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Language Policies in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan

A Language Ideological Perspective

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Short word of thanks

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خلاصة عربية – Arabic summary

تتناول هذه الورقة السياسات اللغوية التي تبنتها الحكومة الانجليزية المصرية في السودان في فترة السيادة المشتركة، أي من عام ١٨٩٩ حتى استقلال السودان في عام ١٩٥٦. خلال هذه الفترة قسمت الحكومة الاستعمارية السودان إلى قسمين (قسم شمالي وقسم جنوبي يشمل المحافظات الجنوبية الثلاثة) وحكمتهما كأنهما كانا كيانين منفصلين ومميزين فشجعت على تطورهما بشكل معزول عن بعضهما البعض على الصعيد السياسي والاقتصادي والثقافي واللغوي. تركز الورقة في هذه السياسة التي سميت "السياسة الجنوبية". تهدف الورقة إلى أن تناقش هذه السياسة من الناحية اللغوية وترسم الخلفية التاريخية التي ظهرت فيها. قامت الحكومة الاستعمارية بمشروع اختراع هويتين مختلفتين وحتى مضادين في السودان واستخدمت التنوع اللغوي الذي يميز السودان كما استغلت الاختلافات الثقافية والدينية والعرقية بين الجماعات السودانية لتحقيق هذا الهدف اعتمادا على المبدأ أن اللغة تشير إلى الهوية الثقافية والدينية والعرقية. كذلك أصبحت اللغات السودانية أدوات لتكوين فصل بين الشمال والجنوب وهويتيهما.

تتكون هذه الورقة من ٥ فصول إضافة إلى المقدمة والاستنتاج. يهدف الفصل الأول للورقة إلى أن يقدم موجز اللغات المختلفة الموجودة في السودان ويوضح أدوارها. يتناول هذا الفصل مكانة اللغة العربية في جميع أشكالها – وخصوصا تلك الأشكال التي تظهر فيها في المناطق الجنوبية – كما يتناول اللغات السودانية الغير عربية واللغات الأجنبية التي تلعب دورا في السودان.

يوفر الفصل الثاني الخلفية التاريخية لبقية الورقة ويتناول السياسات اللغوية التي نفذتها الحكومة البريطانية المصرية في السنوات التالية لإعادة احتلالها للسودان. في هذه السنوات الأولى حكمت الحكومة الاستعمارية السودان كدولة واحدة وطغت اللغة العربيّة على الساحة السياسية والإدارية في الجنوب كما في الشمال. أكثر تحديدا فأصبحت اللغة العربية السودانية الجنوبية لغة إدارية مهمة في الجنوب وكذلك اكتسبت أهمية ونفوذا. بداية من أوائل العشرينيات بدا في الدوائر الاستعمارية إدراك وجود "مشكلة لغوية" في الجنوب مرتبطة بانتشار العربية السودانية الجنوبية واستخدامها كلغة إدارية في المناطق الجنوبية. يبحث الفصل الثالث عن السياسات اللغوية التي تبنتها الحكومة استجابة لهذه المشكلة اللغوية. كان جوهر "السياسة الجنوبيّة" أن اللغة العربية في أي شكل من أشكالها ليست مناسبة كلغة إدارية أو لغة تعليم في الجنوب وأنه لا بدّ من أن تعرقل الحكومة استخدامها وانتشارها في الجنوب وتبدلها باللغة الانجليزية ولغات جنوبية "متأصلة" على الرغم من أن العربية السودانية الجنوبية كانت منتشرة كلغة مشتركة بين الجماعات المختلفة داخل الجنوب. يناقش الفصل الرابع قرار الحكومة لقلب سياستها في الجنوب بشكل كامل بعد انتهاء الحرب العالمية الثانية. تشير الورقة إلى السياق التاريخي والظروف السياسية والاجتماعية والاقتصادية المتغيرة والمصالح البريطانية المرتبطة بها لشرح هذا القرار. يتناول الفصل الخامس والأخير الإيديولوجية اللغوية التي تكشف السياسات اللغوية الاستعمارية عنها. اعترفت الحكومة بأن اللغة مظهر لعناصر هوية المتحدث وتلاعبت على هذا البعد الرمزي للّغة لتحقيق طموحها في السودان. كذلك فتُعتبر اللغة العربية رمزا للإسلام والعروبة والثقافة العربية وبالتالي تُعتبر العربية إشارة إلى الهوية الشمالية. في مقابل ذلك فتصورت الإدارة الاستعمارية هوية جنوبية متناقضة وراسخة في اللغات السودانية الجنوبية الغير عربية والمسيحية والثقافة الإفريقية. تبحث الورقة عن المصطلحات التي استخدمتها الحكومة للتعبير عن سياساتها اللغوية وتناقش المفاهيم التي كانت أساسية لها والتي كانت مقبولة في الدوائر البريطانية كأنها بديهية. تستنتج الورقة أن الترتيبات اللغوية والثقافية التي أنتجتها الحكومة والتناقضات التي اخترعتها أصبحت مقبولة كمعطى طبيعي لا سبيل إلى الشك فيه.

Introduction

This paper explores the language policies adopted by the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium government, which ruled the Sudan[1] from its 'Reconquest' of the territory in 1899 to Sudanese independence in 1956. During this time, the Condominium government divided the Sudan into a Northern and a Southern part, both of which it governed separately and in which it encouraged the development of different political, economic, social, and cultural systems. In pursuing this 'Southern Policy', as it was called, language was instrumentalised and its symbolic function exploited in the construction of internal divisions. The present paper aims to elucidate the way in which the linguistic resources of the Sudan were mobilised in the construction of particular cultural categories of belonging. I attempt to demonstrate that underlying this project of construction was a particular linguistic ideology which was shared by the British administrators and their entourage and which strongly informed the decisions they made in terms of language policy. Although the Southern Policy is the primary concern of the paper, it also pays attention to the way in which the colonial language policy was adapted – one could even say it was quite radically reversed – after the Second World War in order to accommodate the shifting British interests. The paper draws on key concepts from the fields of sociolinguistics as well as anthropology to pursue these aims.

As far as the structure of the paper is concerned, there are five main sections. Firstly, a brief sociolinguistic overview of the Sudan is provided in order to familiarise the reader with the various linguistic resources present in the Sudan and disambiguate the terms used in the rest of the paper to refer to them. The second section of the paper discusses the early colonial language policies adopted by the Condominium government and the way in which the British came to perceive the existence of a 'language problem' in the South. The third section, subsequently, focuses on the colonial Southern Policy, which was officially adopted in 1930 but had been gradually taking shape in the years before that. The paper zooms in on both the coercive and the semiotic strategies which were employed to achieve the goals of the Southern Policy, paying special attention to the proceedings of the Rejaf Language Conference (1928), which can be considered a landmark in colonial language policy. Fourthly, the reversal of the Southern Policy after the Second World War and subsequent developments in the years leading up to Sudanese independence are examined. Before the paper is concluded, the fifth and final section considers the particular linguistic ideology underlying this

[1] This paper is primarily concerned with the period of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (i.e., 1899-1956), and therefore with the territory of the current-day Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan combined. I will use the term 'the Sudan' to refer to this territory, which constituted a single country under Condominium rule, but from which the three Southern provinces (these are Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile) seceded in 2011.

trajectory of colonial language policies and touches upon some of the repercussions of these policies for the fledgling independent Sudanese state.

A few technical remarks should be made at this point. Firstly, when rendering Arabic terms into English, I will depend on the transcription system devised by Hans Wehr (1994). According to this system, each Arabic character is represented by one character in the transcription. Please see Appendix 1 for a full transcription table. So as not to impinge too much on the readability of the paper, I will provide a full transcription of Arabic names only at first mention, after which they will be rendered in their most common English version. Secondly, the words 'South' and 'North' in 'South Sudan' and 'North Sudan' – as well as their derivatives ('Southern', 'Northerner', and so on) – are written with a capital letter in this paper, in order to reflect the fact that the Northern and the Southern provinces respectively were thought of by the British and eventually came to consider themselves separate political entities – as was corroborated by the secession of the three Southern provinces in 2011. On a different note, it can be remarked here that, although the paper generally follows the guidelines proposed by the American Anthropological Association, I have chosen to deviate from the particular guideline stipulating the letter 'b' in 'Black (people)' be written in lowercase. I instead prefer to capitalise the term, by analogy with other terms denoting specific cultural, ethnic, or racial groups of people, such as Asian, Hispanic, First Nation, and so on.

A final remark to be made concerns the appendices, of which there are two. The first appendix contains the transcription table. Secondly, I have included a map of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in order to give the reader an idea of the geographical placement of the different provinces and the most important cities, to which reference is sometimes made throughout the paper, as well as the distribution of the most important Sudanese ethnic groups.

I. Sociolinguistic landscape of the Sudan

James (2008: 61) notes that "in linguistic and ethnic terms, the Nile valley is very diverse, a logical effect of its having been the corridor of movement literally since the dawn of human history". Before we can sensibly discuss any (socio)linguistic phenomenon, we must map out the amalgam of labels used to describe this diversity. Therefore, this section aims to briefly sketch the sociolinguistic landscape of the Sudan and make some remarks about the terms used in the paper to refer to different linguistic resources.

The geographical area which constituted the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan throughout roughly the first half of the twentieth century is linguistically very heterogeneous (Abu Manga 2009). According to the Ethnologue database, 142 languages were spoken in this territory in the period immediately preceding the secession of the South in 2011 (Abdelhay et al. 2011a: 4). Languages belonging to three out of the four linguistic 'families' of Africa proposed by Greenberg (1966, cited in Abu Manga 2009) are represented in the Sudan, namely the Afro-Asiatic family, the Nilo-Saharan family, and the Niger-Congo family (Abu Manga 2009; Miller 2018: 125). The largest linguistic density and diversity is found in the (now seceded) Southern provinces, but the linguistic diversity of the North – particularly the Nuba Mountains area – is significant as well (Abu Manga 2009; Sharkey 2012: 429).

According to James (2008: 64), everyday language use in the Sudan is characterised by a large degree of code-switching[2]. He attributes the remarkable degree of language survival – even among languages with small communities of speakers – to the people's capacity to "overcome language difference" by learning to manage or even achieve fluency in more than one language (James 2008: 77). Many local communities have interpreters who make communication across different languages possible (James 2008: 77). Abu Manga (2009) has stated that the linguistic situation in the Sudan is very 'unstable' – or, since "variation in language is a default sociolinguistic reality" (Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 463), one should perhaps rather say 'dynamic' – as a result of constant historical demographic movement due to droughts, famines, and warfare.

Arabic in the Sudan

Miller (2006), among many others, has lamented the unnuanced use of the term 'Arabic' to refer to a wide variety of communicative forms which sometimes differ markedly from one another on the typological level. The label 'Arabic' conceals great linguistic complexity and diversity (James 2008:

[2] Code-switching can be defined as "a linguistic or discourse practice in which elements and items from two or more linguistic systems, or codes – be they different languages or varieties of a language – are used in the same language act or interaction" (Mejdell 2011).

64, 73-74) and can be considered an umbrella term encompassing multiple varieties and registers. In the context of this paper, it is understood in exactly this way.

As is more generally the case in the Arabic-speaking world, different varieties of Arabic exist in the Sudan in a language situation which has been termed 'diglossia'[3], based in the perceived existence of a 'High' and a 'Low' variety of the Arabic language. On the one hand, *fuṣḥā* Arabic (also referred to as 'Modern Standard Arabic', 'Classical Arabic', or 'literary Arabic') functions as the language of formal writing and speaking, is used in professional contexts and in news broadcasts, as well as on other occasions where there is a need to communicate on specialised topics or with speakers of different dialectal backgrounds (McCarus 2011). The term '*ʿāmmīya*'[4], on the other hand, is used to denote those varieties of Arabic which are used for familiar and informal conversation – "familiar conversational speech", as Abboud-Haggar calls it – and which are primarily used in the home or among family and friends from the same dialect area (Abboud-Haggar 2011). *ʿĀmmīya* is variously translated as 'dialect', 'colloquial', and 'vernacular'[5]. While *fuṣḥā* is acquired through formal education, *ʿāmmīya* can be considered the native variety of Arabic speakers and is acquired as a mother tongue (Abboud-Haggar 2011). There are many studies which challenge this suggested diglossic functional distribution of *fuṣḥā* and *ʿāmmīya* by providing counter-examples from various Arabic countries, including the Sudan (see, for example, Bell & Haashim 2006, cited in James 2008: 73). Without going into more detail about this matter, we can conclude that, for the purposes of this paper, the term 'Arabic' will be used as an umbrella term embracing both *fuṣḥā* Arabic and non-*fuṣḥā* (i.e., *ʿāmmīya*) varieties of Arabic. The text itself will specify which variety we are concerned with when necessary.

Arabic occupies a hegemonic position in the linguistic configuration of the Sudan (Sharkey 2012: 429). According to Sharkey (2012: 429), the hegemony of Arabic is facilitated by three factors.

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[3] The term 'diglossia' was popularised by Ferguson (1959), whose article sparked an ongoing debate centred around the functional specialisation of different varieties of Arabic in the Arabic-speaking world. Despite the fact that Ferguson's proposed functional distribution has been criticised by various authors, it has generally been taken for granted as matter of fact, and the term 'diglossia' has persistently been used to describe the 'language situation' in the Arab world. However, Daniëls (2018a) calls for a different approach to the concept of diglossia from a language ideological point of view. She explains the taken-for-granted nature of the concept of diglossia, despite its being counterfeited by actual language use, by pointing to an underlying ideology of language. Rather than a model for the accurate representation of the way speakers engage with linguistic variability in actual language use, the concept of diglossia is more useful for describing speakers' *attitudes* towards this linguistic variability (Daniëls 2018a).

[4] See Daniëls 2018b for an in-depth discussion of the semantic evolution of the term '*ʿāmmīya*' and its ideologically informed connotations.

[5] Acknowledging that '*ʿāmmīya*', and perhaps even 'non-*fuṣḥā*', are the more neutral of these terms, the three terms mentioned ('dialect', 'colloquial', 'vernacular') will, for the sake of convenience, be used as synonyms of '*ʿāmmīya*'/'non-*fuṣḥā*' in this paper.

Firstly, the number of Arabic speakers in Sudan greatly exceeds those of any other language, some of which only have a few thousand speakers (Lesch 1998: 15-21, cited in Sharkey 2012: 429). Secondly, Arabic derives a large degree of prestige from its religious associations (with the Koran, first and foremost, and therefore with Islam), but also because of its historical importance. Thirdly, the country's (and particularly the North's) affinity with Arabic is compounded by its geographical proximity to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Abu Manga (2011a) states that

> mother-tongue Arabic speakers make up the most economically affluent, socially prestigious, and culturally dominant ethnic group in the Sudan, and Arabic derives its prestige from their status.

Arabic is spoken in the Sudan in a number of *ʿāmmīya* varieties which each exhibit distinctive linguistic features: there exists one central vernacular, that of the capital, Khartoum, alongside a number of regional vernaculars (Abu Manga 2011a). In the far west of the Sudan, for example, a regional variety of Arabic with distinctive characteristics has developed (James 2008: 73) and serves as a lingua franca there (Jernudd 2015: 137-138). Abu Manga (2011a) attributes the multiplicity of regional varieties of Arabic in the Sudan to environmental and linguistic factors: the earliest migrants to the Sudan originated from various well-known Arabian tribes and settled in different areas in search of pasture. Isolated from one another, they maintained the particular dialectal features of their own tribes, and their speech also became influenced by the indigenous languages present in their new habitats (Abu Manga 2011a).

'Sudanese Colloquial Arabic' (also referred to as 'Khartoum Arabic' or 'Omdurman Arabic') refers to the variety of Arabic spoken in the central and northern parts of the country (James 2008: 73; Abu Manga 2011a). It is seen as the 'central' or 'model' variety of Arabic in the Sudan and serves as a standard which speakers of the other Arabic varieties strive to approximate when trying to speak more elegantly (Abu Manga 2011a). Its centre of gravity is the central Sudan, which is the socially and economically most developed part of the country (Abu Manga 2011a). At the time of the Anglo-Egyptian rule over the Sudan, Sudanese Colloquial Arabic was mostly an everyday spoken language, though it was also occasionally written (Trimingham 1946, Persson and Persson 1979, both cited in James 2008: 73), as it is, of course, today. James (2008: 73) points out that even within Sudanese Colloquial Arabic itself there are what he calls 'levels' (of approximation to 'standard' Sudanese Colloquial Arabic) which indicate speakers' socio-economic status, level of education, and family background. For example, those accents in which the vowels are clipped are generally perceived as leaning towards Egyptian Colloquial Arabic, while broader articulation of the vowels is associated with what James terms "the language of the street" (James 2008: 73). Sudanese Colloquial Arabic is influenced by non-Arabic Sudanese languages, notably Nubian languages and Beja, and by foreign languages, especially Turkish, Persian, English, and French (Abu Manga 2011a).

South Sudanese Arabic

The variety of Arabic which developed in the South through a process of creolisation[6] has often been termed 'Juba Arabic' (see, for example, Miller 2011; Manfredi & Petrollino 2013), in reference to the city of Juba in the very south of the Sudan, now the capital of the Republic of South Sudan. However, I tend to agree with Leonardi's (2013: 352) standpoint that the term 'South Sudanese Arabic' (henceforth: SSA) accounts better for the language's regional and temporal variations across the South. SSA comprises a wide range of distinct social, geographical, and temporal varieties including pidgins and creoles, but also 'decreolised' or 'quasi-colloquial' varieties (Miller 2011). The question of whether or not creole languages eventually assume the status of 'colloquial' and which specific characteristics pinpoint this transition can of course be objects of discussion. Manfredi & Petrollino (2013: 55) suggest in this regard that it is useful to think of SSA as constituting a continuum implying a high degree of phono-morphological variation (just as is the case for *ʿāmmīya* as a category more generally). For the sake of convenience, I will consider those Arabic-based varieties which have undergone a process of creolisation as part of the *ʿāmmīya* category, thus placing them alongside the 'ordinary' non-*fuṣḥā* varieties of Arabic. Even though SSA was (and still remains) primarily a spoken language without an established orthography, it was already used in written form during the colonial period, using Latin script[7], particularly for the purpose of producing prayer booklets, which were introduced by Christian missionaries and contributed significantly to the spread of SSA (Miller 2002, cited in Jernudd 2015: 131; Manfredi & Petrollino 2013: 55).

SSA originated in the nineteenth century, in the context the expansion of Turco-Egyptian imperialism and the concomitant southward expansion of ivory and slave trade (Johnson 1989). Following the annexation of the Sudan by the Ottoman empire in 1820, trade, and especially slave raiding, was expanded further south and was increasingly taken over by commercial companies who based themselves in fortified stations, known as *zarāʾib* (singular: *zarība*) from which they launched raids into the surrounding territories (Miller 2011; Leonardi 2013: 356; Manfredi & Petrollino 2013: 54-55;). Some of these trading stations were taken over by the Ottoman government and made into army stations (Leonardi 2013: 356). In this environment, a pidgin Arabic developed as a means of

[6] Leonardi (2013: 352-354) remarks that recent scholarship has tended to move away from the traditional model of thinking about the concept of creolisation as a linear trajectory, a set of stages of development linked to linguistic categories (such as 'pidgin', 'creole', 'post-creole') and ultimately culminating in the formation of a 'dialect', whereby 'nativisation' (i.e., the point at which a certain linguistic variety starts to become acquired as a mother tongue) is taken as the juncture between 'pidgin' and 'creole'. Instead, the transition from pidgin to creole language can be understood as characterised by the language's becoming 'necessary' for communication in particular contexts, hence developing into a main language of interaction (Leonardi 2013: 352-354).

[7] The Southern Policy, officially adopted in 1930, encouraged the writing of SSA in Latin script and tried to prevent it from being written in Arabic script, which we might assume happened quite rarely at this point. The Southern Policy will be discussed in more detail later in the paper.

communication between, on the one hand, the speakers of Sudanese or Egyptian Colloquial Arabic who were associated with the government, and, on the other hand, the majority of soldiers, slaves, and servants who were recruited within the South (Leonardi 2013: 356), a previously non-Arabic speaking area (Mahmud 1982, Owens 1997, both cited in Miller 2011). This military pidgin was first known as 'Bimbashi Arabic' ('*bimbāšī*' is the Ottoman Turkish word for 'officer'), and later as 'Mangalla' or 'Mongallese' Arabic (named after a military garrison in the place which is now the city of Mongolla, near the city of Juba) (Tucker 1934: 28; Miller 2011). This military pidgin would later undergo a gradual process of creolisation (Nakao 2012: 128-129, cited in Leonardi 2013: 356).

Knowledge of SSA spread among the native population as concentric circles of settlement and interaction developed around the *zarā'ib* (Johnson 1989: 77-78; Leonardi 2013: 358), and some people became interpreters and translators (Pedemonte 1975: 62, cited in Leonardi 2013: 356-357). Tucker (1934: 29) writes that

> [w]ith the opening of roads and the protection given to travellers, [SSA] has spread throughout the Southern Sudan, its pronunciation varying from tribe to tribe.

Although SSA has drawn its vocabulary primarily from the Egyptian and Sudanese Colloquial Arabic spoken by the early Turco-Egyptian troops, the non-Arabic indigenous languages spoken in the South have also had a significant substratal influence, reflecting the large extent of local interaction around the stations (Miller 2011; Leonardi 2013: 352; Manfredi & Petrollino 2013: 54). Tucker (1934: 28), somewhat degradingly, asserts that

> an Egyptian [...] would experience great difficulty in understanding any of it [i.e., the early forms of SSA], since the pronunciation of the sounds and the arrangement of the syllables has been contorted almost out of recognition in the mouths of the various tribesmen who have attempted it.

SSA became an effective inter-ethnic lingua franca (Manfredi & Petrollino 2013: 55) and came to be acquired as a mother tongue among Southerners who no longer spoke their ethnic native language, notably among displaced communities in Sudanese urban centres, such as Khartoum, but also abroad (Miller 2011). SSA underwent a significant functional expansion throughout the twentieth century: apart from its function as everyday language in an informal context, it also came to be used in more symbolic and formal settings, such as cultural productions and artistic performances (Miller 2002, cited in Miller 2011), radio programmes (James 2008: 73; Manfredi & Petrollino 2013: 55), some political speeches (Miller 2002, cited in Miller 2011), in local courts (Miller 2007, cited in Manfredi & Petrollino 2013: 55; Leonardi 2013: 369-371), and Christian religious services, broadcasts, and publications (Miller 2002, cited in Miller 2011; Miller 2007, cited in Manfredi & Petrollino 2013: 55; James 2008: 64; Miller 2010).

Apart from its being typologically differentiated from the other Arabic varieties spoken in the Sudan, SSA also became increasingly dissociated on a symbolic level from the associations which these Arabic varieties, notably Sudanese Colloquial Arabic, carried with them (Leonardi 2013: 370-371). SSA came to be used as a common language among the soldiers of the Southern guerrilla movements in the context of the multiple Sudanese civil wars, and it was probably the most common

language used on Radio SPLA while it was active (James 2008: 73; Leonardi 2013: 370-371). In this way, SSA increasingly became a vehicle for expressing a new South Sudanese identity which transcended tribal affiliations (Manfredi & Petrollino 2013: 55). However, because of its military origins and its historical associations with agents of state coercion, there remains among some segments of the South Sudanese population a somewhat ambiguous attitude towards SSA, and some do not yet accept it because of its perceived association with both *fuṣḥā* and Sudanese Colloquial Arabic, which are both associated with Arab political domination (Leonardi 2013: 352, 366-368; Miller 2018: 146). Others associate SSA with urbanisation and with what Leonardi calls "the moral ills of town life" (Leonardi 2013: 366-368), as well as with the erosion of ethnic culture and the disappearance of indigenous vernacular languages, fearing that the latter would be eclipsed by the rapid spread of Arabic.

Mass displacement as a result of the civil wars which the country has witnessed in the past decades has turned Khartoum into a melting pot of all of the Sudan's languages (Abu Manga 2010). In this regard, some scholars have predicted that SSA, as used among displaced Southern communities in Khartoum, was likely to be absorbed into the more prestigious Sudanese Colloquial Arabic and would thus come to be seen as a mere variety of the latter (Leonardi 2013: 370-371). Abu Manga (2010), for example, has argued that the coming together of the various Sudanese languages in Northern urban centres will ultimately lead to the acceleration of language shift to the particular Arabic varieties dominant in these cities. Versteegh (1993: 66-76) has referred to the process by which the SSA creole might – or might not; he does not take a clear position – become a 'regular' colloquial variety of Arabic under the influence of more overtly prestigious varieties (i.e., Khartoum Arabic and *fuṣḥā* Arabic), as 'levelling' or 'decreolisation'. He notes that there are certain elements which make the occurrence of such a process probable, but found the data (at the time of his writing) inadequate to draw any conclusions about how it might proceed. He does suggest, by referring to other cases of a creole language existing side by side with a clearly dominant and prestigious other language, that the process of 'levelling' or 'decreolisation' might be blocked by "in-group feelings within the creole-speaking community" (Versteegh 1993: 75). Similarly, Miller (2007: 619-620, cited in Leonardi 2013: 370-371) has suggested that such an assimilative process has been impeded in the case of SSA by the fact that it has increasingly been legitimised among Southerners as 'the language of the South', and accordingly, she notes, there has been a tendency among Southerners to condemn speakers who attempt to approximate the Arabic of the North. In other words, the importance of its identity function has been a significant contributing factor in the maintenance and development of SSA (Miller 2011).

In this regard, we might digress somewhat in order to further explore the question of the distribution of prestige among different linguistic resources employed by language users in a particular community. This attribution of prestige is not monolithic, but rather layered and contextually shifting, concealing a much more complex picture than is suggested by the simple opposition between one, overtly prestigious language variety and a non-prestigious (stigmatised), 'local' variety (Daniëls 2018a). There are indeed different kinds of prestige, some more overt than

others, attached to linguistic resources, and thus the question of which linguistic variety's prestige overrules that of another in a given moment is determined situationally. Daniëls (2018a: 196), writing about the different kinds of prestige associated with various varieties of Arabic, states that, despite the fact that *fuṣḥā* is generally regarded as the most overtly prestigious variety in Arabic-speaking communities, "['local', stigmatised non-*fuṣḥā* varieties of Arabic] can serve as a strong marker for in-group identity and as such they can be considered to be prestigious within the in-group", to the point that members of the in-group who deviate from the variety associated with their in-group identity may be reprimanded by other members for their linguistic behaviour. She further writes that

> [t]his [i.e., the prestige of 'local', in-group language varieties] is exemplified by the softly reproachful expression '*lēš tmaddanti*' ["why do you (fem. sing.) talk urban?"] that is directed towards (mostly young female) speakers of rural Jordanian varieties when they insert phonological or lexical items that are associated with urban varieties, such as the glottal stop ['] (urban variant) for /q/ instead of [g] (rural and Bedouin variant) (Daniëls 2018a: 196).

Such deviation from the 'local' prestigious variety may be perceived as a form of 'betrayal' of or 'unfaithfulness' to one's identity, in the same way that, for example, "the Quebec francophone who tried to move towards English risked being called a *vendu*, [and] the Spanish speaker (in America) a *vendido*" (Edwards 2012: 12). In the same way, SSA carries prestige as a marker and symbol of in-group identity among Southern migrants in displaced communities in, for example, Khartoum, where Sudanese Colloquial Arabic is the much more overtly prestigious variety. The salience of the identity-marking associations of SSA is of course amplified by the confrontation with the multilingual context of Northern cities, which, as has just been mentioned, had become melting-pots of the multitudinous Sudanese languages. In the same vein, Miller (2002, cited in Jernudd 2015: 132) has found indications of the link between SSA and Southern identity in her investigation of the use of SSA in theatrical performances by Southerners residing in Khartoum. She found that the use of Sudanese Colloquial Arabic indexes a 'Sudanese context' (in the theatrical piece), while the use of SSA points to a specific Southern ethnic origin and culture (Miller 2002, cited in Jernudd 2015: 132).

A final remark to be made before moving on to the next section is that a variety of SSA is also found in current-day Uganda and Kenya, where it is referred to as 'Ki-Nubi' (literally translated from Swahili as 'language of the Nubi') (Schippers & Versteegh 1987: 140-142). When the Mahdist uprising in 1885 forced the Ottoman governor of Equatoria to flee southwards, some groups of Ottoman soldiers and traders (most of whom originated from the far northern region of Nubia [James 2008: 68]), too, fled to Uganda or Kenya accompanied by their civilian entourage, where they settled and became known as 'Nubi' (Schippers & Versteegh 1987: 140-142; Versteegh 1993: 71; James 2008: 68; Leonardi 2013: 359). These groups retained their SSA creole, which came to be known as 'Ki-Nubi' (Schippers & Versteegh 1987: 140-142; Leonardi 2013: 359). New generations of speakers generally acquired Ki-Nubi as a mother tongue, and usually learned Swahili or another African language as a second language (Schippers & Versteegh 1987: 140-142).

Non-Arabic Sudanese languages

The majority of the non-Arabic 'indigenous' languages of the Sudan are found in the South of the country, which, as has been mentioned, is the most linguistically dense and diverse area. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise the diversity of the North as well, and not disregard this reality by presenting the North as uniformly Arabic-speaking, a temptation to which "hasty journalists" (James 2008: 74) more often than not seem to succumb.

The non-Arabic Sudanese languages belong to three out of the four language families found in Africa as proposed by Greenberg (1966, cited in Abu Manga 2009). The Nilo-Saharan languages of the Sudan, firstly, constitute the majority of the non-Arabic languages spoken in the Sudan (Abu Manga 2007), and are found mainly in the west of the country (James 2008: 66-67). A significant number of these languages can be subsumed under the branch of the Nilotic languages (e.g., Dinka, Nuer, Zande, Bari). Of the Nilotic languages spoken in the Sudan, Dinka is the most widespread, and the Dinka as an ethnic group are demographically and politically dominant in the South (James 2008: 76). Another branch of the Nilo-Saharan language family which is well represented in the Sudan is the Nubian[8] branch. The Nubian languages are spoken in the northern part of the Sudan, from the region of Aswan in Egypt southwards along the Nile as far as the city of Dongola (indicated as 'Danaqla' on the map in appendix, see Appendix 2) (James 2008: 68). According to James (2008: 68), the two main distinct languages in this branch are Nobiin and Kenuzi-Dongola, both of which are still widely spoken. The immediate ancestor of the Nubian languages is Old Nubian, which had its own script (using characters from Coptic, Egyptian, and Meriotic) (Bell & Haashim 2006, cited in James 2008: 68). James (2008: 61) also remarks that the fact that the Nubian languages, which are

[8] James (2008: 68, footnote 6) explains the different meanings which may be expressed by the core syllable 'nub', which is sometimes claimed to be associated with the ancient Egyptian word for gold. Three distinct ethnic and linguistic terms are contained in it. Firstly, the term 'Nubia' (and its adjective 'Nubian') refers to the region straddling the Egyptian-Sudanese border and the peoples and indigenous languages of this territory – this is supported by ancient Greek and Ethiopian sources. Secondly, 'Nuba' has been used since the late eighteenth century to denote the area of the Nuba Mountains as well as the people living there and their languages. Quite confusingly, however, the Arabic expression '*bilād al-Nūba*' refers not to the region of the Nuba Mountains, but rather to region of the Nubian Nile along the Sudanese-Egyptian border. Thirdly, the term 'Nubi' refers to the military men and traders originating from the far northern region of Nubia who, during the Ottoman period, arrived in the far South of the Sudan. The label 'Nubi' has since been applied to Sudanese soldiers and merchants and their civilian entourage, and it is also freely used in many parts of the Southern Sudan to indicate traders, military recruits, and 'detribalised' persons in general (James 2008: 68). According to Johnson (1989: 83), the expression 'becoming Nubi' is used in both South Sudan and northern parts of Uganda to indicate the process by which rural persons become urban by entering a town and adopting SSA (or Ki-Nubi in Uganda) along with other urban customs such as Muslim dress, Arabic names, and Islamic forms of worship.

spoken in the extreme northern parts of the country, belong to the Nilo-Saharan family points to an ancient connection between this region and regions further south.

The non-Arabic Afro-Asiatic languages of the Sudan are mainly found to the north and the east (James 2008: 66-67). They are Beja (or 'Bedawi') and Hausa. The Beja community in the north-east of the country is one of the major non-Arab – yet Islamised – communities in Northern Sudan (Jernudd 2015: 132-133). The Beja form a confederation of several traditionally land-controlling family groups who use Beja as a primary means of communication among themselves (Jernudd 2015: 132-133). Although Beja men are generally bilingual in Beja and Arabic, the Beja language is considered central to Beja identity and the organisation of Beja politics and has therefore continued to be transmitted to new generations (Jernudd 2015: 132-133). The Sudan is also home to speakers of Hausa[9], who have immigrated there and have lived in close proximity to Arabic speakers, leading to extensive mutual influencing between the two languages (Abu Manga 2011b). The majority of Sudanese Hausa are bilingual in their mother tongue (i.e., Hausa) and Arabic (Abu Manga 2011b). Thirdly and finally, the Niger-Congo languages of the Sudan are spoken in both the western and southern regions of the country, and the majority of them are found in the Nuba Mountains area (James 2008: 66-67, 74-75).

It has been noted above that Arabic (as a general category) in the Sudan carries a prestige that is not accorded the non-Arabic Sudanese languages (James 2008: 73-74). The latter are often referred to (in Northern, Arabic-speaking circles) as '*ruṭānāt*' ('lingo', 'gibberish') (James 2008: 73-74; Daniëls 2018b: 241, footnote 6), "a dismissive term invoking a limited, local, primitive way of talking inherited from the dark ages" (James 2008: 74). However, the non-Arabic indigenous languages are highly valued by the groups of their speakers, despite the fact that these same groups often use different varieties of Arabic as lingua franca (James 2008). As has been pointed out for the case of SSA, the non-Arabic Sudanese languages, too, carry significant prestige as markers of in-group identity among their speakers: "the vernacular languages have remained associated with rurally rooted, ethnic cultures and traditions and seen as the authentic vehicles of southern identities" (Leonardi 2013: 367).

[9] The Hausa people developed from a mixture of groups migrating from the central Sahara (due to desertification) to the central savanna in the south during the first millennium C.E. This group later absorbed a number of other ethnic groups and came to constitute one cultural and linguistic entity with the Hausa language as a unifying factor. Therefore, the term 'Hausa' is more a linguistic than an ethnic one (Abu Manga 2011b).

‘Foreign’ languages

Just like ‘Arabs’, however defined, are not indigenous to the Sudan (James 2008: 69), Arabic itself is also imported, and is thus, strictly speaking, a ‘foreign’ language[10]. Arabic has undoubtedly been the most impactful of the many ‘foreign’ languages introduced in the Sudan throughout its history (James 2008: 69). Other ‘introduced’ languages include Egyptian, Greek, Latin, Coptic, and Turkish, which all arrived along with trade or as a result of conquest (James 2008: 69). As the Sudan’s first language of colonial administration, Turkish has left many traces in discourses of local government, police, and military institutions (James 2008: 70). The same is true for English, which was spread in the South by the Christian missions during the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period and became the dominant language of government and post-primary education in the South (James 2008: 70; Leonardi 2013: 366-368). The English language produced a link between the Southern Sudan and the neighbouring Anglophone countries and was promoted by Southern postcolonial political leaders as a medium of communication with (other) African countries as well as among the Southern Sudanese themselves (Leonardi 2013: 366-368). English thus spread gradually into the educational, social, and cultural life of the South’s elite (James 2008: 70).

[10] The process of Arabisation in the North has deep roots in Sudanese history and dates back centuries before the advent of Islam in the seventh century (Deng 1995: 35-37). Arabic was the medium of communication between the earliest Arab migrants and the Sudan’s local people (Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 463) and spread widely in the region of the Nile Basin during the period of the Islamised Funj Sultanate (established in the early sixteenth century) as a result of the settlement and local intermarriage of Arabic-speaking traders, the associated spread of Muslim teachers, and the immigration of some Arabic-speaking herding peoples from both the lower Nile and across the Red Sea from Arabia (James 2008: 69).

II. Early colonial language policies and the emergence of a 'language problem'

The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium

With the 'Scramble for Africa' in full swing, Britain invaded the Sudan in the late 1890s, claiming to act in order to recover Egypt's earlier claims to the territory (Sharkey 2012: 433). The 'Reconquest', as it was called, was prompted by a number of factors, one of the most pressing elements being the British wish to stop the French from advancing up the Nile (Deng 1995: 52). The Mahdist regime was overthrown and the Sudan effectively became a British colony. The colonial system, which remained in place until 1956, was termed the 'Anglo-Egyptian Condominium'. This concept of 'joint government' entailed, in theory, that the colony was to be governed cooperatively by Britain and Egypt, transforming Egypt into a "colonised coloniser" (Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 462, citing Powell 2003). Despite the fact that Egypt undeniably exerted significant influences over the Sudan during this period, its recognition as partner in the Condominium was largely a symbolic move intended to present the colonial regime as Muslim; Britain maintained the upper hand (Sarkesian 1973: 3; Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 466).

The British colonial authorities pursued a policy of 'Indirect Rule' (also termed 'Native Administration'), which meant, in brief, that they recognised the legitimacy of 'traditional' tribal leaders and sought to preserve – or at least not actively alter – the existing tribal structures and cultural characteristics of the region (Sarkesian 1973: 6; Sharkey 2012: 434). The gist of this policy was "to establish and maintain law and order but otherwise to leave the people alone" (Deng 1995: 79). The policy of Indirect Rule was implemented in both the North and South in 1921 (Abu Shouk 1998, cited in Miller 2018: 127). More concretely, it entailed an administrative construction based on existing tribal structures in which the tribes with the largest demographic weight in each region were to represent not only their own tribe, but also smaller groups which the British decided would be administratively affiliated with them, on the various levels of administration (Miller 2018: 127). This system necessitated a classification of the different ethnic and tribal groups, and this became a key task of the early colonial government. These classifications were based on multiple factors, among them tribal genealogy, physical anthropological features, as well as language. Language classifications and statistics thus became important administrative tools to implement the policy of Native Administration (Miller 2018).

During the first two decades of colonial rule, for socio-economic reasons, the British governed the country as a united entity (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 345) and did not attempt to change the prevailing regional characteristics of neither the North nor the South (Sarkesian 1973: 4). The British paid greater attention to and showed greater appreciation for the Northern part of the country (Deng 1995: 62-63; Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 466), which they considered to be culturally more refined

(Sarkesian 1973: 4). Northern tribal leaders were entrusted with great powers (Sarkesian 1973: 4; James 2008: 70; Abdelhay et al. 2017: 349-350). In an attempt to establish some legitimacy and to avoid provoking rebellion, the colonial government showed respect for and even reinforced the Arab-Islamic religious values and institutions present in the North – so much so that one British governor-general even described the Condominium government as 'Islamic' (Trimingham 1948: 25-26, cited in Deng 1995: 17; Deng 1995: 55; Sharkey 2012: 434). Significant investments were made to encourage the political, economic, and cultural development of the region (Deng 1995: 11). The South, in contrast, was ruled by British military administrators and treated as an area requiring pacification and protection from the North (Sarkesian 1973: 4). Deemed undeveloped and unready for exposure to the modern world, it was left to develop and govern itself 'indigenously' until after the First World War (Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 466-467). Deng (1995: 19) writes in this respect:

> Although the British administered ethnic communities in the South through their traditional leaders, protecting or preserving them to evolve gradually along the lines of their indigenous cultures, they did not show the same degree of sensitivity, recognition, and deference to these African cultures that they showed to the Arab-Islamic culture of the North.

Many British administrators, in fact, saw the Southern provinces as belonging to 'Black Africa' and envisioned them as bound to develop more in line with the pattern of Britain's other colonies in East Africa, even leaving open the possibility of their being joined with them (Collin 1962: 75, cited in Sarkesian 1973: 3; Henderson 1965: 165, cited in Deng 1995: 84-85; James 2008: 70).

Early colonial language policies (1899-1920s)

In the early stages of colonial rule, Arabic served as a bureaucratic tool which the Condominium government used to advance its material interests (Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 467, citing Sanderson and Sanderson 1981: 78). Arabic, along with Islam, continued to occupy a place of pride in the Sudan as a whole, but particularly in the North, while other languages were deemed less important (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 345). Arabic retained its association with the coercive forces of the state, as it had during Ottoman rule. No explicit language policy was designed for the Southern Sudan at first and no attempts were undertaken to introduce an administrative language other than Arabic there (Tucker 1934: 28; Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 467). For the colonial administrators, language was an important factor in the selection of interpreters, but also of local tribal leaders in both North and South, many of whom had at least some knowledge of Arabic (Leonardi 2013: 360-361, 364-365). This somewhat facilitated communication between the tribal leaders and the British officials, since the latter had usually learned Arabic to some extent (Leonardi 2013: 364).

Many of the government stations established during Turco-Egyptian rule were taken over by British officials and were used by the colonial government as administrative centres (Leonardi 2013:

359)[11]. As has been referred to above, South Sudanese Arabic (SSA) functioned as the main lingua franca in these multi-ethnic towns (Leonardi 2013: 360-361). By the 1920s, SSA had become so ubiquitous that it had become virtually unavoidable for the colonial administrators to use it as a language of local governance, commerce, as well as in the army and police forces (Leonardi 2013: 361). Sanderson and Sanderson (1981: 78, cited in Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 467) aptly note that

> [t]o the ordinary Southerner, the Condominium Government presented itself as an Arabic-speaking institution. Apart from the occasional British Inspector, remote and Olympian, all the officials whom he was likely to meet (including the warders if he went to jail) spoke Arabic either as their mother-tongue or as an effective second language usually acquired early in life. A Southerner who wished to be considered 'civilised' took these men, and especially the Arabised and Islamised Blacks in the Army, as his models; and for a Southerner to function as a 'chief' or notable under the administration, some ability to communicate in Arabic was virtually indispensable.

SSA furthermore functioned as an intermediary language in courts: 'local', non-Arabic vernaculars were translated by interpreters and police officers into SSA, which was more easily intelligible to the colonial officials (Jackson 1955: 113, cited in Leonardi 2013: 364). Tucker (1934: 29) notes that this use of SSA as an intermediary language in courts accorded it great prestige, as it became "the language best calculated to win favour with the police", who were usually recruited not from the tribe in whose territory they were stationed but from distant tribes, often speaking totally different languages. Tucker (1934: 29) goes on to say that

> [u]ltimately, of course, it [i.e., SSA] was a useful language to know, should one's case come before the District Commissioner, since it enabled the plaintiff to evade the court interpreter, who was not always to be trusted to translate fairly unless well bribed.

SSA thus became a multifunctional language in the South, central not only to communication with colonial officials, but also as a means of communication between 'ordinary' people in an increasingly multicultural (and multilingual) urban environment. It evolved from an intermediary contact-language (a 'pidgin') used primarily for communication between the local population and colonial officials, to a full-fledged creole language, as it developed new innovative structures which were

[11] Following the Reconquest, the British formally abolished slavery, yet former slave-soldiers throughout the country generally continued their service to the government as farmers, policemen, workers, etc. (Johnson 1989: 80). The area in the former *zarā'ib* towns in which these communities of discharged soldiers (and their families) settled, were called the '*malakīya*', "a term with overtones of government property" (Johnson 1989: 80). According to Johnson (1989: 80-81), furthermore, some soldiers became interpreters, acting as intermediaries between their old communities and the government, or even chiefs for the new government in the South. In many ways, these towns functioned just like the nineteenth-century *zarā'ib*, drawing in and interacting with people from the local rural communities, resulting in the development there of a distinctive culture and language which revealed both the military background of the towns as their multi-ethnic composition (Johnson 1989: 82).

distinct to it, and as its vocabulary spread into the local vernaculars (reportedly even replacing vernacular terms by the 1930s) (Leonardi 2013: 352-354, 365-366).

Summarising the above, we can conclude that the government's language policies during the first two decades of its rule over the Sudan consolidated rather than disrupted the linguistic patterns which had developed throughout the nineteenth century out of the Ottoman administrative practices, in which knowledge of Arabic gave access to positions of power and intermediation (Leonardi 2013: 360-365).

A 'language problem'

We have just seen that, while Arabic continued to be used as an administrative language by the British colonial administration in the North, it had also become an indispensable instrument of governance in the South, albeit in creolised form. Unrest in Northern Sudanese cities in 1924[12] and prior political developments in Egypt[13] caused the British authorities to feel increasingly alarmed by this pragmatic use of SSA as an administrative language by colonial officials (Leonardi 2013: 361). Sudanese nationalism gained momentum in tandem with the rise of Egyptian nationalism, which called for Sudanese-Egyptian cooperation and the independence of the entire Nile Valley from British colonial powers under the Egyptian crown (Deng 1995: 102-103). Fearing that Egyptian nationalism might encourage nationalist sentiments among educated Northerners, the British decided to break the close connection between the Sudan and Egypt[14] in an attempt to curb Egyptian influence (Deng 1995: 80-82, 86-87). The British sought to further counter the anti-British, pro-Egyptian nationalists in the Sudan by deepening the separation of the North from the South and strengthening those religious leaders who opposed Egyptian ambitions for the Sudan (Deng 1995: 102-103, 111-112).

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[12] Strained relations between the Condominium partners prompted the British to order the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from the Sudan. Sudanese units in Khartoum, protesting the withdrawal of their Egyptian colleagues, refused to obey British orders and were eventually put down by force, with heavy loss of life. This event, known as the Khartoum Mutiny, led to the Sudan's coming under full control of Britain, with Egypt losing all effective participation in the government of the country (Deng 1995: 106).

[13] In 1919, an anti-British nationalist revolution had taken place in Egypt, leading to the country's (nominal) independence from Britain in 1922. The British refusal to accept a delegation of Egyptian nationalists (led by Saad Zaghloul [Ṣaʿd Zaġlūl]) to the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920) – where the nationalists had planned to plea for Egyptian autonomy – followed by Zaghloul's arrest, sparked a widespread revolt. Zaghloul was released and concessions were made to the nationalists in the hope of outmanoeuvring them. A declaration of independence (1922) ended the protectorate, but the British retained power in four matters, namely the security of imperial communications, defence, the protection of foreign interests and minorities, and the Sudan (Little et al. 2019).

[14] Egypt's position was restored in 1936, albeit in somewhat diminished capacity (Deng 1995: 80-82, 86-87).

Colonial authorities came to perceive the widespread use of an Arabic-based language – in general, and particularly by government administrators – in the South as worrisome, since they feared it could serve as a vehicle through which nationalist sentiments would be transmitted to the Southern regions (Leonardi 2013: 361). In order to maintain order and peace in the South, the colonial government believed, the rural Sudanese were to be governed by 'traditional' authorities, insulated from nationalist influences and unrest coming from the North (that is, both the Northern Sudan and Egypt) (Leonardi 2013: 361). From the 1920s onwards, discussions were held concerning language policy in the Southern provinces (Mahmud 1983: 15, 47-52, cited in Leonardi 2013: 362). Tucker wrote in 1934:

> It is only of late years that the Sudan Government has laid particular stress on the language side of the Southern administration. Hitherto all official intercourse with the natives had been through the medium of Arabic (Tucker 1934: 28).

According to Tucker (1934: 28), furthermore, it had at this point become apparent to the colonial government that "the form of Arabic spoken in the Southern provinces was so debased as to be hardly practical", and that it was "incapable of exact statement" (note by the Resident Inspector of Southern Education [1936], cited in Leonardi 2013: 363). The British therefore decided to adopt a policy which would bar the South Sudanese creole Arabic completely from the South, to be replaced by English and 'local' vernaculars as languages of administration (Tucker 1934: 28-39). The Education Secretary, J.C. Matthew, in his 'Memorandum on the Language Problem of Southern Sudan' (1927), argued that SSA – which he, not so sensibly, characterised as "a clumsy instrument" – was "totally unfit to be used for educational purposes" (Memorandum on the Language Problem of Southern Sudan [1927], cited in Leonardi 2013: 362). Another element of the 'language problem' which the Education Secretary perceived existed in the South was the potential use of the Arabic script to write SSA (Memorandum on the Language Problem of Southern Sudan [1927], cited in Leonardi 2013: 362). Matthew, here, recognised the Arabic script as a symbol of Islam and Arab culture, and hence feared it would encourage Islamisation and Arabisation of the areas in which SSA was spoken.

III. The colonial Southern Policy

The course of events outlined above provoked a significant change in British policy: the colonial administration decided to no longer govern the Sudan as a united entity, but rather as two separate units, a 'North' and a 'South'. The Colonial Southern Policy, as it came to be known, was already underway in the 1920s, but was officially adopted in 1930, when it was articulated in the Memorandum on the Southern Policy (1930). The Southern Policy effectively divided the Sudan into two separate political entities with differentiated administrative, economic, military, cultural, and educational systems. The colonial authorities pursued this separatist policy until a radical change of direction after the Second World War, which will be discussed later on in the paper. In this section, we will proceed to outline the core idea of the Southern Policy. Then, we will examine how it was implemented, both on a physical and semiotic level.

The Southern Policy can be understood as a strategic policy which was part of the broader 'divide and rule'-strategy of the British colonial enterprise and which facilitated the establishment and maintenance of law and order in the territory (Deng 1995: 11, 51-52, 61, 77-79; Abdelhay & Mugaddam 2014: 179-180; Abdelhay et al. 2017: 349-350). This strategy entailed the construction of a hierarchically structured society, a process in which language, along with religion and race, played a significant role as a dividing instrument (Abdelhay & Mugaddam 2014: 179-180). Sarkesian (1973: 4-5) outlines two major premises on which the Southern Policy rested. Firstly, the Southern Policy was based on a perceived cultural distinction between the North and the South of the Sudan. The Northern part of the country was thought of as characterised by the Arabic language, Arab customs, and Islam, while the South was conceived of as inherently Black African and tribal. Secondly, the Southern Policy tied in with the previously mentioned ambiguity in British policy concerning the possible integration of the Southern region with British East Africa. This caused the British to also envision the economic development of the Southern provinces jointly with the East African colonies, while the North was viewed as economically tied to the Arab countries of North Africa and the Middle East, particularly Egypt (Deng 1995: 86).

The first factor (the perceived cultural antagonism between North and South) expressed itself in a number of semiotic strategies aimed at dividing the Sudan into two self-contained, mutually exclusive 'spaces' with antagonistic socio-cultural systems (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 345). The Southern Policy constructed two cultural identities which were spatially anchored to their respective geographical areas and semiotically bound to their respective religions, languages, ethnicities, and cultures. On the one hand, the cluster 'Islam / Arabic language / Arab ethnicity and culture' was indexical of 'Northern identity', while, on the other hand, the cluster 'Christianity / English and 'local', non-Arabic vernaculars / African ethnicity and culture' signalled 'Southern identity' (Abdelhay 2010b: 28; Abdelhay et al. 2017: 349-350). The country's cultural, religious, linguistic, and ethnic diversity was thus controlled by reducing it to this fixed, binary opposition. Language and

religion proved indispensable instruments in drawing the necessary social and ethnic boundaries between the envisioned homogeneous units (Abdelhay et al. 2016; Abdelhay & Makoni 2018: 103).

The Southern Policy was in large part motivated by the colonial government's wish to neutralise the nationalist tendencies which had begun to develop in the Sudan, by depriving the educated class of influence and instead cultivating the 'traditional' leaders (Deng 1995: 111-112). The separation of the North from the South was an important part of this policy and was intended to contain any nationalist sentiment to the North. With this in mind, the Southern Policy aimed to produce two physically (geographically) and semiotically differentiated units. To achieve this, the colonial administration, first of all, used coercive measures which effected a physical separation of the North from the South – and hence of the 'Northerner' from the 'Southerner'. In addition, it employed semiotic strategies, drawing on the discursive resources present (Abdelhay et al. 2017: 349-350). We will first review the coercive strategies used to implement the Southern Policy, before turning to the semiotic strategies.

Coercive strategies: Physical separation of North and South

The British colonial government used a number of coercive strategies to physically separate the North from the South, and more precisely, to impede contact between Northerners and Southerners. As a result of the Southern Policy, the South became completely closed off to Northerners, including colonial administrators stationed in the North (Henderson 1965: 164, cited in Sarkesian 1973: 5). These measures primarily affected the administrative, economic, and military systems.

A number of laws implemented in the framework of the Southern Policy were significant in physically closing off the North from the South and vice-versa. Firstly, the so-called 'No Man's Land Law' of 1929 effected the evacuation of a strip of land on the border between the Southern and Northern provinces, in order to prevent human interaction across the regions (Abu Manga 2007). Secondly, the 1922 'Passports and Permits Ordinance', together with the 1930 'Closed District Ordinance' (thirdly), severely restricted free movement and travel between North and South; a government permit was required for non-Sudanese to enter the Sudan, and for Sudanese themselves to travel between North and South (Hurreiz 1968, cited in Abu Manga 2010; Deng 1995: 80). Consequently, travel from the South to the North became virtually non-existent (Deng 1995: 80). The expressed rationale behind this segregation of Northerners and Southerners and the restrictions on their mobility was the belief that both 'peoples' should be allowed the opportunity "to develop in consonance with their own ethnic, cultural, economic and linguistic aspirations" (Nyombe 1997: 103, cited in Abu Manga 2010). This clearly reflects the colonial government's perception of a cultural discrepancy between North and South.

The British constructed the North and the South as separate political entities. In the North, the colonial administration favoured a narrow segment of the elitist Northern Arab communities, whose compliance they ensured by turning them into colonial employees (Sharkey 2007: 27-30). The British understood and made use of the tribal configuration of the North to maintain law and order

and to establish a sense of security and stability in the countryside (Deng 1995: 61). Tribal leaders were entrusted considerable state powers, notably through the system of taxation (Abdelhay et al. 2017: 349-350). In the South, a distinct political system was created in which the existing tribal structures were upheld and local chiefs cultivated (Sarkesian 1973: 5-6).

Furthermore, the 'Chief's Court Ordinance' in 1931 institutionalised the judicial powers of Southern tribal leaders in both criminal and civil cases and formalised tribal institutions (Deng 1995: 81, 111-112). In the North, the British compromised with regards to the legal system: criminal and civil jurisdictions were based on English law, while personal matters were entrusted to the jurisdiction of the Islamic courts and were thus governed by Islamic law (Deng 1995: 55).

Additionally, the Khartoum Mutiny in 1924 led the British to reorganise the army on a regional basis (Deng 1995: 110). A local Southern military force, which became known as the 'Equatoria Corps', was created, divorced from control by Northern authorities (Sarkesian 1973: 6). These Southern military units were under the command of British officers, and Northern and Egyptian recruits were excluded (Deng 1995: 80). This decision allowed for the removal of the Northern garrisons from the South, and with them their entourage of (Northern) traders and other civilians left the scene, hence destroying an important link with the North (Sarkesian 1973: 6).

Furthermore, some symbolic measures were taken which intended to eliminate from the South everything that was indexically linked to Arabic, Arab culture, or Islam, such as the adoption of Sunday as the weekly day of rest in the South while maintaining Friday as the day of rest in the North (Deng 1995: 81), the adoption of different public holidays (Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 469), and the forced abandonment of Arab-like forms of dress and Arabic naming-practices (Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 469; Abdelhay & Makoni 2018: 103).

Among the most important outcomes of these coercive measures was the elimination of all formal and informal channels – apart from the British administrators – through which the South Sudanese could gain political experience or pursue their political interests at a national level (Sarkesian 1973: 5). Furthermore, the physical prevention of mutual contacts and the belief among the British administrators that both 'identities' were culturally antagonistic hindered the formation of positive relations of understanding between Southerners and Northerners and encouraged detrimental attitudes (Sarkesian 1973: 5). There was a widespread attitude among Northern Sudanese, especially in uneducated circles, which considered the Southern Sudanese as belonging to an inferior race, and many Northerners habitually referred to the Southerner as 'slave' (Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Southern Sudan During August, 1955: 6, 123-124, cited in Sarkesian 1973: 5). Deng (1995: 409, partly citing Khalid 1990: 135) writes in this respect:

> Such derogatory terms as zunj [*zanǧ*, *zinǧ*], "Negro," or abid [*ʿabd*], "slave," commonly applied to the southern Sudanese and black [*sic*] Africans in general, are now less rampant than they were even a few decades ago. But they are still popular in casual conversations that sometimes have a serious and even racist edge. Mansour Khalid has intimated that, "In the

> closed circles of northern Sudan there is a series of unprintable slurs for Sudanese of non-Arab stock, all reflective of semi-concealed prejudice."

The condescending view of the average Northerner towards the Southerner was reciprocated by the belief among Southerners that the Northerners had inferior moral values inherent in the genetic and cultural composition of their identity (Deng 1995: 411). In the South, Northerners were strongly associated with the region's past experiences with slavery, and they were thus generally viewed with contempt or at least a degree of suspicion (Deng 1995: 83, 411).

Semiotic strategies: Construction of antagonistic, spatialised identities

We have seen in the previous section that a number of coercive measures effectively inflicted a physical separation of Northerners from Southerners and that certain practices which were indexical of 'Northern identity' and which happened to be practiced in the Southern 'space' were considered 'out of place' there and were discouraged. More influential and impactful still were the semiotic aspects of the Southern Policy, as these primarily had their effects on the minds of the people of both the North and the South and were thus less easily changed; deeply engrained attitudes cannot be as easily erased as physically constructed barriers can be lifted.

A certain asymmetry is noticeable with regards to the semiotic facets of the Southern Policy: while the Southern Policy further recognised and reinforced those discursive resources deemed indexical of the North, a much more fundamental project of construction was undertaken in the South. The name 'Southern Policy' also points in this direction, as it suggests a certain focus on the South, an assumption that there is some type of work to be done in the South that is apparently not needed in the North. Essentially, in the eyes of the colonial officials, there existed a culture and civilisation in the North (based in Arab culture and Islam), and, regardless of how this 'Northern culture' was subsequently evaluated, such a pre-existing culture was perceived to be altogether lacking in the South. Because of this suggested 'emptiness', the South lent itself to 'construction'. With the mirror-image of the Arab-Islamic North in mind, the South could be structured so as to implant in it an 'image of communion' (Anderson 2006: 6), thereby constructing – or, more accurately, 'inventing' (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983) – its identity. This asymmetry also clearly manifests itself when we focus solely on the language policies pursued in the North and the South respectively: the colonial government readily recognised Arabic as the 'indigenous' language of the North, but this was not the case for the South, where the administration deemed it necessary to organise a language conference (the Rejaf Language Conference) in order to 'delimit' – and, essentially, 'construct' and 'invent' (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983) – the 'indigenous' languages of the South. We will come back to this point later.

The following section will examine how both the Northern and the Southern socio-cultural systems were semiotically constructed in the framework of the Southern Policy. We will start by reviewing some of the points alluded to earlier concerning the Northern socio-cultural system.

Semiotic construction of the Northern socio-cultural system

The North of the country was perceived by the British as a homogeneous entity, defined above all by Arabic and Islam (Abdelhay et al. 2011b). In comparison to the South, the question of which language to use as the official administrative language and as medium of instruction in Northern schools seems to have had a more straight-forward answer. The administration recognised the symbolic value of Arabic for most Northerners as well as its instrumentality – i.e., its being widely known and having a history of associations with the state apparatus. Arabic was seen as intrinsically linked to Islam and Arab ethnicity and was thus recognised as the official language of the North, to be used as administrative language and medium of instruction. As such, it was invested with considerably more power and prestige than any other communicative form present in the area (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 345).

As far as religion is concerned, the British were motivated to recognise and respect the Islamic identity of the North in order to prevent violent opposition, and were willing to make some concessions, such as the adoption of Friday as the official day of rest and the partial institutionalisation of Islamic law. In this way, the government can be said to have adopted "a policy of positive encouragement of Islam" in the North (Deng 1995: 54-55). The administration capitalised on the cultural and religious divisions between various religious and ethnic factions in the North, playing a moderating and pacifying role. Religious leaders were co-opted and turned into political allies, and thus religion became politicised in the otherwise secular British administration (Deng 1995: 56-58). As has been mentioned, the cultivation of these religious leaders, whose authority was, essentially, colonially constructed, was an important strategy to curb nationalist influences in the region and secure the loyalty of the people (Deng 1995: 79-82). Furthermore, the colonial government upheld and supported an educational system based on Islam and included Islam as part of the curriculum in state schools (Deng 1995: 55).

In sum, the Southern Policy aimed to produce a homogeneous 'Northern identity' indexed by Arabic, Islam, and Arab culture, and bound in geographical space to the Northern part of the country (Abdelhay et al. 2017: 349-350). In this process of identity construction, other groups which did not conform to the envisioned identity of the Northerner were excluded. The Eastern and Western regions of the Sudan, which, despite having been predominantly Islamised, had remained largely non-Arab[15], were nevertheless considered part of the 'North' and were subjected to the same

[15] Deng remarked that is both factually incorrect and politically misleading to assume that the North has been uniformly Arabised and Islamised (Deng 1995: 44-45). Many non-Arab tribes in the North have adopted Islam but have nevertheless retained their non-Arab ethnic and cultural identities, including their own distinctive languages (Deng 1995: 401-402). As mentioned previously in this paper, these communities have often embraced Arabic as a lingua franca alongside their non-Arabic mother tongue (Sharkey 2012: 430). The most notable among these groups are the Nubians in the north of Northern Sudan, the Beja in the eastern part, the Nuba in Southern Kordofan province, and the Fur in the western Darfur province (Deng 1995: 44-

educational system and language policies (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 345), thus causing considerable strain on the (non-Arabic) 'indigenous' languages of these groups.

Semiotic construction of the Southern socio-cultural system

The Memorandum on the Southern Policy (1930) outlined the nexus of the colonial administration's vision for the South:

> The policy of the Government in the Southern Sudan is *to build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units* with structure and organisation based, to whatever extent the requirements of equity and good government permit, upon indigenous customs, traditional usage, and beliefs... (Memorandum on the Southern Policy [1930], cited by Abdel-Rahim 1965: 20-23, in Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 468, emphasis mine).

Language was considered a major indicator of tribal belonging (Miller 2018) and was thus an indispensable tool for the government in building up the envisioned "self-contained racial or tribal units". This general idea, on which the Southern Policy as a whole rested, was rationalised by discourses of 'indigeneity' and 'endangerment' (Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 468), and the belief that the administration ought to 'rescue' the South from "the evils of rapid urbanization, detribalization, and consequent loss of morality and discipline, which might follow from an uncontrolled immigration of Arabic-speaking northern Sudanese to the south" (James 2008: 70). There was indeed a widespread sentiment among the British that the South needed genuine protection from the North, and "the indigenous institutions and traditional cultures of the South" were not considered strong enough "to withstand the onslaught of Arabism and Islam" (Warburg 1990: 156, cited in Deng 1995: 80). The British administration felt it had a necessary role to play as moderating force, in order to prevent the North from 'lording over' and imposing its will on the South (Deng 1995: 61). Henderson (1965: 162-163, cited in Deng 1995: 81-82) asserts in this regard that the British viewed the Northerner as "either a raider or a trader";

> [a]s for the professional trader (the Jellabi [*ǧallābī*][16]), [...] [h]e had always preyed upon the Southerner and now he threatened to interfere with progress, as the Indian was doing in East Africa, by monopolising petty trade and cash farming.

Accordingly, the colonial regime sought to delegitimise Arabic by portraying it as a 'dangerous language', conceptually undetachable from Islam, Arab ethnicity and culture, and the perceived

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45; Sharkey 2012: 430). The fact that these identities, cultures, and languages have been preserved in the North highlights the fact that the processes of Arabisation and Islamisation did not simply obliterate indigenous worldviews, but rather built on them (Anderson 1955: 263, Heintzen 1962: 42, Trimingham 1964: 39, 61-63, 74, 163-164, all cited in Deng 1995: 45).

[16] The term '*ǧallābīya*' denotes the "loose, shirtlike garment" which was "the common dress of the male population in Egypt" (Wehr 1993: 153). The professional Northern traders, then, were associated, through their clothing, with Egyptians, who were, in the minds of the general Southern population, closely linked to the South's past experiences with slavery.

desire of the Northerners to dominate the South (Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 468; Abdelhay et al. 2017: 349; Abdelhay & Makoni 2018: 103). The Southern Policy aimed to eliminate the use of SSA as a lingua franca in the South and encouraged its replacement by English and local vernacular languages (Tucker 1934: 29; Deng 1995: 80; Abdelhay 2010b: 28). The Civil Secretary at this time, Harold MacMichael, declared that "every effort should be made to make English the means of communication among the [Southern] men themselves to the complete exclusion of Arabic" (Abd Al-Rahim 1969: 245-249, appendix 6, cited in Deng 1995: 81). Notwithstanding the "strong feeling [among colonial officials] that one's dinner-time conversation would no longer be sacred with an English-speaking boy waiting at a table" (Tucker 1934: 35), the British successfully introduced English as the new lingua franca in the South, in the hope of making SSA redundant, and it spread in the South at a remarkably steady speed (Tucker 1934: 35-36).

As in the North, the Condominium administration institutionalised a religious version of education in the South, rooted in Christianity (Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 467). The Catholic and Protestant Christian missions were an important factor in the process of constructing the cultural identity of the South. From the earliest stages of the Condominium, they had been given free rein to Christianise the Southern tribes, which were considered 'pagan' (Tucker 1934: 28), and they had been entrusted with the task of organising elementary education using the local vernaculars of the communities (Sharkey 2012: 434). The predominant goal of the missions was to Christianise the African populations through (a version of) their local idioms; they opposed the use of modern Western educational materials in European languages (Abdelhay et al. 2016). The colonial government hoped that the Christian missionaries would modernise the South and introduce the rudiments of 'Western civilisation' (Deng 1995: 11, 79). This policy of 'civilising' the South through the missionaries had culturally quite far-reaching effects in the sense that Christianity, to a large degree, came to replace (the) pre-existing cultural worldview(s) with a modern, Western-oriented worldview (Deng 1995: 84). In contrast to the more traditional relationship between religion and politics which was characteristic of the North, the Christian influence encouraged a disentanglement of religion from politics in the South, creating the attitude among Southerners that religion was primarily a matter of individual spiritual consciousness (Deng 1995: 84).

The discursive resources which were made indexical of the South were, on the one hand, Christianity (and, to a lesser extent, animistic religions), and, on the other hand, English and Southern (non-Arabic) vernacular languages (Deng 1995: 388; Abdelhay 2010b: 28). In the South even more so than in the North, the colonial regime engaged in the 'invention of traditions' (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983), as it constructed artificial boundaries, not only between the North and the South, but also between different communities internal to both parts, despite the fact that these communities regularly interacted with one another (Abdelhay 2010a: 210). Noteworthy in this respect is the example of the Nuba Mountains area, for which the colonial government designed a

peculiar policy known as the Nuba Policy[17]. This policy was aimed at constructing a distinct 'Nuba identity', differentiated from the identity of 'the Northerner', despite the fact that the Nuba Mountains were technically part of the Northern region (Abdelhay 2010a).

In summary, we can say that, while the North was constructed as a homogeneous entity, the South suffered what Abdelhay et al., using Fabian's (1983: 31) term, aptly call a "double denial of coevalness": "[the colonial Southern Policy] located the 'South' in a temporal, indigenous world incompatible with both the North and the West" (Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 468).

The Rejaf Language Conference (1928)

Language policies formed an important part of the semiotic strategies used by the colonial government to achieve the goals of its Southern Policy. The bulk of these language planning measures were articulated during the Rejaf Language Conference (henceforth: RLC), held in 1928 in Mongolla, one of the larger cities of today's Jubek State in the Republic of South Sudan. Among the conferees were British colonial officials (including representatives from the East African colonies), linguists, and representatives of the Christian missions preoccupied with educational work in the South (Tucker 1934: 29; Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 470-471; Sharkey 2012: 434). 'Native voices', however, were conspicuously absent from the conference (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 347). The main impetus for organising the RLC was the colonial government's realisation that, if the South was to be(come) the antagonistic mirror-image of the North – as the Southern Policy envisioned – the discursive resources associated with the North (notably, the Arabic language) could not be allowed to occupy a place of importance – if any place at all – in the Southern provinces. The British, however, were faced with the inconvenient reality that a creolised variety of Arabic (i.e., SSA) had already become the well-established lingua franca of the Southern provinces (Miller 2018: 129). The conferees to the RLC dismissed this variety of Arabic as "a pidgin Arabic, a jargon severely limited in its means of expression" (Report of the Rejaf Language Conference [henceforth: RRLC] 1928: 10, cited in Miller 2018: 129), and, convinced of the fact that "Arabic, being neither the language of the governing nor the governed [i.e., the Southern Sudanese], will progressively deteriorate" (Memorandum on the Southern Policy [1930], cited by Abdel-Rahim 1965: 20-23, in Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 468), they concluded that there was no language in the South Sudan deemed "capable of further development" (RRLC 1928: 10, cited in Miller 2018: 129), as was the case for Swahili in East Africa, or Hausa in West Africa (Miller 2018: 129).

The construction of the Southern vernaculars

The focus of the RLC, then, was to 'discover' such non-Arabic, 'indigenous' languages, and subsequently develop them into suitable media of instruction. This was to be achieved in four main

[17] See Abdelhay 2010a for an in-depth discussion of the Nuba Policy.

steps. Firstly, the conferees were to 'draw up' an official list of 'languages' and 'dialects' spoken in the Southern Sudan; secondly, they were tasked with devising a system of 'group languages' and 'selecting' these group languages for the various areas; thirdly, they were to discuss the adoption of a unified system of orthography for all the selected languages; finally, they were tasked with the production of educational materials (textbooks, grammars, reading books, etc.) in the selected languages (RRLC 1928: 4, cited in Abdelhay et al. 2016: 346; Tucker 1934: 29-30). The 'language groups' were established based on the principle that the demographically most important languages would be considered representative of a group of languages and language varieties, and were thus suited to serve as languages of instruction in the areas in which they were spoken (Abdelhay et al. 2011b; Miller 2018). In determining the demographic weight of the various Southern languages, the first official language statistics were produced (Miller 2018). Notably, the number of Arabic speakers in the South was not counted, despite the fact that (South Sudanese creole) Arabic was the mother tongue of an increasing number of speakers, particularly in urban communities, and was widely known as lingua franca (RRLC 1928: 23, 25, 26, cited in Miller 2018: 130). The source of the numbers of speakers recorded for each linguistic variety is rather ambiguous: according to Miller (2018: 127-131), the numbers are likely to have been estimated based on the list of tax payers from each district. In any case, the outcome of this 'grouping' process was that six 'group languages' were selected; these were Bari, Dinka, Latuko, Nuer, Shilluk, and Zande (RRLC 1928: 30, cited in Abdelhay et al. 2016: 353). A committee was set up for each of these languages, entrusted with the task of stabilising and circulating them by providing prescriptive materials such as textbooks and grammars (Abdelhay et al. 2011b; Abdelhay et al. 2016: 344, 350, 354). Analogous to the way in which larger tribes were seen as administratively representative of smaller tribal groups, the chosen 'group languages' were considered representative of the linguistic variability in their respective districts. Tucker (1934: 30-31) rationalises the 'grouping' process of the Southern languages as follows:

> It was seen at the outset, of course, that it would be impossible to patronize all the language and dialects in the Southern Sudan, so careful sifting and arrangement had to be made. The multidinous languages and dialects were boiled down to six groups, and the principal member of each group was chosen as representative language.

Tucker also remarks, however, that some "language confusion" followed this undertaking, since the languages which were selected as 'representative' more often than not were representative only of a limited segment of language users in the designated area in which the language was to be further developed (Tucker 1934: 31-33).

The RLC has been described as a 'language-making event' (Sharkey 2012: 434). The Conference can be said to have produced a 'linguistic cartography' (Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 471) of hierarchically ordered linguistic varieties, in which the Southern 'languages' were envisioned as discrete units with clear boundaries, anchored to specific localities as well as to specific ethnic and tribal identities (Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 471). In fact, the names given to the six 'group languages' are clearly intertextual with the ethnic composition of the South as envisioned by the colonial

administration. More concretely, these 'group languages' (e.g., Dinka, Nuer) are not just linguistic, but ethno-linguistic categories (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 350). The creation of these ethno-linguistic categories through the 'selection' of 'group languages' entailed processes of recognising and 'constructing' certain identities, while simultaneously erasing others (Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 471). Certain communicative resources used by Southerners were given the status of 'language', while others were placed in the category of 'dialect'. In this way, implicitly, those people speaking 'languages' were upgraded to a higher status than those speakers of a mere 'dialect of a language', who were, again implicitly, hierarchically subsumed under another heading, as a part of a larger group, and not a distinct group in their own respect. This entire project was based entirely on the perceptions of the British administrators, without taking into consideration the beliefs the 'natives' held about their own identity.

In brief, then, the colonial administration used strategies of 'selecting' and 'grouping' in order to 'manage' – or rather, 'manipulate' or 'mold' – the cultural, linguistic, and ethnic diversity of the South. Ethno-linguistic categories, once constructed, were semiotically bound to demarcated districts in the South, and more specifically to the particular 'spheres of influence' of the different missionary organisations active in the South[18] (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 347). Similar to the way in which the 'language groups' were considered as 'fixed', 'static' units, the groups of their speakers were likewise considered to be self-contained, ethnically hermetic units, and they were governed as such, in as much as communication between them – which had consistently taken place, as mentioned, in SSA, in its capacity as lingua franca – was not encouraged (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 350).

Language education policies in the RLC: The 'de-Arabisation' and 'vernacularisation' of South Sudanese Arabic

The RLC marked the active intervention of the colonial government in the field of language education planning, a domain which had hitherto exclusively been entrusted to the missionary organisations (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 346). The educational system was an important vehicle through which both the spreading of English and the development of the vernaculars were pursued (Tucker 1934: 29). Three main principles were outlined concerning language education in the South, and these were documented in the RRLC (1928). Firstly, the principle medium of instruction in lower elementary grades of education was to be a 'tribal language', and students in these grades were to receive an introduction to English. Secondly, a lingua franca of African origin (i.e., an 'indigenous' language) was recommended to be introduced in the middle grades in linguistically diverse areas.

[18] The government's assigning of separate 'spheres of influence' to the most important Catholic and Protestant missionary organisations had a two-fold purpose. First of all, it kept the various missions out of each other's way, avoiding conflict between them (Sanderson 1963: 237, cited in Abdelhay 2010a: 204). Secondly, it dispersed them throughout the Southern provinces, providing the British with the opportunity to use the missionaries as proxies for "cheap colonial rule" (Sharkey 2012: 434).

Thirdly, English was to be the medium of instruction in the higher grades (RRLC 1928: 9, cited in Abdelhay et al. 2016: 348; Deng 1995: 81; Sharkey 2012: 434). The parallelisms evident in these three principles (namely, 'tribal language' ~ lower grades; African lingua franca ~ middle grades; English ~ upper grades) clearly reflect an underlying evaluation of the communicative resources in question in terms of their 'goodness' and therefore also imply something about their users. Abdelhay et al. aptly write:

> These guiding principles thus create a hierarchy of linguistic resources reflecting their users' social statuses. Using European languages at upper levels and local languages at the bottom or local level enacts an ideology in which *education is a process of becoming European* (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 348, emphasis mine).

The addition of the phrase 'of African origin' in the second principle effectively ruled out Arabic in any form, creolised or otherwise, as a medium of education at this level. Arabic was considered unfit for the South on two grounds. Firstly, the barring of Arabic from the South was "an essential feature of the general scheme" (Memorandum on the Southern Policy [1930], cited by Abdel-Rahim 1965: 20-23, in Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 468); it was one of the foundations of the Southern Policy that Arabic be contained to the North, where it was semiotically anchored to Islam and Arab culture. Arabic was dismissed as 'non-indigenous' to the South and belonging exclusively to the North. Secondly, the type of creolised Arabic spoken in the South at this time – coming as it did, in the view of the colonial administrators, in a "crude form", and being as it was "severely limited in its means of expression" – was deemed to be of inadequate quality to "fulfil the growing requirements of the future", and was therefore considered unfit as a language of instruction in Southern schools (Memorandum on the Southern Policy [1930], cited by Abdel-Rahim 1965: 20-23, in Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 468). In this way, the RLC engineered a perceived absence of an 'indigenous' lingua franca in the South (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 350).

As mentioned, the RLC recommended the use of 'the vernacular of the community' (i.e., a 'tribal language') at the level of primary education. Some of the conferees noted that Arabic (more precisely, SSA) fulfilled this function in some Southern districts and suggested that it should thus be used as a medium of instruction at the lower level of education in these districts (RRLC 1928: 23, cited in Abdelhay et al. 2016: 352). To ease the feelings of discomfort that this suggestion evoked among the conferees, the proposition was put forth to do away with the Arabic orthography and to use Latin script for writing SSA in the South instead (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 352; Miller 2018). In this way, the variety of Arabic used in the South could effectively be 'downgraded' to a 'local vernacular' on par with the non-Arabic indigenous languages spoken in the area. Furthermore, the suggested orthographic change would break the association of SSA with Islam and Arab culture. The adoption of Latin orthography could thus simultaneously 'vernacularise' and 'de-Arabise' SSA (Abdelhay et al. 2016), thereby reducing its indexical capacity as indicative of Islam and Arab culture, both symbols of Northern identity. The use of Latin script, which carries particular associations and

connotations of its own[19], opened up the possibility of association instead with the larger Christian community (and notably also those Christian communities in the East African colonies) (Miller 2010: 388; Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 471-472).

The question of the orthography of SSA introduced significant discussion to the conference[20]. Some of the missionaries continued to vehemently oppose Arabic even in this 'desensitised' capacity, relieved of its cultural, religious, and racial connotations. While the missionaries tended to stress the ostensibly problematic symbolic load of SSA, the colonial officials viewed it more in its instrumental function and gave greater recognition to its administrative convenience (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 355, footnote 19). The Southerners' own assessments concerning the suitability of SSA remained absent in the discussion. Nevertheless, it might be assumed that they evaluated Arabic positively (or at least neutrally), in its function as lingua franca or even community vernacular (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 355, footnote 19). Most of the missionaries, recognising the inevitability of teaching in SSA in some areas, eventually agreed to its orthographically conditioned use in elementary education (Miller 2018: 130).

The construction of the South as a multicultural front

We have just examined how the RLC produced its envisioned 'self-contained racial and tribal units' in the South by 'selecting' certain linguistic varieties and fixing them onto the groups of their speakers on the premise that language is indicative of cultural and ethnic belonging, thus producing categories which are at once linguistic and ethnic. The language policies of the RLC had significant and long-term repercussions with regards to the conceptualisation of Southern identity, as will be discussed in this section.

By institutionalising "ideologically constructed categories of interaction" (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 344, 347), the RLC reduced the multilingual practices of the South to grouped artefacts – i.e., 'languages' which the conferees recognised as 'real', as they were countable, and therefore controllable (Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 471). In this way, an image of multilingualism was constructed

[19] We might somewhat tentatively say that, in the same way as the Arabic script is indexical of an Islamic worldview, the Latin script carries with it notions of a particular Western worldview strongly informed by the attainments of the Renaissance (Mignolo 1992: 304), as well as specific religious (Christian) associations (Miller 2010: 388).

[20] Tucker (1934: 33) states that the question of the orthography of the Southern Sudanese languages more generally was never harmoniously settled during the RLC. As Abdelhay et al. (2016: 344) note, the designing of a common writing system for the Southern Sudanese languages was not merely a matter of practicability, but an inherently ideological act revealing the power struggles going on *within* the colonial administration itself. The question of writing conventions provoked fierce conflict, particularly when different missions became involved in the standardisation of one and the same language, to the point that some missions resorted to banning other missions' publications because of the spelling (Tucker 1934: 33).

in the South, in contrast to the monolingualism characteristic of the North. In other words, facing the 'monoglot' North was posited the 'polyglot' South (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 344, 347).

The language policies of the government, as articulated during the RLC, reflect a recognition by the British of the South's diversity: the government adopted a favourable stance to multilingualism and promoted various ethno-linguistic identities (Abdelhay et al. 2016). As the RLC constructed an image of linguistic pluralism in the South, it concurrently produced a pluralistic, 'multicultural' image of the whole of Southern society itself (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 344, 347). However, this linguistic and cultural pluralism was, as Abdelhay et al. (2016: 354) have noted, merely an artificial construction, "the product of institutional intervention and engineered division", not simply a corroboration of the natural order of things. Although the linguistic pluralism of the South was recognised, the construction of language groups also had an assimilative and reductionist effect, since certain linguistic resources were reduced to mere varieties ('dialects') of overarching 'group languages'. Awarding certain linguistic resources the status of 'group language' meant recognising them as 'languages', in the full sense of the word, and conferring a sense of 'togetherness' onto the groups of their speakers. Concurrently, other linguistic resources were not awarded such status, and so the groups of their speakers, too, were denied such full recognition.

Politically, the South was considered a singular entity (Abdelhay et al. 2011b). The colonial government deemed it necessary to construct the South as a homogeneous front so that it could be mobilised as a counterweight to the seemingly homogeneously Arab-Islamic North and the perceived threat emanating from it (in Hurreiz' [1968: 13, cited in Abdelhay 2011b: 471] words, "the threat of the invading Arabic language and culture which formed a homogeneous and consolidated front"). The perception of a Southern 'linguistic unity despite multilingualism' was made possible by the Southern languages' shared African origin, and their ability to be lumped together if not on the ground of their similarities, then at least on the premise of the common unlikeness between them and Arabic. In addition, as we have seen, the RLC pressed orthography into service to consolidate its linguistic categorisations. A shared orthography was used as a tool to present the Southern vernaculars as a united front (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 347), and the use of Latin script for writing SSA in Southern primary schools was likewise a discursive strategy used to distance it from Arabic and thereby reduce the perceived power in its use (Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 471).

Leonardi (2013: 366) remarks that SSA embodied the contradictions of colonialism, as it was "neither the idealised rural vernacular, nor the formal grammar and script of colonial government". Despite the government's efforts to suppress its use, SSA nevertheless survived and continued to be used as a lingua franca in the South (Leonardi 2013: 352). This we can attribute, as has been mentioned previously, not only to its practicability, but also to the symbolic importance which it gradually acquired as a marker of Southern identity. Leonardi (2013: 372) aptly writes that

> [a]ttempts to inhibit the use of South Sudanese Arabic or to impose other official languages [in South Sudan] have failed to prevent its spread: a stubborn sign that a great deal of power and agency in everyday life has come to be located neither in the elite languages of high office nor in the idealised cultural and moral values of the vernaculars, but in the quotidian

> struggles, disputes and discussions that take place just outside the minister's office – and in the markets, streets, bars, tea-places, courts, police stations, army barracks, and local government offices, in which this lingua franca is so often spoken.

In sum, the colonial Southern Policy structured the Sudan in such a way that two antagonistic, mutually exclusive identities were created. It produced a discourse that fused the Arabic language, Islam, and Arab culture and ethnicity with the Northern territory (Abdelhay et al. 2011b). In the South, an image of multilingualism and multiculturalism was constructed, thereby reducing the diversity of the South to "a set of socially structured monoculturalisms and monolingualisms" (Abdelhay et al. 2017: 349-350). The South, despite its internal pluralism, was constructed as a politically united front (Abdelhay & Mugaddam 2014: 179; Abdelhay et al. 2016: 347). The North and the South were no longer dynamic spaces, but were made into physically and culturally self-contained 'places' to which certain 'ethnicities' became anchored and were recognised as objective and transcendent categories of belonging (Abdelhay et al. 2017: 349-350).

IV. Reversal of the Southern Policy (1946)

In 1946, the colonial government decided to radically change its Southern Policy; it reversed its policy of separate development and instead adopted a new position which envisioned the North and South combined into a unitary nation-state with shared political and economic systems (Beshir 1968, Nyombe 1997: 106, both cited in Abdelhay 2010b: 28).

According to Deng (1995: 88), the reversal of the Southern Policy by the British was provoked by, on the one hand, increasing internal political awareness among the Northern elite whom they had fostered and favoured, as well as, on the other hand, external pressures from Egypt. After the Second World War, the British made some attempts at decentralisation of power in the Sudan by creating councils at both the national and the local levels. Two administrative conferences were held in 1947, one in the North and one in the South (Sarkesian 1973: 7). Deng (1995: 89-90) notes that the prevailing atmosphere at these conferences was one of mutual suspicion, with Northerners suspecting the Southerners of desiring separation, and the latter suspecting the former of wishing to dominate the South. The Southern chiefs who attended the Juba Conference stressed what they perceived as the danger of close association with the North: Southern chiefs feared that the politically more experienced Northerners would completely subdue the South, or, more bluntly, "that a crowd of hungry Gellaba [*ǧallāba*] would invade the south and swamp them and cheat the people" (Sarkesian 1973: 5, paraphrasing Chief Luath Ajak, one of the Southern leaders attending the Juba Conference).

At the first administrative conference, held in the North, the British for the first time clearly announced the abolition of the Southern Policy and the subsequent adoption of the New Southern Policy (Sarkesian 1973: 7). In this regard, the British Civil Secretary at the time, James Robertson, declared:

> We should now work on the assumption that the Sudan as at present constituted with possibly minor boundary adjustments will remain one: and we should therefore restate our southern policy and do so publicly as follows: the policy of the Sudan government regarding the southern Sudan is to act upon the facts that the peoples of the southern Sudan are distinctively African and Negroid, but that geography and economics combined so far as can be foreseen at the present time to [*sic*] render them inexplicably bound for future development to the middle eastern [*sic*] and Arabicized northern Sudan (Said 1965: 164-165, cited in Sarkesian 1973: 7).

Sarkesian (1973: 7) indicates a number of factors which provoked this "acting on the facts". Once again, the relationship between the Condominium partners proved a determining factor. Britain was at this time entertaining negotiations with Egypt concerning revisions to the 1936 Treaty for Alliance, with the Egyptians demanding the Sudan become an integral part of Egyptian territory, and that Egyptian sovereignty over it be recognised. This was as unacceptable to the British as it was to many Southerners, who, remembering the region's history of slavery, could not conceive of Egyptian

control over the Sudan (Sarkesian 1973: 7). The British therefore figured that a united Sudan would be much more able to resist these Egyptian pressures than a divided one. Additionally, a number of British administrators expressed their doubts about the South's political and economic ability to exist as an independent entity separated from the North. Two generations of seclusion and separate development notwithstanding, the South still seemed to have a relationship with the North that was lacking with any of the other surrounding territories, which led a number British officials to the conviction that an integrated Sudan including both the North and South was the most advantageous course of action to take (Sarkesian 1973: 7).

According to Deng (1995: 88), no second conference was initially planned to take place, essentially meaning that the South's future was planned to be determined in a conference in which no Southern representatives participated. However, British administrators in the South protested against the new policy decided on during the Northern Administrative Conference on the grounds that it was one-sided, and they suggested a similar conference be held in the South (Deng 1995: 89).

During the Juba Conference, held in the Southern city of Juba in June 1947, the first steps towards the political integration of North and South were taken (Sarkesian 1973: 7). In an attempt at establishing common political institutions, a National Legislative Assembly was formed in which both Northern and Southern representatives would participate (Said 1965: 46-71, cited in Sarkesian 1973: 7; Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 472). The Juba Conference saw some modest breakthroughs, most notably the achievement of a consensus among the Northern and Southern representatives about the need for political unity between North and South under a centralised Sudanese government and with a common Legislative Assembly (Sarkesian 1973: 7-8). Overshadowing this consensus, however, were the sentiments of mistrust among Southern conferees about the intentions of the Northerners and the protection of Southern interests in future government institutions. These feelings were compounded when it became clear that a mere 13 Southerners were to be appointed to the 95-member Legislative Assembly when it first opened in 1948 (Oduho & Deng 1963: 21, cited in Sarkesian 1973: 7-8).

Deng (1995: 91-97) points out several factors which explain why the Southern representatives to the Juba Conference eventually consented to the idea of a unitary state. Apart from the shared anti-colonial sentiment and the promise of political equality, the most critical factor was the inadequacy of Southern representation and the lack of real comprehension on the issues involved on the part of the Southern representatives. In Deng's view, there was thus no quasi-miraculous 'meeting of minds'; Southerners were essentially in a disadvantaged position[21], which allowed them to be swayed to support the joint Northern-British agenda (Deng 1995: 91). During the Juba Conference, Southerners as well as British administrators in the South called for protective

[21] Deng remarks that there was a significant gap in age, level of education, and political sophistication between Northern and Southern leaders; the Northern leaders had developed refined communication and interaction with the Condominium powers and the Arab world at large, while the Southern leaders had not enjoyed such opportunities (Deng 1995: 134).

provisions to safeguard the interests of the South in the unitary state. These were opposed by the Northerners, who saw any such measures as a modification or qualification of full unity (Deng 1995: 96-97). The Southerners ultimately relied on the colonial government to protect them from possible Northern domination, and in this sense, the Southern willingness to share political power with the North in a unitary state seems to have stemmed from a misunderstanding between them and the British: the Southerners seem to have trusted the British to protect them against Arab hegemony in the unitary state (Deng 1995: 91-92, 96-97). The same Southern men who had agreed to unity with the North in the Juba Conference would later become the leaders of the Southern political struggle, indicating that what they had consented to in the Juba Conference and what eventually occurred were different, leading to a loss of confidence on the part of Southern politicians (Deng 1995: 92).

From the late 1940s, British officials increasingly ceded administrative power to the Northern Sudanese intelligentsia, who consolidated their position as leaders of the incipient nationalist movement (Sharkey 2003: 67-94, cited in Sharkey 2012: 434). These Northern intellectuals had been carefully cultivated by the British because they, in line with British interests, envisioned a national Sudanese state 'for the Sudanese' and opposed the idea of a Sudan dominated by (or politically united with) Egypt (Deng 1995: 59). The elite which spearheaded the independence movement was estranged from the traditional tribal leaders and quite far removed from the larger (overwhelmingly rural) community it claimed to represent, especially in the South (Deng 1995: 63). The Northern nationalists did not fully consider Southern claims and interests, and the view of the South as primitive and backward, which most Northerners shared with the British, fostered in Northern politicians a condescending attitude towards the Southerners (Deng 1995: 134). This crisis of legitimacy was not limited to the Southern provinces, but affected other marginalised areas as well, notably the western and eastern regions of the country, which came to feel increasingly politically alienated (Deng 1995: 133-134):

> The peoples of southern Sudan, and most of those in western and eastern Sudan, had little access to the benefits which the state bestowed (education, health services, remunerative government jobs, etc.) [...]. The state personnel who faced them [...] appeared to share little of their cultural or ethnic background (Niblock 1987: 146, cited in Deng 1995: 133).

Despite all of this, there occurred during the period from the inauguration of the Legislative Assembly until the Sudan's independence in 1956 a visible degree of development in the South, which, along with increased bonds of unity between North and South, allowed the process of transferring power to the Sudanese to unfold quite rapidly, and indeed much faster than the British had anticipated (Henderson 1965: 171; Beshir 1968: 66, 68, cited in Sarkesian 1973: 8; Deng 1995: 93).

According to Deng (1995: 93-95), the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement for Sudanese Self-determination in 1953 aroused Southern political consciousness and proved an impetus for the movement of Southern recognition to take more organised form. This movement expressed Southern sentiments that the South had not been accorded its due share in the decision-making processes leading to self-determination, that the envisioned Sudanese constitution did not give due

recognition to the Southern identity, and that a unitary system of government would cause the South to be politically subordinated to and dominated by the North (Deng 1995: 93). What Deng termed the 'disparaging' attitude of Northern officials and their dismissive reaction towards Southern fears fanned Southern feelings of alienation, eventually leading to a violent revolt in August 1955 (Deng 1995: 93-94). The revolt started as a mutiny in the town of Torit, but quickly spread throughout Equatoria province and eventually became a general uprising in which several hundred Northerners were killed (Deng 1995: 94; Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 472). British authorities were forced to intervene, but this apparently did not dissuade them from disengaging from the Sudan soon afterwards, having effectively handed political power to the North (Wai 1980: 66, cited in Deng 1995: 95).

V. Colonial linguistic ideology

The language policies which the colonial government pursued in the Sudan and which we have discussed so far were informed by an "unproblematised European and colonial conceptualisation of things" (Silverstein 1998: 406), reflecting a way of thinking about language in colonial circles which was unquestioned and accepted as commonsensical. More concretely, the colonial language policies reveal a particular ideology of language underpinning it. Before examining some ideologically informed cultural and linguistic concepts employed by the colonial government in managing the linguistic diversity of the Sudan, we will take a look at the concept of (language) ideology more broadly. We will then discuss in which ways the colonial linguistic ideology manifested itself in the 'construction' of the Southern linguistic landscape in the context of the RLC. Furthermore, we will briefly touch upon the ideological dimension of orthographic change, before, finally, discussing how the colonial linguistic ideology was internalised by the colonial subjects, and how it, as a result of this, had a lasting impact on the way in which language is thought about in the Sudan.

Language ideology

The concept of language ideology is defined by Silverstein (1979: 193, cited in Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 459) as "any sets of beliefs about language articulated by the users as a rationalisation or justification of perceived language structure and use". Suleiman (2013: 6) stresses that these beliefs and ideas which make up ideology are not organised in a system but can be rather disjointed. In a similar vein, Therborn (296: viii, cited in Woolard & Schieffelin 1994: 71) metaphorically likens ideology in general to "the cacaphony of sounds and signs of a big city street", more so than to "the text serenely communicating with the solitary reader or the teacher [...] addressing a quiet, domesticated audience". It is a feature of language ideologies that the ideas contained in them tend to become part of the belief-structure of speakers, and, as such, are taken for granted as common sense (Suleiman 2013: 5-6). This 'commonsensicality' is a central element in Verschueren's (2012: 6) conceptualisation of ideology:

> We can define as ideological any basic pattern of meaning or frame of interpretation bearing on or involved in (an) aspect(s) of social "reality" (in particular the realm of social relations in the public sphere), felt to be commonsensical, and often functioning in a normative way [i.e., having the ability to signpost not just how things may be, but how things *should* be].

Suleiman (2013: 7) further states that "language ideology is everywhere, and, because of this, may in fact appear to be nowhere". It is exactly this pervasiveness of language ideology which normalises it to the point of making it covert and barely visible in ordinary discourse (Suleiman 2013: 7). This allows linguistic ideology to serve as an interpretative filter in the relationship of language and society (Woolard & Schieffelin 1994: 62, citing Mertz 1989). Language ideological discourses are not necessarily about linguistic issues, but rather represent socio-political concerns which are

articulated by the proxy of language (Suleiman 2013). In this way, language is sometimes pressed into service as a vehicle for expressing views about race, education, power, and access to state resources (Suleiman 2013: 43). The deep structure meaning of such (often politically sensitive) discussion is broached with extreme care by speaking about it in code (Suleiman 2013: 46).

Language ideology is often at work in projects of individual and group identity formation and maintenance. As Walters (2011) notes, language ideologies create links between language or language varieties and abstractions (such as the nation-state), social descriptors (like 'religious', 'masculine'), and social categories (like class or religious denomination). In this way, "[i]deologies of language [...] envision and enact links of language to group and personal identity" (Woolard and Schieffelin 1994: 55-56). Put differently, "a definition of language is always, implicitly or explicitly, a definition of human beings in the world" (Williams 1977: 21, cited in Woolard & Schieffelin 1994: 56). Because of these linkages which language ideology produces between (group or personal) identity and language, it plays a mediating role both in the construction of social differences in society (Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 460) and in regulating relations between individuals and groups (Suleiman 2013: 7). Language ideology is "thrown into high relief" (Woolard & Schieffelin 1994: 55) especially whenever there is (perceived) inequality among groups of speakers, as is often the case in situations of colonial domination (Woolard & Schieffelin 1994: 55-56). In such situations, linguistic relations are indexical of power relations and structures, or can even be said to be themselves relations of symbolic power (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 142-143, cited in Abdelhay 2010b: 27).

A modernist conception of language

Central to the language planning endeavours of the colonial regime were a number of concepts, such as 'language', 'dialect', 'vernacular', 'indigenous', 'native', 'nation', 'literature', and so on, which were used as instruments for the management of cultural and linguistic diversity in the Sudan (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 343-344). The way in which the government's language policies were articulated using these concepts – in, for example, official documents produced during the RLC – reflects various underlying assumptions and commonsensicalities which the colonial officials and their affiliates seem to have shared. Metalinguistic categories such as those mentioned above were considered unproblematically transparent and self-evident, pointing to a common Western framework for thinking about language, a shared linguistic ideology (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 343-344, 347). As it is characteristic of ideology to be both descriptive and prescriptive at the same time (i.e., to combine theories of how things are with theories about how things *should* be) (Verschueren 2012: 8), the existence of this ideological framework in colonial thinking about language is not just a neutral characteristic of colonial language policies to be acknowledged; it had profound implications for its implementation, and had lasting ramifications for post-colonial language policies.

Taking the RRLC as an example, the use in it of expressions such as 'drawing up' and 'selecting' makes it clear that the individuals involved in the conference departed from the implicit suggestion that the 'languages' and 'dialects' in question pre-existed linguistic classification, that they existed as

'natural' and unchanging categories of the social world which could be named and assembled into a list as if they were static objects (Blommaert 2010: 4-6; Abdelhay et al. 2016: 347). Language and ethnicity are assumed to belong to the realm of nature, while in reality belonging to the realm of culture (Abdelhay et al. 2017: 356-357). This vision of language and ethnic categories as 'handed-down-by-nature' is taken for granted as commonsensical, thus obscuring the underlying reality that "the terms being used [to denote different linguistic resources] were in themselves one specific manner of creating and inventing languages" (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 346, citing Makoni & Pennycook 2007). Before the linguistic resources present in the South could be 'selected' or 'drawn up' in a list, an active process of construction and standardisation was required which resulted in the birth of a full-fledged 'language' conforming to a particular conceptualisation of this notion. What is portrayed as passive 'discovery' of 'languages' is in actual fact active 'invention', and this process of invention was inevitably informed by the particular cultural condition of those who performed it, and more precisely by the ideological presumptions concerning what a language and its speakers *should* look like, which they had (Abdelhay et al. 2016: 347, 349).

Language standardisation – understood as the process by which a linguistic norm which is evaluated by some significant group of people as 'correct' or 'preferred' is isolated and prescribed in certain contexts and for certain functions (Rubin 1977, cited in Cooper 1989: 144) – is a central element in the construction of 'languages' according to the modernist conception of what a language should look like. It is important to note that

> [o]ur notions of 'standard' and 'non-standard' dialects rest upon foundations of social convention, and not – as many continue to think – upon any intrinsic differentiations in 'goodness' (Edwards 2012: 13).

Furthermore, standardisation has the effect of making languages assume the status of *natural* categories of the social world (Suleiman 2013: 13), shrouding their perpetual constructedness and consequently also the constructed nature of what Suleiman (2013: 47) has termed the 'language-identity link'[22]. Woolard & Schieffelin (1994: 64, citing Sakai 1991) similarly note that "[t]he existence of a language is always a discursive project rather than an established fact", and that the concept of a standard language should be treated as an ideological process that is tied to specifically European forms of hegemonic institutions (Woolard & Schieffelin 1994: 64). The standardisation of Sudanese languages in the South by the missionaries essentially entailed the creation for each of

[22] Suleiman (2004: 13) asserts that "language, in its capacity to signal ideological positions of various kinds, serves as a marker of group identity and as a boundary-setter between the in-group (ourselves) and the out-group (others)", thereby bonding its speakers internally and bounding them externally. When language is deployed as marker of identity in a process of identity construction, Suleiman refers to this as 'forging the language-identity link' (Suleiman 2013: 14-15). This construction is context-bound, and historically situated political interests play a defining role (Suleiman 2013: 14-15). What Suleiman terms the 'proxification' of language (i.e., the use of language as proxy) to signal identity is made possible by its symbolic function; "language is related to identity through symbolism" (Suleiman 2013: 16).

them of a norm, which they were considered to be lacking previously. In this process, speech communities were transformed into 'language communities'[23], as linguistic resources were supplied with normativity (Silverstein 1998: 407-408). Silverstein (1998: 410), drawing on Anderson's (2006) concept of 'imagined communities', asserts that standardisation – as it informs, or even creates, the language community's norm – is a paramount colonial and ethno-national project.

The modernist conception of language, which was a central element informing the colonial linguistic ideology, artifactualises and objectifies language. Languages are constructed as bounded, enclosed units, and are often thought about in ways which reduce them to their particular grammatical structures and vocabularies (Silverstein 1998; Blommaert 2010: 4-6). Silverstein (1998: 415) argues that, in the contemporary world, under strong influence of Herderian constructions of difference, language is essentialised as a precondition of ethnocultural identity. Within such a view, language is postulated as a timeless, indispensable quality of community membership, and, as such, is quite detached from the way in which it is practiced (Silverstein 1998: 415). When both its dynamic and its constructed nature are denied, language is disconnected from its historical evolution and 'frozen' in time. Such a conceptualisation of language as 'immobile' (Blommaert 2010) reflects a way of thinking in which change is equalled with decay and which stresses the supposed 'purity' of language and the 'heritage' which it embodies[24] (Woolard & Schieffelin 1994: 63).

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[23] Silverstein (1996: 285, cited in Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 460) conceptualises the 'linguistic community' (or 'language community') as a group of people who are

> united in their adherence to the idea that there exists a functionally differentiated norm for using their 'language' denotationally (to represent or describe things), the inclusive range of which the best language users are believed to have mastered in the appropriate way.

In this way, the linguistic community is a normative ideological construct reflecting underlying, hegemonic language ideologies (Blommaert 2006a, 2006b, cited in Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 461).

[24] This tendency is reflected in discourses evaluating certain linguistic phenomena which highlight the dynamicity of language (such as code-switching and -mixing, pidgin and creole languages, etc.) as indicating less than full linguistic capabilities (Woolard & Schieffelin 1994: 63). Such linguistic phenomena invalidate the conceptualisation of language as primordially ordained, natural, and static, and disprove a language's supposed mythic purity and isolation (Silverstein 1998: 409). The dynamicity inherent in language, amplified by globalising processes, gives to those who espouse a grammar-centred approach to language impressions of 'language death', of less severe 'language loss' affecting the structural and lexical richness of the language in question, or at the very least of a degree of 'language interference' or 'language mixing' (Silverstein 1998: 409). Accordingly, pidgin and creole languages are seen in the folk-view as in some sense defective, exceptional, or 'impure' (Silverstein 1998: 409), and tend to be described in quite negative terms, evoking images of 'corruption' of the language. This is amply reflected by the ways in which both colonial officials and scholars referred to the South Sudanese creole Arabic. Tucker (1934), for example, certainly makes no effort to conceal his view of SSA as a degeneration, a contortion of 'actual' Arabic, referring to it with various unflattering terms, such as "the jargon which passes for Arabic" (Tucker 1934: 28), "doggerel Arabic" (1934: 29) and "Arabic *patois*" (1934: 32).

As "the pillar of groupness" (Edwards 1994: 129), language constitutes an important element of nationalist ideologies and projects, to such an extent that the absence of such a 'pillar' in a given nationalist project might cast serious doubts on the legitimacy of the people's claim to nationhood (Woolard & Schieffelin 1994: 60). Nationalist ideologies which espouse a romantic, almost mystical connection between language and nation, sometimes even equating language with nation, are informed by a historically and ideologically constructed conceptualisation of the nation dating back to the Enlightenment period in Western history, in which the nation is conceived of as intrinsically linked to a kind of, in Anderson's [2006: 68] words, "private-property language". Exported through colonialism, this conceptualisation of the nation has become the dominant model around the world (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983, cited in Abdelhay et al. 2017: 346; Edwards 1994: 130; Woolard & Schieffelin 1994: 60; Anderson 2006).

A recurring notion in official documents of colonial language planning is the notion of 'indigeneity'. When a language or language variety is categorised as 'indigenous', this implies a romanticising sense of 'self-enclosure', the existence of an intrinsic value naturally contained in the language since its original inception (Abdelhay et al. 2017: 351-352). The notion of 'indigeneity' combined with language furthermore constructs language as a-temporal and stationary, untouched by the dynamics of history and social life (Abdelhay et al. 2017: 351-352). The concept of 'indigeneity' in general invokes notions of 'exclusivity' and even 'racial purity' (Abdelhay et al. 2017: 351-352). In a similar vein, the concept of 'local' languages (and communities) is not a completely neutral one. Such 'local' languages or language communities do not exist in a state of nature; the very concept of 'locality' presupposes the existence of the non-local, and reflects "a contrastive consciousness of self-other placement that is part of a cultural project of groupness" (Silverstein 1998: 405). In other words, the 'locality' of a language community necessitates a positive sense of participation in and belonging to the language community among its members, as well as a feeling among them of difference and incongruousness with other language communities (Silverstein 1998: 404). In this sense, designating a certain group of people as 'local' means ascribing to them a particular 'culture' (Silverstein 1998: 403). Furthermore, the term 'local', in the European experience of speech communities, is infused with the image of a kind of functional linguistic cline on which 'local' languages tend to be taken for granted as occupying a less prestigious position (as, for example, the codes of home as opposed to those of the marketplace, of intimate gatherings as opposed to public politics, and so on) (Silverstein 1998: 405).

The ideological construction of the Southern linguistic landscape

As has been discussed, the colonial Southern Policy aimed to construct 'self-contained tribal units' in the South, and it mobilised (or 'proxified') language in pursuing this goal. The Southern linguistic landscape was 'constructed' in the framework of the RLC by Western colonial officials, linguists, and missionaries, who were tasked primarily with discerning which linguistic resources present in the South would lend themselves to standardisation (i.e., undergo the process which would turn them

into full-fledged 'languages', as conceptualised by the ideologically informed modernist conception of language). Suleiman (2013: 5) conceptualises language construction as

> a form of purposeful manipulation that actually impinges on linguistic structure by branding certain linguistic features as standard and others as non-standard. Through corpus and status planning, the linguistic frontiers of a language (both in its oral and its scriptural forms) are defined.

Woolard & Schieffelin (1994: 68) assert that "European missionization and colonization of other continents entailed control of speakers and their vernaculars". It is interesting to think about this project of 'construction' of the Southern linguistic landscape in terms of the 'colonisation' of the South Sudanese languages. The concept of 'colonisation of language' was developed by Mignolo (1992) and refers to the processes of cultivation and designing of 'languages' by colonial powers (Mignolo 1992: 303). The project on which the British embarked within the framework of the RLC was not one of mere 'organising' – or "careful sifting and arrangement" (Tucker 1934: 31) – as the British themselves articulated it, but more so a process of '*re*-organising' and '*re*-arranging'. More concretely, the implicit organisation and structure of the linguistic resources of the colonised communities were not recognised as valid, and instead, 'organisation' and 'structure' was forced upon their languages, inspired by a strictly European experience and epistemology of language (Mignolo 1992). One might perhaps say that the British colonised the Sudanese peoples by proxy of their languages.

One of the central premises of the Southern Policy was the assumed existence of a one-to-one link between ethnic groups and speech communities; language was taken as a prime indicator of tribal belonging (Miller 2018). In this way, the colonial Southern Policy envisioned the construction of 'language communities', united by a standardised, fixed, 'language' at its core. The conferees to the RLC essentially constructed culturally particular concepts of language normativity which were intended to bind subsets of language users into 'language'-bearing groups (i.e., 'language communities') (Silverstein 1998: 407-408). In the framework of the Southern Policy, and more precisely during the RLC, linguistic categories and identity categories were constructed simultaneously and were mutually intertextual (Abdelhay et al. 2016). In other words, language was mobilised for the extra-linguistic purpose of constructing the language-identity link; the Southern languages were 'constructed' along ethnic lines, and, in turn, were used to underpin and consolidate the colonially invented identities (Suleiman 2013: 22).

Silverstein (1998: 405) writes that

> [i]n linguistic terms, scholarly and scientific consciousness of "local" languages has emerged in various projects of mapping diversity on behalf of some (generally politically interested) project.

The RLC can clearly be understood as such a project of 'mapping diversity', aimed at facilitating the colonial government's rule over the area. The 'selected' languages were made into mechanisms of the colonial project, and they were structured in such a way as to serve as vehicles for producing the socio-

political order envisioned by the colonial officials, regardless of the extent to which this contradicted the cultural and (socio)linguistic reality 'on the ground'. Silverstein (1998: 405) goes on to say that

> scholarly consciousness has in effect contributed to the production of (cultural) locality in the contemporary world by associating, for particular eras or phases of Western historical imagination, particular, geopolitically conceptualized, bounded swatches of the earth attached to particular labels for "languages" – and their bearers – sometimes in the face of the actualities of communicational patterns.

Abdelhay & Makoni (2018: 96) point out a number of semiotic strategies which mobilise the symbolic aspect of language in order to validate language-ideological constructions which relate language to identity. The strategy of 'erasure' (Irvine and Gal 2000, cited in Abdelhay & Makoni 2018: 96), for example, entails the process by which dispreferred differences are eliminated from cultural representation. This strategy can be seen employed in discourses that present the North of the Sudan as a socio-politically and linguistically homogeneous and monolithic entity, based on a cultural core comprised primarily of Islam and Arabic, while, in reality, the North is and has always been linguistically and culturally very diverse (Abdelhay & Makoni 2018: 100-101). The strategy of 'distanciation' (Suleiman 2013) entails the linguistic construction of social distinctions: a particular social group is dissociated from another on the basis of linguistic difference (Abdelhay & Makoni 2018: 96). In this regard, the colonial Nuba Policy is a case in point (see Abdelhay 2010a).

Metalinguistic practices carried out by colonial officials and academics, notably the practice of linguistic cartography, have contributed significantly to the forging of linkages between specific languages and localities (Abdelhay 2010b: 31). This was most clearly the case for Arabic, which was indexically bound to the North, but also for the Southern languages, which were constructed as geographically bound to specific areas in the South, informed by the 'spheres of influence' of the missionaries and by tribal configurations. In the project of linguistic cartography, linguistic labels were created in conjunction with ethnic labels. Suleiman (2013: 27) asserts that

> [n]aming a variety or language gives it recognition and legitimacy and helps make it a site of identity formation in the ideological sphere, mainly through the exercise of alterity.

It is important to stress that the labels which are used to describe linguistic variability are not merely neutral categories representing linguistic reality; rather, they

> [imply] categorization, drawing boundaries, chopping up the essentially continuous reality of linguistic variation into discontinuous blocks, into 'categories of communication', such as 'language', 'dialect', 'standard' etc. (Daniëls 2018a: 186, citing Gal & Woolard 1995: 129).

Linguistic terminology thus reveals an ideological discourse disclosing how linguistic variability is interpreted (Daniëls 2018b).

Similarly, the production of normative materials designed to spread the 'selected' Southern Sudanese languages in their standardised ('frozen', 'fixed', a-temporal) forms, notably grammar books, by the missionaries was a significant aspect of the colonisation of the Sudanese languages, and, by proxy, the transformation of the epistemologies of language of the groups of their speakers (Mignolo 1992: 304-305; Silverstein 1998: 418-419).

Mignolo states that

> the significance of writing grammars of primordially spoken languages in colonizing those languages [...] is that they are not only re-arranged but also *possessed* and *assimilated* (Mignolo 1992: 305, emphasis mine).

In other words, the linguistic resources, which were perceived and declared to be without grammar, were assimilated to fit the idea of a 'language' as it was envisioned in the European context of that time, thereby denying the implicit organisation of the languages and the implicit knowledge of their speakers about their own linguistic interactions (Mignolo 1992: 310). Woolard and Schieffelin, drawing on Mignolo's (1992) concept of the 'colonisation of language', state:

> Europeans brought to their tasks ideas about language prevalent in the metropole, and these ideas, though themselves shifting in different historical moments, blinkered them to indigenous conceptualisations and sociolinguistic arrangements (Woolard & Schieffelin 1994: 68).

Summarising the above, the process of constructing the Southern linguistic landscape entailed the 'enregistering' (Agha 2007, cited in Abdelhay 2010b: 30) of particular linguistic resources with certain demarcated spaces and social identities: the South was constructed as the 'multicultural' and 'multilingual' mirror-image of the North. The 'South' and the 'North' are not natural categories, but politically and socially constructed conceptions which became institutionalised through the colonial language policies (Abdelhay et al. 2011b: 458). The colonial Southern Policy compartmentalised the Southern space into self-contained ethno-linguistic units, thus producing an image of diversity which was essentially an amalgam of permanently fixed homogeneities, not at all reflective of the complex social reality of the Sudan and the dynamic nature of both language and identity (Abdelhay et al. 2017: 347, 357).

Orthography

The colonial language planning measures impacted languages both in their spoken form and in their physical manifestation in script. We have discussed that the use of South Sudanese creole Arabic as medium of instruction in Southern primary education provoked discussion among colonial officials and their entourage of linguists and missionaries. The use of SSA for educational purposes was orthographically conditioned in order to subvert its symbolic associations with Arab culture and Islam.

Woolard & Schieffelin (1994: 65) have noted that "orthographic systems cannot be conceptualized simply as reducing speech to writing" but are rather "symbols that carry historical, cultural, and political meanings". The colonial administration was clearly aware of the historical, cultural, and political meanings inherent in the Arabic script, and this awareness of the symbolic dimensions of the Arabic script is what led them to oppose its use in the South. Because scripts share the two functions of spoken language, namely instrumentality and symbolism, there exists a 'script-identity link' which parallels the 'language-identity link' (Suleiman 2013: 35). Although the salience

of the symbolism of language is most outspoken in status-planning measures, corpus-planning measures, too, may assume ideological meanings, and may be mobilised to serve extra-linguistic goals, such as the construction or consolidation of a certain (group) identity (Suleiman 2013: 15). The practical, instrumental function of script was only a secondary matter of concern to the colonial administration; the primary concern was to break the symbolic associations between SSA and the different varieties of Arabic used in the North.

According to Suleiman (2013: 37), the construction of the script-identity link, much like the construction of the language-identity link, entails a two-fold process of identification with a certain group or identity on the one hand, and distanciation – not so much from any script or language, but rather from what these may represent – on the other hand. Put differently, orthographic change serves the purpose of making visible – i.e., 'constructing' – differences between languages (Suleiman 2013: 20). Much like the orthographic changes inflicted on Turkish under the influence of the cultural and political ideology of Kemalism, the decision to do away with the Arabic script for writing SSA was a way to distance a linguistic resource (Turkish, or SSA) from the Islamic scriptural world which the Arabic script represents (Suleiman 2013: 36). Such an orthographic change may be justified on instrumental grounds, but instrumental motivation might not have been enough in itself to make the change, had it not been for the strong symbolic factor at play, namely the link between Arabic script and the Islamic, mainly Arab, world (Suleiman 2013: 36). In this way, the colonial government can be said to have adopted a policy of "linguistic protectionism against Arabisation" (Abdelhay 2010a: 206), whereby the Latin script was mobilised as a kind of cultural barrier to Arabisation and Islamisation (Sharkey 2002: 70, cited in Abdelhay 2010a: 208).

The fact that "acts of script construction [are] deliberate and often aimed at political ends" (Suleiman 2013: 37) and that "the selection of a graphic representation of language is a mode of political action" (Abdelhay 2010a: 201) is exemplified by the effects of the reversal of the colonial Southern Policy in the decade preceding Sudanese independence: as the colonial government's vision for the colony changed, it changed its stance towards the use of Arabic script for the South Sudanese languages. Clezio (1975: 42, cited in Abdelhay & Mugaddam 2014: 183) points out that the Arabic script, after the reversal of the Southern Policy, became a "factor of national integration" in Sudan, precisely because of the symbolic, historical, and political meanings it carries and its potential in signalling a certain identity, which aligned with way in which the post-colonial political elite envisioned Sudanese society.

Internalisation of colonially constructed cultural and linguistic categories

The ethno-linguistic categories which are salient in the Sudan until this day are a product of both external foreign expertise (i.e., the colonial administrators and linguists affiliated to them) and the 'internal subjectivity' of ordinary citizens (i.e., the colonial subjects) (Miller 2018: 146). The 'local' can reproduce the colonial ideological understanding of language as a result of internalisation

(Abdelhay 2010a: 201), obscuring the ideologically constructed nature of linguistic categories and resulting in their being considered part of the natural order of things.

According to Miller (2018: 146), the major boundary inherited from the colonial powers is the opposition between Arabic and all other Sudanese languages, and, concomitantly, since the colonial linguistic ideology assumed a one-to-one relationship between tribal belonging and language, between Arab ethnicity and non-Arab (African) ethnicity[25]. The idea of a one-to-one correlation between ethnic affiliation and language, a fundamental principle of the colonial language policy, was adopted by the post-colonial regime, and the colonial ethno-linguistic classifications which were made based on this principle continue to inform national censuses and statistics:

> The idea of a strong correlation between ethnicity and language is widely shared by the different social actors, from the top of the state down to the ordinary citizens, in spite of the important language changes precipitated by urbanization and displacement (Miller 2018: 146).

In this regard, Miller discusses in detail the first official national census which took place in 1955-1956[26], at the eve of independence, under supervision of the British (Miller 2018: 132). The conception and realisation of this census reflect the way colonial conceptualisations of Sudanese society and colonially constructed metalinguistic categories have become naturalised and were adopted by the post-colonial regime (Miller 2018: 142, 146). Three important remarks which Miller made concerning the way in which the census was organised can be pointed out here. Firstly, the census adopted the colonial system of macro- and micro-groupings and worked with a system of three units for organising tribes and languages: 'major tribal group' > 'tribal group' > 'tribe' and 'language group' > 'language' > 'sub-language', respectively. A second notable element is the fact that the tribes and languages were allowed to be registered under their 'local', 'unofficial' names, but these names were considered local variations of 'proper names'. This reflects the idea that the formulation of these categories was a task that was to be carried out by the ruling officials, as was the case in the colonial period, and that these categories were mainly "based on external expertise and not based on internal subjectivity" (Arel 2009, cited in Miller 2018: 133; see also Kertzer and Arel 2002: 10, cited

[25] Miller interestingly notes that the maintenance of the boundary between Arabic and non-Arabic languages can be gleaned even from recent developments in the Republic of South Sudan, where SSA was initially refused status as one of the national languages. Despite the fact that it is spoken as either a lingua franca or mother tongue by many South Sudanese and that it is typologically disconnected from both *fuṣḥā* Arabic and Sudanese Colloquial Arabic, it is not yet accepted by part of the South Sudanese population and continues persistently to be associated with Arab ethnicity and Arab political domination (Miller 2018: 146).

[26] To give the reader an idea of the 'language situation' at this time: the most important languages (in terms of number of speakers who claimed to speak the language at home) at the time of the census were (Sudanese Colloquial) Arabic (more than 5 million speakers), Dinka (more than 1 million speakers), Beja (ca. 500.000 speakers), Nuer (ca. 500.000 speakers), Fur (ca. 250.000 speakers), and Teso (ca. 200.000 speakers). This is according to analyses by Hurreiz and Bell (1975) and Thelwall (1978) (cited in Miller 2018: 136-138).

in Miller 2018: 133). We may draw a parallel here to a point which was touched upon earlier in the paper, namely that the implicit organisation of linguistic resources, based on the implicit evaluation of linguistic variability by the Sudanese speakers themselves, was not considered valid by the British officials, missionaries, and linguists. Thirdly and finally, Miller highlights that the 1955-1956 language classification reveals a difference in treatment between the non-Arabic languages of North Sudan, on the one hand, and those of the South Sudan, on the other hand. The former were clustered in one major group, in spite of their typological differences, on the virtue of the unifying characteristic of their being non-Arabic (Miller 2018: 136). The classification of the South Sudanese languages, in contrast, was established in far more detail.

Miller (2018) thus concludes that the 1955-1956 census, like those that followed it, reproduced the model and logic of linguistic and tribal classification employed in the RLC and the colonial system of Native Administration. The macro-categories which were invented in the framework of the RLC to delimit the demographically most weighty Southern 'languages' in particular were taken for granted as natural and unchanging categories and were consistently reproduced in language statistics and language planning endeavours undertaken by the post-colonial regime (Miller 2018). Thus, the colonial, Western understanding of linguistic variability and ethnicity based on the idea of a neat and static correlation between territory, ethnic affiliation, and language continued to inform language (and other) policies long after the British had left the Sudan (Miller 2018).

Conclusion

This paper has explored the language policies adopted by the British government in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (1899-1956) by situating them in their historical context and by relating them to key anthropological and sociolinguistic concepts. In this paper I have described how the colonial administration, in the framework of its Southern Policy, 'constructed' the North and the South of the Sudan as two separate political, economic, and cultural entities, thereby 'proxifying' language (Suleiman 2013) in order to shape their respective identities as mutually exclusive and antagonistic.

The colonial Southern Policy was based on the premise that Arabic, along with Islam and Arab ethnicity, indexically signalled Northern identity, while English and the non-Arabic Sudanese languages, along with Christianity (and, to a lesser extent, animistic religions) and African ethnicity, indicated Southern identity. The South was constructed as a multicultural and multilingual front constituted by a number of 'self-contained racial and tribal units' which were conceived of as culturally and linguistically distinct and internally homogeneous. The British colonial administration instrumentalised language in pursuing non-linguistic aims. This is illustrated by the fact that it radically changed its language policy in order to accommodate changing circumstances and its shifting interests.

The paper has furthermore demonstrated that the British colonial administrators, linguists, and missionaries active in the Sudan were informed by a particular European, modernist ideology of language, which was reflected in the linguistic and cultural categories which they created and institutionalised in the Sudan. These cultural and linguistic categories, being ideologically constructed, were subsequently taken for granted as *natural* categories of the social world and, as such, have remained largely unquestioned until this very day.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Transcription table

Arabic character	Transcription character
ء	ʾ
ا	*ā*
ب	*b*
ت	*t*
ث	*ṯ*
ج	*ǧ*
ح	*ḥ*
خ	*ḫ*
د	*d*
ذ	*ḏ*
ر	*r*
ز	*z*
س	*s*
ش	*š*
ص	*ṣ*

Arabic character	Transcription character
ض	*ḍ*
ط	*ṭ*
ظ	*ẓ*
ع	ʿ
غ	*ġ*
ف	*f*
ق	*q*
ك	*k*
ل	*l*
م	*m*
ن	*n*
ه	*h*
و	*w* / *ū*
ي	*y* / *ī*

The transcription of Arabic words in this paper follows the system outlined by Hans Wehr (1994). Some additional remarks should be made concerning the transcription:

- The three short vowels of *fuṣḥā* Arabic, *fatḥa*, *kasra*, and *ḍamma*, which are generally not indicated in the Arabic script, are represented as ‘a’, ‘i’, and ‘u’, respectively.

- The letter *hamza* (ء) is only represented when it occurs in the middle or at the end of words, not when it occurs at the beginning.
- The *tā' marbūṭa* (ة) is generally not represented; words ending it simply have a final 'a'. However, when the *tā' marbūṭa* is preceded by 'ā', it is represented as 'h', and when it is the ending of the first noun of an *iḍāfa* construction, it is represented as 't'.
- The *alif maqṣūra* (ى) is represented as 'ā'.
- The semivocals *wāw* (و) and *yā'* (ي) are represented as 'u' and 'i' after 'a' (e.g., '*yaum*', '*'ain*').

Appendix 2: Map of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan



The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1937 (Roberts 1986: 758)

Author's note: "The heavy black line shows the northern boundary of the Southern Provinces."