highest number of representatives elected will form the government. This also implies that in Belgium, the link between the MPs and their constituency is weaker compared to the UK, implying in turn that the link of the MPs with the voters is weaker compared to the UK. The election of the UK Parliament MPs is organised by drawing the elected members from the districts across the country. Each of these constituencies elects a single MP on the basis of a First-Past-the-Post voting approach (Electoral Reform Society, 2017). According to that approach, the candidate who collects the highest number of votes in the constituency wins the MP-seat for that constituency in the Parliament.

In this study, it is assumed that the main motivation of politicians for engaging in politics is to be re-elected in the next legislative period. As a consequence, the behaviour of these MPs can change over the electoral term to favour voter perception regarding the next election. As Geys (2013) has demonstrated the existence of cyclical behaviour of politicians in the UK House of Commons, it is worthwhile to verify whether this cycle effect is also observed in a list-based system. To achieve this, data of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives will be used as it is the Belgian equivalent of the UK House of Commons, the lower house. Burrick (2015) already investigated the cycle effect in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives in his paper. As previously mentioned, a district-based system will entail much more competition between the aspiring politicians compared to a list-based system, because of the fact that only one candidate is appointed to the Parliament. Another reason that the UK could be more sensitive to moonlighting (translating into a stronger cycle effect in this analysis) is the fact that the candidates are much more visible in the UK, as there are only a limited number of aspirants in each district. In Belgium, this occurs less due to the development of lists per province. As the public perceives extra-parliamentary interests negatively (see section 2.1.3), politicians

in a district-based system will tend to reduce their moonlighting activities, hoping to make a better (public) impression than their competitors. They will even reduce their extra-parliamentary activities further before elections, which leads to a stronger cycle effect. Therefore, we assume that:

Hypothesis 5 (a): *District-based MPs (UK) have fewer outside mandates than list-based MPs (Belgium).*

The same argument of hypothesis 5 (a) can be used to establish our last hypothesis that is a combination of hypotheses 1 and 5 (a), resulting in:

Hypothesis 5 (b): *The cycle effect is stronger for MPs that are elected in a district-based election (UK) than MPs that are elected in a list-based system (Belgium).*

Chapter 3

Data collection

3.1 New data on moonlighting at the UK Parliament for the period 2011-2015

MPs can engage in outside activities on the condition that all income and assets are declared in the official, publicly available Register of Members' Financial Interests and that the activities do not relate to lobbying in the Parliament (House of Commons, 2017). The purpose of such a register is to provide the public information about the occupations of politicians, generating financial interests or other benefits beside their parliamentary salary. By means of this register, transparency towards the public is provided so that MPs can be held accountable for their actions. Each year and for each outside activity, they must indicate the name and address of the company, the executed function, the time span of the job and the amount of money earned from the mandates taken up during that year. After submission, the information is investigated by the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards and publicized in the register. On this basis, the UK system is the most advanced in transparency of extra-parliamentary activities amongst all European countries. The register provides additional details such as information on assets owned. The registration happens in twelve categories: *directorships* (category 1), *remunerated employment* (category 2), *clients* (category 3), *sponsorships* (category 4), *gifts* (category 5), *land and property* (category 6), *shareholdings* (category 9) and *employment of family members paid from the staffing allowance* (category 12) (Geys, 2013; House of Commons, 2017). As a rule of the Code of Conduct for Members of the UK House of Commons, these outside activities are submitted to the register within 28 days after the start of the activity (House of Commons, 2017).

In our data gathering, the categories directorships, remunerated employments, clients, and family members employed and remunerated through parliamentary allowances will be taken into account. *Directorships* are employments in public and private firms (House of commons, 2017). *Remunerated employment* can include a large

range of functions: "employment, office, trade, profession or vocation (apart from membership of the House or ministerial office) functions which are remunerated or in which the Member has any financial interest." (House of Commons, 2017). For our analysis, this employment information is further divided into continuous and one-off employment. The category *Clients* is linked to the directorships and remunerated employment category. Under this category, information about the MPs' clients is registered. The last category about which we collect data is the category *Family members employed and remunerated on the basis of parliamentary allowances*. New since 2008 is the registration of employment of family members paid from the MPs' staffing allowance. There is no upper limit for Category 1 and 2 as of July 2009 (House of Commons 2012; Geys, 2013). Campbell and Cowley (2015) found the remunerated employment category to be the most important motive for MPs to adjust their moonlighting behaviour. This is also why we will focus on the remunerated employments, being remunerated directorships, fixed (continuous) or single-project (one-off) employments. It is important to mention that the data counting is subject to interpretation by the researches.

This case study on moonlighting behaviour in the UK Parliament includes new data for the 2011-2015 period and will re-analyse the data for the 2005-2015 period, covering two election terms. Therefore, we will use the available subsequent versions of the Register of Members' Financial Interests of the UK House of Commons to avoid overlaps. These were the registers of 18/04/2011 (April 2010 - March 2011), 16/04/2012 (April 2011 - February 2012), 11/03/2013 (March 2012 - April 2013), 10/03/2014 (May 2013 - February 2014) and 09/03/2015 (March 2014 - March 2015) available on the website of the UK Parliament. The researchers collected next to the extra-parliamentary employment activities from these registers for each MP additional biographical data from searches in the MPs' personal and other websites.

3.2 Descriptive statistics

In Appendix B, the codebook for the data is provided and explains how the different variables were entered in the dataset. Below, these variables are analysed in more detail.

3.2.1   *Dependent variables*

In our analysis, we split the observed remunerated activities reported since 2005 from category 2 of the Register of Members' Financial Interests into two types: continuous and one-off remunerations. These are our dependent variables. First, we use the total of the continuous outside mandates that are either fixed long-terms or recurring one-offs. The second dependent variable covers all other mandates that are not performed continuous, but rather performed one-off. Continuous mandates were defined as mandates that occurred more than once a year. One-off mandates are defined as outside jobs that occurred only once a year. In table 2, the reported numbers of outside activities can be found and they provide our dependent variables. It can be observed that parliamentarians perform on average 1.33 more one-off than continuous mandates.

Table 2 Average continuous and one-off employments

One-off

Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
3.16	1.17	0	71

Continuous

Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
1.83	0.12	0	17

Figure 1 shows the average number of mandates for our dependent variables, namely the average number of activities for continuous and one-off outside activities during the period from 2005 until 2015. By looking at figure 1, it is possible to have a first indication in support of hypothesis 1. Until 2011 more mandates are performed rather one-off than on a continuous basis. As from 2012, the number of one-off and continuous mandates is more or less equal, although there are systematically slightly more one-off mandates, but we always see slightly more one-off mandates. For the effective acceptance or rejection, we refer to the statistical analysis.

Figure 1 Average number of outside mandates by employment category per year

3.2.2 *Independent variables*

General gender literature shows some differences between the behaviour of men and women, and therefore we would like to consider the *gender* variable more closely. The previous chapter also pointed out differences in voting systems, such as district- and list-based approaches. It would be of great interest to explore the variable *commons* in more detail too. To test hypotheses 3, data about the gender type of parliamentarians was coded. For testing hypothesis 5, data about the Parliament where the MP was elected has been coded. This dummy *gender* variable takes value 1 if the politician is a male and 0 if the politician is a female. The dummy *commons* takes value 1 of the politician is a member of the House of Commons and value 0 if the politician is a member of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives.

3.2.3 *Control variables*

The control variables account for the features of an MPs' mandate and socio-economic status, and are listed in table 3. Our control variables therefore include: an MP's *age* and university degree (*master*). The latter is further split up into *economic*, *Law* or *PhD*. We also control for the party affiliation of the parliamentarians (*conservative*). Likewise, MPs' *current experience* in Parliament is an important control variable and is coded as the number of years active in Parliament. The *turnout* percentage indicates the percentage of the population that participated in the election is also collected.

Age, *experience* and *total remunerated* are continuous variables. The dummy variable *master* takes value 1 if the observed MP has a master, if not we assign a 0. The dummy *economics* takes the value 1 if the observed MP is an economist, if not we assign a 0. The dummy *lawyer* takes the value 1 if the observed MP is an economist, if not we assign a 0. The dummy *conservative* takes the value 1 if the observed MP is a member of the conservative party, if not we assign a 0. The fact that he or she is remunerated is also controlled where 1 indicates that the MP had at least one paid office.

Table 3 Codebook with explanations of variables used

	Explanation	Example
Name	Last name of the MP	Abbott
Given name	First name of the MP	Diane
Year	Year of the observation	2011
Age	MP's age, 2016 – year of birth	(2016-1953) = 63
Gender	MP's gender, 1 for male, 0 for female	0
Master	MP did a master degree, 1 for an obtained master degree, 0 for no master degree	1
Economist	MP did economics university studies, 1 for yes, 0 for no	0
Lawyer	MP did law university studies, 1 for yes, 0 for no	0
PhD	MP with an obtained PhD at university, 1 for yes, 0 for no	0
Conservative	MP is a member (or supporter) of the Conservative Party, 1 for yes, 0 for no	0
Commons	MP is a member of the UK house of Commons, 1 for an UK MP, 0 for a Belgian MP	1
Exp current	MP's urrent experience, difference between year of observation and year of first appearance in UK House of Commons	(2017-1987) = 30
RenTotBin	Remunerated Total (Binary), number of remunerated mandates exercised by an MP and as published in the UK House of Commons Register of Members' Financial Interests over the period 2011-2015 for the year of observation	1
Turnout	The number of people voting for the 2011-2015 election	62.9%

Note. Diane Abbott is used as reference (House of Commons, 2017). A short description for each variable is provided, together with the method of measuring the variables. This codebook was constructed folowing the paper of Burrick (2015) in order to be able to compare the data of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives (Belgian lower house) with the data of the UK House of Commons (UK lower house).

Table 4 Independent and control variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Age	60.47	10.36	33	96
Experience	11.74	8.98	0	51
Total Remunerated	2.50	0.94	0	78

Variable	Pct of MPs
Female	20
Master	38
Economist	5
Lawyer	9
PhD	5
Conservative	37

As exhibited in table 4, the average age of MPs in the UK House of Commons from 2005 until 2015 is 60 years and they are on average almost 12 years in Parliament (experience) with 2.5 remunerated mandates. Only 20% of the parliamentarians are women. When looking at the educational degree, around 38% of the MPs possess a master degree. More specifically, 5% of the UK House of Commons MPs have an economic academic background, on average 9% of them has a law degree and 5% obtained a PhD. It is also worth mentioning that on average 37% of the observed elected politicians of the UK House of Commons are affiliated to the Conservative Party. This is in line with the past where the Conservative Party has been the major governing party over the (last) years. During this 10 years in Parliament around 40% of the mandates per year are remunerated.

Figure 2 Average percentages of variables *gender*, *master* and *conservative* per year in the UK

From figure 2, it can be reaffirmed that around 20% of the MPs are women and that this stays constant over the 10 years of observation. With regard to the variables *master* and *conservative*, we can observe a reversal in 2011. Before 2011, about 45% of the MPs hold a master degree and 30% of the politician of the UK House of Commons are part of the Conservative Party. As from 2011 we see a shift with 35% of the parliamentarians owning a master degree and 45% of the parliamentarians being of the Conservative party. This means that over the years 2005 until 2015 MPs are less highly educated when looking at the evolution of the variable *master* in figure 2. From figure 2, it can also be observed that the Conservative party gains popularity in Parliament, as they are part of the government as from 2011. This explains the shape of the graph as before 2011, labour was in power and from 2011 the Conservatives are governing with the Liberal Democrats. Then again, the dive in the variable *master* is less obvious to explain straightforwardly. The descriptive data are an exploration of the data and in chapter 4 we switch to a statistical analysis in order to make an assessment of the hypotheses.

Chapter 4

Statistical analysis

4.1 Estimation model

In line with Geys' (2013) statistical methodology, a multiple regression model is applied to test hypotheses 1, 2, 3 (a), 4 and 5 (a) (subscript i refers to MPs and t to time):

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^{5} \beta_j YEAR_t + \gamma Z_{i,t} + \delta X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

(1)

Using this model allows us to compare our findings (UK 2011-2015 legislative period) with the results of the previous legislative period (2005-2010) of the UK House of Commons (Geys, 2013) as well as the results of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives (Burrick, 2015) necessary for the comparative study.

Equation (1) is estimated for the two dependent variables ($Y_{i,t}$), continuous and one-off mandates, using the count of mandates instead of binary variables, as was the case for Geys (2013). The vector $YEAR_t$ comprises a set of four-year dummy variables, with election-year-minus-4-years as reference year. This vector is equal to 1 in the sessions going from three years prior to the election year until the election year itself. To confirm hypothesis 1, our main hypothesis, the coefficient estimates (β_j) need to be further negative or less positive for years when elections took place in comparison to non-election years. $X_{i,t}$ covers the set of control variables. These control variables account for the features of an MP's mandate, characteristics of the election year in the MP's district and socio-demographic aspects. The socio-demographic aspects include: age, gender, master and holder of economic, law, and PhD degrees. Their experience is measured as the number of years since their first presence in the UK House of Commons. These control variables are required to evaluate hypothesis 2 and 4. $Z_{i,t}$ contains the independent variables and is a subset of $X_{i,t}$. These independent variables are required to evaluate hypothesis 3 (a) and 5 (a). The coefficient (γ) is a vector of parameters to be estimated and can also be found in table 5.

To test our hypotheses 3 (b) and 5 (b), we estimate a model with interactions between a vector and our variables of interest as was done by Geys (2013):

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha + \gamma X_{i,t} + \sum_{j=1}^{5} \beta_j YEAR_t + \sum_{k=1}^{5} \delta_k (YEAR_t \times Z_{i,t}) + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

(2)

Equation (2) is used to verify whether electoral cycles occur in our variables of interest of hypothesis 3 and 5, gender and commons. Here, the addition of the interaction terms ($YEAR_t \times Z_{i,t}$) allows for the study of the cyclical effect in interaction with the MPs' gender or membership of the House of Commons.

Contrary to Geys (2013) who used binary variables 0 or 1, we used count variables for our dependent variables. The reason being that in the case of using dichotomous variables with 1 meaning that the MP holds one mandate or more, and with 0 meaning he or she has no extra-parliamentary mandates. Considering that almost no MPs have no mandates (0 mandates), using binary variables as dependent variables would reduce the possibility to examine changes and evolutions in the data. Everyone would be "1", making the analysis impossible and the model obsolete. Our continuous and one-off remuneration dependent variables were therefore obtained by counting the actual performed mandates retrieved from the Register of Members' Financial Interests. There is an important difference between counting the number of mandates and using binary data (only 0 or 1 values). The number of mandates is approximately maximum 17 (see table 2, section 3.2.1), always smaller than 100, not binary and not negative. Geys (2013) used a logistic model (binary variables) where value 1 meant that the MP had at least one outside activity for that category and 0 that he or she had no outside mandate. As stated, this study used count variables, in the form of the number of accumulated mandates, which necessitates the application of a negative binomial model. As a different model was used than Geys (2013), some caution should be taken when comparing our outcome to that of Geys. This is a limitation of our research and for reasons of accuracy why we decided to line up the models next to each other to show differences and similarities between them (see section 4.2.2).

4.2 **Findings**

4.2.1 *New analysis for the UK*

Hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 4 (a) are tested in this subchapter by means of equation (1) and the results are shown in table 5. These coefficients help to consider the influence of the control and independent variables as well as to get a better understanding of the determinants for moonlighting behaviour by MPs in the UK.

Appendix A explains how the statistical results should be interpreted. As a start, the control variables will be discussed thoroughly by means of the data in table 5: the variable *Age* has a negligibly small and negative effect (-0.0033) and is significant at the 10%-level ($p<0.1$) for the number of one-off remunerations in the UK for 2011-2015. For the period 2005-2015 in the UK, the effect of these one-off remunerations is also very small and negative (-0.0072) at the 1%-level of significance ($p<0.01$). We can conclude that although the variable *age* is significant, the effect is too small to have a real effect. Although, the variable *gender* has a significant positive effect on the number of continuous remunerations in both observations periods, the observed effect is rather small. During the period 2011-2015 this gender-dependent effect is significant at the 10%-level ($p<0.1$). In the period 2005-2015 (UK), this effect is significant at the 1%-level ($p<0.01$). Gender is considered to have an impact on the continuous revenues earned from moonlighting activities. When analysing the variable *master*, having a master degree does not seem to play a significant role in moonlighting behaviour for MPs, neither does having an academic background in economics (variable *economist*). In contrast, our results indicate that being a *lawyer* has a small positive effect of 0.078 mandates on continuous remunerations for the 2005-2015 period in the UK, significant at the 5%-level ($p<0.05$). For the variable *PhD* a very significant positive effect is observed for one-off remunerated outside activities for the 2011-2015 period (UK) at a level of 1% ($p<0.01$). For the 2011-2015 period, membership of the Conservative Party (variable *conservative*) has a significant positive effect (0.064) on the number of continuous mandates ($p<0.1$) and significant negative effect (-0.15) on the number of one-off mandates ($p<0.01$). Both effects are rather small. For the 2005-2015 period being a conservative MP has a significant positive effect of 0.21 mandates ($p<0.01$), but as was observed for the 2011-2015 period, this effect is rather small. The variable *current experience* (UK) is significant over both periods and both types of

remunerations. In 2011-2015, the *current experience* has a significant positive effect of 0.0071 mandates for continuous remunerations (p<0.01) and 0.0042 mandates for one-off activities (p<0.1). For 2005-2015 in the UK, this variable *current experience* has a significant positive effect of 0.0093 mandates for continuous activities (p<0.01) and 0.01 mandates for one-off remunerations (p<0.01). The variable *total remuneration* is significant at the 1%-level and very high (0.92) for continuous extra-parliamentary assignments in 2011-2015 (p<0.01). Furthermore, it is significant in 2005-2015 too, both for continuous and one-offs extra-parliamentary remunerations (p<0.01). This means that if an MP has many mandates, these will be spread over both categories. The variable *turnout* does not seem to play a significant role in moonlighting behaviour of UK MPs.

Table 5 Regression results for MPs' outside activities for the UK

	UK 2011-2015		UK 2005-2015	
Outside activities	Continuous	One-off	Continuous	One-off
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Election Year -4	*Reference year*			
Election Year -3	0.0126	-0.0171	0.0168	0.0093
	(0.0541)	(0.0590)	(0.0331)	(0.0348)
Election Year -2	-0.1014**	-0.0427	-0.0274	-0.0061
	(0.0514)	(0.0586)	(0.0328)	(0.0550)
Election Year -1	-0.0092	-0.1568***	-0.0761**	0.1576**
	(0.0537)	(0.0508)	(0.0306)	(0.0617)
Election Year	-0.1490***	-0.1473***	-0.0805***	0.0418
	(0.0501)	(0.0517)	(0.0280)	(0.0572)
Age	0.0004	-0.0033*	-0.0014	-0.0072***
	(0.0021)	(0.0020)	(0.0011)	(0.0019)
Gender	0.0685*	-0.0495	0.0803***	-0.0442
	(0.0396)	(0.0456)	(0.0212)	(0.0594)
Master	0.0181	0.0087	-0.0056	-0.0366
	(0.0365)	(0.0399)	(0.0196)	(0.0384)
Economist	-0.0311	-0.0560	0.0702	0.0613
	(0.0562)	(0.0578)	(0.0478)	(0.0896)
Lawyer	-0.0582	0.0576	0.0775**	0.0076
	(0.0513)	(0.0602)	(0.0345)	(0.0892)
PhD	0.1694	0.8217***	0.0066	0.2993*
	(0.1348)	(0.2939)	(0.0472)	(0.1717)
Conservative	0.0640*	-0.1468***	0.2088***	0.0204
	(0.0371)	(0.0398)	(0.0248)	(0.0411)
Current Experience	0.0071***	0.0042*	0.0093***	0.0105***
	(0.0027)	(0.0024)***	(0.0014)	(0.0030)
Total Remunerated (binary)	0.9245***	1.0126	1.0251***	0.9159***
	(0.0551)	(0.0652)	(0.0527)	(0.0646)
Turnout	-0.0022	0.0019	0.0005	0.0074
	(0.0032)	(0.0039)	(0.0016)	(0.0047)
Intercept	0.5073*	0.5444	0.3071**	-0.0911
	(0.2842)	(0.3348)	(0.1563)	(0.3452)
No. of Observations	2718	2718	5585	5585
Log Likelihood	-21.103.706	-14.747.052	-37.584.843	-15.694.920

Note. OLS point estimates with random effects estimator; The table shows non-standardized coefficients and its standard errors between parentheses; Dependent variable = the number of mandates. Significant level; ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01.

Now the control variables are explained, hypothesis 1, will be evaluated by looking at the vector *YEAR_t* effects from table 5.

Hypothesis 1: *Outside activities decrease prior to elections.*

In order to support this hypothesis, (β_j) coefficients from table 5 should become more negative or less positive for years during which elections took place. We see that in 2011-2015 there are less one-off mandates than before on the basis of the observation of the coefficients that are overall more negative. The coefficient estimates of continuous remuneration in the UK over the period 2005-2015 show an overall downward cyclical effect. For example, by means of table 5, we notice a coefficient estimate for *Election Year -2* that is more negative than that of *Election Year -3*, indicating a decrease over these years. A small decrease of the coefficient estimate of *Election Year -1* is observed compared to the coefficient of *Election Year -2*. From *Election Year -1 to Election Year*, we also observe a more negative coefficient. Overall, for continuous remunerations, the pattern shows a decrease in coefficient value prior to an election as hypothesized in both observation periods (2011-2015 and 2005-2015), but the evolution during the period is not as smooth or consistent as our hypothesis would require. In accordance to Geys (2013), Burrick (2015) and Van den Abbeele (2015), the existence of electoral cycles in MP's behaviour (hypothesis 1) is confirmed for continuous extra-parliamentary activities.

For interpreting hypothesis 2, we look at the variable *conservative* from table 5.

Hypothesis 2: *Rather rightist parties gather more mandates, while left-wing politicians will avoid this in the case of the UK.*

This is true for continuous remunerations in the latest observation period (2011-2015), but not for the one-offs. Here we see the opposite effect of what we expected to find. Conservative MPs have on average 0.06 more continuous mandates than other parties (p<0.1). For one-offs, the opposite is observed (p<0.01) where conservatives have on average 0.15 less mandates than other parties. For 2005-2015, we focus on continuous employment where conservatives have on average 0.21 more mandates during this period (p<0.01). The one-off employments are not statistically significant from 2005 until 2015. Based on our observation data we cannot confirm hypothesis 2. However, hypothesis 2 can be confirmed for the continuous mandates. The rightist parties (conservatives) do gather more continuous mandates in both observation periods,

but these values are negligible small, generating a very small effect. For one-off mandates the hypothesis can certainly not be validated.

Hypothesis 3 (a) can also be tested on the new data of the UK House of Commons by looking at the independent variable *gender* in table 5.

Hypothesis 3 (a): *Female MPs will have fewer outside activities than male MPs.*

It is hypothesized that female MPs moonlight less than male MPs. According to our results, where men are coded as 1, men indeed moonlight more than women for continuous assignments, about 0.08 mandates more ($p<0.01$) for the period from 2005 until 2015 and 0.06 mandates more ($p<0.1$) from 2011 until 2015. Men are thus more oriented to continuous assignments. Women in turn are more inclined to take-up one-off assignments, but this observation doesn't turn out to be significant. Consequently, this result may be a coincidence in the data and not necessarily the result of an underlying property. Hence, we find support for the hypothesis, as the effect the one-off mandates is not significant. It is only true that female MPs have 0.08 less continuous outside activities for 2011-2015 ($p<0.01$) and for 2005-2015, this is of 0.06 fewer continuous mandates ($p<0.1$).

Next, we evaluate hypothesis 4 by looking at the control variable *current experience* in table 5.

Hypothesis 4: *The more experience MPs have within Parliament, the more extra-parliamentary mandates they will hold.*

During the 2011-2015 period, for fix assignments 0.007 more mandates are observed ($p<0.01$) and for one-off assignments this means 0.004 more ($p<0.1$) per year of experience of the MP. During the 2005-2015 period, for fix assignments 0.009 more continuous mandates are observed ($p<0.01$) and for one-off assignments this means 0.01 more mandates ($p<0.01$) per year of experience of the MP. The conclusion is that experience in Parliament plays a role and hypothesis 4 hence is accepted, but this effect is almost negligibly small.

4.2.2 *District-based versus list-based voting system*

In this subchapter hypothesis 1, 3 (a), 4 can again be evaluated by means of two different models, but the focus will be on the interpretation of hypothesis 5 (a) and 5 (b).

As mentioned before, in a district-based voting system politicians moonlight generally less because of the way their system functions (see section 2.2.3). In the UK, parties can only choose one candidate per district requiring more visibility for those candidates and creates consequently more internal rivalry between the candidates. If there are only a few candidates from whom a candidate can be chosen to hold a seat in Parliament, the voter can easily find all information because they only have to look these few people up. In Belgium, there are many more candidates, which means that it is much more difficult for the voter to read up on all candidates. Because of this, many extra-parliamentary activities might go unnoticed by voters.

For the comparison between the UK and Belgium, we redefined the data, as the Belgian data does not contain information about one-off activities. As actually almost everyone had at least a single one-off outside job in the UK, using the binary model would be useless. The entries of the binary model would all be "1" because everybody had at least one outside job, which would remove any variation from the data and thus making analysis useless (see section 4.1). Hence, we only coded the continuous remunerated mandates and directorships. While not necessarily true, for the sake of this study, the assumption was made that directorships run over several years. Together the remunerated continuous and directorship employments represent the long run employments which we used in the binary model. Because of the binomial aspect of the data of Geys (2013) we can hardly compare the results of Geys with our count model on the accumulated mandates. So we look at the same data, but test it with another model and investigate if there are different conclusions to be made.

The results of table 6 help to consider the coefficients of the control variables and to get a better understanding of the determinants of moonlighting behaviour by UK MPs. *Age* has a positive effect of 0.0089 more mandates on the count data of the UK 2011-2015 ($p<0.01$), but the effect is very small. *Gender* has a significant positive effect on the count data of 0.39 more mandates for men ($p<0.01$) that is moderate and has a significant negative effect on the binary data of -0.69%, meaning that male MPs have on average a 0.69% lower probability of having an extra-parliamentary mandate ($p<0.01$). A *master* degree has a small significant positive effect on the count data of 0.17 more

mandates (p<0.01). It has a small significant negative effect on the binary data of -0.12% (p<0.05). Being an *economist* has a significant positive effect on the count data of 0.25 more mandates (p<0.01). It has a significant negative effect on the binary data of -0.62% (p<0.01). Being a *lawyer* has a small positive significant effect on the count data of 0.096 more mandates (p<0.05) and the binary shows a small negative significant effect of -0.33% (p<0.01). The variable *PhD* shows a negative significant effect (p<0.05) in our count model. This means that having PhD leads to 0.15 less mandates on average. In our binary model the variable PhD is of no interest as it is not significance. *Current experience* does not seem to play a significant role in moonlighting behaviour for MPs. MPs part of the *commons* in our count model have on average 2.84 less mandates than Belgian parliamentarians from the Chamber of Representative and furthermore this is a strong significant negative effect (p<0.01). When we look at our binary data, we observe all the opposite where UK MPs have on average a 6.78% higher probability of having an extra-parliamentary mandate (p<0.01).

Table 6 Regression results for UK MPs' outside activities using the count and binary model over the period from 2005 until 2015

	UK 2005-2015	
Outside activities	Count (1)	Binary (2)
Election Year -4	*Reference year*	
Election Year -3	-0.0443	0.0376
	(0.0392)	(0.0880)
Election Year -2	-0.0655*	0.0408
	(0.0389)	(0.0880)
Election Year -1	-0.0975**	0.0757
	(0.0383)	(0.0882)
Election Year	-0.1295***	0.2114**
	(0.0361)	(0.0821)
Age	0.0089***	-0.00419
	(0.0011)	(0.00265)
Gender	0.3855***	-0.6854***
	(0.0244)	(0.0736)
Master	0.1740***	-0.1177**
	(0.0262)	(0.0581)
Economist	0.2491***	-0.6295***
	(0.0615)	(0.1102)
Lawyer	0.0965**	-0.3255***
	(0.0421)	(0.0895)
PhD	-0.1538**	0.1944
	(0.0615)	(0.1322)
Current Experience	0.0003	-0.00007
	(0.0002)	(0.000229)
Commons	-2.8358***	6.7797***
	(0.0788)	(0.5031)
Intercept	2.7021***	0.5444***
	(0.1019)	(0.3348)
No. of Observations used	7855	7855
Log Likelihood	-35.719.395	29.763.355

Note. OLS point estimates with random effects estimator; The table shows non-standardized coefficients and its standard errors between parentheses; Dependent variable = the number of mandates. Significant level; $*$ $p<0.10$, $**$ $p<0.05$, $***$ $p<0.01$.

In table 6, we systematically see that the two models show highly significant, but contradictory results. It must be made clear which of the two models is the most suitable and what results should be regarded as most reliable. As discusses earlier, the count model takes the high values (i.e. many mandates) also into account, which isn't the case

of the binary model. It is very probable that the effect emerges from these high values. As the binary model is maximum "1", this whole fluctuation falls out in the binary model. The reason why we use the count model is that the binary model reduces all variability in the number of mandates to "1" (whether it be 1 or 10 mandates, for example). The count model is the most suitable and should in this research be regarded as "the right one".

Using the coefficients of table 6, hypothesis 1 is interpreted:

Hypothesis 1: *Outside activities decrease prior to elections*

On the same manner as previous section, we can distinguish a cyclical effect for the coefficient estimates of the count data, but not for the binary data. The coefficients of the count model become more negative going from *Election Year -4* to *Election Year*. The binary data actually shows the opposite effect. Hypothesis 1, outside activities decrease prior to elections, is true for the count data.

By means of table 6, hypothesis 3 (a), is also verified:

Hypothesis 3 (a): *Female MPs will have fewer outside activities than male MPs.*

For the count model, men have on average 0.39 more mandates than women ($p<0.01$). For the binary model, the opposite effect is observed where men have on average 0.68% lower probability to hold an extra-parliamentary mandate than women ($p<0.01$). Hypothesis 3 (a) can be accepted for the count model at the 1%-level significance and thus this research. We see that the effect of the *gender* variable is rather small, but highly significant. For this reason, this variable will be discussed in more detail in the following section (section 4.2.3).

Using the coefficients of table 6, hypothesis 4, can also be interpreted:

Hypothesis 4: *The more experience MPs have within Parliament, the more extra-parliamentary mandates they will hold.*

Hypothesis 4 doesn't hold for both models, as they are not significant ($p>0.1$). Even if the results do not allow for noticeable and significant changes, similarly to the results in the previous table.

By means of table 6, hypothesis 5 (a) is also examined:

Hypothesis 5 (a): *District-based MPs (UK) have fewer outside mandates than list-based MPs (Belgium).*

In the count model, parliamentarians of the UK Parliament (*commons*) have on average 2.84 less mandates. Again this is not true for the binary model stating that the chance that an English MP has an outside interest is 6.78% bigger for an English MP than a Belgian MP (Chamber of Representatives). The negative coefficients of the count data are highly significant ($p<0.01$) and so are the positive coefficients of the binary data. Therefore, hypothesis 5 (a) is true at the 1%-level of significance as we consider the count model to be better.

To test hypothesis 5 (b), we applied equation (2) to data about MPs of the UK House of Commons en Belgian Chamber of Representatives. The idea is not only that MPs have fewer mandates, but also that they are more sensitive to the cycle effects. To evaluate this hypothesis, the coefficients (δ_k) from table 7 are analysed.

Hypothesis 5 (b): *The cycle effect is stronger for MPs that are elected in a district-based election (UK) than MPs that are elected in a list-based system (Belgium).*

In table 7, we can find the coefficients where the results for interaction between the time vector and the variable *commons* (*Election Year – ( ) × Commons*) are reflected. For the count model, from *Election Year – 3 x Commons* to *Election Year – 2 x Commons*, we see a small increase of the coefficient over the period from 2005 until 2015. For the binary model, from *Election Year – 3 × Commons* to *Election Year – 2 × Commons*, we see a small decrease of the coefficient. When looking at table 7, the coefficients of the count model show no electoral cycle where increases and decreases alternate from year to year over the cycle (going from *Election Year -3 × Commons* to *Election Year × Commons*). In order to identify a cycle, we should see a decrease or increase over the complete legislature. For the count model, we see a cycle effect with a decreasing number of mandates over the election cycle (not a smoothly decrease), but this model turns out to not entirely be statistical significant. We therefore conclude that the cycle effect is not stronger for the district-based system than for the list-based system. This means that UK politicians actually do not care more or less of what people think than in a list-based voting system. In table 7 it is again confirmed that *commons* have less mandates, 3.15 less mandates ($p<0.01$) from 2005 until 2015.

Table 7 Regression results for UK MPs' outside activities with year interaction terms for the variable commons

	UK 2005-2015	
Outside activities	Count	Binary
	(1)	(2)
Election Year -4	*Reference year*	
Election Year -3	-0.4989**	116.080
	(0.2367)	(258.5)
Election Year -2	-0.5643***	119.461
	(0.2162)	(258.5)
Election Year -1	-0.4050	11.21
	(0.2188)	(258.5)
Election Year	-0.1360	0.2147***
	(0.0359)	(0.0821)
Commons	-3.1457***	180.224
	(0.1634)	(258.5)
Election Year -3 × Commons	0.4580*	-115.715
	(0.2366)	(258.5)
Election Year -2 × Commons	0.5052**	-119.091
	(0.2160)	(258.5)
Election Year -1 × Commons	0.3073	-111.368
	(0.2185)	(258.5)
Election Year × Commons	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Intercept	3.0099***	-165.939
	(0.1751)	(258.5)
No. of Observations used	7855	7855
Log Likelihood	-35.687.107	2.991.721

Note. OLS point estimates with random effects estimator; The table shows non-standardized coefficients and its standard errors between parentheses; Dependent variable = the number of mandates. Significant level; $*$ p<0.10, $**$ p<0.05, $***$ p<0.01.

4.2.3 *Gender analysis*

Some of the conclusions about differences in behaviour and actions of women and men are observed from the literature review in chapter 2. With this analysis, we look with greater detail to the result for the UK House of Commons for the period 2005 until 2015. Then, like in the previous chapter, we compare the count and binary models to check whether the effect is weaker or stronger for women than for men. With the use of mixed data for this second part, caution is recommended. The mixed data (including UK and

Belgian data) is only continuous otherwise it is impossible to compare the count and binary data (see section 4.1).

Hypothesis 3 (a) was analysed in the previous tables and the conclusion was that female politicians moonlight less continuously, but do take on one-off outside jobs. Using table 8, the gender variable can also be analysed both in the binary and count model.

Hypothesis 3 (a): *Female MPs will have fewer outside activities than male MPs.*

In the UK only, the variable *gender* has a significant positive effect of 0.08 more continuous mandates (p<0.05) for men in the UK over the period 2005 until 2015, which confirms our previous findings. With data of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives at hand, we mixed both the data of Belgium and UK to observe the effect on the variable *gender* over the same period (2005-2015). There, *gender* has a very significant effect for the count data with 0.37 more mandates (p<0.01) compared to male MPs and 0.64% less chance to hold an extra-parliamentary mandate in the case of the binary data (p<0.01). Hypothesis 3 (a) is therefore true for the count model (p<0.01), which we consider to be more accurate, with data on MPs from Belgium and the UK combined.

In this subchapter hypothesis 3 (b) is also analysed by means of table 8.

Hypothesis 3 (b): *The cycle effect is stronger for female MPs.*

The idea is that the electoral cycle is stronger for women. They perform generally more work for the management of the family, therefore have less time, and are more sensitive to what people think. Because of this one would expect that, as the elections approach, their outside activities would even decrease faster than those of male MPs. We expect the cycle to be less negative because we are talking about males (coded as 1).

In order to evaluate hypothesis 3 (b), table 8 is used to display the time-effects for the male MPs. The coefficients (*Election Year – ( ) × gender*) in table 8 show that for the count data the coefficients become more positive meaning that men increase their outside activities prior to elections. From our results, women thus decrease their outside interests prior to elections, which means that the cycle effect is stronger for female MPs. However, these results are not significant, thus the hypothesis doesn't hold.

In table 8, we also see strong significant effect for the variable *commons*. UK MPs (*commons*) in our count model have on average 2.84 less mandates than Belgian parliamentarians from the Chamber of Representative (p<0.01). When we look at our

binary data, we observe all the opposite where members of Parliament have on average a 6.79% higher probability of having an extra-parliamentary mandate (p<0.01). This finding confirms hypothesis 5, like the results of table 6.

Table 8 Regression results for MP's outside activities with year interaction terms for the variable gender

Outside activities	UK 2005-2015		Mixed UK - Belgium 2005-2015	
	Continuous (1)	One-off (2)	Count (3)	Binary (4)
Election Year -4	*Reference year*			
Election Year -3	0.0313	-0.0789	-0.0217	-0.0758
	(0.0583)	(0.1113)	(0.0653)	(0.2128)
Election Year -2	-0.0565	-0.0795	-0.0759	0.0341
	(0.0530)	(0.1188)	(0.0622)	(0.2128)
Election Year -1	-0.0818*	0.0223	-0.1260**	0.2009
	(0.0495)	(0.2139)	(0.0595)	(0.2199)
Election Year	-0.0693	0.0394	-0.1582***	0.3788*
	(0.0470)	(0.4421)	(0.0566)	(0.2070)
Gender	0.0814**	-0.0908	0.3651***	-0.6387***
	(0.0486)	(0.1680)	(0.0594)	(0.1667)
Election Year -3 × Gender	-0.0218	0.1099	-0.0364	0.1367
	(0.0708)	(0.1302)	(0.0823)	(0.2336)
Election Year -2 × Gender	0.0432	0.0944	0.0175	0.00811
	(0.0664)	(0.2837)	(0.0798)	(0.2359)
Election Year -1 × Gender	0.0095	0.1806	0.0482	-0.1493
	(0.0623)	(0.2113)	(0.0775)	(0.2401)
Election Year × Gender	-0.0172	0.0106	0.0478	-0.1979
	(0.0569)	(0.3626)	(0.0727)	(0.2253)
Commons	/	/	-2.8369***	6.7949***
			(0.0788)	(0.5035)
Intercept	0.3175	0.0395	2.7115***	-5.4060***
	(0.1587)	(-1.2832)	(0.1054)	(0.5457)
No. of Observations used	5585	5585	7855	7855
Log Likelihood	-37.578.153	-15.698.082	-35.710.345	3.157.088

Note. OLS point estimates with random effects estimator; The table shows non-standardized coefficients and its standard errors between parentheses; Dependent variable = the number of mandates. Significant level; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.

Chapter 5

Reality check

The objective of this reality check was to collection testimonials from a broader group of politicians in both the United Kingdom and Belgium. In both countries, a right-wing party and a left-wing party were approached. The researcher approached 80 politicians, split equally over left and right parties as well as between the UK and Belgium. Interest and openness to talk about the subject proved rather limited in both countries.

In the United Kingdom, of the 40 politicians approached, 2 responded not having the time or not being interested. There were no other confirmations of interest, even upon trying to establish telephone contact with a number of them. In Belgium, of the 40 politicians approached, 8 responded and indicated that they rather had their national spokesperson or party secretary coordinate the response to the request. In Belgium, both socialist and liberal parties volunteered for their party secretary or spokesperson to take the word and provide a party-coordinated input. The lack of response and prudence in communication provides the evidence that politicians, whether that it be in the UK or in Belgium, consider the subject of moonlighting a delicate and sensitive issue to communicate.

In order to support the statistical finding, two testimonials were held with national party office members: Tom Willems from Open Vld (Belgian right-wing party) and with Alain André from Sp.a (Belgian left-wing party). The testimonials have a double objective: on the one hand, to test the formulated hypotheses in fact and on the other hand, to initiate the awareness process of politicians about the consequences and implications of exercising moonlighting activities. This undertaking turned out to be very instructive and provided further evidence and support of the findings and conclusions already established through our earlier statistical analysis.[7]

The researcher stated the hypotheses and interviewees were asked whether they agree or not with these. Globally, the interviewees answered the questions with the same responses. Therefore the analysis and conclusions are joined together for both interviews:

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[7] However, the results should be interpreted with caution as we were only able to reach out to Belgian politicians.

Hypothesis 1: *Outside activities decrease prior to elections*:

Both indicated to not agree. Strikingly was the fact that both parties indicated not to recognize a cycle effect according to which extra-parliamentary mandates decrease prior to elections in Belgium. Open Vld ratified this with a lot of arguments about the nature of the list-based selection system in Belgium, which is very different from that in the UK (see section 2.2.3). The place on the list is so important and decisive in the way of doing business. In the UK, there is a lot of competitiveness between MPs to be elected in their district. So they are going all out focusing entirely on the run-up to the elections, which makes it easier to notice a downward cycle effect. This internal competition between candidates causes the election cycle to affect the extra-parliamentary activities. Open Vld believes it is important for their politicians to keep an extra-parliamentary career in order to maintain a link, preferably constant over the years, with the business or academic world. Generally speaking Open Vld members attach great importance to the network that they build up as a member of the Parliament, adding it is vital to their success. The Sp.a, representatives explained the non-existence of an election cycle by the fact that they, due to Party prohibition, do not have, or very limited, other mandates than their political mandate.

Hypothesis 2: *Rather rightist parties gather more mandates, while left-wing politicians will avoid*:

Both did agree. Based on their ideology, they believe that politicians need to be connected to the real world.

Hypothesis 3 (a): *Female MPs will have fewer outside activities than male MPs*:

Both did agree. Women maybe hold slightly less mandates. This is also mainly because there are slightly less women (40/60% in line with the split male/female in the corporate world). Open Vld's Ann Brusseel, one of the interviewees, sees the decline in outside activities falling together with the heightened acceptance and empowerment of women in politics.

Hypothesis 3 (b): *The cycle effect is stronger for female MPs*:

Both indicated to not agree. They don't witness this in the Belgian political environment.

Hypothesis 4: *The more political experience MPs have within Parliament, the more*

extra-parliamentary mandates they will hold:

Both did agree. The experience level has an important impact on the level of accumulated mandates. The older parliamentarians are, the more chance they have to be asked to join a project. Open Vld's Ann Brusseel, states that older Parliamentarians have more experience also because the tradition and older political culture where outside activities were considered part of the political job.

Hypothesis 5 (a): *District-based MPs (UK) have fewer outside mandates than list-based MPs (Belgium)*:

Both did agree. There is no tough competition between candidates like it exists in the UK. This might be explained by the fact that Belgian politicians don't understand what was meant with election cycle because they just continue their professional practices in the wake of a build-up towards an election. The only factor that can be of influence is the time constraint and time allocation trade-offs have to be made. In upcoming elections, politicians are more focused on their campaign, but again less than in the UK because of the list-system where there is less competition between the candidates. The campaigns, used in election time, are more organised on a national level in Belgium. Contrary to the UK, where the candidate has to campaign much more locally in order to get elected as MP of his or her district and to receive a seat in Parliament.

Hypothesis 5 (b): *The cycle effect is stronger for MPs that are elected in a district-based election (UK) than MPs that are elected in a list-based system (Belgium)*:

Both did agree. This is likely to be due to the working of a district-based system.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Only limited literature and empirical studies on moonlighting and cyclical behaviour during the election cycle can be found. The main motivation for this master's thesis is the contribution it brings to the development of the moonlighting topic, as well as complementing and improving the work of Geys (2013), Van den Abbeele (2015), Burrick (2015), Goedbloed (2016) and Varga (2017). The scandals during the 2005-2010 legislature in the ÙK House of Commons regarding the earnings and financial interests (as discussed in section 2.2.2) led to a dual need: on the one hand, an update of the Geys study and on the other hand, a verification to find out whether the findings are tainted by these wrongdoings. Therefore, the first objective of this study is to revisit the UK research and conclusions of Geys (2013) with new data for the period from 2011 until 2015. With this data, the second objective of this paper can be tackled: a cross-border comparative study of the practices at the UK House of Commons and the Belgian Chamber of Representatives. We identified that no multi-country research has been carried out to date. With the data available of the UK House of Commons for the period from 2005 until 2015 and the Belgian Chamber of Representatives for the period from 2004 until 2013, the development of a comparative study was feasible. This master's thesis provides a comprehensive insight into the moonlighting behaviour of MPs in the United Kingdom over a longer period of time, up to ten years, and investigates whether this behaviour correlates, or not, to the moonlighting behaviour of politicians in Belgium.

Transparency about extra-parliamentary activities towards the voters is important because of the sensitiveness by the public opinion regarding the practice of such 'electioneering' attitude. This image tends to reduce MPs to the negative status of money grabbers. Because a time allocation trade-off between the different activities arises, MPs are unable to fully commit to their main political mandate. As discussed above, the main reason for politicians to moonlight is to ensure being re-elected. However, the literature review shows that also visibility and incremental income are driving forces for taking up extra-parliamentary mandates. Last but not least, we find it valuable to investigate whether the Election Day, gender, party affiliation and

experience as well as the kind of voting system, play their role in moonlighting behaviour.

With the conclusion formulated under hypothesis 1, the results provide evidence that, similar to Geys' (2013) conclusion during the 2005-2010 legislature, outside activities in the UK decrease before elections from 2005 until 2015 (using the count model). Under hypothesis 2, the study confirmed that MPs from the Conservative Party in the UK gather more mandates than MPs from other parties. This validates the hypothesis that rather rightist parties accumulate more mandates compared to the left-wing parties in the UK House of Commons from 2005 until 2015. During the observation period 2005-2015, with respect to the study's hypothesis 3, UK female MPs had on average less continuous mandates than their male counterparts, but they had more one-off jobs. However, the cycle effect was not stronger for women than men. Similar results are also found in Belgium (Burrick, 2015; Goedbloed, 2016; Van den Abbeele, 2015), Germany (Backer et *al.*, 2009) and Italy (Gagliarducci et *al.*, 2010). Hypothesis 4, handling the link between the extent of experience in Parliament and the accumulation of more mandates, is indeed also confirmed (for the assumed-correct count data model). Nevertheless, the results are negligibly small indicating a very weak connection between the accumulation of extra-parliamentary mandates and experience in Parliament. The evidence that the type of voting system has an impact emerged from our hypothesis 5 statement. It was demonstrated that MPs from district-based systems like the UK hold less extra-parliamentary mandates than list-based systems, because to the voting systems' inherent exposure and competition status for the aspirants before an election. However, the results proved that the cycle effect is not stronger for MPs elected in district-based systems compared to list-based systems. From the reality check interviews, it emerged likewise that a district-based system is more sensitive to a cycle effect where parliamentarians adjust their extra-parliamentary activities downwards in the wake of elections as competition is high and exposure turmoil can have decisive negative impact on the election results. In a list-based system, like Belgium, campaigning is more done at national level and is the place on the list primordial and critical to be elected.

Evidently, it is also important to highlight the limitations of the study. Caution should be applied regarding the reliability of the interpretations of the motives of MPs. Motives are likely to come from the quest for exposure, financial gain or intellectual

enrichment. Also, the personal data interpretation by the researcher could result in divergences. For example, a level of subjectivity involved with the classification and delimitation of continuous and one-off jobs cannot be ignored.

Like for most of the previous research about moonlighting, the results for the UK and Belgium cannot easily be universalised. Because of cultural and voting systems differences between the two countries, they are at different stages of maturity towards awareness, transparency and acceptance of moonlighting practices. The pressure for more transparency and implementation of obligatory registration will influence the practice of taking up extra-parliamentary mandates in general.

As research and literature about parliamentary moonlighting is still very limited and moonlighting has a definite multifaceted impact on parliamentary activity, all initiatives and incentives for further research are welcome. Areas for future research could cover more cross-border the moonlighting activity comparisons between additional countries or research about the link between voters' perception and the level of moonlighting activity, including reality checks with politicians in person in order to understand their behaviour and motives to moonlight or not. A comparative study between countries with little but growing maturity towards and acceptance of registration of interests and income such as the UK and France (just having implemented new rules regarding reporting of revenue and assets, inspired by the UK's register of financial interests) would be a very interesting research subject.

Least but not least, the current and near term research will push for greater pan-European consistency in registration discipline and transparency levels as well as create greater awareness amongst politicians about the impact and importance of their moonlighting behaviour.

Appendix

A. Reading of statistical results

The analysis and interpretation of the results by its audience requires a number of definitions and terms to be documented and defined:

- A positive effect means that the coefficients are positive in sign "+" and a negative effect means that the coefficients are negative in sign "-".

- Increasing positive effect means that the effect becomes more positive, grows in "+" or less negative, reduces in "-". An increasing negative effect means that the effect becomes more negative or less positive.

Significant means the statistical probability level ("p") of being true and a result is significant as from the 10%-level in this analysis.

- When a result is significant with p<0.1, it means that the chance that the observed effect emerged by chance is smaller than 10%. Simply, but not technically 100% correct, it means that the result has a 90% chance of being true.

- When the result is significant at level 5%, it means that the result is very probably true for 95%.

- When the result is significant at level 1%, it means that the result is highly probably true for 99%.

Being probably true, doesn't mean that the result is important. The importance of a result is based on the size of the coefficient along with the level of significance, as illustrated in the tables of this chapter.

B. Political parties in the House of Commons

The political parties that are represented in the House of Commons after the 2015 General Election are:

- Conservative Party
- Co-operative Party
- Democratic Unionist Party
- Green Party
- Labour Party
- Liberal Democrats
- Plaid Cymru
- Scottish National Party
- Sinn Féin
- Social Democratic and Labour Party
- UK Independence Party
- Ulster Unionist Party

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