KU LEUVEN

FACULTEIT INGENIEURSWETENSCHAPPEN

What Makes a Refugee Camp a Resilient Temporary Human Settlement?

Resilience Building by Community Architects in the Context of the European Hotspots.

Rani De Becker
Yana De Reu
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Thesis submitted for the degree of
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Wat Maakt een Vluchtelingenkamp een Veerkrachtige Tijdelijke Menselijke Nederzetting?

Veerkrachtopbouw door Gemeenschapsarchitecten in het Kader van de Europese Hotspots.

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Febe Viaene

Thesis voorgedragen tot het behalen van de graad van Master of Science in de ingenieurswetenschappen: architectuur

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Academiejaar 2019 – 2020

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Throughout our years as students at the KU Leuven we developed a keen interest in the social and humanitarian aspect of architecture and urban design. We were therefore very grateful and eager to get the opportunity to research the possible roles of architects in Moria Refugee Camp on the Greek island of Lesvos. All our expectations were exceeded once we arrived there. Mainly in a good way as we felt very much at our place at Office of Displaced Designers, but also in a less good way as the actual conditions in the camp were worse than we ever had imagined. It was a very unique experience that not only brought us lots of new insights and knowledge, but also touched us personally. We would first and foremost like to thank the Planning & Development Research Unit, under the auspices of Prof. Pieter Van den Broeck for giving us this opportunity and this research topic, which kept us captivated until the last written words. Moreover, we would like to express our deepest appreciation to Angeliki Paidakaki, who has always assisted us on this enriching journey, and for her critical attitude that helped us to always dig deeper and take our research to the next level. We would also like to thank her for her continuing support and guidance throughout the whole process of our thesis and for even coming to Lesvos, to reflect with us on our case study at the time when the situation was destabilizing. We are also grateful for Bobby Rahman, Layan Mneymne and Shareen Elnaschie for reading our master's thesis.

We would also like to say a special thank you to Shareen Elnaschie (co-founder of the Office of Displaced Designers), for hosting us during our field trip and letting us be part of ODD. She took us under her wings and guided us through every chapter of ODD's practice. Moreover, she shared her expertise and experiences with us and always took time to join us for discussion. She offered us new insights and broadened our vision on the migration crisis and the displaced community. This did not only widen our knowledge and opinion on humanitarian architecture, but also made us realise the importance of alternative humanitarian aid. Furthermore, we would like to express gratitude to our interviewees, Tina Agerbak, Brooj Alammari, Fabiano Sartori and Edouard Wiegert for making time for us, for explaining their organisation and describing their experiences, and especially for the interesting conversations we had together.

Our last word of thanks goes to our family and friends for supporting us through every step of this journey, for listening endlessly to our stories, their encouragement and overall, for always believing in us.

Rani De Becker, Yana De Reu and Febe Viaene,

Leuven, June 2020

ABSTRACT

Nowadays, the roles of community architects in the cultivation of resilience in post-crisis situations and in the rebuilding processes of affected human settlements are much discussed topics in disaster literature. These studies primarily emphasise the permanent reconstruction and in situ recovery of disaster struck areas. What remains limitedly discussed, are the resilience-building processes (co-)led by community architects in extraterritorial temporary human settlements such as refugee camps. The context of a refugee camp differs vastly from the traditionally described post-disaster contexts in contemporary literature. Firstly, refugee camps are managed through exceptional governance arrangements where decisions are frequently made through centralised decision-making processes on a national and supranational level, with limited participation from civil society actors. Secondly, the displaced and transient nature of refugee camps results in a rapidly changing and heterogeneous community with distinct vulnerabilities. These two aspects demand novel contributions from community architects in order to cultivate resilience in temporary human settlements.

Our research pushes the boundaries of knowledge on post-disaster reconstruction and resilience-building practices by community architects, in order to broaden this discourse from permanent to extraterritorial temporary human settlements. Therefore, we reconceptualise the notion of resilience and define it both as a socio-structural quality acquired by a multiplicity of actors as well as a highly political and contentious process with multiple socio-structural results. This new definition allows us to uncover three novel roles manifested by community architects, in addition to the seven roles found in post-disaster reconstruction literature. We critically analyse the potentials and limitations of those roles in refugee camps and investigate to what extent architects are able to foster resilience, both in terms of improving the socio-structural quality of the camp and in re-articulating the governance arrangements. This analysis was conducted in the context of the 2015 European migration crisis and mainly builds upon a one-month ethnographic research of the Office of Displaced Designers (ODD), a humanitarian community architecture practice active since 2016 in the Olive Grove, an informal settlement adjacent to Moria Hotspot, on the Greek island of Lesvos.

From this case study analysis of the practice of ODD we conclude that it is crucial for community architects in the context of extraterritorial and temporary human settlements to politically activate themselves, build up stronger alliances and steer more pro-equity humanitarian aid trajectories in the refugee camp, in order to have a deeper and more lasting socio-political impact with their projects. Bolstering resilience as a process by attempting to improve the governance arrangements is equally important as building socio-structural qualitative resilience in the refugee camps, because the capacity to build the desired optimal socio-spatial quality of a camp largely depends on the (a)symmetric power relations across all actors involved. Consequently, community architects should enhance the camp's socio-spatial environment and equally aim to rearticulate the power relations in the governance structure. We believe this will fully unlock their potential in the refugee camp context and better the living conditions of the displaced people.

Key words: resilience | community architecture | temporary human settlements | 2015 migration crisis | EU hotspots | refugee camps

SAMENVATTING

Vandaag is de rol van gemeenschapsarchitecten in het opbouwen van veerkracht in post-crisissituaties en in de wederopbouw van getroffen menselijke nederzettingen een veelbesproken onderwerp in rampenliteratuur. Deze studies benadrukken vooral de permanente wederopbouw en het in situ herstel van getroffen gebieden. Wat echter beperkt besproken blijft, zijn de veerkrachtversterkingsprocessen die (mede)geleid worden door gemeenschapsarchitecten in extraterritoriale tijdelijke menselijke nederzettingen zoals vluchtelingenkampen. Deze context verschilt sterk van de traditioneel beschreven contexten in rampenliteratuur. Ten eerste worden vluchtelingenkampen bestuurd door middel van uitzonderlijke bestuursregelingen waarbij beslissingen genomen worden via gecentraliseerde besluitvormingsprocessen op een (supra)nationaal niveau. Hierin blijft burgerparticipatie beperkt. Ten tweede leidt het vergankelijke karakter van vluchtelingenkampen tot een snel veranderende en heterogene gemeenschap met duidelijke kwetsbaarheden. Deze twee aspecten vragen om nieuwe bijdragen van gemeenschapsarchitecten om veerkracht op te kunnen bouwen in tijdelijke nederzettingen.

Ons onderzoek verlegt de grenzen van de kennis over wederopbouwpraktijken van gemeenschapsarchitecten na rampen, en breidt het vertoog uit van permanente naar extraterritoriale, tijdelijke menselijke nederzettingen. Daarom herdefiniëren we het begrip veerkracht zowel als een sociaal-structurele kwaliteit, verworven door verschillende actoren, en als een politiek en controversieel proces met meerdere sociaal-structurele resultaten. Deze nieuwe definitie laat toe om drie nieuwe rollen te ontdekken die gemeenschapsarchitecten vervullen, naast de zeven rollen gevonden in rampenliteratuur. We analyseren kritisch de mogelijkheden en beperkingen van deze rollen in vluchtelingenkampen en onderzoeken in hoeverre architecten in staat zijn om veerkracht te bevorderen. Dit zowel op vlak van het verbeteren van de sociaal-structurele kwaliteit van het kamp als in het herformuleren van de bestuurlijke regelingen. Deze analyse werd uitgevoerd in de context van de Europese migratiecrisis van 2015 en bouwt grotendeels voort op een één maand durend etnografisch onderzoek van de Office of Displaced Designers (ODD), een gemeenschapsarchitectuurpraktijk actief in de Olive Grove sinds 2016, een informele nederzetting naast Moria Hotspot, op het Griekse eiland Lesbos.

Uit deze analyse van ODD concluderen we dat het voor gemeenschapsarchitecten in extraterritoriale en tijdelijke menselijke nederzettingen cruciaal is om zichzelf politiek te activeren, sterkere allianties op te bouwen en te ijveren voor meer rechtvaardige humanitaire hulptrajecten. Zo kunnen ze met hun projecten een diepere en duurzamere sociaal-politieke impact hebben. Het versterken van de veerkracht als proces is even belangrijk als het opbouwen van sociaal-structurele kwalitatieve veerkracht in de vluchtelingenkampen. Het vermogen om de gewenste sociaal-ruimtelijke kwaliteit van een kamp op te bouwen hangt namelijk grotendeels af van de (a)symmetrische machtsverhoudingen tussen alle betrokken actoren. Daarom moeten gemeenschapsarchitecten de sociaal-ruimtelijke omgeving van het kamp verbeteren en evenzeer streven naar het herdefiniëren van de machtsverhoudingen in de bestuursstructuur. Wij geloven dat alleen zo gemeenschapsarchitecten hun potentieel volledig kunnen benutten en de leefomstandigheden van de vluchtelingen kunnen verbeteren.

Trefwoorden: veerkracht | gemeenschapsarchitectuur | tijdelijke menselijke nederzettingen | 2015 migratiecrisis | EU hotspots | vluchtelingenkampen

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AMIF	Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund
AS	Asylum Service
BRF	Boat Refugee Foundation
BYOP	Bring Your Own Plant
CEAS	Common European Asylum System
COVID-19	2019 Novel Coronavirus
DRC	Danish Red Cross
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
ECF	European Cultural Foundation
EU	European Union
EURODAC	European Dactyloscopy (fingerprinting procedure)
EUROJUST	Judicial Agency of the European Union
EUROPOL	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
FRC	First Reception Centre
Frontex	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
FRS	First Reception Service
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KEELPNO	Hellenic Centre for Disease Control and Prevention
MdM	Médecins du Monde
MotG	Movement on the Ground
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
ODD	Office of Displaced Designers
PSS	Psycho-social support
R4R	Refugee 4 Refugees
RAO	Regional Asylum Offices
RIA	Registration and Identification Area
RIC	Registration and Identification Centre
RIS	Registration and Identification Service
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WHO	World Health Organization

1 INTRODUCTION

The role(s) of architects in rebuilding practices after a disaster and in cultivating resilience in post-crisis situations are much-discussed topics in literature. This literature on disaster resilience and reconstruction practices will constitute the theoretical foundation of this research. More specifically, it will rely on a social analysis of resilience which emphasizes the social aspects of post-disaster recovery; namely recovery characterized by a dynamic and socially innovative process that bounces forward into new, more socially just and infrastructurally robust redevelopment outcomes (Davoudi et al., 2012; Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2012). The scientific discourse on community architecture clarifies the roles architects can fulfil to contribute to both the physical and the social aspects of post-disaster recovery through engaging in participatory design and construction with the affected community.

In both these theoretical discourses, the emphasis is primarily placed on permanent reconstruction and in situ recovery, in the area where the community was hit by a natural or man-made disaster. In this research, we look at post-crisis resilience processes taking place in temporary settlements in new (national) territories. More specifically, we investigate resilience processes led by community architects in a refugee camp[1] context on the island of Lesvos during the 2015 European migration crisis.

Outlining the 2015 European migration crisis

Since 2015, Europe has been facing increased migratory pressure at their external borders. These migration flows have been of mixed nature; they mainly consist of political refugees fleeing authoritarian regimes and civil wars in their home countries such as Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, but also include marginal numbers of economic migrants who migrate to Europe because of poverty or a lack of opportunities. The proliferation of political instabilities in Middle Eastern and North African countries led to a peak in the number of entries in 2015, when more than one million people reached European territory either via dangerous sea routes or via crossing national borders illegally (UNHCR, sd). This number represented the highest annual migration flow to Europe since 1985 (Connor, 2016) and was the quadruple amount compared to the year before, resulting in the introduction of the term *migration crisis* by the European Union (EU) to refer to this exceptional situation.

In April 2015, the EU responded to the increased pressure on their external borders by deciding on a ten-point plan for immediate action, which was the precursor of the European Agenda on Migration. The Agenda was an EU strategy to address both the immediate challenges of the migration crisis, such as the loss of lives at sea, and the long-term migration challenges, such as managing flows adequately and resolving the structural limitations of the EU migration policy

[1] In this research, we refer to the residing community in the refugee camp with neutral terms like *third country national*, *border crosser*, *displaced person/community* or *camp resident,* in order to (1) provide a general and overarching term that addresses all the people migrating towards Europe, for any reason and (2) avoiding terms that carry a certain connotation. We will use the term *refugee camp* when we address the physical space where the displaced community is residing.

(European Commission, 2015). To achieve the aforementioned aims, the Agenda introduced the *hotspot approach* that led to the installation of ten *hotspots*, of which five in Italy and five on the Aegean islands in Greece. A hotspot can be seen as the main instrument to control the irregular migration flows, through the demarcation of a place at the external border of the EU. It consists on the one hand of facilities (mostly containers) for the various national and international agencies involved in the processing of arrivals and asylum claims, and on the other hand of (limited) temporary accommodation infrastructures such as isoboxes for displaced people waiting for their registration or asylum claim granted (Vradis et al., 2019). In a hotspot, EU agencies are appointed to cooperate in situ with the authorities of the frontline EU member states experiencing disproportionate migratory pressure (European Commission, 2015).

The first hotspot was installed in Moria, a village in close vicinity to the capital of Lesvos island in Greece. The space was first a military base, after which it was incorporated in 2012 as a First Reception Centre (FRC), providing reception services for third country nationals arriving on Greek territory. Moria Hotspot was at that time mainly a transit facility with limited accommodation facilities, only hosting third country nationals on their journey to mainland Europe for just a few days. In October 2015, the FRC was inaugurated as a European hotspot (Vradis et al., 2019). The transformation into a European hotspot had significant implications. The open reception and accommodation facility became more strictly regulated whereby several EU agencies were designated to assist the Greek authorities to make sure that all border crossers were identified and registered (Dimitriadi & Sarantaki, 2019; Papadopoulou et al., 2016).

Since the summer of 2015, Moria Hotspot on Lesvos and by extension the other hotspots on the Aegean islands (Kos, Leros, Samos and Chios) became the focal point of the migration crisis receiving the majority of arrivals. Mainly Syrians fleeing the civil war in their country that has started in 2011 (UNHCR, 2019) arrived at the Greek hotspots. As a consequence, the EU took additional measures in order to not only regulate the flows from Turkey to the Aegean islands, but also to reduce them by concluding a deal with Turkey in March 2016 (European Council, 2016). The EU-Turkey Deal seemed to work on a holistic level, as the arrivals on the Aegean islands did decrease drastically since 2016.

However, it had important consequences for the working of Moria Hotspot which resulted in an even larger humanitarian crisis to unfold. The EU-Turkey Deal transformed the hotspot from a temporary stop on the way to Europe, to the final destination where third country nationals were forced to apply for asylum, no longer allowed to transit to Europe (Dimitriadi, 2017). The slow processing of the asylum procedures and return decisions (made stricter and more complex, as prescribed in the EU-Turkey Deal) prolonged the stay of the applicants from days to months.

As a result of this prolongation, the provided accommodation facilities became insufficient for the accumulating amount of people, resulting in a severe overpopulation of Moria Hotspot and the formation of an informal camp settlement in the adjacent Olive Grove site. In March 2020, 8.000 people were living within Moria Hotspot, which has an original maximum capacity of 3.000 places (Ilias et al., 2019), and 12.000 people were residing in its surrounding Olive Grove (E. Wiegert, protection team leader ICRC, personal communication, February 14, 2020). The overpopulation in Moria caused the hotspot and its surroundings to become infamous for its extremely poor living conditions, consisting of a lack of decent shelter provision, long queues for food, no access to clean water, proper sanitation facilities or health care, dirt scattered all over the place and frequent violence and fights. The highly problematic context of Moria Hotspot has made the residing displaced community multifariously vulnerable, environmentally (mainly due to the dire living

conditions), socio-culturally (because of discrimination based on specific nationality, ethnicity or language) and socio-politically (because of rights violation and exclusion from decision-making processes) (Sabates-Wheeler, 2019).

In the absence of an adequate response to the crisis from the national (Greek) and supranational (EU) authorities, a multitude of humanitarian aid workers came to Lesvos in order to address these vulnerabilities. The humanitarian organisations present on Lesvos consist of both established international or national Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (such as EuroRelief or the Red Cross) and individuals who organised themselves into grassroots organisations. One of these grassroots organisations is the Office of Displaced Designers (ODD), a non-governmental organization of community architects, whose role(s) in socially and spatially improving the living conditions around the official Moria Hotspot, i.e. in the adjacent Olive Grove site, will be investigated in depth in this research. ODD has organised various creative activities since the summer of 2016, such as workshops in their Mytilini office and participatory construction sessions in the Olive Grove. During these workshops and sessions all participants could "share skills and co-create a more equitable and inclusive society" (Office of Displaced Designers, 2020). The organisation is characterised by their positive and future-focussed attitude, emphasizing the creative capacities, interests and ambitions of the displaced community (Office of Displaced Designers, 2020).

Problem statement

The context of temporary human settlements such as refugee camps differs greatly from contemporary literature on in situ post-disaster resilience-building processes by community architects. Refugee camps have specific governance arrangements where decisions are made through centralised decision-making processes on a national and supranational level with limited stakeholder participation including civil society actors. Moreover, the displaced and transient character results in a rapidly changing and heterogeneous residing community with distinctive vulnerabilities. This specific nature of refugee camps strongly influences community architecture practices, as they are limited in initiating longer-term projects, and forced to constantly adjust skill sets. The discussion on the potential role(s) of architects in fostering resilience in these temporary human settlements, is missing in both professional literature as in conventional architectural education programs. This research aims to fill this gap in the disaster scholarship and practice by shedding light on the resilience-building potential of community architects in post-crisis refugee camps located in new national territories.

Research aim and objectives

The general aim of this research is to push the boundaries of existing knowledge on place-based post-disaster reconstruction and resilience building by community architects, in order to re-approach the notion of resilience and community architecture from the perspective of the specific context of temporary human settlements such as refugee camps. Furthermore, this research aims to expose the distinctive vulnerabilities of the displaced communities residing in the refugee camps and in turn, examine how community architects can reduce these vulnerabilities and thus contribute to fostering resilience. Additionally, this research seeks to uncover the roles of community architects in this context and reveal the potentials and limitations of their practice through the analysis of the specific governance arrangements of refugee camps and the examination of the partnerships and collaborations between different actors present.

To summarise, the general aim can be subdivided into four main objectives:

1. To re-approach the notion of resilience from a migratory perspective that is characterised by displacement and temporality, starting from the existing theories on place-based post-disaster reconstruction and resilience-building in permanent contexts;
2. To map out the specific nature and vulnerabilities of the refugee communities hosted in extraterritorial temporary human settlements such as refugee camps;
3. To determine which roles community architects can fulfil in this temporary and displaced setting and reveal the potentials and limitations of their practice in reducing these vulnerabilities and thus bolstering resilience in refugee camps;
4. To uncover the multi-level governance structure of the hotspot by scrutinising the partnerships and collaborations between different actors involved; as well as to investigate how this governance framework affects resilience-building in refugee camps.

Research questions

Consequently, the main question this research aims to answer is:

"What makes a refugee camp a resilient temporary human settlement? To what extent can community architects contribute to fostering resilience of refugee camps for displaced populations in a post-crisis context?

This question is subdivided in the five following questions:

1. What are the specific vulnerabilities of displaced communities in the context of refugee camps and what are their main or root causes?
2. What roles do community architects play in addressing the vulnerabilities of the displaced communities and hence foster resilience in refugee camps?
3. What are the potentials and limitations of the multifaceted community architecture practice in the context of temporary human settlements such as refugee camps?
4. How are refugee camps governed, and how does this governance structure foster or hamper their resilience-potential?
5. How do community architects position themselves in these governance structures and to what extent do they contribute to the governance-improvement process aiming for a more resilient refugee camp?

Methodology

To answer the research questions, a desk research was first conducted, relying on secondary data. Newspaper articles, EU reports and EU statements were explored to gain a deeper understanding of the 2015 migration crisis context. After acquiring a good knowledge on the general context of the problematique, three different bodies of literature were investigated to develop the theoretical framework of this research: (1) disaster studies and the concept of resilience, (2) theories about multi-level governance and social innovation, (3) community architecture and post-disaster reconstruction.

In order to re-approach the concept of resilience and make it applicable to temporary human settlements, as well as to broaden existing knowledge on the roles of architects in post-disaster resilience-building processes, these three bodies of literature were complemented with theoretical insights on the specific nature and vulnerabilities of displaced communities, the

governance of humanitarian spaces such as refugee camps and the philosophical ideas of Giorgio Agamben on *bare life* and *state of exception*.

To gain an empirical understanding of the social and spatial problematics of refugee camps and uncover the roles and resilience-building potential of architects in this type of settlements, we conducted ethnographic research of one month with ODD, an organisation consisting of community architects, active on Lesvos island. During this one month, we participated in making a monograph on ODD's most important accomplishment, i.e. the *Olive Grove recreational project* which took place from the winter of 2016 until the summer of 2019. By collaborating on this monograph and meanwhile observing ODD, all necessary empirical data was collected in order to understand their practice, objectives and methods, as well as partnerships with other organisations and their position in the specific governance arrangements of Moria Hotspot. Furthermore, semi-structured interviews with key informants that worked closely together with ODD, such as former volunteers and partner organisations, were conducted in order to gain additional information providing different perspectives on the organisation's accomplishments. Interviews were first transcribed and then distilled in order to derive valuable information that could help answering the research questions and supporting final arguments. Furthermore, informal conversations were held with volunteers from different organisations to gain a better understanding of the macro-context. Finally, upon return in Belgium, a second round of desk study was conducted (e.g. data portals or legislative documents) that provided additional, secondary data on information that was not found during the ethnographic research such as numbers of arrivals, legal information about asylum procedures, etc.

Scopes and Limitations

This research is subject to some limitations and therefore does not have a universal applicability. Firstly, it is based on a case study of only one community architecture organisation. Furthermore, the only one refugee camp in the context of the 2015 migration crisis was investigated. Other refugee camps, which may have different governance structures and characteristics, were not included in this research.

Secondly, a one-month empirical research is insufficient to fully understand the complex nature of the situation on Lesvos and to meet all relevant actors and organisations. Furthermore, this research discusses projects and activities of ODD that took place over the course of four years and ended a couple of months before the empirical study took place. Therefore, the investigation of the practice of ODD is fully based on reflections and testimonials about past experiences.

Thirdly, the collection of primary data was hampered by the extreme mediatisation and political sensitivity of the 2015 migration crisis. This made it difficult to establish contacts with government officials or with larger international organisations as many stakeholders often had other priorities, were not willing to give an interview because they had been overwhelmed by similar requests by other researchers, scholars and journalists, or did not dare to speak freely about the situation.

Finally, measures for the protection of the displaced community as well language barriers made it difficult to establish contacts with camp residents. As the official Moria Hotspot has been a territory to which access is forbidden without permission, and due to the general advise of not talking to members of the displaced community residing in the informal camp settlement of the Olive Grove, contacts could only be made with camp residents who were connected to ODD and

had knowledge of the English language. Therefore, empirical knowledge on the vulnerabilities of displaced people and their experiences of the camp is mainly based on secondary data and observations.

Research outcomes

This research aims to understand the relevance and resilience-building potential of architectural practices for humanitarian responses in temporary human settlements. It intends to provide a list of suggestions to community architects on how to build up resilience in the context of refugee camps and which roles they herein could display. Furthermore, it identifies the potentials and limitations of the practice of community architecture in this context as well as ways to respectively unlock or overcome them.

The next chapter presents the theoretical framework of this research where literature about resilience, multi-level governance, social innovation and community architecture are brought into dialogue with each other. An overview of the different roles of architects in post-crisis resilience-building processes will be provided, as well as theories about the distinctive nature and vulnerabilities of displaced communities and the governance of refugee camps. The chapter will conclude with a provisional definition of resilience that could be operationalized in the context of refugee camps. Chapter three offers an overview of the most important empirical research results deriving from the field work on Lesvos. The last chapter reflects upon the empirical findings in order to uncover new roles of architects in temporary human settlements and determine their resilience-building potential.

2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, a first step is taken towards building an understanding of the nature of community architecture practices and its resilience-bolstering potential in temporary human settlements such as refugee camps. In order to achieve this aim, relevant concepts and theories of different bodies of literature are discussed and brought into dialogue with one another *(see table 1)*. First and foremost, the concept of resilience in the disaster scholarship is explored, focusing on its social interpretations. To further enrich the concept of resilience with political features, theories on multi-level governance and social innovation are taken on board. These theories are applied to a post-disaster setting in order to examine how existing governance structures can impact the reconstruction and resilience-building trajectories in the post-disaster field. Furthermore, the concept of community architecture is discussed in order to investigate which roles of community architects emerge in the post-disaster reconstruction context where various actors and (a)symmetries of power relations play out and interact. Finally, to further clarify and predefine the concept of resilience from a migratory perspective in post-disaster temporary human settlements, we analyse the specific nature and vulnerabilities of displaced communities and the governance arrangements of refugee camps, connecting them with theories of philosopher Agamben on *bare life* and *state of exception*.

Table 1 shows the prominent scholars used throughout this theoretical framework, categorised by topic.

Table 1: Overview of the main literature. (Source: authors)

Topic	Scholars
Resilience	Lorenz (2013) Davoudi et al. (2012) Keck & Saldapolrak (2012) Paidakaki & Moulaert (2017)
Multi-level Governance	Eizzaguire et al. (2012) Pradel et al. (2013) Moulaert (2010) Swyndegouw & Moulaert (2010)
Community Architecture and the Roles of Architects	Andriessen (2018) Andriessen et al. (2020) Aquilino (2011) Boano & García (2011) Boano & Talocci (2017) Charlesworth (2006) Luansang et al. (2012)
Nature of Refugee Camps and Vulnerability	Agamben (1995) Diken (2004) Hilhorst (2018) Ilcan & Rygiel (2015) Sabates-Wheeler (2019) Macklin (2003)

2.1 DISCOURSE ON RESILIENCE

This section discusses the evolution of the scientific concept of resilience. It starts with the original interpretations of the concept viewed from ecological perspectives, then moves towards the reinterpretation of resilience by social scientists and concludes with more political analyses of the concept.

2.1.1 Evolution of a Multifaceted Concept

The concept of resilience was firstly mentioned in ecological literature in the 1970s by Holling to describe the "measure of the persistence of systems and their ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between populations or state variables." (Holling, 1973, p.14). Two main understandings of this concept could be further distinguished. The first interpretation, called *engineering resilience*, emphasizes constancy and a (quick) return to a certain stable state after a disorder took place. It can be measured as "the resistance to disturbance and speed of return to the equilibrium." (Holling, 1996, p.33). The second perception is based on the existence of several stable states that can be pursued after a disruptive event, where the transition to a different equilibrium depends on the *ecological resilience* of the system or "the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system changes its structure [...]" (Holling, 1996, p.33). Contrary to the first understanding, the focus here is on preserving the function of a system rather than striving for the stability of its components (Adger, 2000).

From the ecological sciences perspective, resilience can be interpreted as an act of *bouncing back* that encompasses features like predictability, constancy and efficiency, which are all preferable qualities of a 'fail-safe' structural design (Davoudi et al., 2012). In this sense the concept of *structural resilience* can also be understood, that revolves around the design and construction of resilient buildings and infrastructures in disaster-prone regions. These buildings are able to withstand hazards by employing disaster-resistant construction techniques and following local building codes in the post-disaster design process (Bosher, 2008).

The preceding ecological and structural interpretations of resilience mainly emphasize the spatial-physical aspect (disaster-prone regions) and neglect the social aspect (disaster-affected communities). Because of the concept's deep rootedness in the ecological sciences based on a disconnection between nature and society, these definitions could not be simply transferred to the context of urban environments (Paidakaki & Moulaert, 2017). This would lead to the risk of the "re-naturalization of society and the re-emergence of a simplistic natural determinism" (Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013, pp.5-6). The equilibristic view on resilience and the 'resistance to change' interpretation bypasses the uniqueness and complex nature of social systems (Paidakaki & Moulaert, 2017; Davoudi et al., 2012; Kuhlicke, 2013).

The main difference between ecological and social systems is that "the feedback processes associated with each one are incomparable: […] responses of individual organisms to levels of complexity, are defined not solely by structural variables, but by agency." (Davidson, 2010, p.1142). A manifestation of agency is the fact that human actors can anticipate, imagine, interpret, and give meaning to certain occurring events. As a result, they build up future expectations and priorities and possess the ability to act with a specific intention or purpose (i.e. to strive for these expectations). The expectations they strive for can be read as 'stable or equilibrium' states, with the difference that these steady states can change over time, through the competence of social

systems to learn from past events and re-organize by consciously adjusting their expectations. (Davoudi et al., 2012; Lorenz, 2013). This is in stark contrast with the behaviour of ecological systems, which can be predicted by mathematical models and is expected as consistent under the same set of conditions (Davidson, 2010).

These specific characteristics of human actors enable certain capacities that are inherent to socially resilient systems and should thus be considered when defining *social resilience*. Lorenz (2013) and Keck & Sakdapolrak (2013) distinguish (1) the coping or "re-active" capacity which relates to the ability of communities to deal with the failure of expectations and to absorb threats and persist, (2) the adaptive or "pro-active" capacity which emphasizes the competence of the social system to learn from past events, anticipate future events and to adapt their way of life accordingly and (3) the participative capacity which defines whether a social entity can access and practice its own adapting and coping capacities in a context of unequal power relations. If the participative capacity of a social system is high, there can be a radical alternation of the system's structures into an alternative and, more importantly, improved situation or livelihood.

The social resilience of disaster-affected communities is expressed in and through these capacities. Resilient communities can use their coping capacity to include disasters and hazards in their 'frame of expectations' and assign meaning to them. As a result, disaster will no longer be regarded as detrimental because communities have used their adaptive capacities to anticipate the danger, considering the risk of hazardous events as part of everyday life. They are able to re-organize their internal structures as change is understood as necessary and essential and a disorder is seen as a window of opportunity for innovation and development (Lorenz, 2013; Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013; Editorial of Local Environment, 2011). Instead of trying to control change, they build the ability to respond to change and shape their own recovery trajectory, which is needed to thrive in an uncertain and hazardous environment. Consequently, communities are no longer vulnerable and powerless victims of disasters and hazardous events, but they are empowered to take matters into their own hands (Brown & Westaway, 2011). To develop this coping, adapting and transforming capacities, social entities must not only draw from their community resources, which can be of social, cultural, human, political, natural or built nature, but also mobilize them strategically. Only when these resources are used for collective action and the satisfaction of community objectives, community resources transform in community capital and social resilience is built (Magis, 2010).

Consequently, from a social perspective, post-disaster resilience is not seen as a robust and steady outcome in which a quick return to a former state is desirable, but as a dynamic and socially innovative process whereby communities build on their capacities to re-emerge more resilient than before (Davoudi et al., 2012). A return to the pre-disaster context (and thus a former state) may be conceived as undesirable due to the fact that this situation triggered the disaster and induced vulnerabilities in the first place (Editorial of Local Environment, 2011; Paidakaki & Moulaert, 2017). In this sense, resilience is understood as an act of *bouncing forward*, that highlights the notions of social learning, adaptive evolution and collective transformation and underpins the evolutionary interpretation of the concept (Davoudi et al., 2012; Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013).

The social dimension of resilience, while further clarifying the concept, has been criticized for being portrayed as too positive and optimistic. The *bouncing forward* interpretation of resilience disregarded the fact that different social groups are embedded in a complex social and political framework, attempting to impose their own resilience trajectory at the expense of other groups'

recovery ambitions (Leach, 2008). This raises questions like "bouncing forward to what and for whom?" (Paidakaki & Moulaert, 2017, p.278); "Resilience in whose interests?" (Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013, p.14); who determines the recovery trajectories and hence are the main agents of change? The answer to these questions lies within the power asymmetries that exist within social systems enabling hegemonic actors to silence alternative views or opinions while strengthening their own narrative on recovery trajectories. The ability of a community to access their resources and exercise their agency in order to guide their own recovery process is facilitated or hampered by multifarious power relations, dominant discourses on resilience and an unequal distribution of resources and knowledge (Paidakaki & Moulaert, 2017; Kuhlicke, 2013; Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013; Leach, 2008). Therefore, resilience becomes a politically laden and conflictive process (Leach, 2008; Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013; Davoudi et al., 2012). Shaw (2012) states that the resilience discourse should embody a more radical agenda and take up a more critical stance challenging existing power structures and dominant ways of thinking. (Shaw in Davoudi et al., 2012).

The previous paragraph testifies to the fact that the concept of resilience has recently been assigned political features, although this political analysis remains embryonic (Paidakaki & Moulaert, 2017). An analysis of the political context in which a disaster takes place, an identification of the powerful actors and an investigation of the nature of their relationship with alternative and counter-hegemonic voices is crucial in order to understand whose bouncing forward ability is supported and whose is undermined. Furthermore, how these multi-stakeholder interactions can mutate in a post-disaster context, whether new actors emerge and to what extent they might influence recovery trajectories through socially innovative practices needs to be further examined.

2.1.2 Governance and Social Innovation

In an endeavour to grasp the political circumstances of recovery trajectories and resilience building trajectories, social innovation and multi-level governance theories are explored and applied to a post-disaster setting. This exploration is necessary to understand the 'institutional landscape' of actors steering post-disaster recovery processes, identify their power relations and agency and dig out who benefits and who loses from the recovery praxis.

Multi-level governance or *governance-beyond-the-state* can be understood as a change in statehood that originated at the end of the 20th century. It describes new governance arrangements that rely both on a distribution of power between different levels of governance and the development of partnerships with non-state actors (Pradel et al., 2013; Eizaguirre et al., 2012; Swyndegouw, 2005). This results in a hybrid and participatory form of governance in which a new articulation and restructuring of power relations between the state-civil society-market emerges in a horizontal networked structure (Swyndegouw, 2005; Swyndegouw, 2009). By transferring responsibilities to lower levels of governance the aim is to create a competitive environment between different regions. Whereas economic growth used to be distributed across the borders of the entire nation, different regions and cities are now responsible for their own prosperity (Eizaguirre et al., 2012).

This new decentralized form of governmentality led to growing opportunities for non-state actors to have a voice in policy-making processes through socially innovative practices (Moulaert & Swyndegouw, 2010; Pradel et al., 2013). These socially innovative practices are framed in and

subject to a particular context and time-related governance structure and can simultaneously induce change in that very same governance structure. In this way governance becomes both a framework and a field for social innovation (Pradel et al., 2013). Social innovation refers to strategies or processes that address the fulfilment of certain needs and concerns of social groups that are excluded from society through dogmatic decision-making. In this way, these strategies contribute to improving the human capabilities of these groups and their empowerment. Furthermore, they are committed to challenge existing governance structures and transform them into democratic practices of equality and inclusion (Moulaert, 2010; Pradel et al., 2013; Moulaert & Swyndegouw, 2010).

The fact that these socially innovative processes seek to challenge existing governance arrangements reflects their conflictive and politically-radical nature, exposing the deficiencies and failures of the state (Moulaert & Swyndegouw, 2010). As a result, the relationship between socially innovative practices from civil society actors and public administrations can be quite tense and compromises are often reached after a period of contention and negotiation (Pradel et al., 2013).

In this sense, Eizzaguirre et al. (2012) advocate for a governance form where negotiation and even conflict plays a pivotal role rather than the pursuit of consensus and harmony, embracing citizens or bottom-up initiatives that do not agree with hegemonic discourses and present alternative strategies. Institutional structures that aim for a governance form that is based on achieving social cohesion and order, silence alternative voices and tend to "ignore power relations, territorial fragmentation and access to social rights" (Eizaguirre et al., p.2012).

The extent to which socially innovative practices can impact the governance framework depends on the degree of decentralisation of the state and their openness concerning the participation of non-state actors. Socially innovative strategies can contribute to a reconceptualization or re-approach of a policy problem, to changing policy-making processes that strive for more transparency and accountability, as well as to effectively changing a policy (Pradel et al., 2013). It is important for socially innovative practices to increase their networking capacities by establishing relationships with actors or institutions at higher levels within the multi-level framework. In this way they institutionalize their practices, increasing their influence and sustainability. However, they should not forget to maintain a critical attitude towards current governance mechanisms in order to cause a radical change (Pradel et al., 2013).

Especially in times of crisis or in a post-disaster setting, government instabilities originate that can both provoke and accelerate the possibility of socially innovative practices to emerge (Moulaert, 2010). Disasters can often be seen as the failure of the social contract between the state and the citizens when the government is weakened and unable to respond to the citizen's immediate needs. This creates opportunities for the restructuring and renegotiation of power relations between actors possibly leading to a drastic renewal of the urban system. The deprivation of a variety of human needs generates the proliferation of grassroots civil society initiatives under the denominator of social mobilization to fill up the 'cracks' left behind by the government (Paidakaki & Moulaert, 2017; Pelling & Dill, 2010; Johnson, 2011; Gonzalez & Healey, 2005).

However, the existing social mobilization has a heterogenous nature due to the fragmentation of civil society that has different goals and priorities regarding the reconstruction process (Johnson, 2011). This social mobilization differs in terms of “ideology, interest and agendas, modes of action,

level of professionalism, cooperation with or against the state and/or in favor or against the socio-political status quo." (Paidakaki & Moulaert, 2017, p.283).

The lack of a collective objective from civil society gives the government the possibility to favour certain actors (those whose vision fits within their view of the reconstruction process and who are willing to 'play within the rules of the game') at the expense of other actors (those who are more socially innovative and thus rebellious in nature striving for a critical juncture in the current political regime) (Swyndegouw, 2009; Moulaert & Swyndegouw, 2010; Pelling & Dill, 2010). This creates uneven power relations that results in a "prominence of new social actors, the consolidation of the presence of others, the exclusion or diminished power position of groups that were present in earlier forms of government and the continuing exclusion of other social actors who have never been included." (Swyndegouw, 2009, p.74).

The recovery direction taken in the post-disaster field largely depends on pre-disaster political circumstances and is therefore path dependent. Pre-disaster political conditions and governance structures determine the likelihood for change and whether the recovery trajectory will result in an accelerated status-quo or a tipping point for a transformation of governance arrangements (Pelling & Dill, 2010). In this sense and given the fact that civil society is highly heterogeneous and governance arrangements are multi-level and complex, post-disaster resilience-building emerges not as a linear process of bouncing forward but as a multidirectional trajectory with multiple bouncing forward possibilities. This multi-directionality is embedded within a complex political framework that exists of multiple different actors – some more powerful than others- who all have their own perception on recovery trajectories and try to steer the discourse on reconstruction (Paidakaki & Moulaert, 2017; Paidakaki & Moulaert, 2018).

From a social innovation and governance perspective, it can be concluded that a disaster may lead to the proliferation of a heterogeneous spectrum of civil society initiatives that try to determine recovery trajectories by complying with or potentially challenging institutional arrangements. In the next section the position of community architects in this highly multi-governed and conflictive field of post-disaster reconstruction is discussed, by elaborating on the notion of community architecture, after which the different roles community architects take on in facilitating resilience trajectories are identified.

2.2 ROLES OF COMMUNITY ARCHITECTS IN BUILDING UP RESILIENCE

In this section the community architecture practice (its origins, nature and main philosophy) will be discussed and the various roles community architects play in building resilience in and through post-disaster reconstruction processes.

2.2.1 Rise of Community Architecture

In the 1970s a movement was born that called itself *community architecture* as a reaction to the lack of a social focus on architecture in conventional practices and education (Till, 1997). Conventional architectural education was criticised for being formalistic, aesthetic and technological, paying little attention to the significance of architecture for society and its future users. Charlesworth (2006) points out that the movement highlighted two main voids present in many architecture schools today. The first void is that architecture is mostly taught on the basis of iconic works by individual architects who are considered as idols in the field (Charlesworth, 2006). Attention is mainly paid to the individual person, and less to the embodied values and significance of the designs for society. The second void is that architecture is often less open towards other disciplines such as philosophy, politics and sociology (Charlesworth, 2006). It is considered as a creative discipline that is not compatible with these social sciences. The more socially engaged community architecture movement aspired to break this conventional attitude by embracing interdisciplinary knowledge exchange in their practice and education. They advocated for a paradigm shift in which architects no longer desired to provide architecture *for* but work together *with* the communities and support them in finding solutions themselves (Petal et al., 2008). Community architects have shared the ideas of John Turner (1972) who states that the role of architects is much more than just providing the physical aspect of housing. Turner (1972) argues that housing, when seen as a verb, not only refers to a physical action, but also to sociological, economic and political. process whereby architects, together with other involved professionals and communities analyse the community's values and way of life, understand the interrelations, and exchange skills and knowledge (Petal et al., 2008). And since one community can be very different from another in terms of needs, he stresses the importance of architects to become familiar with the values, culture, knowledge and skillsets of the communities they serve. Only by understanding the affected community, architects will be better enabled to respond appropriately to the local needs (Boano & Kelling, 2013).

This familiarisation with the community is one of the most important features of community architecture. Moreover, involving the affected community in post-disaster (re)building processes through participation is also key. Defined by Mägdefrau & Sprague (2016, p.297), participation "comprises of the involvement of all relevant and potentially affected individuals, parties and/or organisations in decision-making processes towards reducing disaster risks". These participatory processes are a two-way exchange of values, skills and knowledge between different actors, and often produce a more appropriate outcome to the needs of the community. This is in contradiction to the methods used by international NGOs. These institutions often adopt a universal approach to find solutions, and therefore are not able to answer suitably to these needs (Lizarralde, 2010). Participation is expected to include all relevant stakeholders, such as authorities, NGOs, designers, and also public actors, such as the affected community (Davidson, 2010). It is essential that each of them has a well-defined role in order for the participation to run smoothly. Venkatachalam

(2011) points out that if the community participate in the decision-making processes, they feel a greater satisfaction and affection with the place.

Each post-disaster reconstruction process is context-specific and, hence, unique. This makes every participatory process having different requirements and taking different forms. Nevertheless, some key principles must always be considered in order to create a fruitful participatory process. The first principle is the fact that dialogue is strongly required. As mentioned before, this dialogue allows a better understanding of the current needs, knowledge and technical expertise of the community members. The constant dialogue creates trust among the community members, which is a second important principle of the participation process in order to bring the project to a successful ending (Davidson, 2010). A third main principle, also linked with trust, is transparency. Only a transparent communication can avoid possible disappointments by the community or conflicts between groups (Mägdefrau & Sprague, 2016). Furthermore, in order to have an efficient participatory process with the community it is highly recommended to use local materials and building technologies. Since there is no need for long distance transport and people have a wide knowledge about these materials and technologies, it will fasten the participatory process and the people will easily feel valuable (Coulombel, 2011).

The community architecture movement has clearly expanded the spectrum of possible roles of architects in rebuilding projects and processes, adding more socio-political roles to the traditional ones originating from conventional architectural education. The architectural profession has, thus, become more multifaceted and multidisciplinary. The goal of architects is not only to enhance the living conditions in post-disaster situations, but also to help the community to feel more empowered, and to make them realise that they are capable of making good decisions and coming up with solutions themselves. The architects take on a position where they are on an equal footing with the affected people, listen to them and support them when needed.

An overview of this wider spectrum of possible roles are described below. The first two roles (genius designer and building teacher) are design oriented. The following five (attentive student, compassionate friend, distant translator, involved facilitator and social mediator) are more socio-politically oriented:

1. **Genius designer**

In her book *Architects without Frontiers*, Charlesworth identifies the architect as a hero who is "an independent artist and creative genius who refuses to sully his or her profession in any act of artistic compromise and has clear superiority over the rest of the construction team" (Charlesworth, 2006, p.40). Therefore, the design is a product of only the architect's creativity and does not involve participatory processes as he/she takes all the decisions. The *genius designer* upholds this attitude with the aim of creating an original, individual design in order to gain international acclaim and press glorification (Charlesworth, 2006). These creative products can lead to improved structural resilience but are not necessarily what the community desires. The architect is only interested in architecture as an exclusive discipline that is not open for civic engagement. Therefore, the genius designer only acts on his/her own personal interests and agenda (Andriessen, 2018).

2. **Building teacher**

Architects as *building teachers* are there to advise and support the affected community with their technical skills and knowledge (Boano & Talocci, 2017). This is a long-term sustainable approach

where the architects pass on their knowledge to the community, so they are able to provide for themselves in the future (Andriessen, 2018). This is a one-way knowledge where the architects focus mostly on building longer-term structural resilience through technical improvement and is not really open to other disciplines. However, they are more open to using local materials and use all their skills and creativity to find something that the local community can easily understand and replicate.

3. **Attentive Student**

The role of the *attentive student* is the opposite of the building teacher. It is also a one-way knowledge exchange but from the community to the architect, as he/she learns about local building techniques and materials from the community (Luansang et al., 2012). Especially in many areas in the Global South, communities have been designing their homes themselves for a long time, and as a result, they have a lot of knowledge to share with the architect. The community feels supported when their traditions and values are listened to and respected, hence this stance can bolster social resilience within the community (Andriessen, 2018). The role of attentive student still only remains within the architecture discipline, but it already goes far beyond the domain of the traditional education of the architect.

4. **Compassionate friend**

As a *compassionate friend*, the architect tries to bond with the community and gain their trust before the design process starts. He/she wants to empower them and make them feel comfortable to speak up and give ideas. It is a two-way knowledge exchange through participatory processes, whereby everyone is treated as equal partners (Andriessen, 2018; Boano & Talocci, 2017). This can bring the community closer together and therefore foster social resilience. The aim of the compassionate friend is to respect the local community and to be completely open to learn from them. He/she listens to their traditions and tries to understand their culture and values (Boano & Talocci, 2017). By being a compassionate friend, the architect hopes to bridge the gap between him/her and the community members (Andriessen, 2018). After this is accomplished, the actual design phase can start.

5. **The distant translator**

Boano and García (2011) see the role of the architect as the *translator* as someone who interprets the habits and the needs of the community and translates them into a graphic design. This design represents the whole community and let the voices of everyone be heard. By doing this, the architect strives for equity. Furthermore, the capacities of the multiple actors are acknowledged by the architect without conveying a sense of power or a sense of superiority to the community. The architects do not only rebuild the damaged structures contributing to structural resilience, but they also start a process of re-building the social and cultural aspects of the community and of making it more resilient in a more holistic way (Boano & García, 2011). This causes a shift from the well-known physical dwelling towards a more widely view on housing, including both the social and economic dimension. Architects are no longer working in isolated fragments but the connections and cultural differences between different groups are taken in mind (Boano & García, 2011).

6. **Involved Facilitator**

The *involved facilitator* combines the characteristics of both the building teacher and the attentive student (Andriessen, 2018). A two-way knowledge exchange takes place where conversation is

key. Both the community and the architect share information and knowledge with each other in order to improve the design. Everyone's voice is being heard, also the ones of the often-excluded minorities, hence this creates a design that includes all cultural differences (Boano & García, 2011). The architect also facilitates discussions and negotiations with the public authorities in the name of the community (Boano & Talocci, 2017). This social engagement of the architects and the empowerment of people may eventually lead to new modes of political engagement between the community and the public authorities (Boano & Talocci, 2017). This role is already more politically involved, as the architect tries to foster a new future by empowering the community. This approach fosters both social resilience within the community as well as structural resilience in their built environment.

7. **Social Mediator**

The architect acts as a *social mediator* when he/she mediates in a neutral way between two or more conflictive parties and different actors by bringing them around the table to solve possible conflicts and problems (Charlesworth, 2006). It is a very multidisciplinary role as it involves coming into contact with different actors from different disciplines. During the discussion and negotiations, the architect advocates for the needs of the community, involving various authorities to this end. This approach leads to a more socially resilient community as they feel supported by the architect to voice their needs and concerns to the more powerful actors during these interactions. The architect is also there to help them defend their opinions, values and traditions.

Table 2 provides an overview of all the roles, which kind of resilience (social and/or structural) they foster and their main characteristics, i.e. the actors involved, the use of participatory processes, interdisciplinarity, and the social and political engagement. These roles are formulated within a post-disaster reconstruction context that is demanding permanent solutions in situ. In the final section of this research, a first step is taken to broaden the knowledge that exists about the emerging roles and position of community architects in a non-permanent post-disaster context in which displaced populations are residing in temporary settlements (e.g. refugee camps) located in new national territories.

Table 2: Overview of all potential roles architects in a post-disaster crisis situation. (Source: authors)

Role	Actors?	Participatory processes?	Interdisciplinarity?	Political action?	Fostering resilience?
Genius Designer	Architect	No knowledge exchanges. There is no consultation with the community.	No.	Indifferent.	Possibly structural resilience.
Building teacher	Architect and community.	One-way knowledge exchange. Architect passes on his knowledge to the community.	No.	Indifferent.	Long-term structural resilience.
Attentive student	Architect and community.	One-way knowledge exchange. Community learns local building techniques to the architect.	No.	Indifferent.	Social resilience.
Compassionate friend	Architect and community.	Two-way knowledge exchange. The architect creates a bond with the community before the design phase starts. Both parties are working together as equal partners.	No.	Very limited. This political action stays within the community where the architect strives for equality.	Social resilience.
Distant Translator	Architect and community.	Two-way knowledge exchange. The architect translates the needs of the community into graphic design. All voices of the community members are being heard.	Limited. The architect listens to the needs of the community and tries to fulfil them. These needs can be interdisciplinary.	Limited. Empowering the community and striving for better living conditions.	Structural and social resilience.

Role	Actors?	Participatory processes?	Interdisciplinarity?	Political action?	Fostering resilience?
Involved facilitator	Architect and community.	Two-way knowledge exchange. Both the community and the architect learn new things through a conversation.	Limited. The architect listens to the needs of the community and tries to fulfil them. These needs can be interdisciplinary.	Limited. Empowering the community and striving for better living conditions.	Structural and social resilience.
Social mediator	Architect, community and authorities	The architect brings different parties together to find a solution for the communities' main issues.	Absolutely. Different actors from various disciplines are involved.	Absolutely. The architect advocates for the needs of the community and involves various authorities to this end.	Social resilience.

2.3 TEMPORARY MIGRATORY CONTEXT

In this section the focus on the resilience-community architecture nexus shifts to a non-permanent post-disaster context. The humanitarian-crisis-induced migratory context differs in some respects strongly from the permanent and place-based post-disaster reconstruction environment. Therefore, to get a better picture of the unique characteristics of this context, the nature of the refugee camps is first set out using the theory of the *state of exception* developed by Agamben (1995). Subsequently, the distinct characteristics and vulnerabilities of the residing displaced people as well as the specific governance arrangements of refugee camps are investigated.

2.3.1 Refugee Camps as the State of Exception

One of the much-debated theories used by several contemporary scholars to describe today's conditions in refugee camps is the one of the *state of exception*, declared by philosopher Agamben in his book *'Homo sacer. sovereign power and bare life (*Agamben, 2020*).* In this book he explains that Greeks consider two types of life: *zoé* and *bios*. *Bios* is referred to as political life; it is one's social and political appearance in society. This is what gives the person the opportunity to live not just a life but a good life. *Zoé* on the other hand is the natural life, the state of being alive. The natural life is the form of life of human beings where they can develop personally, it is seen in society as the biological appearance of a person.

In addition to these two forms of life, Agamben describes a third one: the *bare lif*e. Before modern times, human beings were described according to Aristoteles' vision as an animal, a pure biological object, of which their natural life has no political interest, they are only *zoé* (Agamben, 2020, p.155). However, this perception changes once modern times begin, after the declaration of independence equality rises and all objects become equal subjects. They are now *zoé* with the rights of *bios*, natural life is included in the political life. Nevertheless, a fraction of this natural life is at the same time excluded from the legal order. Agamben calls this the *bare life*. Hence, this form of life is included in the form of exclusion. It is not only debarred from political life but is also controlled by the political life or the legal order. In this way, both the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of the political life and to grow in the natural life are eliminated. *Bare life* is therefore situated in between *bios* and *zoé*.

Someone who is forced to this *bare life* is what Agamben calls the *homo sacer.* This character originates in the Roman law and refers to someone who is banned from society and "a life that may be killed but may not be sacrificed" (Agamben, 2020, p.101). The fact that the *homo sacer* may be killed shows that it is beyond the scope of human law and the legal order. The life cannot be sacrificed because a sacrifice for the gods is seen as a good cause, leaving the life of the *homo sacer* to be excluded from the divine law as well. The *homo sacer*'s life is seen of such little worth that it does not belong to law and is often compared to as a worthless life.

The device used by a state to reduce human beings to their bare life and accordingly take away their *bios* and restrict their *zoé* is what Agamben names the *state of exception*. Human beings are given the political life, *bios* but only with the consideration that this can be taken away from them once they are banned to the *state of exception*. Here, the right to have rights is no longer present and the bare life is included. Agamben uses the term *camp* to talk about the materialization of the *state of exception*. For a long time, the *state of exception* has been temporary, and only used by

states in case of war or emergency. But in the notion of the camp, Agamben states that the *state of exception* is becoming more likely to be a permanent reality, the camp is an absolute biopolitical space.

The term biopolitics has been used for some time but only became really known when philosopher Michel Foucault started to discuss this term in more detail in his lectures at 'Collège de France' (Ojakangas, 2005). Foucault declares that at the start of the modern era politics transformed into biopolitics. Natural life becomes the source of the legal order and the human being becomes the main target of political strategies (Ojakangas, 2005). Biopolitics implies that there is a political control over the natural life and the bare life. The human being and its life are now the stakes of politics. These biopolitics form the actual system in which biopower is exercised. Biopower literally means the power over bodies. Foucault describes it as a mechanism of power used by modern states to manage human beings, the power to decide on their social lives (Ojakangas, 2005). The camp as described by Agamben is the place where the power over human beings their lives is absolute and without any restrictions.

Agamben's notion of the camp as the main materialisation of the *state of exception* is often compared to contemporary refugee camps. Van der Heiden (2020) describes the refugee camps as transient spaces where displaced people are stranded and cannot benefit from the same rights or the same political protection as the citizens. Agier (2017) agrees to this as he states that the camp contains all the traits of extraterritoriality. With this he refers to the fact that different laws and regulations apply here in comparison to the host state and that there is a strong form of exclusion. By detaining the displaced community in a physically defined space where there is no political equality, they are excluded both legally and territorially (Agier, 2017). Hence, the displaced people residing in refugee camps are reduced to their bare life and therefore not included in the political life, although they are dominated by it (van der Heiden, 2020). The displaced community lives in a permanent state of exception where they are treated more like objects than human beings or subjects (Diken, 2004). Diken (2004) states that the displaced person is considered as *homo sacer*, reducing them to a referent object of contemporary biopolitics. The refugee camps are not about living the good life, but entirely about the fundamental aspect of survival. These camps reinforce the separation between "refugee and citizen" and between "qualified lives and lives without any value" whereby this latter refers to the bare life (Arán & Peixoto Jr., 2007). Because of the exclusion of society, the displaced people have no power to decide on their natural or political life since they are voiceless and without any political involvement (Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015).

2.3.2 Vulnerabilities of Displaced People in Refugee Camps

In a permanent and place-based post-disaster reconstruction context, communities are exposed to spatial vulnerabilities because they are unprotected to natural phenomena, e.g. an earthquake. In the context of refugee camps, vulnerabilities of camp residents to natural hazards are still witnessed, however, the most predominant ones are of a different kind and relate to the political and natural life. Diken (2004) argues that the extreme isolation that characterizes life in the camps is not only physical but also cultural and socio-economical. The displaced people are excluded from various social functions and political systems which causes their freedom to be severely limited (Diken, 2004). This context of isolation, combined with several other factors, results in displaced people living in refugee camps to be extremely vulnerable (Macklin, 2003). Sabates-

Wheeler (2019) classifies these different factors into three forms of vulnerability, i.e. spatial, socio-cultural and socio-political vulnerability.

The spatial vulnerabilities of the displaced people occur due to the location of the camp and their conditions. Refugee camps are informal settlements which are often located away from urban centres. The displaced people are not familiar with their surroundings and have unclear information about the transportation means available or their rights to go somewhere, which restricts their movement (Sabates-Wheeler, 2019). Furthermore, the living conditions in the camps are poor as they reside in temporary shelter such as tents and the camps are often overcrowded. In addition, the camps very often lack facilities or an overall management. Hence, the displaced people are exposed to a greater risk of getting both physical and mental illnesses. This is frequently accompanied by trauma caused by what they experienced before they arrived in the camp, as well as the high-level insecurity and uncertainty they face (Sabates-Wheeler, 2019). Furthermore, this displacement also results in the loss of the displaced people's home-based community while at the same time they cannot obtain a new community since they find themselves in a temporary and uncertain situation (Bulley, 2014).

The latter is also part of the second form of vulnerability that occurs in the refugee camps i.e. the socio-cultural vulnerabilities. With the loss of their home-based community, the displaced people also lose the protection and empowerment which this community offered. These essential elements of a community, or even a community in itself, cannot be regained in the camps. Diken (2004) confirms this impossibility of a new community in his theory based on the idea of philosopher Agamben. As Agamben states that the camp is a place where a political community is suspended and thus cannot exist, Diken interprets this in an even more extreme way. He refers to refugee camps as *non-places*, according to the philosophical idea of Augé (Diken, 2004). Augé defines these *non-places* as places that "do not integrate other places, meanings, traditions and sacrificial, ritual moments but remain, due to a lack of characterization, non-symbolized and abstract spaces" (Augé, 1995, p.82). By using this concept of Augé, Diken (2004) states that no form of community is able to exist in the refugee camps. Hyndman (2000) shares similar theories with Agamben and Diken. She argues that a community in refugee camps cannot be self-identified, as they are generated by authorities and institutions. Her theory on communities relies on the idea of individuals who intentionally choose to link themselves with others because they have common identity markers (e.g. language, culture, etc.) and thus form an "us", i.e. a community. Forming a community therefore requires a free choice; this is not the case in refugee camps, which excludes the existence of a community. However, the French philosopher Nancy, in turn, criticises this theory of Hyndman. He observes that being is always 'being with'; being in relationship with other individuals is not always by choice, it is something that comes with being human (Nancy, 2000, p.30). Community is not something that the individual can decide to engage in, but something that is inevitably connected with the social activity of being. Herewith, Nancy concludes that human beings will inevitably become part of a community.

Furthermore, the displaced people are regarded as outsiders and are judged based purely on their ethnicity, language or because of their status as 'refugees' (Sabates-Wheeler, 2019). They are considered by society as 'victims' of the migration crisis and criminal poor. Moreover, in order to gain access to certain services, they need specific additional documents which local people do not need. For instance, the procedure they must go through to apply for asylum is very lengthy and puts them in an even greater state of uncertainty throughout this period. Additionally, this also

ensures that they are excluded from various social opportunities for a longer period (Sabates-Wheeler, 2019).

Thirdly, the displaced people are also subjected to socio-political vulnerabilities. They are discriminated with regard to the access to public services because their unclear political status makes them ineligible for entry (Sabates-Wheeler, 2019). Again, the lengthy procedures they have to go through in order to obtain a particular status, e.g. refugee status, ensure that they are exposed to this discrimination for a longer period of time. Additionally, they are not allowed to participate in political activities since their political life is deprived of them as soon as they arrive in the camps (Sabates-Wheeler, 2019). At the end, these forms of vulnerability result in the displaced people having only a limited (or even no) ability to protect their own interests.

2.3.3 Humanitarian Governance as Response to Vulnerabilities

Sabates-Wheeler (2019) argues that in order to deal with and reduce the vulnerabilities of the displaced people residing in refugee camps, social protection must be provided. This aims at both managing and overcoming situations that affect people's welfare in a negative way. To this end, programs are put in place that serve to reduce both the vulnerabilities as well as the exposure to their causes. In today's European refugee camps this social protection is not given by the national state. The lack of response from national institutional structures led to the development of a diverse landscape of multi-level public authorities and international, national and local NGOs, as well as grassroots organizations providing social protection in the camps (Sabates-Wheeler, 2019).

Hilhorst (2010) argues that a humanitarian space like a refugee camp is gradually transforming into a *humanitarian arena* where a multitude of international and non-governmental actors try to steer the everyday realities of humanitarian practices emerging in the camp.

The concept of *humanitarian arena* refers to the growing reinterpretation of humanitarian situations from neutral areas where different humanitarian organisations work side by side in peace "according to principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence" (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010, p.117), to spaces identified by a politicization and a proliferation of a multiplicity of interests. In this context, different organisations develop their own understanding and vision on the provision of humanitarian aid based on their interpretations of needs and try to impose this as a universal truth by creating discourses (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010). This leads to an environment characterised by social negotiation of actors about the practices of aid and the competition over funds resulting in processes of exclusion in which some discourses regarding humanitarian aid become dominant while others are silenced (Hilhorst & Jansen 2010; Hilhorst, 2018).

Two major discourses can be distinguished regarding the provision of humanitarian aid in refugee camp i.e. *classic humanitarianism* and *resilience humanitarianism* (Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015). *Classical humanitarianism* represents the dominant one which is present within most aid-organisations. Their main focus is on reducing spatial vulnerabilities, i.e. provision of shelter, food and medicines for the displaced people (Sabates-Wheeler, 2019).

However, this paradigm is being challenged by *resilience humanitarianism* which is increasingly emerging and is more compatible with the social realities of the crisis. The main objective of the organisations is to improve both the socio-cultural and socio-political vulnerabilities of the

displaced people by providing aid which is more focussed on their social qualities. This is achieved by focusing on offering assistance to the displaced people, soothing their suffering and helping them navigate through the culturally and institutionally novel conditions (Hilhorst, 2018). Hence, displaced people are encouraged by the organisations to adapt rather than continue to resist the dire situation they are in and are supported to withstand the uncertainties of the future (Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015). This could be attained by involving the displaced people in camp management. Consequently, they can be empowered and become more responsible to take care of their own futures. Like that, they would be treated as active subjects instead of passive beneficiaries (Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015).

2.4 RESILIENCE RECONCEPTUALISED

In the previous sections of the theoretical framework an overview of the resilience concept was provided and theories about the different possible roles of architects in the post-disaster field were presented. Furthermore, the specific context and governance of refugee camps, inhabited by displaced people with distinct characteristics, were discussed. By combining the different strands of literature, a first attempt is made to redefine the concept of resilience from a migratory perspective. Post-disaster resilience of refugee camps is twofold and consists both of a quality and a process.

Resilience as a quality entails the establishment of sturdy public camp infrastructure (structural quality) that provides safety and access to basic and sufficient emergency needs such as shelter, food, medical care and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) facilities. Furthermore, it equally values the provision of social infrastructure (social quality) that establishes spaces for social life, recreation, worship and education. Hence, a resilient refugee camp is a liveable human settlement with decent living conditions and respect for the heterogeneous nature of the residing community and their skills, knowledge and potentials.

Resilience as a process relates to the politicization of the humanitarian space, transforming it into an arena, in which different humanitarian aid workers; hegemonic and alternative; coming from public authorities, grassroots organisations, novel and well-established local, national and international NGOs promote and accommodate their own interests and agendas. From this perspective, resilience is seen as a politically conflictive and multi-governed process with the aim to formulate governance arrangements that are socially optimal both for the humanitarian actors involved in the management of refugee camps and the refugees whom they aim to serve. Hegemonic humanitarian organisations and their discourses on the nature and implementation of humanitarian aid defend traditional views on humanitarianism, consisting of an emergency response which mainly foresees structural quality in camps i.e. the provision of shelter, food and health care. Alternative humanitarian organisations, including community architects, attempt to transform this approach by building up and adapting counter-hegemonic narratives and practices that revolve around the concept of resilience humanitarianism, which recognises displaced people as active recipients of aid instead of passive beneficiaries. These organisations emphasise the value and provision of social quality in temporary human settlements.

3 CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

This chapter outlines the case study of Moria Hotspot and its surroundings on the Greek Island of Lesvos, and the practice of ODD in order to empirically test the provisional definition of resilience and uncover the roles of community architects in temporary post-disaster human settlements. The first section of this chapter (3.1) discusses in detail the context of the 2015 migration crisis in Europe. Both the emergence of the crisis and the responses of the EU are explained. The latter also elaborates on the concept of the *hotspot*. In order to acquire a more profound understanding of this concept, the following section (3.2) provides an in-depth study of Moria Hotspot, which consists of both a demarcated area for the execution of identification, registration and asylum procedures as well as accommodation facilities. Over the years, these accommodation facilities have expanded beyond its official boundaries to the surrounding Olive Grove. Hence, its evolution from the start of the migration crisis in 2015 until now will also be discussed. The last section (3.3) gives an overview of the practice of ODD, including their objectives, methods, and challenges.

3.1 2015 MIGRATION CRISIS

3.1.1 Introduction to the Phenomenon of Migration

Migration is a timeless concept which has been occurring since the start of mankind (General Assembly of the UN, 2016). In the Oxford Dictionary this concept is defined as "the movement of people to a new country or area in order to find work or better living conditions" (Oxford University Press, 2020). The size and directions of this movement of people are determined by geopolitics, socio-economic conditions, and cultural factors (Bonifazi, 2008).

People migrate for several reasons and there is a specific terminology associated with these. Table 3 gives a clear distinction between the terms *migrant*, *asylum seeker* and *refugee*. However, as already stated in the introduction, in this research only neutral and overarching terms like *border crosser, third country national* or *displaced person/community* will be used in order to address all people who migrate to Europe, for any reason and in every state (still as an asylum-seeker, already recognised as a refugee or waiting for their return).

Table 3: Explanation of the terms 'migrant, 'asylum seeker' and 'refugee'. (Source: authors)

TERM	EXPLANATION
MIGRANT	The term 'migrant' does not have a legal definition and is mostly used as an overarching term for addressing all people who migrate. However, this not entirely correct. UNCHR describes a migrant as people who "choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but mainly to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons. Unlike refugees who cannot safely return home, migrants face no such impediment to return" (UNHCR, 2016).
ASYLUM SEEKER	Amnesty International states that an Asylum Seeker is "someone who has left their country and is seeking protection from persecution and serious human rights violations in another country, but who hasn't yet been legally recognized as a refugee and is waiting to receive a decision on their asylum claim" (Amnesty International, sd).
REFUGEE	According to the 1951 Refugee Convention, a refugee is someone who is "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or unwilling to return to it." (UNHCR, 1951)

Regardless of these various reasons, migration usually involves people who try to cross territorial state borders. A state's territoriality goes hand in hand with a significant strengthening of the state's borders. This strengthening and the definition of borders is what defines human mobility as the phenomenon of migration (De Genova, 2015). Therefore, if there were no borders the concept of migration would not apply, and only free mobility would be a reference term. Van Houtum (2010) described the development of borders based on three main dimensions: (1) bordering, (2) ordering and (3) othering. *Bordering* is the search for and the justification of the location and demarcation of the border. Within this border, the own claimed identity and territory is exclusive and one coherent whole. In order to obtain this whole the second dimension is of great importance. *Ordering* indicates that a new socio-spatial order without internal differences is created or that the current one is reformulated. In addition, the process of ordering is also characterised by the bio-political registration and territorial control of the population. *Othering* is the third dimension and refers to the making of borders by making others. This includes the production of differences between 'we and them' but also between 'here and there'. By creating and emphasising these differences through the border, discrimination is created towards everything that is considered unlike, both in terms of identity and in territory (van Houtum, 2010).

3.1.2 Pre-2015 Migration Discourse in Europe

Migration has always been a phenomenon witnessed in Europe, and over time, migration flows have taken place both from and into Europe. Bonifazi (2008) differentiates four main periods in this overall history of international migration in Europe, which are presented in figure 1.



Figure 1: Overview of the four main periods in Europe's history of International migration. (Source: authors)

Since the 1990s (period 4) there is a positive net migration into Europe. In order to keep control over this influx, the EU has been attempting to set up a general and universal migration and asylum system (Federico & Feroni, 2018). The main objective has been to create a common approach that all EU member states could integrate into their national policies. In order to achieve this international and overarching approach, the EU has made a number of adjustments to its migration policy. Firstly, a necessity arose in 1990 to develop regulations concerning the attribution of responsibility to specific EU states over the process of asylum applications (Federico & Feroni, 2018). This resulted in the Dublin III Regulation, which is still in force today. The regulation determined that asylum may only be applied for in one EU country, the country of first arrival. Secondly, the Schengen Convention was also signed in 1990 (Vradis et al., 2019), stating that controls will no longer be carried out at the internal borders of the EU. This allowed EU citizens to enjoy a free movement across EU borders. However, the EU still strongly focussed on strengthening its external borders for non-EU citizens. Thirdly, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was launched in 1999 and eventually became fully operational in 2015 (Vradis et al., 2019). With CEAS, a general decision-making policy was established so that every asylum application would be treated equally. The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) was established to help EU member states integrating this system into national legislation.

The EU thus strongly focused on reinforcing their external borders. This caused a more intense process of border production to take place. In this way, *others* were created who were not welcome to cross this border. The main goal herein was to preserve and protect the unity of the EU. Today, this fortifying of the EU's external border takes place on two levels (Shields, 2015). The first level of fortifying is that of the external perimeter of the EU to preserve and protect the EU's 'internal comfort zone' from people who, from the EU's perspective, would disturb it. The second level at which border reinforcement takes place extends beyond the borders of the European area. This takes the form of controls, for example in airports, that identify people who try to enter Europe and hence keep track of them (Shields, 2015).

Following this fortification of the external borders, Tsianos and Karakayali (2010) were one of the firsts commentators introducing the concept of *Fortress Europe* into the debate on European

migration policies and borders. This comparison of Europe with a fortress goes back to the extreme security of the external borders and the constant controls that take place both at and further away from the border. Van Houtum and Pijpers (2007) made a similar analogy by comparing Europe with a gated community. They describe a gated community as "a space in which the nation's affluent wall and gate themselves off from the rest of society in an enclave, primarily driven by fear of crime and the need to be amongst ourselves, hence protecting welfare, security and identity" (van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007, p.303). In both analogies, a clear distinction is made between the 'inside' and the 'outside'. This also reflects in the EU's migration and asylum policies which carefully selects who is allowed in and who has to stay out.

3.1.3 Emergence of the 2015 Migration Crisis

Since 2015, *Fortress Europe* came under severe pressure due to increased migration flows coming from the Middle East and North Africa. Several countries (e.g. Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan) were suffering from civil wars, oppressive regimes, and political instabilities, causing thousands of people to flee their homes.

A lot of inhabitants from these countries escaped to another part of their own country or to a neighbouring country, but a large portion of this displaced population crossed over to Europe to apply for asylum. Figure 2 shows the seven main migratory routes distinguished by Frontex (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency). The Eastern Mediterranean route is the one taken by inhabitants from countries in the Middle East to reach the European borders on the Aegean islands. The route from this point further into Northern Europe is called the Western Balkan route (Frontex, 2016).



Figure 2: Map of Migratory Routes in Europe, 2016. (Source: Frontex: Risk Analysis 2016)

The journey that these people have to undertake to reach Europe is not without risk. A large part tries to reach Greece from Turkey by crossing the Aegean Sea with a dinghy. Others come from North-Africa trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea to reach Italy. These boats are often very overcrowded and unstable which has led to thousands of people drowning. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) compared the death toll in the Mediterranean from January 2015 to April 2015 which counted 1.727 people, with that of the previous year in this period, where a death toll of 56 people was counted, and noted that it was 30 times higher (IOM, 2015). Hence, these numbers increased significantly in less than a year, which is why from that moment on the term *migration crisis* was introduced by the EU to refer to the situation.

3.1.4 European Union's Response to the 2015 Migration Crisis – The Hotspot Approach

Responding to the rapid rise of the amount of irregular arrivals in the Mediterranean, the EU called in immediate action and fulfilled a ten-point action plan in April 2015. This plan included ten significant measures that were directly applicable with the aim of establishing an immediate difference. The ten-point plan was drawn up in anticipation of the more structural and comprehensive measures that have continued to evolve since then. These measures were first presented in the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015. In this Agenda, the various measures were sectioned into four pillars of continuous and steadfast action (European Commission, 2015).

The first pillar focusses on how to reduce the incentives of irregular migration, such as smugglers and traffickers, and provides regulations for returning the inadmissible border crossers. The second pillar concentrates on strengthening the border management in order to save lives and secure the external borders of the EU. The third pillar on the agenda plays out Europe's duty to offer third country nationals a fair asylum procedure and protection. The fourth and last pillar aims at a migration policy to resolve the economic and demographic challenges Europe will be facing in the future (European Commission, 2015).

To achieve the aims depicted in the four pillars, the Agenda also introduced the *hotspot approach,* leading to the installation of ten *hotspots* at the external borders of the EU. The hotspots are described in the Agenda as the main instrument of control that ensures that, once reaching the external borders of the EU, third country nationals are registered and identified. The Agenda is part of a universal and overarching strategy attempting to manage the uncontrollable migration influx into the southern borders of the EU (Dimitriadi, 2017). Several frontline EU member states were experiencing disproportionate pressure from the high number of arrivals. Therefore, the EU appointed EU agencies[2] to cooperate in situ with the authorities of the frontline EU member states.

According to Vradis et al. (2019), the hotspot approach consists of three components: (1) an idea, (2) administrative and legal practices and (3) physical infrastructures. Firstly, as an idea the hotspot approach is understood as the solution of the EU policy makers to gain control over the migration flows and to try managing them accordingly. Secondly, as a new combination of administrative and legal practices, the concept of a hotspot incorporates new ways of working

[2] (1) EASO is supporting the regional asylum services to process the asylum claims; (2) Frontex secures the EU outer borders and carries out operations in the Mediterranean and Aegean Sea; (3) EUROPOL and (4) EUROJUST help Greece to uncover smuggling networks.

together between national government and authorities on one hand and international bodies on the other. It creates an entirely new landscape where the EU acts as a supranational entity[3]. Finally, the hotspot is a physically demarcated space that contains both infrastructure and accommodation for third country nationals waiting for their registration or the result of their asylum claim, as facilities for the various agencies involved in the practices of processing arrivals and asylum claims (Vradis et al., 2019).

A total of ten hotspots were installed on the main arrival points, of which five in Italy, and five on five different Greek islands (*figure 3*). Especially the Aegean islands of Greece became the focal point of the 2015 migration crisis and the focus of international media attention. Due to their proximity to the Turkish mainland, Syrians fleeing the civil war that was tormenting their country saw the Greek-Turkish borders as the easiest way to get to Europe. In 2015, 856.723 people made the sea crossing from Turkey to Greece, as compared to 41.038 in 2014 (UNHCR, sd).

Figure 3: Map of all hotspots. (Source: European Agency for Fundamental Rights)

The first hotspot on the Aegean islands was inaugurated in October 2015 in Moria, Lesvos followed by the hotspots on Chios, Samos, Leros and Kos. Until March 2016, the journey of third country nationals from Turkey to the heart of Europe was only a matter of days (Dimitriadi, 2017). People were able to cross the external borders of the EU and, after identification and registration in the hotspots on the islands, to continue their journey throughout Europe. During this period, the hotspot served as a reception and transit centre where border crossers only stayed for a short period of time. At the end of the summer of 2015, voices of European top politicians were mostly positive and recipient coming from a sentimental and moral obligation to help these people.

[3] The power of the nation state is transferred from this nation state to an authority above this nation state. The power is exercised on national level by authorities that stand above this national level.

However, matters turned very quickly when Paris was under attack on the 13th of November 2015, causing the death of 129 people. Fingerprints of two of the attackers were matched with fingerprints being taken in a hotspot in Greece earlier that year, proving that these attackers had travelled all the way through Europe, disguising themselves as 'asylum seeker' (Dimitriadi, 2017). This gave rise to a wave of anger and racist discourses against the displaced community. The xenophobic discourse soon found its way to national authorities and governments. As a result, countries on the Western Balkan route slowly started to close their frontiers out of fear for more terrorist attacks (Dimitriadi, 2017). Soon after these events, on the 18th of March 2016, the EU and Turkey made a deal and signed the EU-Turkey Deal after months of negotiations.

This Deal was made with the aim of reducing the irregular migration flows along the Eastern Mediterranean Route to the Greek islands. The central element of the agreement was that anyone who arrived illegally on the Greek islands after the 20th of March 2016 and for whom Turkey was considered a safe country would be sent back. If Turkey implemented the measures correctly and accepted the return of new arrivals, the EU would provide them with financial support worth a total of EUR six billion (European Council, 2016).

The conclusion of this deal and the increasing number of EU member states closing their borders caused a key breakpoint in the migration discourse that started in 2015 and announced a new phase in in the Mediterranean migration crisis on the Aegean islands (Tazzioli, 2017). The hotspots on the Greek islands that were installed by the EU became the main instrument to implement the EU-Turkey Deal. They provided the environment needed to execute the policies prescribed in the Deal and the infrastructure to ensure returns. As a result, the mobility of third country nationals was governed through the hotspot (Dimitriadi, 2017). Vradis et al. (2019) argues that it was only after the EU-Turkey Deal that the hotspot became fully implemented. Only since then, the EU has complete control over the mobility of third country nationals entering at their external borders. The hotspots were an extension of the external borders since its main purpose was to manage the migration flows and filter who is allowed to pass through and who is not. From this moment on, the hotspot could no longer be seen separate from the EU-Turkey Deal as it is entirely devoted to the elaboration of it.

Although irregular arrivals drastically reduced due to the agreement, the situation on the Greek islands only deteriorated. The hotspot as a place of transit gradually evolved into a place of detention. An intensified and stricter asylum procedure and the slow implementation of return schemes prolonged the period of stay of people in the hotspots to months or even years. People who arrived on the Greek islands after the EU-Turkey Deal thus entered a phase of great uncertainty and endless waiting and hotspots have even grown beyond their physical limits.

The next section will provide a more zoomed in look into the registration, identification and asylum procedures in Moria Hotspot, established on Lesvos, and elaborate on the dire living conditions in and around the hotspot that the EU-Turkey Deal has generated.

3.2 MORIA HOTSPOT

Moria Hotspot is located just outside the village of Moria on Lesvos, the biggest island of the North Aegean region of Greece. The hotspot was originally a military base managed by the Greek Army. In 2012, it gradually started to be taken over by the Police mandated to install a FRC to receive arriving third country nationals. This was in line with the establishment of law 3907/2011 as part of the Greek Action Plan on Migration and Asylum (Vradis et al., 2019; Ilias et al., 2019). Under pressure of the EU, this plan aimed at reforming and strengthening the Greek Asylum and Reception System with the installation of three independent authorities: (1) The First Reception Service (FRS), (2) the Asylum Service (AS) and (3) the Appeal Authority under the supervision of the Ministry of Citizen Protection. Previously, asylum claims were processed by the Hellenic Police (Ilias et al., 2020). FRS was responsible for establishing the FRC and providing first reception procedures to third country nationals arriving on Greek territory (Federico & Feroni, 2018; Dimitriadi & Sarantaki, 2019).

As previously stated, Moria Hotspot was inaugurated in October 2015 as part of the *hotspot approach* of the EU. Although the concept of a *hotspot* did not have a legal foundation at that moment, it had significant implications for the management of the FRC. The open temporary reception and accommodation facility became more strictly regulated whereby several EU agencies were designated to assist the Greek authorities to make sure that all border crossers were identified and registered in the EURODAC system (Dimitriadi & Sarantaki, 2019; Papadopoulou et al., 2016). This registration and identification procedure only required a couple of days, after which arrived border crossers were able to travel to the mainland. The EU-Turkey Deal – established only a few months later – triggered a rise in asylum applications in Greece, as border crossers were no longer allowed to travel to other EU Member States and apply for asylum there. Due to this rise, it took longer to process all of the asylum applications which prolonged the stay of the applicants, causing the hotspot to evolve more and more into a detention facility. (Informal) accommodation infrastructures were expanding in and around the hotspot, hosting an accumulating amount of people trapped on the island, waiting for the decision of their claim or for their return (Dimitriadi, 2017). The hotspot approach and the EU-Turkey Deal had some repercussions for the Greek Asylum and Reception System and were finally transposed into the Greek legislative framework through law 4375/2016. This law transformed the FRC into the Reception and Identification Centre (RIC), established an independent Ministry of Migration Policy[4] and introduced an exceptional asylum procedure i.e. the *Fast-Track Border procedure* based on the notions of *(In)admissibility*, *Safe Third Country* and *First Country of Asylum,* which will be further explained in the following subsection (Federico & Feroni, 2018).

The RIC is thus the legal form under which the European hotspot operates in Greece. The RIC in Moria or Moria Hotspot consists of (1) a demarcated area where registration, identification and asylum procedures take place, in this research called the Registration and Identification Area (RIA) of the hotspot and (2) accommodation infrastructures, hosting people waiting for the completion of their registration/asylum claim. In this research we refer to all accommodation facilities as Moria Refugee Camp, consisting of two different parts since these parts constitute of different actors and stakeholders present *(explained in section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3)*. The formal

[4] Since January 2020, the name of this Ministry has changed in the 'Ministry of Migration and Asylum' (Ilias et al., 2020)

accommodation facilities inside the official boundaries of the hotspot are addressed as the official part of Moria Refugee Camp, the informal accommodation facilities surrounding the boundaries of the official hotspot as the unofficial part of Moria Refugee Camp (also referred to as the Olive Grove – *see section 4.2.3*) (*figure 4*).



Figure 4: Clarification of the terminology around Moria Hotspot. (Source: authors)

Figure 5 provides a summarising timeline of the main events in the EU and Greece regarding the 2015 migration crisis.



Figure 5: Timeline of events in the EU and Greece concerning the migration crisis. (Source: authors)

3.2.1 Procedures in the Registration and Identification Area of Moria Hotspot

3.2.1.1 Registration and Identification Procedure

Many border crossers arrive by dinghy in the north of Lesvos in a small town called Skala Sikamineas where they used to be temporarily hosted in the Oxy transit camp[5]. As soon as they arrive on the island, they are taken by bus to the RIA of Moria Hotspot. The RIA is managed by the Reception and Identification Service (RIS), an independent authority supervised by the Ministry of Migration and Asylum. Here the reception, identification and asylum procedures take place, whereby RIS relies upon different national and EU agencies.

The procedures include: (1) Identity and nationality verification carried out by the Hellenic Police, assisted by Frontex through an in-depth interview. Only when an identification form is filled out and validated by a Frontex screener, the identity screening is complete. (2) Registration of personal data and fingerprinting. The previous collected data on the identity of the person is entered in various databases (of the Hellenic Police, AS, RIS), fingerprints are taken by the Frontex 'fingerprinter' and send to the EURODAC office in Athens. (3) Medical screening and provision of psycho-social support (PSS). Until June 2017, NGOs like Médecins du Monde (MdM) were responsible for carrying out a medical examination, detecting vulnerable cases (pregnant women, victims of torture, children, etc.) and providing them with particular care and support. After June 2017, this responsibility was transferred to the Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (KEELPNO), a private law entity administered and funded by the Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity (Federico & Feroni, 2018). (4) Provision of information and referrals. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provides the asylum seekers with information about their rights and obligations and refers them to the responsible authorities for lodging an asylum application or return procedures. The IOM provides information about the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Program (Ilias et al., 2019; Greek Council for Refugees, n.d.).

Law 4375/2016 states that people entering the RIC have to stay there until their registration procedures are finished. The *restriction of liberty* is issued by the head of the RIS and can take up to a maximum of 25 days. However, in reality people can move in and out the hotspot from day one due to the lack of control. Except from that, third country nationals arriving on the Aegean islands fall under the EU-Turkey Statement and are therefore subject to a *restriction of movement*, enacted by the AS until their asylum claim is processed. This means they can leave the hotspot, but not the island (Greek Council for Refugees, 2018; Malafeka, 2018).

Figure 6 presents the map of Moria Hotspot indicating the two main entrances with corresponding RIAs and demarcating the (un)official dormitory areas of the Refugee Camp.

[5] Oxy transit camp was a reception centre established in the parking lot of a nightclub near Molyvos, where the displaced people were offered food, accommodation and transportation services to Mytilini (Hernandez, 2016).



Figure 6: Plan of Moria Hotspot and the surrounding informal camp settlement i.e. the Olive Grove, January 2020. (Source: authors)

3.2.1.2 Asylum Procedure

After the registration and identification procedures are completed, third country nationals have the opportunity to apply for asylum. The claims are assessed through an interview with the Greek AS in its central offices in Athens or the Regional Asylum Offices (RAO) across the country. In light of the EU-Turkey Deal which caused a significant rise in the number of lodged asylum applications, the European agency EASO has been appointed to support Greece in processing asylum claims.

Law 4375/2016 (the legal framework for the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement) introduced a new sort of 'extraordinary and temporary' asylum procedure i.e. *the fast-track border procedure*, specifically for those arriving on the Aegean islands after the 20th March 2016. In the so-called *fast-track border procedure,* asylum claims from Syrians or nationalities with a *recognition rate*[6] of more than 25% are first assessed based on their *admissibility* (Vradis et al., 2019). In the admissibility procedure the role of EASO is intensified. EASO carries out (in)admissibility interviews and communicates their decision to the AS (Ilias et al., 2019).

The asylum claim is found inadmissible when the concept of *First Country of Asylum* or *Safe Third Country* as defined in Law 4375/2016 is considered valid, after which the asylum applicants are immediately sent back to Turkey. The former concept, *First Country of Asylum*, is considered valid "in cases where a person has already, in a previous state, found international protection, that is once again accessible and effective for the individual concerned" (UNHCR, 2016, p.1). The latter concept, *Safe Third Country,* is in force when "a person could, in a previous state, have applied for international protection, but has not done so, or where protection was sought but status was not determined." (UNHCR, 2016, p.2). Especially for Syrians, claims are easily found inadmissible as Turkey is considered a safe-third country for them in order to be readmitted. However, if their claim is found admissible, the geographical restriction is lifted, and they are allowed to travel to the mainland to get their asylum application investigated under the regular asylum procedure (Greek Council for Refugees, 2018).

The asylum applications of nationalities with a *recognition rate* under 25% are not examined based on the admissibility concept, but on the facts presented about the situation of the applicant (examination based on the merits of a claim) (Vradis et al., 2019). Vulnerable cases or those who are eligible for a family reunification under the Dublin III regulation, are exempted from the fast-track border procedure and could follow the regular procedure on the mainland until August 2017. After August 2017, such applications are also processed on the islands due to the overcrowding of the RAOs on the Greek mainland (Ilias et al., 2020). Once the interview is done, the AS decides whether to grant someone refugee status[7], subsidiary protection[8] or a rejection of his application (Hellenic Republic, 2016).

If someone disagrees with the decision made by the AS, one can start an appeal procedure to review the application. The first, appeal is processed by the Appeals Authority, which became an autonomous Service under law 4375/2016 reporting directly to the Ministry of Migration and Asylum. It is composed of the Central Administrative Service and the Appeals Committees

[6] Recognition rate is "the share of positive decisions in the total number of asylum decisions" (Vradis et al., 2019, p. 50).
[7] Under the 1951 Geneva Convention
[8] If third country nationals do noy qualify for refugee status, but there is a "real risk of suffering serious harm in the country of origin or of habitual residence", they are granted subsidiary protection (Federico & Feroni, 2018, p.37)

(Federico & Feroni, 2018). No new interview takes place unless the Appeals Committee deems it necessary, but the displaced person is entitled to submit additional evidence (Hellenic Republic, 2016). The person can also lodge an application for annulment of a second instance decision (second appeal) which is examined by the Administrative Court of Appeal (Ilias et al., 2020). Figure 7 provides an overview of all the procedures described.



Figure 7: Overview of the registration and identification process, followed by the asylum procedure. (Source: authors)

3.2.2 Official Part of Moria Refugee Camp

3.2.2.1 Governance of the Official Part of Moria Refugee Camp

The EU Migration Crisis received growing international media attention throughout 2015. A multitude of aid workers arrived from all over the world to assist the Greek State in managing the overwhelming amount of arrivals every day. Both larger NGOs (e.g. Red Cross, Unicef, etc.) as well as individual aid workers who organised themselves into grassroots organisations (Refugee for Refugees (R4R), EuroRelief, Starfish Foundation, Iliakthida, etc.) supported the Hellenic Coast Guard and Frontex at the beaches in the north of Lesvos island, by providing dry clothes and food for the newly arrived people. Moreover, the organisations also assisted the public authorities inside accommodation facilities on the island by providing basic facilities such as shelters, electricity and sanitations, or by offering services like medical screening and PSS for the displaced people (Pallister-Wilkins, 2018).

The official part of Moria Refugee Camp, as part of Moria Hotspot, is fully run by the Greek State. The RIS is responsible for the overall regulation and management of the camp. The RIS employs a *Camp Director* who is the first contact point for the actors involved in the camp in case of any problems or concerns (NGO representative, personal communication, April 4, 2020). International organisations like the UNHCR, besides their presence in the RIA of the hotspot, are also active in the camp area to provide shelter, psychological support, transportation and the overall coordination of all NGOs present on the ground (UNHCR, 2015; NGO representative, personal communication, April 4, 2020). The Greek army and the Hellenic Police are responsible for the security, construction, and logistics of the camp (Papadopoulou et al., 2016).

The regional or local authorities have no mandate regarding any migration-related issues and are therefore not present in Moria Hotspot. Policies on reception or asylum procedures and the installation of accommodation facilities in the hotspot are decided through centralised decision-making processes in which the national government transposes the various EU Directives into national legislation, without consulting stakeholders on different levels (Dimitriadi & Sarantaki, 2019). EU funds[9] for tackling the crisis therefore go directly to the national level and international organisations such as the UNHCR (European Commission, 2019). NGOs are present to implement the policies, although they work on a voluntary basis that needs to be respected by the public authorities. The Council of Europe already published a recommendation document back in 2007 clearly stating that public authorities must respect the legal status of NGOs and cannot interfere with their activities. Paragraph 6, article 28 of this document of the Council of Europe states that "Although subject to the law […] the freedom from direction by public authorities is essential to maintain the non-governmental nature of NGOs." (Council of Europe, 2007, p.23). Therefore, the organisations are free to pursue their objectives and cannot be influenced by the authorities.

After the signing of the EU-Turkey Deal, many NGOs withdrew from the official part of Moria Refugee Camp, as a protest and a statement that they did not want to be part of a mechanism that violates human rights. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) declared in 2015, after ending their

[9] Greece gets financial support from the EU under the Asylum Migration Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Internal Security Fund (ISF) regarding the national programmes for 2014 – 2020 (long-term funding.) The Greek State and international organisations are also receiving an Emergency Assistance funding. In total, €816m (Emergency funding) has already been allocated since the beginning of 2015 on top of the €613m of long-term funding (European Commission, 2019).

activities in Moria, that "continuing to work inside would make us complicit in a system we consider to be both unfair and inhumane" (Médecins Sans Frontieres, 2016). Some NGOs, like EuroRelief, remained in the official Moria Refugee Camp. They are until today the main provider of services like shelter allocation, clothing distribution, transportation, and sanitation (Rozakou, 2019). Other NGOs adapted their activities and moved to the capital Mytilini or to other accommodation facilities on the island, such as Kara Tepe camp which is run by the municipality. As the migration crisis further unfolded, an increasing number of NGOs arrived on the island with different capacities and objectives.

To gain an overview and to coordinate the abundance of organisations present on the island, the Minister of Interior Policy and Administrative Reconstruction and the Minister of Marine and Island Policy jointly decided that all organisations should, upon arrival, register with the Coordination Committee of the General Secretary for Aegean and Island Policy (Secretariat General for the Aegean and Island Policy, n.d.). This committee is represented by different local authorities. The Coordination Committee monitors which organisations arrive on the island and what tasks they plan to fulfil. The registration is simple and only requires filling in a form with basic information. If the form passes the inspection and evaluation, the organisation is accredited and certified to practise on the island (Secretariat General for the Aegean and Island Policy, n.d.).

Additionally, since 2015, NGOs coordinate with each other through *coordination meetings* and *working groups* organised by the UNHCR on a weekly basis (UNHCR, 2015). In these meetings, all NGOs present in Lesvos come together to discuss new numbers of arrivals and returns, share concerns or problems, and exchange knowledge. The UNHCR decided to organise these meetings in order to stay on top of everything happening in and around the camps. Moreover, these meetings form an efficient platform to inform all NGOs about who is doing what exactly and to align all activities. Since UNHCR is also in close collaboration and has partnerships with the authorities, they form the linkage between the Greek State and the NGOs (NGO representative, personal communication, April 4, 2020). Nevertheless, the UNHCR has never really coordinated the NGOs, nor determined which activities should be started and which should be ended. They seem to rely on the fact that eventually the NGOs will adjust themselves or will collaborate with each other after being updated during the meetings. Therefore, the effectiveness of these coordination meetings remains limited since these meetings are mainly about reporting on activities and not about establishing a regulatory framework that facilitates cooperation between different organisations (NGO representative, personal communication, April 4, 2020; T. Agerbak, head agent DRC, personal communication, March 6, 2020).

3.2.2.2 Types of Humanitarian Organisations Active on Lesvos

In February 2020, over 87 organisations were present on Lesvos island. These organisations can be divided in two groups taking into consideration their main focus and objective. The first group of organisations is spatially oriented and focuses on enhancing the built environment and living conditions of the camp residents. Organisations such as Movement on the Ground (MotG), and UNHCR emphasize the short-term emergency response providing basic shelters and WASH facilities (acronym of water, sanitation, hygiene) for the displaced people. These organisations represent the traditional view on humanitarianism. The second group has an alternative and more socially oriented vision on humanitarianism, focussing on the psycho-social enhancement of the camp residents and the general social cohesion and quality of life in refugee camps. Examples of organisations within this group are the Red Cross organisations (DRC and ICRC), Oxfam and ODD.

These organisations provide education, PSS and community building activities to make the displaced community more creative and empowered to take their own initiatives. A few organisations are also committed in strengthening the bond between the local community and the displaced community, such as ODD. This idea stemmed from the fact that many displaced people felt closed off from the wider community.

However, these two groups are often not clearly aligned since several organisations are hybrid organisations combining characteristics coming from both groups. For instance, organisations who are constructing material artefacts through participation processes, such as ODD, enhance both the built environment of the camp as the social infrastructure and hence provide both structural and social quality in the camp. Table 4 shows an overview of some organisations, linked to ODD, and present in Moria Refugee Camp on Lesvos island, a short description of their provided service, their link with the practice of ODD, and the type of resilience (as a social and/or structural quality). An extended list of all organisations present on the island with short description of their services can be found in annex A. The list dates from February 2020.

Table 4: Overview of all main organisations present in the Moria Hotspot, linked to the practice of ODD. (Source: authors)

NGO full name	Abbr.	Short description of their services	Link with ODD	Resilience?
Danish Red Cross International Committee of the Red Cross	DRC ICRC	Provision of PSS and community building activities.	Partner for all construction sessions, providing the site in the Olive Grove	As social quality
Oxfam	/	Restoring family links and protection of vulnerable people.	Partner for some of the workshops	As social quality
Office of Displaced Designers	ODD	Design focussed organisation, organising workshops and construction sessions. Also aiming to connect the local and displaced community.	/	As structural and social quality
Movement on the Ground	MotG	Providing shelters, levelling and draining of the grounds, organising activities and education.	Working on the same site in the Olive Grove	As structural and social quality
Low-Tech with Refugees	Low-Tech	Finding sustainable solutions by experimenting with low technologies while involving the displaced community.	Partner for one of the construction sessions	As social and structural quality

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	UNHCR	UN agency providing emergency assistance and protection for refugees. Also providing information about obligations and rights	Director of the coordination meetings	As structural quality

3.2.3 Unofficial Part of Moria Refugee Camp (Olive Grove)

3.2.3.1 Emergence of the Olive Grove

Moria Hotspot is located in the middle of an olive grove that is owned by a local farmer. In 2016, DRC agreed with the landowner to lease part of the land as a space to organise their PSS. Due to an increasing shortage of accommodation facilities within Moria Hotspot during the winter, the Greek army requested the DRC in February 2017 to host some of the tents on their grounds, in order to decongest the Hotspot. This led to the development of an informal accommodation facility/camp beyond the official boundaries of Moria Hotspot, called the Olive Grove, which has been subject to an exponential expansion since the end of 2019 (*see figure 8*). As more and more tents started to pop up, there was a growing need for a coherent organisation and management of the Olive Grove site, since there was no regulating system in place. MotG, a grassroot organisation who evolved into a well-organised NGO active in Kara Tepe at that time, relocated to the Olive Grove site. They started to manage the land, for which they established partnerships with actors at different levels. Firstly, with international organisations like the UNHCR for the provision of tents. Secondly with the national authorities and RIS for the provision of electricity and gas on the Olive Grove site. Thirdly, with municipal authorities since MotG had to respect the building regulations of the site. And lastly, with civic society actors like other NGOs, for example EuroRelief, for the coordination and exchange of people coming from the hotspot to the Olive Grove and vice versa, as well as with the landowner for the leasing of the grounds (NGO representative, personal communication, April 4, 2020; E. Wiegert, personal communication, February 14, 2020).



Figure 8: Transformation of Moria Hotspot and the Olive Grove throughout the years. (Source: authors)

3.2.3.2 The Governance of the Olive Grove

Before the winter of 2016, other NGOs were already active at the Olive Grove and renting plots from the landowner. The Danish Red Cross (DRC) was providing PSS activities for the displaced community on this site. They started collaborating with another organisation, i.e. ODD, for a participatory community project that included small spatial interventions like drainage of the lands, the construction of stairs but also the creation of a fitness and cinema area. Tina Agerbak, head agent of DRC on Lesvos from June 2017 until January 2019 (personal communication, March 6, 2020), stated that their goal was to provide a space that did not have that *camp-feeling.* When MotG started to show interest in managing the Olive Grove, they came to an agreement with the landlord and claimed seventy-five percent of the ground leaving DRC with the remaining twenty-five percent. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which took over DRC's activities in 2018[10], has now also partnerships with other NGOs like Boat Refugee Foundation (BRF) and R4R who in turn can use the plot of ICRC for their (PSS) activities (E. Wiegert, personal communication, February 14, 2020). Different NGOs are collaborating on voluntary basis since there is no overall regulatory framework or coordination network in which the NGOs are obliged to cooperate with each other. NGOs are able to implement their own activities and pursue their own objectives. The lack of coordination between NGOs sometimes leads to conflicts because of different priorities regarding to what is most needed in the camp or it creates an inefficient way of working whereby several organisations provide the same services. However, a certain level of coordination between the NGOs active on the Olive Grove, and by extension in the official part of Moria Refugee Camp or the rest of the island, is (trying to be) reached through the UNCHR's coordination meetings and working groups.

Dimitriadi (2017) states that a formal and informal level of cooperation between NGOs or international organisations and the national level can be detected, both in the official part of Moria Refugee Camp as well as in the Olive Grove. International organisations like UNHCR and IOM have a formal way of collaboration with the authorities by signing memoranda of cooperation. However, alongside this formal system, present international organisations and NGOs set up informal cooperations, established through an oral agreement. An island representative of an NGO (personal communication, April 4, 2020), testified in the interview that she or the head of her NGO can go directly to the Camp Director to request permission for certain activities. This also applies to the other NGOs. The Camp Director can in turn ask certain NGOs for assistance in specific things. Usually, the NGOs "mobilise to the best of their abilities and try to assist, in order to also maintain good working relationship with the Greek government and facilitate their work in the country" (Dimitriadi & Sarantaki, 2019, p.19). *Figure 9* provides a schematic representation of main actors active in the Olive Grove and their interrelations.

[10] ICRC took over the activities of DRC in December 2018 because of a lack of funding (T. Agerbak, personal communication, March 6, 2020; E. Wiegert, personal communication, February 14, 2020).



Figure 9: Scheme of the actors active in the Olive Grove and their interrelationships. (Source: authors)

3.2.4 Evolution of Moria Refugee Camp between 2015 and 2020

The number of displaced people living in Moria Refugee Camp started to rise after the conclusion of the EU-Turkey Deal and is still rising today. The hotspot has an original capacity to accommodate no more than 3.000 people. In September 2016, the number of people living in the official part of Moria Refugee Camp and the surrounding Olive Grove exceeded more than double this capacity (Smith, 2016). This overcrowding only grew worse since then. As of March 2018, several camps at the mainland have gradually been closed by the Greek Government (OECD, 2018). As a result, more asylum seekers had to stay on the Greek islands. This led to a stronger increase in the number of inhabitants residing in Moria Refugee Camp during this period. Consequently, by the end of 2018, the overpopulation reached the cape of more than 8.000 inhabitants (Leape & Brown, 2018). After July 2019, more camps and squatter settlements on the mainland were shut down by the newly elected centre-right Greek government. The new administration implemented stricter asylum laws and desired to build new detention centres and to transform all existing camps into closed or *secure* ones (Stamatoukou, 2019). Their aim was to decongest the existing camps, speed up both the asylum applications as well as the deportations of inadmissible asylum seekers, and control the displaced community better in general (Herman, 2020). These new restricted policies, together with an increase in arrivals in the autumn of 2019, resulted in a strong increase in the number of inhabitants; at the end of 2019 there were 14.000 people living in Moria Refugee Camp (Apostolou, 2019). This number continued to increase sharply in the following months. Consequently, in March 2020, the number of inhabitants exceeded 20.000 (ANSA, 2020), and started to closely resemble the number of inhabitants in the island's capital Mytilini (Herman, 2020).

Figure 10: Tents extending far across the Olive Grove, constituting the unofficial part of Moria Refugee Camp. (Source: authors)

This immense overpopulation of Moria Refugee Camp caused a shortage of materials and human resources available to provide everyone with the help and supplies they need, resulting in a camp with ever-regressing substandard living conditions (Grant, 2020). In the Olive Grove, countless tents are located close to one another and structure is hard to find over the entire domain. Next to the tents, the site is full of dirt. An organised waste management is not present, so the dirt is scattered everywhere and, in some places, even piled up (*figure 11*). The smell and noise associated with it cannot be ignored. There is only a limited supply of water and electricity which means that many people live without or with very limited facilities. At the few toilets and washing facilities on the site, people are queuing daily for hours. The displaced people have to improvise every day to survive. For instance, they light fires to warm themselves or cook food, they wash themselves next to their tents, or use the bushes instead of a toilet. The fact that so many people live so close together without any possibility of maintaining good hygiene implies that there are also many diseases (respiratory infections, asthma, scurvy) in the camp. The rapid spread of these diseases together with violence that is not an unfamiliar reality in the camp make it an unsafe environment for children as well as for women and men.

Figure 11: Waste scattered throughout the Olive Grove. (Source: authors)

Since people stay in the camp for a prolonged period of time, they increasingly see and approach their living conditions as (semi)permanent. This is an important mental shift; they have been realising that they will stay in the camp probably for a year or even more. With this awareness, they have started to expand their tent with self-made infrastructures (of bought or found materials). These are mostly made with the knowledge of local building techniques from their country of origin or by trial and error processes. On the main path between the official part of Moria Refugee Camp and the Olive Grove also small self-patched shops have opened (*figure 12 & 13*). These are made and managed by the displaced people selling food or construction materials for tent extensions, or even offering barbering services. The camp is gradually turning into a small city where the residents become self-sufficient. The temporary character of the camp has been disappearing, and it is now characterised by a permanent temporariness.

Figure 12: Main path between the official Moria Refugee Camp and the Olive Grove. On the right are the small shops located. (Source: authors)

Figure 13: A small kiosk and barber shop made and managed by the displaced people. (Source: Latitude Adjustment Podcast)

Along with the strong increase in the number of camp residents and the poor living conditions, the impatience of the local population for a clear response from their government also increased during the first months of 2020. The new government proposed stricter asylum laws and the construction of new closed detention camps. However, this is not at all what the local government and inhabitants of the islands desire. They do not want another camp; they only want a concrete solution that leads to the fully decampment of their islands. The local population of Lesvos expressed their concerns in a series of peaceful strikes starting from the 22nd of January. A few days later, on the 30th, the displaced community held a peaceful protest, in order to advocate for better living conditions in Moria Refugee Camp. Subsequently, on the 3rd of February, a second protest was held with a larger group of displaced people, asking for the clarification of asylum claim delays and sudden deportations. While marching from Moria to Mytilini, they were pushed back violently by the riot police forces who used tear gas (Herman, 2020).

This brutal approach by the police resulted in a third protest from the displaced community the day after. Again, the community was asking for clear answers and better living conditions in the camp. The displaced people also apologised during their march in the streets of Mytilini to the locals for occupying the island (Herman, 2020). However, this protest was again answered with violence, not only coming from the police, but also from some locals. Unfortunately, this time not only the displaced people were targeted, but also NGO volunteers and workers who were declared the "bad guys" perpetuating the current situation on the island. The days after this protest, volunteers were still threatened both physically as verbally, cars were damaged and the roads to Moria Hotspot were blocked (Herman, 2020). Fascist groups formed the protagonists in these attacks and often deliberately sought volunteers to attack or frighten them. Luckily, the following weeks peace and quietness returned, and volunteers were able to do their work normally again.

But the peacefulness did not last long, because on the night of the 24th to the 25th of February the Greek government secretly sent riot forces from Athens to Mytilini, to start clearing land for the construction of the new refugee camps (Herman, 2020). The Lesvos' population found out about this and consequently went to the streets to protest and even prevented policemen from disembarking the ferry by blocking the roads with garbage trucks (Herman, 2020). The riot forces answered with physical violence and tear gas against their fellow Greeks. Following this event, there was a three-day general strike on Lesvos as the inhabitants wanted to express their anger towards the Greek authority and the brutality of the police forces (Herman, 2020) (*figure 14 & 15*). Local people's violence against NGO workers and volunteers revived and again they threatened the volunteers and destroyed some of their cars. In the north of the island, a building and two informal education centres of the UNHCR was even set on fire by fascist groups. The following days, NGOs kept low profile or while some decided to flee as the situation was destabilising and the island became unsafe for them to continue their activities.

Figure 14: Locals preventing the riot police from disembarking on the night of 24-25th February 2020 (Source: dfherman)

Figure 15: Three-day general strike on Lesvos island and protests in the capital Mytilini. (Source: dfherman)

The situation escalated even more when, on February 27, Turkey declared that they would no longer restrain asylum seekers on its territory from going to Europe, as a result to the Syrian airstrikes by Assad's forces that killed over 30 Turkish soldiers (McKernan & Boffey, 2020). Since then, the EU-Turkey Deal gradually started to fall apart. The Turkish government even promoted the displaced people to travel to Europe by providing free shuttle busses from Istanbul to the Greek border (McKernan & Boffey, 2020). At the border, Greek riot police and military forces used violent means to push back the crowd of migrants as much as possible. The displaced people were trapped between the two borders in no-man's land, not allowed to enter Greece or re-enter Turkey (Herman, 2020).

The scheduled general coordination meeting at the UNHCR office following these turbulent days still took place on the 5th of March, but the topics discussed were nothing alike the previous meetings. The working groups discussed the acts of violence against volunteers and asylum seekers on the island and the violent acts of the coast guards against newly arriving boats on the Aegean Sea. Moreover, the meeting discussed the departure of several NGOs, the sudden suspension of asylum claims, the unjust arresting of newly arrived migrants, riot police violence, and false rumours about transfers to the mainland that cause vain hopes within the displaced community.

Meanwhile, as of middle of March 2020, the COVID-19 virus started to spread to Europe and the fear and cautiousness started emerging on Lesvos island. NGOs were made aware of the unfolding of an additional, severe problem in the refugee camps. If an outbreak were to occur, the situation would be more dire as these people are very vulnerable to the spread of diseases. As Paul Spiegel, director of Johns Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health, states: "Refugees are also more likely to have underlying health conditions such as acute malnutrition. […] there is a lot of concern that the COVID-19 infection will affect refugees more severely than people in their host communities" (Volkin, 2020). Even though the World Health Organization (WHO) drafted and announced recommendations to prevent the virus from spreading, these cannot apply for the residents of Moria Refugee Camp for numerous reasons. Firstly, the WHO asks to wash hands frequently (WHO, 2020), which is not possible as water is only available during limited hours a day. Secondly, practicing good hygiene (WHO, 2020) is also impossible as the living conditions in the camp are dire, and the environment is very dirty. There are insufficient WASH facilities and as mentioned

before, the water is scarce. Thirdly, social distancing (WHO, 2020) in a camp that is that overcrowded is unthinkable since in multiple cases families have been living together in one tent. And fourthly, the main advice of the WHO is to stay home (WHO, 2020), which is not possible for the displaced people. They do not have a decent home where they can stay inside for days since they are living in a tent or a makeshift hut. Moreover, they depend on food distribution posts and WASH facilities outside their shelters, where they must queue for hours. The fear of the virus spreading in the camps revived the demand for decongesting the refugee camps on the Greek islands and transferring the displaced people to proper homes on the mainland.

3.3 COMMUNITY ARCHITECTURE PRACTICE OF THE OFFICE OF DISPLACED DESIGNERS

In this chapter, the practice of ODD is extensively described. Firstly, the origins, main objectives and ambitions of ODD are discussed and later some of its projects are analysed in detail with the aim to understand the organization's methods and tools as well as its collaborations with other organisations. More specifically, the focus lies on the workshops organized by ODD in its Mytilini office as well as on the longest-term project of ODD, the *Olive Grove recreational* project: a series of participatory construction sessions co-led by ODD and the Red Cross on the Olive Grove site. In turn, the results and the effect of these projects on the participants as well as the project's larger impact on the wider society are evaluated and the challenges ODD faces during its activity on Lesvos are explored.

3.3.1 Origins of the Office of Displaced Designers

During the winter of 2015-2016 Shareen Elnaschie (personal communication, March 9, 2020), a British architect, volunteered in Kara Tepe Refugee Camp on Lesvos. While working on an education needs assessment for an NGO, she met numerous creative people of the displaced community with an extensive skill set. Most of them were fine artists, designers, archaeologists or engineers who left their work and portfolio back in their countries when they were forced to flee.

At the end of her voluntary work in 2016, Elnaschie started brainstorming with her friend and fellow architect Kimberly Pelkofsky to set up an organisation that would unite all these people and provide projects where these people could express their creativity. Especially after the EU-Turkey Deal, Elnaschie and Pelkofsky realised that the displaced people would be stuck on the island for a long time. Subsequently, in August 2016, ODD was established as a Restricted Fund under the auspices of the British charity organisation *Prism the Gift Fund* (Office of Displaced Designers, 2020). The ODD team includes two co-founders, three consultants and a constantly changing team of volunteers from different nationalities and design backgrounds. Throughout the years, ODD collaborated with multiple institutional partners such as the Oxfam, DRC, ICRC and the European Cultural Foundation (ECF) (Office of Displaced Designers, 2020).

The *praxis* of ODD is defined by their three main objectives. As first objective, ODD aims to foster social cohesion between the host and the displaced community as well as across the displaced community itself. By organising interactive workshops that bring both communities closer to each other, ODD hopes to reduce cultural misunderstandings about the displaced people and make them feel less isolated from the wider society (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020). Moreover, ODD aims to enhance the social cohesion within the displaced community itself

during sessions inside the camp. As there is a variety of cultures within the camp, this often means that rivalling communities live closely together. By bringing them into contact with each other, ODD aspires at creating an opportunity for them to break down former generalisations and misconceptions, and therefore build new cross-cultural relations. In this way, they hope to create a more equitable and inclusive society (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020).

As second objective, ODD focusses on the personal and professional prospects of its individual participants. It is their philosophy to remain future-focussed and not ask people about the journey they went through to reach the Greek islands (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020). By treating people as equal partners and not as victims of the refugee crisis, ODD emphasis people's past, hobbies, previous occupation, dreams and ambitions for the future. By not being questioned about their journey, the displaced people feel more at ease and trust the organisation. The projects of ODD have therefore been a form of PSS for the displaced people. It is not just about giving them something to do in their spare time while waiting for their asylum to be granted, but it is rather the opportunity to acquire new skills or share theirs with others (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020). By using flexible, simple and not so structural methodologies in their activities, all residents have been able to participate easily and even propose their own ideas and methodologies. It is this flexibility that has allowed the design processes to be easily adapted and has given the organisation and the camp residents some level of freedom (F. Sartori, former volunteer ODD, personal communication, February 22, 2020). Moreover, as the participants have been welcomed to give feedback and input in the activities themselves, they have felt more valuable and engaged and acquired new skills. As a result, the participants of all the activities felt more empowered to reach their future goals.

And as a third objective, ODD intends to create the opportunity for people to get back in touch with their profession and help them create a new resume or portfolio material. ODD makes sure that all projects can be accessed online, and they provide references and certificates for every participant who needs it in order to support them in reaching their goals and ambitions (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020).

3.3.2 Projects, Methods and Tools of ODD

Over the years, ODD organised multiple workshops in the Mytilini office, and construction sessions at the Olive Grove site. All activities incorporated various disciplines, e.g. photography, painting, designing, documentary making, in order to respond to the broad range of design backgrounds and skill sets the displaced community had to offer. While the dynamics of these activities were completely different from each other as the workshops took only a few hours and the construction sessions could last for weeks, the results - in terms of satisfaction and empowerment of the participants - were similar (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020).

The story of ODD started with a one-month pilot project during the summer of 2016 in Kara Tepe camp, which is a camp for the most vulnerable asylum seekers[11] located alongside the main road

[11] Asylum seekers are considered *most vulnerable* if they are "minors, unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor children and persons who have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence", and that therefore require special treatment (Federico & Feroni, 2018, p.242).

between Mytilini and Moria. With this project ODD wanted to test if their activities would interest the camp residents (Office of Displaced Designers, 2020). By working closely together with the Kara Tepe residents, the team of ODD was able to identify the priorities and needs of the camp residents (*figure 16*). For instance, there was a need for more shading, electricity and Wi-Fi. Furthermore, the park in the camp was too dirty, there was no access to the adjacent beach, and there was no information point were the residents could gain information about activities organised by NGOs (Office of Displaced Designers, 2020). Afterwards, ODD and the Kara Tepe residents collectively designed solutions for these needs. This resulted in a series of small projects with which they collaboratively made the site a little better.

Throughout the project, ODD noticed that the participants enjoyed having a workplace to go to where they could work in team on projects that would enhance the camp's infrastructure and facilities (Office of Displaced Designers, 2020). This enthusiasm verified that there was an interest in participatory construction sessions for the future. Moreover, ODD experienced the pressing feeling of the camp residents to be able to come into contact with the local community (Office of Displaced Designers, 2020). This confirmed that it would be a good idea to start organising workshops that would bring both communities in contact with each other.

Figure 16: The pilot project at Kara Tepe camp. (Source: ODD)

After a successful completion of this pilot project and since October 2016, ODD started renting an office space in the city centre of Mytilini (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020). The office was the ideal place to run the workshops, as it was easily accessible to both the displaced and the local community. Since ODD is a collaboration between various creative professionals and volunteers, it organised workshops in different artistic fields, e.g. design, photography, painting.

One of the workshops was *Documentary Filmmaking*, which was a project where one local and one displaced person would team up. The goal was to make short movies about three specific themes, vulnerability, resilience and self-esteem (Office of Displaced Designers, 2020); topics associated with how vulnerable, non-resilient and unconfident refugees often are (*figure 17*). The workshop was preceded by a joint brainstorming session on what these three words meant for both the local and displaced people participating. During this session it was very important that all voices were heard and considered. In the end, the movies expressed the hopes and dreams of each participant. The workshop even uncovered that the local and displaced community shared more similar experiences with the three topics than they had previously imagined (Office of Displaced Designers, 2020).

Figure 17: Brainstorm session for the Documentary Filmmaking workshop. (Source: ODD)

ODD also organised drawing and photography classes, introductory workshops on podcasting and stop motion animation, research sessions and sound mapping exercises. ODD reached their participants through advertising on social media and hanging posters all around Mytillini in Greek and English and by asking other NGOs for further dissemination (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020). Often, people reached out to ODD and asked them if they could share their skills. If their approach and ethos matched with the ideology of the office, i.e. being motivated to teach the displaced people something and not for personal gain, they developed together the ideas into an activity or workshop (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020). A lot of these workshops were organised in cooperation with other organisations present on Lesvos. This allowed ODD and these partner organisations to share ideas, resources and funding. For instance, the sound mapping exercise was co-created with MetaLAB at Harvard and the 'Alternative Atlas of Lesvos' as well as the 'Mentoring Program' were both granted funding from the ECF (Office of Displaced Designers, 2020). Whether or not the workshop was a cooperation, ODD ended all of them with an exhibition, so every participant did their utmost to finish their work and make it as successful as possible. The created works were then displayed to the wider public. This was again an attempt of ODD to connect the two communities together.

After a while, ODD noticed that several organisations started running similar artistic workshops and classes due to high demand (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020). Therefore, ODD stopped organising this kind of workshops and started focussing more on their longer-term project, i.e. the development of the Olive Grove recreational site, which was about to become the centrepiece of their activities. Even though they gathered a lot of knowledge and experience about organising workshops that resulted in local and displaced people working together despite their different languages, they were not able to pass this knowledge on to other organisations, due to a lack of time (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020).

In the summer of 2016 ODD discovered that the DRC ran a recreational and educational program on a piece of land they leased adjacent to Moria (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020) (*figure 18*). The recreational site was an *anti-camp* zone[12] with social spaces for the asylum seekers which they could visit to escape from the rush and chaos of Moria Hotspot. The DRC already constructed a rudimentary outdoor cinema infrastructure there. It was just a white screen painted on the wall of the Olive Grove site with some simple objects to sit on. ODD saw a close opportunity to collaborate with the DRC and in September 2016 they discussed/negotiated a potential partnership. ODD urged them to invest a little more in the previously built cinema infrastructure and to provide proper seating. It



Figure 18: Map of the recreational site area in the Olive Grove next to Moria Hotspot, leased by the DRC. (Source: authors)

[12] An anti-camp zone is an area where the displaced people do not experience the *camp-feeling* as within Moria camp, but rather a more relaxed and comfortable feeling. It is a place where they can enjoy recreational, educational and PSS activities.

was important that this was not only about the seating itself, but also about the creation process in which the residents could participate. They convinced the DRC to invest in a new design process, an *architecture of empowerment*, in which the displaced community would be involved through participatory processes. ODD showed DRC that these processes could also be an important PSS activity in addition to the already organised initiatives (T. Agerbak, personal communication, March 6, 2020). Above all, it could contribute to the improvement of the built environment of the Olive Grove recreational site. By being able to help enhance the living conditions for everyone and co-create the infrastructures, the participants would feel proud, valuable and more empowered (H. Storgaard, project coordinator DRC 2016-2017, communication from ODD's archive, 2017). A former participant of the Olive Grove project, Ibrahim, confirmed in an interview with Shareen Elnaschie that he learned a new skill that "is kind of useful and something I'll love forever". Moreover, he believes the skill might be helpful for the future and sees it as "an additional thing to my cv". He also recognised that the project was not only important for him, but for his fellow residents as well: "It is important for everyone, because […] the people that are not even participating are the people that are using it" (interview from ODD's archive, October 23, 2018).

The Olive Grove project consisted of five main construction phases. During the first phase, a cinema screen and seating were provided. The second phase focused more on practical matters, such as a stairway and a drainage system. During the third phase, an edge design was created as well as a large mural. The fourth phase was a rather small phase and consisted of completing the drainage system and moving isoboxes. Finally, during the last phase a community garden was created.

The cinema seating was part of the first construction phase of the five-phase Olive Grove project. The proposed design had to be different from the existing camp infrastructures and flexible so that other activities could be hosted there too, such as community meetings, live concerts and picnicking. Additionally, it was not allowed to drastically adjust the area as ODD had to abide by building regulations, so ODD opted for loose seating elements, which were robust enough so that they could not easily be moved or destroyed. Moreover, the wood had to be cast into the concrete, so that it could not be stolen and that camp residents would use it as fuel for their cooking fires. Before the first construction phase was initiated, there was an outreach session to all interested people in which they could offer their feedback and additional ideas for the design. Furthermore, as part of this first phase the team also constructed wooden signs and gym infrastructure, but it has not survived to this day, as people started burning the wood during winter (*Figure 19*). In addition, the volleyball court that was constructed by the DRC on a levelled part of the site disappeared at the end of the first phase. The Greek army appropriated the area to pitch a big tent for the displaced people who arrived that winter, as these people needed a place to stay and at that point the official part of Moria Refugee Camp was already overcrowded.

Figure 19: The cinema seating, wooden signs and gym infrastructure, as part of the first phase of the Olive Grove project. (Source: ODD)

The design of the benches was very simple and minimalistic, as the focus was not on the aesthetics but rather on the functionality. The simplicity of the design allowed the benches to be easily constructed and repaired by the participants who have different skill levels. Also, by making exactly the same benches multiple times the participants were able to become better in constructing them. The first phase taught the participants how to cut wood, make formworks, cast concrete and even how to use computer aided drawing programs.

The second construction phase began in March 2017 and focussed more on the practical needs of the Olive Grove site. Moreover, over the winter of 2017, there was an increase in arrivals to Lesvos causing the Olive Grove to be partly covered by tents. People were led to the adjacent site by the army in an effort to depopulate the already overcrowded official accommodation facilities in Moria Hotspot (T. Agerbak, personal communication, March 6, 2020). Since the Olive Grove could become muddy and slippery during winter, ODD aimed at making the area more liveable and accessible by carrying out drainage works and building stairs to go to the higher parts of the Olive Grove (*figure 20 & 21*).

Figure 20: Drainage works as second part of the Olive Grove project. (Source: ODD)

The stairs had a big impact on the Olive Grove site and were constantly used by elderly people, pregnant women, children and many others. It was very satisfying for the participants to see how people were using and enjoying their work. At the end of this construction phase the army decided, without any consent of ODD, to pour concrete on top of the stairs to make them more durable. This was a setback as the participants had been making these stairs by hand for weeks. Nevertheless, the residents still enjoyed the stairs and the volunteers were content with their efforts to make this happen. As Ibrahim, one of the participants that worked on the stairs, stated: "That's really good you know. Seeing people using it, people are using the stairs like all the time; every hour, every minute." (interview from ODD's archive, October 23, 2018). The fact that the participants saw a good result which truly satisfied other camp residents was a very great motivator for the participants to continue working on the project. Even though they did not have a strong attachment to the camp and might not stay long anymore, the participants helped creating a way more pleasant environment for future residents.

Figure 21: The stairs which were handcrafted in the second phase. However, in the end the army poured concrete on top of the stairs to make them more durable. (Source: ODD)

The third phase began again with an outreach session in March 2018 to assess the proposed design and to bring new ideas to the table. ODD organised within this outreach session a community-led mapping workshop (*figure 22*). By using stickers and a map of the Olive Grove recreational site, the residents could easily express their wants and needs. ODD then processed all this input and translated it into a new design for the Olive Grove site.

Figure 22: Result of the community-led mapping workshop by ODD. (Source: ODD)

This new design consisted of two interventions, one that was practical and one that was more creative. As tents had been flooding the Olive Grove site since the winter of 2017, DRC asked ODD to come up with a site edge design that would communicate the boundaries of the recreational zone to the newly arrived residents in which they were not permitted to pitch their tents. ODD came up with the idea of marking the boundaries with objects. These objects were again temporary but sturdy and not easy to steal. The objects were made out of plastic pipes that were casted in concrete blocks in such ways that they could also be used as chairs (*figure 23*). Unfortunately, no prototype was made in advance unlike the cinema seating, and time has shown that the objects were not durable and resistant enough. Almost all plastic pipes broke off quickly, especially when children hung on them while playing. This phase proved the importance of prototyping to guarantee a successful outcome.

Figure 23: Construction phase 3: the recreational site edge design. (Source: ODD)

The second intervention of the third phase was rather creative. It was the design of a mural on the wall where also the cinema screen was painted on. The design process could be subdivided into four parts. Firstly, ODD organised a facilitator training at the Mytilini office, to teach the volunteers

how they could facilitate a participatory process themselves and how to be responsible and take matters into their own hands. After the workshop, ODD more or less distanced itself from the design of the mural and left it entirely to the displaced community. Secondly, there was an on-site open workshop to design the actual mural. All participants were asked to create a triangle-based drawing using only four colours (green, blue, yellow and pink). These restrictions were implemented to make sure that everyone, creative or not, could participate and create something special. Thirdly, all creations were categorised and brought together in one final design for the mural. Finally, the mural was painted on the wall around the cinema screening (*figure 24*). Due to the facilitator training in the beginning of this intervention, the participants felt responsible for the mural and experienced the design as their own. As Alaa, a participant who worked on the mural, testified in an interview afterwards: "It's just like you just give us the foundation to start, it was like yeah I am responsible – I give idea for the design, I change the colour in some part, I add something, it is 100% our work" (interview from ODD's archive, 2018). By working closely together and negotiating and communicating about the design of the mural during this construction phase, friendships were built between people with different origins. It made the participants aware of the things and thoughts they all share. Syzar, an Olive Grove participant, stated: "In this project I know a lot of people from different nationality, … they will be now my friend, and they call me and say hello, hi, and it's good to make relationship with other people" (interview from ODD's archive, October 23, 2018).

Figure 24: Construction phase 3: the facilitator training session, open workshop and execution of the mural design. (Source: ODD)

At the end of this phase, in December 2018, DRC left the island as they ran out of funding. The cash flow of DRC was at that moment mainly coming from private companies and people, but they experienced a funding fatigue in Europe as the migration crisis kept ongoing (T. Agerbak, personal communication, March 6, 2020). The mandate of DRC was then taken over by the ICRC. It was also during this phase that more tents were covering the Olive Grove and the initial recreational site

area shrunk down to only one fourth of what used to be (*figure 25*). Also, at that moment, MotG appeared in the Olive Grove scene and took over the management of the rest of the land that was appropriated by shelters. MotG restructured the shelters in that part of the Olive Grove, levelled and drained the grounds, and built terraces to keep all shelters protected against weather conditions (NGO representative, personal communication, April 4, 2020).

The ICRC tried to keep the tents away from their remaining land as much as possible, but they lacked sufficient means and, thus, were unsuccessful in preventing the flood of tents. MotG offered them the opportunity to take over the management of the site, but ICRC refused their help as the two organisations differed considerably in terms of priorities (E. Wiegert, personal communication, February 14, 2020). MotG wanted to convert the recreational area into an area for shelters, but ICRC wanted to keep it for PSS activities and ODD's construction sessions. However, this flood of tents gradually occupied the entire recreational site, which thus reduced the space where ODD could organise their activities. Eventually, it even led to a complete cessation of all their activities on the Olive Grove site.



Figure 25: The DRC recreational site in 2016 and in 2018. The area shrank by 75% as a large influx of displaced people were send there by the army to use the land as a place of residence., in an effort to depopulate Moria camp. (Source: authors)

The fourth construction phase was a very short phase that was again rather practical. It involved moving the containers and ISO boxes of the ICRC to a southern part of the Olive Grove site. Furthermore, they also repaired some of the benches that were damaged and built an additional staircase. Unfortunately, ODD also noticed during this period that MotG had painted their cinema benches without having received permission to do so.

The fifth and final phase of the Olive Grove project was the community garden. This idea was on the table from the beginning of the project but was not executed until the summer of 2019. ODD funded the garden by itself while collaborating with the Low Tech with Refugees. The community garden consisted of terracing that was handcrafted following traditional methods. One of the participants shared his knowledge on how to build these traditional walls. He taught ODD's volunteers how to place the rocks in the best way, so that the terracing would be solid and sturdy. A previous volunteer, Brooj Alammari (personal communication, March 7, 2020), mentioned in

our interview a camp resident who was the expert on the terracing during the community garden project. “So with this guy, who was like the expert in this place […] he would look at what we do and he was like ‘okay, problem’, which is ‘this is not good, you need to change it’ and like come and change it for us, or he would be proud and be like ‘no problem, that’s good’.” It was a long process in which many camp residents participated to deliver a beautiful result stone by stone. The plants in the garden were planted during a key event, namely the *BYOP* (bring your own plant) *party* (*figure 26*). This event was very successful and attracted many participants from both inside and outside Moria camp, i.e. camp residents, NGO volunteers and local people. It was also the very first time that women from the displaced community participated (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020).

Figure 26: The final phase of the Olive Grove project: the community garden and BYOP party (Source: ODD)

Figure 27 gives an overview of all the partnerships of ODD, the nature of their collaboration and the projects for which they worked together.



Figure 27: Scheme of all the partnerships of ODD (Source: authors)

3.3.3 Legacy of ODD's Projects

In the fall of 2019, the number of residents in Moria Refugee Camp increased substantially to around 20.000, due to a large inflow of displaced people on Lesvos island (ANSA, 2020). The Olive Grove site was completely covered by tents which took over the ICRC recreational site. Despite all the efforts of ODD's volunteers and participants, the Olive Grove project was almost completely gone just a few months after the completion of the fifth phase. Only the cinema infrastructure survived but is in a very bad condition (*figure 28*). The seating elements are temporarily not being used because the films are screened in an isobox during the winter. As a result, they are currently covered by a white party tent, so some residents started using the benches as a toilet at night (E. Wiegert, personal communication, February 14, 2020).

Due to these developments, ODD decided to pass on what still remains of the project to other organisations, namely their experience and knowledge. Therefore, as a sixth, additional phase to the Olive Grove project, ODD aims to publish in 2020 a monograph that explains all the difficulties, tips and tricks of organising participatory projects. By telling their story, ODD hopes to make other organisations aware of the importance of involving the displaced community and creating social spaces inside temporary settlements.

Figure 28: The remains of the cinema infrastructure of the Olive Grove project. (Source: Shareen Elnaschie)

The Olive Grove project also influenced the wider society, as some of ODD's former partners and volunteers already duplicated some of ODD's initiatives or methodologies today in other projects in refugee camps all over the world. Firstly, other organisations noticed the interests and benefits of organising creative workshops for the displaced people (such as the photography workshop) and were inspired to organise similar ones themselves. Secondly, the DRC and ICRC recognised the importance of participatory design processes and their impact on the general wellbeing of displaced people. Hans Storgaard confirmed in an interview: "The impacts of the work can be mostly measured directly on the individuals who are involved. [...] It is quite clear that those young men who are involved in our project manage to cope better than the ones who are not involved." (interview from ODD's archive, 2017). With this recognition, ODD proved to a large international organisation like DRC that architects – with their good problem-solving ability, wealthy knowledge about technical and practical aspects (e.g. building methods, materials, etc.) and their involvement with communities – can offer a great added value on their humanitarian aid practices. Tina Agerbak, the head agent of DRC who succeeded Hans Storgaard, mentioned in our interview about her collaboration with architects for different projects, including the Olive Grove project: "Bringing in architects who have this idea of understanding of how you can actually create space […] translate what we are saying […] into something that is a physical space" (personal communication, March 6, 2020). Thirdly, Fabiano Sartori, a former volunteer of ODD who is now working for the UNHCR, has been using similar concepts in his current working environment. He recently created a mural in a transitory shelter area in Brazil, not only because it was beautiful, but because it was an enjoyable activity for the displaced people. As he explained in our interview with him: "They were taking the opportunity of having fun, drawing, painting and enjoying a good afternoon with others […] process is probably more important than the mural itself" (personal communication, February 22, 2020).

3.3.4 Overall Challenges for ODD

In the context of the Olive Grove, ODD faced six main challenges that influenced their practice and design approach. As a first challenge the political nature of the migration crisis and subsequently the hotspot and its surroundings restrained the Office to design completely freely as they had to design within (the guides of) the camp standards (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020). The Greek army has a great influence on what happens in the Olive Grove and possesses

the authority to stop the design process, change the outcomes or claim certain areas. For example, the army casted concrete on the handcrafted stairs of ODD at the Olive Grove site and placed a big tent on top of the volleyball court in the winter of 2016, which was part of the DRC's sports infrastructure. For a small organisation such as ODD, it has been very difficult to stand up against the army who always has the final decision For a small organisation like ODD it has been very difficult to prevent the actions of the Greek army as they do not have the authority to stand against them (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020). Furthermore, the office also had to abide by the local building regulations of Lesvos.

A second challenge for ODD was the transient aspect of the camp (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020). As the asylum procedure takes an undetermined period of time, it was not certain how long the participants would be able to commit to the longer-term projects, such as the construction sessions. Therefore, the design process had to be flexible, so it could easily be adapted to the number of participants showing up each session. Fabiano Sartori, one of ODD's past volunteers, explained that this is the main difficulty of having participatory processes. "It requires a more disciplinary scene developing the methods and developing the solutions because by the end, obviously we have a bunch of methods that we could apply but we always need to adapt these methods to the context." (F. Sartori, personal communication, February 22, 2020). The transience was also the reason why the office kept the workshops short and intensive, so that participants could learn a lot in a brief session (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020). Another additional challenge was the transience of the organisation itself. As ODD had been mainly staffed by voluntary design professionals and interns its team members changed as well.

A third challenge was that the residents of the refugee camps do not form one coherent group. The community is very complex, multilingual, sometimes disunited, culturally and religiously diverse with different skill sets (B. Alammari, personal communication, March 7, 2020). As a result, ODD was compelled to keep the designs and construction sessions as simple as possible, by using a minimal amount of building materials and tools.

A fourth continuous challenge for ODD was raising funds. Funding had been coming from different sources, such as private donations, voluntary contributions from partner organisations or grant funding from bigger institutions like the ECF. However, as ODD did not provide conventional emergency responses but creative activities and built environment interventions, the Office remained rather decapitalised (S. Elnaschie, personal communications, March 9, 2020). To address this lack of funding, ODD started to collaborate with other organisations to combine forces, for both funding and resources. These partnerships were advantageous, but also disadvantageous, since ODD often had to wait for funds before a new construction phase could start. This waiting sometimes was prolonged due to payment delays. In these challenging periods, ODD organised workshops on a self-funded basis.

A fifth main challenge was to attract as much locals as refugees for the workshops, and therefore to find the perfect balance of participants. As Shareen Elnaschie mentioned in the interview: "we always managed to get one or two locals to our workshops, but the numbers were never equal, so that was really though to achieve." (personal communication, March 9, 2020). It was also noticeable that most of the participants from the local community were women, and from the displaced community were men. ODD only managed once to attract a female participant from the displaced community, as it is not in the nature of most Arabian cultures for the women to participate in public events. Consequently, the entire community was not represented, even

though ODD had been trying very hard to reach the whole community by advertising through posters, social media and other organisations.

And the last challenge of ODD's practice, as mentioned before, had been to find partner organisations that were already working on site and to convince them to use participatory processes. In this way, the camp residents could co-produce the desired result (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020). The organisation's main partnership was with the DRC, which was later succeeded by the ICRC. The DRC provided land to work on, legal guidance, funding and communication with coordinating organisations and the authorities, such as the UNHCR and the Greek army. Even though the co-founders of ODD had been very satisfied with this partnership, they recognised that they often relied on DRC's voice in the site management and coordination meetings without making their own voice heard. Since DRC was sometimes more modest to protect the social space, ODD realised afterwards that they should have done more to defend the recreational site area themselves when it was under the threat of being taken over by tents, by actively advocating for social space as a necessity for the general well-being of the residing community (S. Elnaschie, personal communication, March 9, 2020).

Figure 29 summarises all key moments and dates of the practice of ODD on a timeline covering the period 2015-2020. All the key moments of ODD are also brought in tandem with the key decisions and actions taken at the macro level, i.e. the EU and Greece.



Figure 29: Timeline of events at EU level, in Greece and of ODD and connections between these events. (Source: authors)

4 DISCUSSION/CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this research was to investigate which roles community architects (can) play in the context of temporary human settlements such as refugee camps, and to what extent they contribute to fostering the resilience of these settlements. In order to achieve this, a theoretical framework was first developed in which theories of resilience, community architecture and the potential roles of community architects in post-disaster resilient recovery processes were brought into dialogue. This theoretical framework was further enriched by investigating literature on the specific nature and vulnerabilities of displaced people and on the governance of refugee camps. At the end of the theoretical framework, a provisional definition of refugee camp resilience was provided. To empirically examine the potential and limitations of community architects in building resilience in refugee camps, the practice of ODD, working in the Olive Grove, next to Moria Hotspot on the Lesvos island in Greece was studied. In this section, we reflect on our research findings, identify the types of roles architects display in the context of temporary settlements of displaced communities and their unique vulnerabilities as well as critically analyse the potentials and limitations of community architecture practices in fostering resilience in refugee camps: in terms of bettering both the socio-spatial quality of the camp and the governance arrangements managing Moria Refugee Camp.

4.1 VULNERABILITIES OF THE MORIA REFUGEE CAMP COMMUNITY

Our findings from the empirical research conducted in Moria Hotspot and its surroundings largely confirms previous observations around the nature of refugee camps and the vulnerabilities of the displaced community discussed in literature. Indeed, the displaced community living in Moria find themselves in a context that entirely exposes them to three main manifestations of vulnerability, i.e. spatial, socio-cultural and socio-political vulnerabilities.

The spatial vulnerabilities of the displaced community in Moria are overall caused by the enormous overpopulation present in Moria Refugee Camp as the number of camp residents exceeds the original capacity of the official hotspot seven times over the last five years. As a result, many of the displaced people cannot stay in the tents provided by the UNHCR. Therefore, they make a shelter with any materials they find to sleep underneath. In the area where these shelters are erected, the ground is inclined and the (makeshift) tents are all packed together. Because of this inadequate camp infrastructure and the lack of a drainage system, the displaced people are extremely vulnerable to disaster events such as heavy rain showers and strong windstorms, which can cause the camp to be flooded with mud and the shelters to be damaged or even destroyed. Moreover, this overpopulation has resulted in ever-regressing substandard living conditions in the camp, e.g. lack of food distribution, limited availability of water and electricity, lack of waste management and shortage of WASH facilities. These precarious conditions have made the displaced people more vulnerable to both spreading diseases and large epidemics, such as the current COVID-19 pandemic.

The camp residents are also socio-culturally vulnerable. The literature on vulnerabilities of displaced people indicates that this, to a great extent, occurs from the loss of their home-based

community. Scholars as Diken (2004) and Hyndman (2000) state that due to a loss of personal choice and freedom there is no possibility of forming a new community in the camps. The existing displaced 'community' in the camp does not emerge from voluntary considerations or because one has certain shared interests. This results in unpredictable internal differences or cultural misconceptions within the community, which leads to conflicts in the camp, e.g. between people of different origins. Additionally, this community has an ever-changing nature wherefore long-lasting relationships between the community members are not feasible. Hence, despite the existence of a single displaced community, there is no community-feeling. As a result, the displaced people are more vulnerable to violence and experience a lack of support from fellow community members.

This vulnerability to violent incidents is further exacerbated by the social discrimination associated with residing in the camp. Certain right-wing groups consider the displaced people as criminals which often results in violence of local inhabitants against the displaced people. Additionally, the social discrimination also creates vulnerability to exclusion. The displaced people are excluded from everyday social life as they have restricted access to several social services, e.g. health care, education and social activities. Thus, they are deprived of their natural life, e.g. opportunities to progress as individuals and to establish social connections.

Finally, socio-political vulnerabilities of displaced people are already manifested upon arrival in Moria Hotspot where third country nationals subsequently have to go through the identification, registration, and asylum procedure. Throughout these procedures the EU exerts *biopolitics* to decide which of the arriving third country nationals are allowed to travel further into Europe and who is not. Hence, the future of displaced people remains largely in the hands of EU politics, which deprives them of complete control over their (political) lives. As a result, the displaced people are vulnerable to the politics of the EU. Moreover, these procedures are complicated and extensive and the responsible authorities do not provide sufficient explanation and legal assistance. This generates misunderstandings that consequently lead to inaccurate conclusions and decisions. The lengthy duration of the procedures leads to a prolonged state of uncertainty for the displaced people and a longer restriction of their ability to travel to the mainland. All of the above-mentioned aspects result in the displaced people being vulnerable to long and complex procedures that limit their freedom.

4.2 GOVERNANCE AND POWER (A)SYMMETRIES

Several NGOs and international organisations are present in Moria Refugee Camp aiming at reducing the vulnerabilities of the displaced community. By providing different types of support, they not only strive to improve the camp's infrastructure but also to revive the natural and political life of the displaced people. These organisations do not operate alone but are part of a larger political framework which consists of a hierarchy of supranational (EU), national (Greek authorities), and civil society actors (NGOs). The proliferation of a heterogenous landscape of NGOs in Moria Refugee Camp largely resulted due to the lack of capacity of the Greek State to provide sufficient accommodation and reception facilities. f This has some consequences for the resilience potential of refugee camps and the roles and resilience-building ability of community architects in this context.

Looking at the Olive Grove, it can be observed that an organisation such as MotG has upgraded itself to the main management agency and service provider in the area. The fact that MotG foresees emergency needs gives them a number of advantages. Firstly, they are favoured by the institutional structures because their vision fits within the perception of the national authorities and the EU regarding the migration crisis. Therefore, they are able to establish institutional partnerships with the authorities present in the camp, more specifically with the RIC and the Camp Director. The vision they share represents the concept of *classic humanitarianism*. The EU and national authorities are not very eager to sustain actions other than the provision of emergency needs because it counteracts the logics of emergency responses to crises that have dominated the humanitarian field for years. Moreover, socially inspired actions (instead of the provision of emergency needs) reflect the more long-term vision on the refugee camps, which the authorities refuse to acknowledge. Secondly, organisations like MotG are in a better position to gain more funds since their approach regarding humanitarian aid in the refugee camps represents the hegemonic discourse in Europe and by extension the rest of the world. Consequently, actors defending the traditional view on humanitarianism also get more opportunities since their funds allow them to acquire a lot of resources (e.g. tents). Furthermore, they have a lot of volunteers and professionals working for them. All of the aforementioned reasons permit them to transform their narratives into concrete and tangible facilities and services causing the consolidation of their dominant position in the camp.

However, organisations such as ODD promoting the presence of social quality in the camp, are constantly struggling for their place within the governance framework. They try to downsize the dominance of the *classic humanitarianism* approach provided by NGOs such as MotG by building counter-hegemonic narratives that represent the *resilience humanitarianism* vision. The contribution of organisations like ODD, consisting of creative people and more specifically of architects in refugee camps is not commonly known and therefore fewer people are inclined to donate money to these organisations. Furthermore, ODD's team mainly consists of people with a creative background, which means that ODD deploys stricter conditions when allowing someone to volunteer with them. Due to this smaller number of volunteers, the lack of funding and their alternative vision, ODD has less access to resources and a reduced capacity to build possible institutional partnerships with the authorities.

Due to the top-down approach from the EU and the Greek authorities regarding the management of Moria Refugee Camp, there has been little room for socially innovative practices to emerge and open up spaces for negotiation and contestation in order to change hegemonic narratives. Public authorities establish partnerships with those NGOs who play within "the rules of the game" and comply with the regulations and the vision of these authorities. As a consequence, alternative actors remain insufficiently supported. This institutional framework results in a landscape of asymmetric power relations across NGOs working in Moria Refugee Camp. Due to these governance rigidities, the resilience-building potential of the camp is severely limited.

In order to increase their presence and influence in the camp's existing governance structure, ODD built several socio-spatial interventions in the Olive Grove site in partnership with the DRC/ICRC. By creating a social space in a place where camp management only requested standard emergency aid, ODD built up counter-hegemonic narratives, advocating indirectly for the importance of social quality and for a re-articulation of power relations in the camp. Moreover, ODD also emphasised and tried to convince their partner organisations of the importance of involving the displaced community in the improvement of the camp infrastructure through participatory design and

construction processes, instead of providing everything for them. By involving the camp residents in the architectural practice, ODD empowered the displaced community by treating them as equals and making their voices heard. Moreover, the notion of participatory processes and the involvement of the displaced community caused a mental shift within ODD's partner organisations. These participatory processes re-articulated the relationship between organisations and the displaced community by no longer treating them as passive victims, but as equal partners. For example, ODD caused a mental shift within the Red Cross organisations, which until then had organised activities *for* the residents, and not *with* the residents. ODD showed them that participatory processes can also be a PSS activity and can have a major impact on the general wellbeing of the residents (T. Agerbak, personal communication, March 6, 2020). The coordination meetings, where all organisations meet weekly under the guidance of the UNHCR to discuss the current state of affairs in the camp, can be seen as a slight governance improvement aiming at an equity-based governance structure where all NGOs' voices are heard. These meetings could provide the opportunity for less dominant organisations, such as community architects, to make their voices heard and to further increase their influence beyond their immediate environment, by networking and establishing contacts with more powerful organisations.

To conclude, community architects can thus contribute to governance-improvement processes by constructing socio-spatial interventions as a political statement in order to alter the current police present within institutionalised structures and to create a camp environment where every NGO has the right to experiment with their perceptions of humanitarian aid. Furthermore, by building alliances and setting up partnerships with other stakeholders, architects can make other organisations aware of the importance of social spaces in the camps and the added value of participatory construction processes with the displaced community, in order to rearticulate the relationship between NGOs and the refugee community.

4.3 DIFFERENT ROLES AND RESILIENCE-BUILDING POTENTIAL OF THE OFFICE OF DISPLACED DESIGNERS

To identify the roles of community architects in temporary post-disaster settlements and the type of resilience that each role fosters, the practice of ODD in Moria Hotspot was empirically examined and tested against the roles of architects described in the literature on post-disaster reconstruction.

Since one of the main philosophies of ODD's practice is to involve and collaborate with the displaced community and to treat them as equals, the role of the *genius designer* is barely present. The only time ODD took the leading design role was during the first phase of the Olive Grove project. The DRC requested cinema seating that was robust and heavy so it could not be moved or stolen easily. To guarantee that the designed objects complied to the strict requirements, ODD took the lead and made the design without assessment by the participants, unlike the standard outreach sessions. The design was eventually presented and explained to the participants, who could provide feedback and, if desired, adjust elements of the design. Hence, no superiority was shown towards the participants.

To act according to their philosophy, ODD involved the displaced community in their design processes, for instance by organising learning activities in which various skills are *taught* to the participants. This involvement was an opportunity for the displaced community to either learn

new skills or improve their existing ones. In the construction sessions of the Olive Grove project ODD, taking on the role of a *building teacher*, taught the participants basic construction techniques. These skills were useful for their prospects and individual development but also for their further stay in the Olive Grove. The construction techniques allowed the participants to maintain or repair the already built elements or even start their own projects, in order to improve the structural quality of the camp. Hence, new knowledge was offered to the displaced community that facilitated longer-term sustainable solutions, in the sense that the involved displaced community members were able to improve and provide camp infrastructure themselves. Furthermore, the workshops and participatory sessions were also educational activities that enhanced the social quality within the camp, as these activities helped the displaced community develop and acquire new skills.

ODD's desire was not only to teach skills to their participants. They were also willing to *learn* from the displaced community and hence take on the role of the *attentive student*. Among the residents of Moria Refugee Camp have been engineers, architects, or people with another design background. By being allowed to teach their skills and knowledge to both ODD staff and other participants, these displaced people were given the opportunity to touch base with their profession. In the open participatory processes and brainstorm sessions organised by ODD, simple and flexible methodologies were applied to facilitate that everyone could participate. This flexibility provided a level of freedom for the participants to share their suggestions and knowledge. By being given this opportunity by ODD, the participants felt appreciated and proud of what they could achieve, boosting their self-esteem. These participatory processes can be seen as a recreational activity and a form of PSS that aimed to empower the community by giving equal value to their contributions and allowing them to share their knowledge, improving the social quality of the camp. This one-way knowledge exchange from the participants to the architects could also improve the structural quality of the camp if it was translated into actual material outcomes. For example, the construction of the terracing of the community garden in the Olive Grove was largely led by one participant. He was an expert in building these kinds of traditional walls, therefore he taught proudly ODD's volunteers how to place the rocks in the best way and corrected where necessary. In this scenario, the one-way knowledge exchange also resulted in a material outcome (the community garden terracing) and therefore enhanced the structural quality of the camp.

Throughout their design projects, ODD, as *involved facilitator,* collaborated intensively with the displaced community as they designed together. These projects focussed on both conversation and a two-way knowledge exchange, in which the displaced people not only learned from the architects of ODD, but also taught them and other participants their skills and building techniques. Both the conversations as well as the two-way knowledge exchange are equally important because firstly, the open dialogues at the beginning of and throughout the construction sessions empowered the participants to speak up and to provide new insights to the design, enhancing the social quality of the camp. Secondly, the two-way knowledge exchange allowed the provision of better social and structural quality of the refugee camps. The knowledge that was exchanged, was eventually translated into actual public infrastructure. This collaboration between the architects and the displaced community again empowered the participants and made them feel valuable. An example that reflected the role of the architect as *involved facilitator* was the design of the mural on the Olive Grove site. ODD first organised a facilitator workshop for the participants. In this workshop the displaced people were taught how to take responsibilities during a design process and to speak up for their opinions and ideas. Afterwards, throughout the actual design process

each participant had a personal input and was free to share their ideas. This enhanced the social quality of the camp as the design workshops provided the opportunity for the participants to get to know each other and to feel empowered because ODD listened to their opinion. The final design was a result of the collaboration between ODD who set certain conditions (first way of knowledge) and the participants who drew the design (second way of knowledge).

During these workshops and outreach sessions, ODD also often took on the role of the *distant translator*. Ideas provided by the participants during construction sessions and workshops were translated into actual projects and outcomes. In these projects the needs and wishes of the displaced people to improve the structural and social quality of the camp were identified. Firstly, through outreach sessions and community led-mapping workshops, the needs and wishes were collected and transformed into tangible and workable projects, enhancing the structural quality of the camps. For example, at the start of the third construction phase of the Olive Grove projects, the displaced people made clear that they needed additional seating elements, as they did not have sufficient public places where they could sit properly. To respond to this request, the recreational site edge design that was requested by the DRC was designed as a multifunctional element that could be used as a seating element. Secondly, the wishes of the displaced community were also translated into communal spaces for social activities. For instance, the creation of the additional seating elements was not only an enhancement of the public infrastructure, but it also created a communal place where the camp residents could gather to discuss. By bringing the wishes collected from the community-led mapping workshops to a social qualitative design, the displaced community was being heard and they got the feeling that their opinion was valuable.

In addition to the intensive collaboration of ODD with the displaced community, one of the main objectives of the organization was to empower the displaced community and give them opportunities to create new portfolio materials. Therefore, the role of *compassionate friend* was at the very heart of their practice. ODD's philosophy was to remain future-focussed and not look at the displaced community as *victims* of the refugee crisis. ODD built a bond of trust with the participants by having conversations with them that did not focus on the fact that they were asylum seekers or *refugees*. This made the participants from the displaced community be more at ease with ODD and enabled them to open up more quickly. By participating in the workshops and activities of ODD, the displaced community came into contact with architecture practitioners who treated them as equal partners. Consequently, by considering displaced persons as equal, ODD improved the social quality of the camp. The architects provided a form of PSS through which an environment was created whereby everybody felt supported, less isolated from the wider society and more valuable as they had the feeling that they could make themselves useful again, a feeling that had almost completely disappeared by living in the camp.

Even though ODD mediated within and between the different communities (host and refugee community), ODD's practice did not fulfil the role of *social mediator*, as they neither solved problems between the NGOs and the displaced people, nor they addressed conflicts between the displaced people and the European and Greek authorities.

Additionally, due to the specific nature of the refugee camps (the non-coherent community and the exceptional governance arrangements), the architects of ODD manifested three novel roles that complemented the ones found in the post-disaster community architecture literature.

The non-coherent nature of the displaced community had a lot of influence on how architects were involved in the humanitarian context and what specific roles they fulfilled. During the construction sessions, ODD managed to bring various cultures from the heterogeneous displaced community together that normally would not come into contact with each other. They engaged different groups within the displaced community in a dialogue with each other which helped to change people's perspective on other cultures and even managed to eliminate certain prejudices between people of different origins. This continuous dialogue fostered friendships by making all participants aware of the things and thoughts they shared. In the context of refugee camps with a non-coherent community, ODD displayed the novel role of *community peacemaker* who turns the internal diversity present within the displaced community into a fruitful outcome and cultivates social cohesion within the displaced community itself. Hence ODD fostered the social quality of the camp as their activities resulted in a more social qualitative environment in the camp where every nationality or religion was respected. Moreover, ODD, in their role as a *community peacemaker*, even managed to foster social cohesion between the host and the displaced community. By organising interactive workshops that brought the two communities closer to each other, ODD helped to reduce cultural misunderstandings about the displaced community that were shared within the host community and reconnected the displaced community with the wider society. The importance of the role of *community peacemaker* is even greater today, as hatred against displaced people has become increasingly prevalent on Lesvos. The host communities have become impatient for a clear response of the Greek government to the escalating bad conditions in the refugee camps and the declining welfare of the Greek islands. Regrettably, far-right groups have also been gaining a stronger voice in the migration debate. Instead of blaming the authorities for the failure of the Greek refugee camps, the host communities blamed the displaced people who were not the cause but the victims of this failure that has been holding back the prosperity of the Greek islands. Engaging the host and displaced community into dialogue with each other through workshops, ODD as a *community peacemaker* aimed at breaking down this kind of misconceptions, making local people (at least the ones involved in their projects) realise that the displaced community is not the cause of the migration crisis.

The exceptional governance arrangements of the hotspot meant that ODD also had to engage politically if it wanted to gain its place in the governance structure and exert a wider socio-political impact with their projects. Therefore, in the role of *political activist*, ODD created socio-spatial interventions such as the Olive Grove project in the camp, in order to build up counter-hegemonic narratives and in order to advocate in an indirect way for the empowerment of the displaced community and the importance of social quality in the camp. The *activist architects* promote social change and real equity-based treatment, both for the community as for the NGOs involved, by disrupting the hegemony of current powers. They aim for a real reinvention of the camp environment, where social quality is deemed equally important as structural quality and the displaced community is involved in the construction of it. It can be observed that ODD only partially fulfilled the role of *political activist*, since they did not lobby directly to the higher authorities of the camp (such as the Camp Director). They advocated in an indirect way, through community-led design processes that created socio-spatial interventions in the camp.

ODD further aspired to persuade other humanitarian organisations about the importance of social quality in the refugee camp and the involvement the displaced community in their activities. The community architect plays a new role as an *influencer*, who aims to build coalitions with fellow humanitarian organisations to combine narratives, agencies and resources. These partnerships allowed ODD to gain a wider impact with their counter-hegemonic narratives, challenging the

dominant paradigms in current humanitarian aid, which could even permit them to reach out to the hegemonic NGOs and public authorities. The UNHCR coordination meetings provide an excellent platform for the *influencer* architects, as they allow them to network and establish contacts with other organisations, who share similar alternative narratives and possibly have a larger capacity of resources. For example, ODD convinced the DRC, and later on the ICRC, to invest in a new design process, an *architecture of empowerment*, in which the displaced community would be more involved. ODD was able to convince them through their creative background in architecture and construction, providing the ability to assess complex problems, transform ideas into spatial interventions and facilitate participative design and construction processes. The use of participatory processes to create socio-spatial interventions changed the power relation between the NGO workers and their *clients*, as they are now co-creating improvements for the built environment.

It must be noted that the empowerment of the displaced community could indirectly lead to the rearticulation of power asymmetries. However, it was not the aim of ODD to empower them in order to become politically active and to protest against the current hegemonic governance framework of the camp. The empowerment was merely to enhance the social quality of the refugee camps, and thus never triggered directly the ability of the displaced people to oppose to the authorities.

The following table summarises all roles recognised in the practice of ODD, and the type resilience each role builds. It is clear that ODD's resilience-building potential mainly focusses on the socio-structural quality aspect, whereas the process aspect stays rather limited.

ROLE	DESCRIPTION	Resilience? AS A QUALITY		AS A PROCESS
		STRUCTURAL	SOCIAL	
Building teacher	The building teacher teaches the displaced community basic construction techniques in order to establish long-term sustainable solutions, so that the community is able to easily understand and replicate the architect' s techniques for future projects (Andriessen et al., 2020).	Camp residents learn to improve and provide camp infrastructures through the skills they acquired throughout the participative construction processes.	The participatory workshops and construction sessions are educational activities that help the displaced people to develop and acquire new skills and knowledge.	/
Attentive student	The community architect as an attentive student seeks to learn from the displaced community, as he/she celebrates their knowledge and experiences in engineering and design practices (Luansang et al., 2012).	This knowledge exchange can enhance the structural quality in the camp if it translates into tangible, material outcomes	Provision of activities in the camp which aim to empower the displaced community by equally valuing their contribution and letting them share their knowledge. These activities therefore also provide psycho-social support for the participants, as they feel respected and included.	/
Involved facilitator	The involved facilitator collaborates intensively with the displaced community through participatory design processes (Andriessen et al., 2020). In these design processes, communication and two-way knowledge exchange are key. These two elements are crucial to obtain a qualitative design that offers a sustainable and effective solution to the displaced community' s needs.	The knowledge exchanged between the architect and the displaced community is translated into actual public infrastructure, answering the wishes of the camp residents.	The participatory design processes provide a psycho-social support activity for the displaced people, as both the open dialogues and the two-way knowledge exchange allows them to share their knowledge and values with the architects, and thus are not only able to learn but to teach, too. Therefore, the participants feel more valued, equal and empowered.	/

Table 5: Overview of all roles manifested in the practice of ODD and the kind of resilience each role fosters. (Source: authors)

Distant translator	The distant translator interprets the needs and wishes of the displaced community, which are collected through, inter alia, outreach sessions and community-led mapping workshops. The architect then translates the collected information into a graphic design or workable project, in which all community needs were being heard and valued (Boano & García, 2011). Furthermore, the distant translator also redefines the current camp infrastructure, while translating the needs of the displaced community, in order to improve the built environment (Boano & García, 2011).	Collected needs and wishes of the displaced people are translated into the required or desired public infrastructure (stairs, drainage, seating elements)	Creating communal spaces where the displaced people can gather, which enhances social cohesion within the displaced community. As the participants' needs and wishes are being listened to, they feel respected and empowered.	/
Compassionate friend	The architect functioning as a compassionate friend treats the displaced people as equal partners in the construction and design processes, as they have equally valuable knowledge as the architect. The compassionate friend aims to establish a bond of trust with the participants (Andriessen et al., 2020), by having conversations with them about anything except from the fact that they are refugees, e.g. their values and traditions. Empowerment of the displaced people is the result of treating them as equal partners.	/	Provision of psycho-social support, providing a camp environment where everybody feels empowered and supported by involving them as equals in participatory design processes.	/
Community peacemaker	The community architect as a community peacemaker endeavours to foster social cohesion within the non-coherent heterogeneous displaced community, and between the host and displaced community. He/she brings people from different cultural backgrounds in dialogue with each other through design activities, in order to break down prejudices and cultural misconceptions in today' s society. This practice can eventually lead to a more socially cohesive and tolerant community, and even to a more equitable and inclusive society.	/	Organising participatory workshops provides a platform where different cultures of the displaced community come together and are brought into dialogue. This contributes to a socially qualitative environment where there is respect for everyone' s nationality or religion, and everybody is treated equally.	/

Political activist	The community architect as political activist strives for a more equity-based governance structure of the refugee camps by challenging and disrupting the current hegemony of powers regarding humanitarian aid provision. They aim to accomplish a real reinvention of the camp' s built and social environment based on equity between all actors involved. The architects advocate for this re-articulation of power relations in a direct way through establishing institutional partnerships and in an indirect way through socio-spatial interventions in the camp to make a political statement, bolstering their socio-political agency.	/	/	Building up counter-hegemonic narratives by producing socio-spatial interventions such as the Olive Grove project in a place where only standard emergency aid is requested. This intervention can be seen as a political statement and an indirect advocacy for the importance of social quality in the camp.
Influencer	The influencer inspires other humanitarian organisations to acknowledge the importance of social quality in the refugee camps and the involvement of the displaced community in their activities. He/she aims to build coalitions with other organisations in order to recombine narratives, agencies and resources to a more powerful counter-hegemonic narrative.	/	/	By building up coalitions with other organisations stronger counter-hegemonic narratives gain a wider impact and are able to

4.4 POTENTIALS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE MULTIFACETED COMMUNITY ARCHITECTURE PRACTICE OF THE OFFICE OF DISPLACED DESIGNERS

From the analysis of the practice of ODD, it can be determined that community architects can play a multitude of roles that each fosters a certain type of resilience. However, the emphasis in ODD's practice lies on bolstering resilience as a social quality in the camp. The reason ODD mainly focuses on this social quality is because they are aiming with their activities to anticipate on the potential that each of the camp residents possesses. By making this the central aspect of their practice, they answer the wishes of the camp residents for social activities, in order to feel useful and creative again and get into contact with new people.

However, ODD's resilience-building potential as a social quality was sometimes limited. Both the role of the *involved facilitator*, *building teacher*, *attentive student* and *distant translator* encountered the language barrier's limitation several times. This sometimes formed a restriction in the organised educational activities or workshops, resulting in a situation where the activities could not always be fully exploited. However, this limitation did not outweigh the effort made by both the participants and ODD to achieve their objectives, as the displaced people felt motivated to learn new skills and broaden their knowledge. In the other way around, the displaced people were also very eager to share their knowledge because these activities bolstered their self-esteem and made them feel useful again. Furthermore, ODD also strived to overcome the language barrier by providing other ways to communicate, by using non-verbal ways, e.g. explaining graphically, sign language and facial expressions.

The role of the *compassionate friend* could be fully expressed during the practice of ODD since the camp residents had a great necessity for activities where they would be treated as equals and where the focus would be placed on their skills, knowledge and potentials instead of on the fact that they are mainly passive recipients of aid. To create a cohesive community and to eliminate misconceptions about camp residents in today's society, ODD was effective in their role as *community peacemaker* on a smaller scale as they did manage to create a change of vision within their group of participants. However, their success on a larger scale was rather limited as not all the camp residents were open to collaborate with people of different origins as well as with ODD. Additionally, there are too many camp residents in Moria Refugee Camp to be able to create an overall change reaching everyone residing in the camp. Also, due to the constantly changing community, the aim of providing a more overall coherent displaced community can never be fully achieved.

Through their activities, ODD also provided a better camp infrastructure by providing structural and public infrastructure, e.g. stairs, a drainage system, a cinema area and sport facilities. However, this only resulted in a limited bolstering of resilience as a structural quality in the camps because of the several limitations they encountered.

Some of these limitations are reflected in all four roles that foster this kind of resilience, i.e. the *building teacher*, the *attentive student*, the *involved facilitator* and the *distant translator*. One of the main limitations was the lack of funding. This meant that interventions could only take place once sufficient funding had been received and had to be paused when the funding was exhausted. Furthermore, socio-spatial and structural interventions had to be made with cheap and not so sustainable materials. Often installed objects were destroyed by the camp's residents, such as the

side edge design consisting of seating elements where the plastic tubes were broken off as toys for the children. However, to turn this limited availability of materials into a qualitative design, the background of the architect sometimes came in very useful. For instance, the seating elements were designed and constructed in such a way that the wood could not be stolen. A second limitation was the rapidly changing situation in the camp where unexpected occurrences, such as a sudden increase in arrivals in the camp, prevented planned interventions from being realised or resulted in an appropriation of the already finished projects by an increasing amount of tents. Finally, in order to carry out spatial interventions, free space was required. For ODD, the lack of available land was a very large limitation in building structural quality in the camp. Not only did they have a small piece of land at their disposal, at the end even this piece of land was occupied to a large extent by tents.

ODD's potential as *building teacher* and *involved facilitator* was sometimes limited by the fact that the team of participants that came to the workshops was constantly changing and possessed a variety of skills. Consequently, they had to keep their interventions simple with a limited number of building tools, so that everyone had a chance to participate. However, this also created an advantage, since simple techniques were taught to the participants that they, in turn, could teach to new participants and continue working independently.

As a large part of the displaced community often had no knowledge of design and construction processes, they could not bring their needs or wishes to reality themselves. Consequently, the role of ODD as the *distant translator* manifested itself as an important added value for the camp residents. Moreover, by constructing something that effectively represents the needs of the camp residents, this will eventually be better maintained. Nevertheless, the rapidly changing situation in the camp poses a limitation since it can cause a quick change in the needs of the camp residents as well.

ODD also engaged to a limited extent in the conflictive and multi-governed process of resilience building with the aim of creating a more equity-based governance structure of the camps for all actors involved. By constructing a socio-spatial intervention like the Olive Grove project, ODD built up counter-hegemonic narratives as *political activist* in order to challenge hegemonic practices regarding humanitarian aid. Furthermore, by building alliances and setting up partnerships with other stakeholders, ODD tried to *influence* other powerful organisations on the field, convincing them about the importance of social quality in the camps and promoting the involvement of the displaced community in their activities through participative community-led design and construction processes.

However, the manifestation of the role of *political activist* was severely limited due to the existing institutional rigidities of the camp and ODD's political modesty, which prevented the organisation from becoming radically politicised and going directly to the authorities in order to advocate for the importance of building up social quality and to claim a more dominant position in the camp. These institutional rigidities are illustrated in the example of the Greek Army that occasionally took possession of some of ODD's spatial interventions on DRC's leased land, for example by putting a big tent on the volleyball court and pouring concrete over the stairs.

Only the coordination meetings provided a small opening in the hegemonic governance structure where ODD could possibly influence other organisations. However, these meetings did not provide a cooperative framework and a platform where every organisation's voice could be heard, limiting the role of ODD as an *influencer* severely. Hegemonic organisations are still dominating

the meetings, ensuring that alternative organisations, such as ODD, who promote counter-hegemonic narratives, are rather overlooked. This is what happened eventually with ODD's partnership with the DRC/ICRC. The architects' plead for social space was overshadowed by the dominant emergency narratives of the powerful organisations during the meetings. ODD was not able to defend their projects enough as DRC was speaking on their behalf and were rather modest in defending the importance of social space. Afterwards, the two co-founders reflected on these events and wish they would have taken more action to stand up against the hegemonic narratives in the coordination meetings.

These limitations (institutional rigidities and ODD's political modesty) restricted the roles of *political activist* and *influencer* to be fully bolstered and thus prevented ODD's resilience-building potential as a process to be fully unlocked. Therefore, their contribution in creating a more equity-based governance structure for all actors involved was limited. ODD's limited resilience-building potential as a process is clearly illustrated by the vanishing of the whole Olive Grove project due to the increasing number of tents popping up in the last months of 2019. ODD did not have the capacity or the political agency to defend their socio-spatial interventions. Furthermore, the fact that both the authorities as the other organisations did nothing to help defend the Olive Grove project, for example by giving people a place to stay elsewhere, proved that NGOs do not always work together productively and value each other's actions or activities, and that authorities still maintain the emergency aid logics as dominant paradigm, hereby favouring the action of certain organisations over others.

After the vanishing of the Olive Grove project, ODD decided to further advocate for the importance of social space and community involvement by writing a monograph about the Olive Grove project. With this monograph they aim to pass on their knowledge and experience of participatory processes to other NGOs active in temporary human settlements. By telling their story comprehensively, with all successes and failures, ODD hopes to finally convince and inspire other NGOs to see the value of social spaces and involving participants from the displaced community in their practices. Although this monograph provides an influential discourse, it remains to be seen whether it will change the current power relations and social policies of the camps.

4.5 RESILIENCE OF TEMPORARY HUMAN SETTLEMENTS

Looking back at the practice of community architects such as ODD in Moria Refugee Camp on Lesvos, the roles they displayed and the potential and limitations of their resilience-building capacity, the resilience of temporary human settlements such as refugee camps can be read as

1. A **socio-structural quality** acquired by a multiplicity of actors

which consists of sturdy public camp infrastructure that provides safety and access to basic and sufficient emergency needs such as shelter, food, medical care and water, WASH facilities. Furthermore, it equally values the provision of social infrastructure that establishes spaces for social life and provides recreational activities such as youth programmes and sports, psycho-social support programmes and access to livelihood opportunities or education, such as language classes and activities where people can acquire and develop or practice skills. Hence, a resilient refugee camp is a liveable human settlement with decent living conditions and respect for the heterogeneous nature of the residing community and their skills, knowledge and potentials.

2. A highly **political and contentious process** with multiple socio-structural results

   in which a heterogeneity of humanitarian aid actors tries to claim the lion's share in the provision of refugee camps services and facilities. Community architects and their partners engage in a constant endeavour to transform hegemonic narratives regarding humanitarian aid and the governance of refugee camps. They do this by (1) building up and adapting counter-hegemonic narratives and discursive practices pointing out the value of socially qualitative temporary settlements, and undertaking socio-spatial community design interventions in the camps as an indirect advocacy for their beliefs, (2) creating partnerships and building alliances with other NGOs in order to gain a wider impact with their narratives i.e. the promotion of the importance of social space in the camp and the involvement of the displaced community through participatory processes. This might balance out power asymmetries in the governance structure of refugee camps, further bolstering community architects' political agency and influence.

4.6 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH TRAJECTORIES

Resilience seen as both a quality and a process, aims to imagine and materialise a resilient refugee camp that is socially, spatially and politically optimal both for the actors involved in the governance of the camp and the refugee community they aim to serve. This consists of (1) a built environment with decent living conditions, both structurally as socially where camp residents can become resilient subjects thriving in the camp environment by feeling more empowered and supported. Respect is shown for the heterogeneous nature of the refugee community and their potentials, skills and aspirations and (2) the provision of a facilitating political framework where all stakeholders, institutionalized or grassroots, hegemonic or alternative, have an equivalent voice and equal space to experiment with their own perceptions on humanitarian aid, while everybody's activities or interventions in the camp are fully respected and equally celebrated.

Even though there is mostly need for fast and temporary solutions in refugee camps, such as shelters and WASH facilities, community architects can still add value in this emergency context and have the ability to strongly contribute to building resilience as a quality in the camp. Their educational background and expertise have many advantages. Firstly, architects can improve the built environment by not just thinking about shelter optimisations specifically, but they can take a holistic approach to design more flexible structural solutions for the entire camp. Secondly, they are also educated in working closely together with communities and facilitating participatory processes. Community architects are therefore able to translate the needs and wishes of the community, in both structural and social infrastructure, such as communal areas. Thirdly, the knowledge and skills of architects is often multifaceted as they have a sense of aesthetics, have technical knowledge about building techniques and building regulations, easily see potentials and opportunities, and know how socio-cultural factors influence today's society.

However, there are also limitations of the community architecture profession in the field of emergency response. Firstly, the transient aspect of the camp makes it difficult to work with a stable, non-changing community. Hence this is limiting the community architects to start up longer-term projects as skills sets and participants constantly change. Furthermore, the interests

of the displaced community also vary continuously, making it difficult to anticipate the right needs for the newly arrived camp residents that succeed the previous participants. Secondly, there is the governance structure that is often dominated by hegemonic paradigms regarding the needed emergency support. Since communal spaces and organising creative workshops are less prioritised in this context, community architectural practices receive less funding. It is therefore also challenging for the architects to obtain a good position in the working groups and coordination meetings to advocate for the necessity of social spaces. Moreover, it is difficult to find a place in the camp where they can carry out their activities. This shows that it is important for architects to become radically politized, build up institutional partnerships and engage more in the conflictive processes of stakeholders to have a wider impact. Bolstering resilience as a process by attempting to improve governance arrangements is equally important as building up quality in the refugee camp, because if unbalanced power relations keep existing, the capacity to build resilience as a socio-structural quality will be largely limited. Community architects should build resilience as a quality and equally engage in resilience as a process to unlock their full potential in refugee camps.

Future research trajectories

This research was entirely based on one case study, namely that of the practice of ODD in Moria Hotspot on Lesvos island. Therefore, it is desirable that other case studies are also investigated in future research. This will allow the generalisability of the definition of resilience in temporary human settlements to be examined and, if necessary, to be refined. Moreover, in light of the recent COVIC-19 pandemic, the potential roles of community architects in protecting the camp communities from epidemic/pandemic outbreaks need to be further investigated. Presumably, architects could play an important role in the protection of the refugees' health by providing a better overall infrastructure for the camp, that has more open space and wherein social distancing is thus achievable. Moreover, they could come up with design solutions of infrastructure that is easily adaptable in times when viruses such as COVID-19 arise. For instance, an efficient distribution of all facilities across the site can ensure that the camp can be divided into enclosed zones where less people come into contact with each other. Furthermore, architects could, as *political activist*, even advocate for the transfer of the displaced people to decent accommodation on the mainland, such as social housing, so they can stay home and easily protect themselves from the corona virus.

Finally, during this research it became apparent that the temporariness of Moria Hotspot is increasingly developing into a permanent temporariness. Several elements in the camp created the impression of a more permanent settlement and also numerous NGOs are starting to approach the situation with a longer-term view. The impact of the coming, inevitable permanent temporariness on current social policies can be further examined in future research, i.e. whether this change influences the emergency responses of higher authorities, such as the Greek government or even the EU. Furthermore, it can also be investigated whether this increasing permanency that is transforming the camp gradually into a self-sustained city (with shops, schools and other services opening) also causes the camp to become more resilient. The residents of this city will eventually establish an economy, start a profession, and be able to better look out for themselves. Consequently, the displaced people will be less dependent on the humanitarian organisations. On the longer-term this can even lead to the improvement of the built environment, as people will most likely have the resources to build their own houses and facilities. Hence, this acceptance of permanency might also ensure that long-term, alternative solutions take

precedence over short-term, conventional emergency solutions and therefore give the residents more chance to find peace and settle for a longer period of time, instead of constantly being in a state of limbo. Therefore, future research can investigate the roles of community architects in these emerging cities, as they can provide all necessary (public) infrastructure, design resilient masterplans and houses, and teach residents building techniques and knowledge for further development. Subsequently, research can also be carried out on permanency on the next level, i.e. the resettlement of the displaced community to permanent residences, such as social housing and even vacant buildings, in order to decongest the refugee camps or ultimately abolish them. This action could finally make the displaced people living in the refugee camps less vulnerable and give them a more dignified life.

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6 ANNEXES

Annex A: Alphabetic list of all organisations and initiatives on the Lesvos island, Greece, working with Refugees & Asylum Seekers (dates from February 2020) (based on the table of Nicolas Perrenoud)

NAME OF THE NGO	ABBR.	SHORT DESCRIPTION ACTIVITIES
A Drop in the Ocean (Dråpen i Havet)	/	Community Center, education, activities with UAMs
Advocates Abroad	AA	Legal aid (Interview Preparation, Appeals), Advocacy, Human Rights
All4Aid	A4A	Education (All4Kids Learning Centre), showers/laundry (All4Women), upcycling (Living Timber Project)
Art Bridges (Angels Relief Team)	/	Music education, art, creativity, social integration
Asterias Starfish Foundation	/	Transportation for UAMs, Distribution of baby boxes & strollers, Self Defence and Yoga classes, OpenSpace
Attika Human Support	/	Warehousing, Logistics
Because we Carry	BwC	Distribution & Activities
Becky's Bathhouse	/	Showers & wellness
Boat Refugee Foundation (Stichting Bootvluchteling)	BRF	Medical aid, psycho-social support (PSS)
Borderline Lesvos	/	Integration, Education, mental health information sessions with IRC
Caritas Hellas	/	Education
Christian Refugee Relief	CRR	Logistics (transports of containers with NFIs from e.g. the Netherlands) for organizations working in Moria camp, short term volunteers
Connect by Music	CbM	Music classes and -therapy
CRWI Diotima	/	Legal aid for survivors of gender-based violence, sexual exploitation and abuse
Danish Refugee Council	DRC	Legal aid (Protection)
Dirty Girls of Lesvos	/	Laundry
European Lawyers on Lesvos	ELIL	Legal aid
EuroRelief	/	Shelter, basic assistance, distribution
families4peace (Familiasparalapaz)	/	Support for families
FENIX Humanitarian Legal Aid	FENIX	Legal aid, protection
Global Aid Network	GAiN	Logistics (transports of containers with NFIs from e.g. Switzerland) for organizations working in Moria camp, short term volunteers
Greater European Mission	GEM	Community center, Christian organization
Greek Council for Refugees	GCR	Legal aid
Healthbridge Medical	/	General medical care, alongside the existing dentist clinic of Health Point Foundation, in direct support of KEELPNO/AOD
Health Point Foundation	HPF	Dental care
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society	HIAS	Legal aid
Help International	HI	Distribution, Activities with UAMs
Help Refugees	HR	Charity, Fundraising
Home for All (Nikos & Katerina)	/	Kitchen / Social Enterprise (Restaurant)

i58 - The Oasis	/	Distribution (through EuroRelief), Community centre/Christian church
Iliaktida AMKE	/	Accommodation & protection, child protection & hosting, PwD & vulnerable groups support
International Committee of the Red Cross	ICRC	Psycho-social support and community building activities
International Rescue Committee	IRC	WASH support in Kara Tepe, Stage 2
International School of Peace	ISOP	Non-formal education and activities for children and adults
Kitrinos Healthcare	/	Medical aid
LATRA Innovation Lab	/	Creative Lab
Legal Centre Lesvos	/	Legal aid
Lesvos LGBTIQ+ Refugee Solidarity	/	Support for LGBTIQ+ refugees
Lesvos Solidarity / Pikpa	/	Shelter, basic assistance
Light Without Borders Org	/	Ophthalmologist (provides eyeglasses and ophthalmology support)
Lighthouse Relief	LHR	Emergency response to boat landings, spotting and NFI distribution in Stage 2 transit camp
Low-tech with Refugees	/	Sustainability, Environment, Vocational Training
Mare Liberum	/	Human rights monitoring
Médecins Du Monde	MDM	Medical aid
Médecins sans frontières (Doctors without Borders)	MSF	Medical aid (Paediatrics), psychological aid, health promotion
Medical Volunteers International	MVI	Medical Aid (Basic healthcare, physiotherapy)
METAdrasi	/	Legal aid, interpretation, education, protection of unaccompanied minors, diagnosis and certification of torture victims
Mikros Dounias	/	Early childhood education
Mosaik Support Center	/	Education, vocational training, work opportunities
Movement on the Ground	MotG	Shelter, Activities, Education
No Border Kitchen	NBK	Food distribution
Office of Displaced Designers	ODD	Art, Communication
One Happy Family	OHF	Community centre, distribution of NFIs, activities, education
Osteopathy for Refugees	OFR	Osteopathy / manual therapy
Oxfam	/	Restoring family links and protection for vulnerable people
Paedagogical Institute of Los Angeles "The Nest"	PILA	Childcare
PRAKSIS	/	Social housing, integration, humanitarian support for unaccompanied children at risk and vulnerable families
Proemaid	/	Lifeguards, emergency relief, swimming lessons
Proyecto movil kitchen (Accion Directa Sierra Norte)	ADSN	Food distribution
ReFOCUS Media Labs	/	Media skills training
Refugee Education & Learning	REAL	Education
Refugee Observatory Aegean (University of the Aegean)	/	Monitoring, Research
Refugee Rescue "Mo Chara"	RR	Search and rescue
Refugee4Refugees	R4R	Distribution of clothes and NFIs, emergency response
Remar SOS	/	Emergency relief, food distribution
Rowing Together	/	Women's Health Clinic, Health/hygiene promotion

SAO Association (Bashira Centre)	/	Psychosocial support (upon referral only)
ShowerPower	/	Showers
Siniparksi (ΣΥΝΥΠΑΡΞΗ)	/	Social Integration
Smiles on the Way	/	Collection of donations in kind (second-hand clothing, footwear, and toys) and transport to partner organizations on Lesvos (LHR, R4R, Attika, ...)
SOS Children's Villages	/	Child education
Stand by me Lesvos	/	Educational community center offering English and Greek classes to camp residents and a tailor shop so people may alter and mend their clothes.
Sultana Foundation	/	Women & Children community centre
TAPUAT	/	Child and family support hub, education
Team Humanity	/	Children activities
The Hope Project (The Kempsons)	/	Distribution of clothes and NFIs, art workshop
The Lava Project	TLP	Public laundry for residents of Moria camp (collection/distribution in the camp conducted by partner organizations)
The Smile of the Child	/	Child protection
Three Peas help make a difference	/	Fundraising support for housing and community centre projects
Together for Better Days	/	Educational and social support, environment and sustainability, procurement
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	UNHCR	UN agency providing emergency assistance and protection for refugees. Also providing information about obligations and rights
WaterShed Foundation	WS	Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)
Wave Of Hope For The Future	WHF	Non-formal education and activities conducted by refugees from the camp and international volunteers
Where Borders Meet	WBM	Media workshops (Photo, Radio, Film, Writing, Podcasts)
Women In Solidarity House Lesbos	WISH	Activities for women
Yoga and Sport for Refugees	YS4R	Individual & team sport groups, fitness, Yoga, self-defense, swimming, running
Zaporeak	/	Food distribution

Annex B: List of all our interviews, the previous interviews by ODD and our short conversations with volunteers from other NGOs.

	Date	Interviewee	Organisation and position
Interviews	14.02.2020	Edouard Wiegert	Protection team leader, ICRC
	22.02.2020	Fabiano Sartori	Former volunteer, ODD
	06.03.2020	Tina Agerbak	Head agent, DRC
	07.03.2020	Brooj Alammari	Former volunteer, ODD
	09.03.2020	Shareen Elnaschie	Co-founder, ODD
	04.04.2020	NGO representative	Island representative Lesvos
Previous interviews by ODD	23.10.2018	Syzar	Former participant from the displaced community, ODD
	23.10.2018	Ibrahim	Former participant from the displaced community, ODD
	2017	Hans Storgaard	Project coordinator, DRC
	2018	Victor	Former participant from the displaced community, ODD
	2018	Alaa	Former participant from the displaced community, ODD
Conversations	25.02.2020	Simon	Volunteer, One Happy Family
	07.03.2020	Dimitris Patestos	Medical coordination operations, MdM
	20.03.2020	Melinda McRostie	Founder, Starfish Foundation
	25.02.2020	Chow	Volunteer, Low-Tech with Refugees
	25.02.2020	Pierre	Volunteer, Low-Tech with Refugees
	15.02.2020	Carlotta	Volunteer, Low-Tech with Refugees
	12.02.2020	Eisa	Asylum seeker, artist from Afghanistan

Annex C: An overview of all the events we went to during our one-month case study:

Date	Event name	Organiser
15.02.2020	Exhibition, overview of all recent projects of Low-Tech with Refugees	Low Tech with Refugees
05.03.2020	General coordination meeting	UNHCR