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Extensions of the Fictional Mind

The Embodied Mind in Dorothy Richardson's Short Stories *Ordeal, Sunday,* and *Visit*

Raven Van den Wyngaert

Promotor: Olga Beloborodova
Assessor: Dirk Van Hulle

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Raven Van den Wyngaert

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Introduction

In an attempt to break away from literary genres focusing on the external world, the emergence of psychoanalysis in 1896 inspired the literary genre Henry James called psychological realism. The defining characteristic of this genre was that authors felt that descriptions of the environment and superficial descriptions of the mind were no longer sufficient. Instead, they felt the focus should lie on subconscious and hidden desires and thought patterns. They attempt to represent these as accurately as possible by turning inwards. Through the use of the narrative technique of interior monologue, thoughts of characters in modernist novels are often represented as a stream of consciousness. The term stream-of-consciousness, credited to William James, is a hallmark strategy to the genre of modernist fiction. Through the interior monologue, modernist authors attempt to depict the mind in an as authentic form as possible. (Peter Childs 60; David Herman 247-51). A key assumption of this approach is the notion that the mind is completely internal, a view towards which cognitive science takes an opposite stance. The term "mind" is used rather carelessly in this case, leaving the meaning open to interpretation of the reader. In order to avoid ambiguity, a clear delineation of the term "mind" is necessary. I will use a philosophical approach in this thesis with support of cognitive science to attempt to provide an answer. The field of cognitive science looks into what constitutes the mind and a cognitive process. Specifically relevant for this thesis are the branches in cognitive science known as the extended and the embodied mind. They provide a philosophical, cognitive and literary framework.

According to Rowlands (*New* 3), the new direction that cognitive science is moving towards no longer views the brain as the epicenter around which cognitive activity revolves. Instead, it focusses on the ideas that mental processes are embodied, embedded, enacted and extended. Shaun Gallagher dubbed these the 4 e's. What is fundamentally different from the traditional views on the mind and the new approach these 4 e's provide, is that the focus shifts from the modernist's internal focus of cognition, towards the notion that cognition and cognitive processes can occur externally as well. This notion of external manifestation of cognitive processes does not eliminate the concept of internal cognition,

but rather proposes that cognitive processes can be the result of an interaction between the internal mind and external objects. (Rowlands, *New* 3-5)

For this thesis, I will zoom in on the short stories *Visit, Ordeal,* and *Sunday* by modernist author Dorothy Richardson and investigate how the characters in these stories can be looked at as agents who interact with their environment, using the embodied mind. It is for this reason that this paper discusses modernist short stories in particular because of their focus on the characteristic inward turn and resulting stream of consciousness.

Literature in general, but short stories in particular, are mostly being discussed in light of their contextual framework and from a historical point of view. As Paul Delaney and Adrian Hunter (1-4) observe, critical analyses of the short story have only recently come to the forefront of literary criticism, and today the focus is still put on the cultural and contextual framework in which a story was written. More recently, the focus has started to divert to the aesthetic role short stories play, which is also the direction in which this thesis is looking. Modernist short stories in particular have a tendency to start *in medias res*. As a result of this, any potential preamble is omitted. Childs posits that the short story has changed under modernist influences from a realistic representation of life to an ambiguous and allusive type of prose (Childs 99). Due to the limited length a short story has, the author has fewer opportunities to include a context, and it is up to the reader to attempt to interpret what is meant exactly. The limited scope of the shorty, combined with the modernist stylistic approaches, provide the reader with an attempt of an accurate representation of the human mind in literature. In this connection, Childs refers to Dorothy Richardson as being pivotal in changing the ways authors used to represent thoughts in literary works. Although she has not been as extensively studied as other modernist authors, she was a major contributor to works which use the interior-monologue technique, as well as focusing on displaying a female perspective in a male-dominated literary environment. (Childs 84-85) Her importance, relevance, and underrepresentation are why I chose to analyse Dorothy Richardson's short stories.

The cognitive sciences

Cognitive processes and the mind

Given that the aim of this paper is to determine the presence and use of the embodied mind in Richardson's short stories, it is important to have a clear notion of what exactly constitutes the mind in general and in fiction.

The idea that the mind is independent from the body has always been assumed to be a fact. Descartes proposed the concept of dualism to differentiate between the physical body and the non-physical mind. He described the mind as a non-physical subject. Clark and Chalmers (27) attempt to tackle the question of where exactly the mind ends and the rest of the world begins, more in depth, and they first proposed the concept of active externalism. In a nutshell, this concept argues that the mind is comprised of the brain and reciprocal engagement with the environment. The basic premise for this train of thought is that should the external component be excluded, the cognitive behaviour would be severely obstructed as well (Clark and Chalmers 30). It is important to demarcate what Clark and Chalmers (30-31) mean when they talk about the mind. According to them, the mind entails cognitive processes which are achieved through a system of coupling. This system entails a form of linking between the human organism and an external entity where there is a degree of a two-way interaction. As soon as this coupling has been achieved, Clark and Chalmers propose these systems can be seen as cognitive processes in their own rights. A critical note they themselves propose is that some coupled systems are too easily decoupled. So instead of using the term 'coupling,' they introduce the term 'reliable coupling'. They define the term 'reliable' in this context by noting that the neural agent must always have immediate access to the external object with which that agent will interact. Ultimately, they propose the following definition of a cognitive process:

> If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, *were it done in the head,* we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. (Clark & Chalmers 29).

This definition stresses the importance of external influences on cognitive processes. These influences in tandem with the mind form a cognitive process as a coupled system.

Despite Cartesian dualism having been disparaged and dismissed in its traditional form, Rowlands (*New* 12) proposes that the contemporary discussions and mind/body theories are all drawn heavily on Descartes' propositions. The dominant idea Rowlands (*New* 2) attempts to undermine is that the mental processes exist entirely inside the brain. According to this relatively traditional approach, cognitive processes are either identical with or exclusively realized in the brain. Rowlands claims these cognitive processes were, in early cognitive science, compared to computer programs or cognitive software because of their limited descriptive function of cognitive processes. Yet from the 1980s onwards, cognitive sciences linked cognitive processes more to hardware because of the emphasis being put on the neural pathways and connections of the brain on which hardware is based. Cognitive science attempts to find answers to the question how these programs, cognitive processes, are established in the brain. Rowlands (*New* 2) does define these cognitive sciences as Cartesian cognitive science because there is a clear distinction between the programs, the cognitive thought processes, and the hardware, which would be our brains. Although Rowlands (*New* 2-3) stipulates that there is a wide spectrum of Cartesian cognitive sciences, the underlying, uniting principle of modern cognitive science argues that the cognitive processes occur only partly inside the heads of the relevant organisms. The reason for this is because of the coupling and external localization of actors that play such a vital role to the forming of these cognitive processes.

Although there is an apparent focus the 4 e's place on the physicality and external localization of the mind, Rowlands (*New* 8) argues that non-Cartesian cognitive sciences do not focus on the spatial location of the mind but rather on mental processes themselves. These mental processes do not need to occur inside the brain; instead, they can be the product of multiple external occurrences or actions. Rowlands (*New* 17) argues that the information is readily present in the environment for everyone at all times, yet it is only by engaging with these bodies of information that they transform from being present to being available. It is this interaction that lies at the heart of non-Cartesian cognitive science, Rowlands proposes. This does not answer the question whether or not these external information bearing structures are part of the mind.

The central question to cognitive sciences, Rowlands (*New* 22, 52) proposes, is whether states, processes and structures which manifest themselves outside the body can be considered to be part of cognitive processes. The Cartesian cognitive sciences would argue that they cannot be, since cognitive processes are produced exclusively by the brain. The non-Cartesian sciences would argue that some cognitive processes can be composed of elements occurring outside the brain as well. The non-Cartesian sciences differentiate between the embodied and the extended branch. The embodied strand argues that cognitive processes and structures can, in part, be made up of processes outside the body but ultimately exist inside the brain. These processes and structures are influenced by a source outside the brain but ultimately manifest themselves inside the body. The extended strand argues that these processes can be composed of influences outside the body of the cognitive organism. (Rowlands, *New* 22). Before discussing the embodied mind further on in this thesis, I will briefly explain the extended mind, and cognitive sciences in general. The extended mind could thus involve an object such as a diary, where a version of the author is immortalized in an object rather than in a living organism. This would then result in at least two versions of this author, the physical author and the diary author. Both of these versions of the author are representations of a person at a specific point in time, with the physical author occupying space and engaging with the world and the diary author being a static individual, never changing their views. This diary could then be considered to be an example of an extended cognitive organism because the author is being engaged with as soon as someone reads the diary.

Although this paper focuses on the embodied mind and its impact on reading modernist fiction, all four distinctions are relevant to the discussion and they do briefly need to be explained:

- The embedded mind entails that mental processes only function when the body engages in a specific activity, emphasizing the influence of the environment on mental processes.
- The enacted mind focusses on the interaction between the brain and the environment. It differs from the embedded mind in the way that it is the environment which is affected by cognitive influences.

- The extended mind holds the idea that cognitive processes can be transferred onto physical objects in the external world. Through the transfer of information on external devices which can later be accessed after the internal mind has forgotten the information remains accessible and the mind thus becomes “extended”.

The three descriptions provided above offer a vague idea of three of the 4 e’s, but they are flawed in their limitedness and thus require a more in-depth definition for which this thesis is too limited. Because of its relevance to the topic, the embodied mind will be discussed in depth.

These four strands of cognitive science can be described as anti-Cartesian cognitive sciences. Rowlands suggests the Cartesian vision should be discarded because the question of whether or not processes which occur outside of the brain can be considered constituents which form cognitive processes. Rowlands argues that they do, and because of this rejects Cartesian dualism. The new cognitive science, the 4e’s, fill the caveat left by the rejection of the Cartesian vision. (Rowlands 20-23, 52)

A continuation of the Cartesian vision is the separability thesis, which states that it is irrelevant in which body a mind resides. According to this thesis, it would be perfectly possible for a mind of a human-like entity to have a body which would not even have to be organic. As a counterargument Shapiro proposes the embodied mind thesis (EMT). This EMT entails that the biological restrictions influence the way different sensory input is processed and perceived. Because of this, the nature and type of body can be inferred by looking at the workings of the mind. Simply stating that cognitive processes can occur in an environment outside of the body is dismissive since these interactive workings are what form the cognitive process. As established, the interaction between the brain of organisms and the information bearing structures found in the environment is what ultimately amounts to the mind. (Shapiro qtd. In Rowlands, *New* 53-54)

The extended and the embodied mind

The extended mind and cognition

Stephen Hawking (75-78) states that biological evolution progresses slowly, although it is speeding up. The reason why humans have evolved so quicky, is that they have transitioned from a purely internal informational transmission, DNA and genetic evolution, to a form of external informational transmission. Hawking argues that the external information transmission vastly surpasses the internal information transmission:

> The timescale for evolution in the external transmission period is the timescale for accumulation of information. This used to be hundreds, or even thousands, of years. But now this timescale has shrunk to about fifty years or less. On the other hand, the brains with which we process this information have evolved only on the Darwinian timescale, of hundreds of thousands of years. (Hawking 78-80)

Rowlands (*New* 3) describes the extended mind as an extension of the mental processes engaging in interaction with the environment, in part, forming specific cognitive processes and structures because of those interactions. Rowlands (*New* 58) posits an alternative approach from the definition as proposed by Clark and Chalmers by debating a crucial argument they made. Clark and Chalmers argue that when the mind engages in interaction with external devices, the mind and the objects become a coupled system. They define this interactive link between the mind and the object as cognitive processing and introduce the "parity principle". What this principle entails is that both poles have an equal value and contribution to the cognitive process (Bernini 352). Clark and Chalmers proposed the following interpretation of the extended mind:

> If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. (Clark and Chalmers 29)

Rowlands (*New* 61) argues that this criterium for an extended mind is too limited and vague and further defines the extended mind. He states that the extended mind comes to be when a manipulation of external structures occurs and then engages with the internal cognition of an individual. He introduces the notion that information must specifically be manipulated from being present to becoming available (Rowlands, *New* 64). It is exactly this definition that he uses to support his proposition that the extended mind should be classified as a process-oriented account rather than active externalism. Rowlands proposes the following alternative definition as more specific and clearly defined:

> It [the extended mind] is a thesis that concerns cognitive processes and it claims some of these processes are, in part, composed of processes of manipulating, exploiting, or transforming environmental structures. (Rowlands, *New* 67)

Rowlands argues that this approach towards the extended mind is still compatible with environmental structures. These structures are essential to the cognitive processes, and yet they are not identical to cognitive states. These information-bearing structures do not have had to have been designed to contribute to cognitive processes, yet this is not to say that they cannot possibly be part of it (Rowlands, *New* 75).

As an alternative to the parity principle, Mark Sutton proposes the complementarity principle (194). Sutton specifies that the cognitive processes as established by interaction with external actors do not need to mimic or replicate the structure or format of internal cognitive processes. As Clark puts it, "The brain need not waste its time *replicating* such capacities. Rather, it must learn to interface with the external media in ways that maximally exploit their particular virtues." (Clark qtd. in Sutton 205). These external devices are defined as exograms and provide a reliable source of input which can be consulted in any given context. The exogram differs from the engram in the sense that the engram is entirely internal and thus inherently unreliable because of the dependency on memory (Sutton 205). Sutton goes as far as to propose that humans are cyborgs by nature and humans' biological brains have been technologically enhanced to such an extent that they can no longer be considered to be encumbered by the physicality of the world. According to the complementarity principle, much like Rowlands' interpretations also posits, the brain cannot

store all information indefinitely and must operate under the principle that external information bearing structures, or exograms, are automatically coupled with the brain and trigger a cognitive process.

The embodied mind and cognition

Much like the extended mind, the definition of the embodied mind as used in this thesis also focusses on the interaction between external influences and the mind, and the cognitive processes that are generated because of this interaction. The difference is that where the extended mind, as described by Clark and Chalmers, should be considered to entail a constitutive interaction between the brain and an external object, the embodied mind stresses the importance of the body which the mind occupies. As Francisco J. Varela notes,

> By using the term *embodied* we mean to highlight two points: first, that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural context. (Varela 172-173)

What this quote stresses, is how the mind is influenced by the body it occupies, and thus the cognitive processes that result from interacting with external objects are affected by personal experiences. In the case of the three short stories which will be discussed here, it concerns three humans: a child, an adult and an older lady. The fact that the stories deal with protagonists from varying ages seamlessly ties into the second point Varela makes. The embodied actions and minds are affected by the biological specificities of each individual. These differences are the result of either age, and any biological impairment related to age, or life experience, which affects psychological and cultural influences as well.

Varela also posits that this interaction goes both ways and that it is the organism that influences the environment, but that the organism is equally affected by the environment: "*embodiment* has this double sense: it encompasses both the body as a lived, experiential structure and the body as the context or milieu of cognitive mechanisms" (Varela xvi). This two-way relationship between an organism and the mechanisms in its context can lead to

the organism questioning its own perception of the self, which ties into the concept of subject-object relations (Varela 107-108). Rowlands, much like Varela, agreed with the established definition of the embodied mind was lacking and needed to be expanded on by considering the notion that cognitive processes could be the result of not only the brain, but also wider bodily functions. (57) This essentially means that the distance between the eyes and the observed object or action directly influences the cognitive process of the cognizing subject. Rowlands' view on the embodied mind is particularly relevant to this thesis, considering the biological differences between all three protagonists of the stories.

The embodied mind in modernist short stories

As stated earlier, Dorothy Richardson's short stories are characterized by the fragmented representation of the internal mind in a condensed form. Based on the definitions of cognitive science provided by Clark & Chalmers, Sutton, Menary and Rowlands, there needs to be a degree of coupling between the internal mind and external objects, which leads to a system of coupling. The modernist genre provides an insight into the minds of literary characters, allowing the reader to see one key element to cognitive science. The reason why short stories are particularly relevant is because the author is steered towards a minimalist approach towards sharing information.

According to the parameters imposed by both Sutton's and Rowlands' approaches towards extended mind, external scaffolding and exograms are inseparable parts of the cognitive process. Despite examples of external scaffolding or exograms not being limited by the external scaffolding provided by language in fictional work. Richard Menary (8) argues that language is an example of central coupling and should thus be looked at as a prime contributor to cognitive processes. Clark and Chalmers (32) propose that language could be considered a central agent which enables the extension of the mind into, and onto, the outside world.

Although Robert Rupert (Rupert qtd. In Menary 325-328) agrees that language is a profound influence on cognitive processes and greatly affects the cognitive system, he argues that language is inherently fleeting and thus should not be considered an extension of the mind. Further he argues that the extended mind is built on what he calls dependence-reasoning where the mental processes depend on a particular external element, which in

turn make this external element an inherent component of the cognizing subject's thoughts. Although Rupert does acknowledge language-based inference, whether or not the external element is language or not, he argues it would be too unreliable to consider language as the source for a foundation of cognitive systems. In order to address this issue, he refers to the nontriviality clause of Wheeler and Clark. 'If an organism is coupled to the production of some significant, cognitive aspect of a cognitive process, then that cognitive process is extended.' (327) Rupert defines nontrivial in this context as interactions of reciprocal influence where the external element, or the two elements which are coupled, have an influence on each other, rather than one element being influenced by another. Yet when considering this definition of coupling as being central to cognitive systems, a monologue which affects the listener should not be considered as a cognitive system, despite the impact it might have on the subject. For this reason, Rupert proposes three possible approaches to content-dependence:

> (1) it might be that, in an important range of cases, external representations carry the contents of our thoughts (Houghton 1997); or (2) it could be that, in some cases, thoughts inherit the contents of external representations after which those thoughts are in some sense patterned; or weaker still, (3) it might be that thought content is determined by the structure of internal cognitive processes where the structure in question is shaped by the causal or temporal structure of external linguistic resources (even though content is not directly inherited from external, linguistic structures). (Rupert 335)

Since the second and third approaches are most relevant to this thesis, these will be discussed more in depth. Rupert posits that the second approach includes the thought processing using linguistic processes, despite these not being explicitly present. This corroborates the position of language-inference and proposes that external elements that engage with a subject produce cognitive processes which are always inherently linguistic. Rupert also argues that dependence would advocate the inclusion of many minds, seeing as the mind of an individual is a sum of experiences of not only that individual, but also of generations which have led to this individual and its specific cognitive processes. Although Rupert dismisses this second approach as reductionist reasoning since "cognitive science

has no use for cognitive systems that include the dead and decomposed" (Rupert 339), I argue that to dismiss the dead and decomposed as potential input to the extended mind is equally reductionist. Take for example Dorothy Richardson, whose work is still being read today, and although her personal extended mind is not available due to the fact that she cannot interact with her environment, her texts are still very present and are still able to inspire and evoke feelings and processes, despite her having died in 1957. The third approach discusses the causal effect external objects might have on the cognitive process, provided that the subject is already aware of the content of the external influence. The example Rupert proposes argues that, when hearing about electrons, the listener will only be able to develop a sense of what the subject is when having some given knowledge of the topic. Yet this approach can also be looked at in a broader sense, like finding similar patterns between mathematical equations and grammatical structures. (Rupert 325-345)

Dorothy Richardson

Childs describes Dorothy Richardson as a key figure who changed the way authors represent the mind and thoughts (84). Richardson's life work *Pilgrimage* is considered to be a significant contribution to the genre of modernism and because of her work she is considered to be an influential developer of the interior monologue technique. Although she spent a large amount of her literary energy working on *Pilgrimage*, she was a prolific author who produced multiple short stories, reviews, essays and other works. Her work has been largely ignored by critics, but the style she used corresponds to the style in *Pilgrimage*. Dorothy Richardson's style is described as extremely experimental, and she considered her own stories to be indefinitely unfinished and perpetually growing autonomously. Support for this can be found when looking at the various new publications of her work and seeing how these different editions are vastly different from each other. Trudi Tate argues that the characters portrayed in her short stories are notably decentered, have an open-endedness and cannot be defined by fixed meanings (Tate x-xi). Dorothy Richardson attempts and succeeds to present a fragmented whole through experimentation with punctuation and by disregarding a formal distinction between narration and speech (Childs 84; Tate x-xxxiii).

Analysis of Dorothy Richardson's short stories

Visit, first published in 1945

In the short story *Visit*, the focalisation the reader is introduced to is one of a child, Berry. Berry is on her way to stay with Great-aunt Stone with her sister Pug in Bilberry Hill. The extensions of the mind in *Visit* are present in the way Berry thinks about the world around her. When she and her sister Pug are on the train in the opening paragraph, Berry already feels as if the world she knew is being left behind, and even though her sister is with her, they are like strangers. "There is Pug, opposite. But not like she is at home. Like a stranger. Berry feels alone." (10). This could be considered an example of the embedded mind with the character attributing certain elements and characteristics to people depending on where they are. This is further supported by the acknowledgement that Berry on the train and Berry upon hearing the news do not share the exact same views and opinions on the same topic, leaving for Bilberry Hill:

> All the time it is coming nearer. Not like it was in the garden, when Mother said about going, and Berry and Pug had danced round the lawns singing Off to Philadelphy. Berry looks across at Pug and sees that she knows it is not the same. (10)

There are two distinct versions of both Berry and Pug in this excerpt, who behave differently depending on their environment. As with the previous example from the text, this one also does not show interaction with an object, but rather with a place, which would make it in concordance with the theory of the embodied mind.

A clearer example of either the embodied or the extended mind can be found in the following excerpt where the train has just taken off. "The wheels keep saying: Going-to, going-to, Bilberry Hill, Bilberry Hill, Bilberry Hill, Bilberry HILL." (10), and a few sentences on again "The wheels begin again, slowly. Aunt*ber*tha they say, Uncle*hen*ry, Uncle*al*bert, Greataunt*stone*" (10). An argument in favour of these excerpts being examples of the embodied mind could be made seeing how Berry's thoughts are influenced by the object she is interacting with. Berry's interior monologue is being altered to fall into a rhythmic

cadence with the wheels of the train. The sound and movement produced by the train in this case provide an exogram with which Berry engages, creating a cognitive process, following Rowlands' categorisation of mental processes. The external object and the thoughts of Berry have formed a coupled system. The reason why this can be classified as an example of a coupled system is because it has transformed from being present to available, as Rowlands put it. The compartment Berry and Pug are in is unknown to the reader, yet it is safe to assume that it contains some elements which are just not shared with the reader. These elements are present but not interacted with, which is indicative of how little importance they have for Berry. Instead, she focusses on the train and its movement, linking it to her destination and who she will meet there.

Despite the people she is about to visit, Berry is not looking forward to her visit to Bilberry Hill. This becomes clear from a number of passages:

> Another station and the guard comes and says: 'Next station, young ladies!' and Berry thanks him politely and looks at Pug as soon as he is gone, to try and feel happy. But Pug' face says there is no help. Home is gone, for three whole days. Berry stares at Pug, trying to think of something to make her say something instead of just sitting there with her pug-face, nose all screwed up, like looking out of the window when it rains on a holiday. (11)

From this passage it can be inferred that Berry is the oldest of the two sisters since she takes the responsibility to respond to the guard, yet she still looks at her sister to reassure her of the obviously negative emotions she is currently experiencing. Pug does not have any words of comfort and instead tries to act as if she does not share Berry's feelings. "'Watery-boughtery-*ceive*,' says Pug, and looks away, trying to show she does not care" (11). In terms of content these words are nonsensical, and it could be argued that it is because this statement has no meaning in and of its own, that it is an argument for why Pug tries to convey the idea that she does not care. Continuing this statement, Berry seems to think that Pug does care: "But she does care. She is thinking of the strange place and strangers. 'Great-aunt Stone won't say grace for *tea,*' says Berry." (11) These statements make clear that both Berry and Pug are feeling anxious about their trip. The people they are to meet are considered to be strangers despite the fact that

they are family. Further on in the short story, it also becomes clear that they have all met before:

> Every day, for every meal, someone has to get her to the table like this. Perhaps Uncle Albert always makes the same mistakes, making her angry. At home she clung on to the servants' arms and made little jokes as she came, and made funny faces at Pug and me to make us laugh. Aunt Bertha on a visit happy and polite. This is Aunt Bertha at home. Quite different. Angry like a little girl, and making Uncle Albert frightened. She knows I have seen, and is smiling at me now that she is sitting down; and I can't smile back. (14-15)

The narrator is also oblivious to the class and wealth difference between herself and her relatives. This difference between level of wealth can be inferred from the reference to the servant Aunt Bertha clings to when they are at Berry's home, whereas in her own home, Bertha does not have this luxury.

This excerpt further supports the statement that Berry and Pug are staying with family. What makes this excerpt relevant to this thesis however, is the apparent plurality of personalities different individual characters have. In this extract, Berry distinguishes two versions of Aunt Bertha. On the one hand, Berry sees Aunt Bertha at home, by which she means Berry's home, where Aunt Bertha clings to servants' arms, while on the other hand there is angry Aunt Bertha who is in her own home. How Berry distinguishes between these two different versions is problematic, since she refers to both these Aunts' position regarding to 'home'. Yet home in the context of the kind Aunt Bertha means Berry's home, whereas the angry Aunt Bertha is at her house in Bilberry Hill. This insinuates that Berry up until this point had only one view of her Aunt. Already on the train ride, Berry's anxiousness could indicate that she was aware of potential differences she might encounter in this strange place, yet the people would be the same. Berry is now confronted with the fact that her Uncles and Aunts have lives of their own wherein they function, which contradicts her earlier ideas of them only having existed when they came to visit her at her house. Instead of seeing this as single individuals acting differently depending on where they are, Berry instead chooses to create two different people in order to fit the image she has of them. What Berry does here is observe how Aunt Bertha in this case shows an example of the

embodied mind, according to Berry. Aunt Bertha acts in a specific way when interacting within the scaffolding of her own home. When she sees Berry seeing her, she adapts her behaviour accordingly. Berry however is not able to respond to this appropriately according to general protocols of decorum. Despite the fact that we as readers are not offered insight into the mind of Aunt Bertha, this observed behaviour is indicative of the embodied mind.

The narrator has difficulty with distinguishing between different versions of people as well as objects. When looking at the importance of specific rooms and objects in rooms, a clear example of the embodied mind can be found as well. On the one hand there is the chair Great-aunt Stone occupies, which Berry feels dominates the entire room:

> It [the room] is low and small and musty, sending away the summer. Aunt Bertha is there, twisted round in her chair, to welcome. While Berry kisses her she sees home and the mornings with Aunt Bertha, … and give your Great-Auntie a kiss, and the little room is full of Great-aunt Stone sitting in a low armchair with no arms. (13-14)

As can be inferred from the paragraph, it is summer outside, and this has positive connotations to Berry. This room disperses that feeling, and an argument for the reason why this is could be the fact that it is being described as low, small and musty, yet when Great-aunt Stone is mentioned, she starts taking up the entire room. Later on in the story, the reader is presented with extra information regarding this chair:

> Black darkness. Taking away the walls. You can only tell it is the same room by the musty smell. All the things are in it like they were when the candle was there. The Chair. No, no, NO! I *won't* see the Chair. 'Pug,' very quietly, just to show she is there, even if she is asleep. When the colours are gone, the Chair is there, inside her eyes, with Great-uncle Stone sitting in it. Dead. Like Eliza said they found him. But with certainly a gold watch-chain. Look at the watch-chain. All gold and shining, like it was when he was going about the house and going out. Going to Wesleen Chapel. But one day he couldn't go out. He came upstairs and sat in that Chair. For ten years. (17)

Berry appears adamant to be confronted with the chair as little as possible, having nightmares about it. Whereas in the earlier paragraph it appeared to be Great-aunt Stone who was exerting influence on the room, from this paragraph it becomes clear that the chair poses more of a problem than the person occupying it. The chair becomes a personification of the death of a relative, and death and decay in general, and it thus becomes part of a coupling for Berry's mind. This chair, and by extension the image of the person sitting on it, forms an external structure which influences Berry's cognitive activity. Through the focalisation presented in this short story, the interior of Berry is known to the reader. The cognitive processes exert themselves externally through Berry's show of emotions. It is for this reason I would argue that this chair is an example of the embodied mind. Although one of the purest forms of the extended mind would be an object in which cognitive processes are stored and which an individual could carry around at all times, this chair still serves as an exogram that engages with Berry's mind. This coupling between the object and the mind evokes the multiple thoughts in Berry which have not happened. While her cognitive processes are influenced by experiences and emotional associations with particular events, the chair also provides insight into particular possibilities that are related to the events which effectively occurred. Berry's interactions in this case revolving entirely around this object which in its current form is, and will be, fixed in place permanently. She is not able to physically bring this object with her. This physical transportation is not necessary because, even in a metaphysical form it is still the object located in a fixed special area that exerts influence over her in her dreams. Because Berry is a child, she does not have the life experience adults have. I argue that it is partly because of this reason that her cognitive processes extend themselves into the realm of the metaphysical. It can be argued that, since the current status of the relationship between Berry and the chair is based on experiences and potentialities rather than on predetermined biological neurological components and relationships, this exogram is an example of the embodied mind.

Sunday, first published in 1919

The story *Sunday* is written from the point of view of an unknown narrator who is only referred to as "I" and with the focalisation remaining the same throughout. It is also divided

into two different parts with the first part taking place in the home of the narrator and another character, Josephine, and the second part is about a visit to Grannie at her house.

The first two sentences of *Sunday* already show an example of the embodied mind. "I looked up and saw Josephine cutting cake. Until that moment every moment of Sunday had been perfect." (25) Josephine does not actually say anything in this entire story, yet the narrator appears to deduce some meaning from the silence, Josephine's presence and how she acts. As becomes clear from the rest of the paragraph, the narrator thought the day was perfect and was blissfully observing the world. Then as soon as she observes Josephine cutting cake her mood shifts from a positive to a negative outlook. Yet as stated earlier, Josephine does not actually speak, and I would argue that it is actually not Josephine but Josephine cutting the cake that is the example of the embodied mind. As becomes clear from the following excerpt:

> […] Josephine standing in the way bent over the cake, looking exactly like Grannie as she pursed her face to drive the knife through. I stayed stupidly looking, not able to get back until the cake was cut, and although she had not noticed me she reminded me in her spitefully unconscious vindictive spoil-sport that it was my turn to go to Grannie's. There was no need to say it. (25)

This paragraph confirms that it is not Josephine that is the source of negative emotions, but rather it is the version of Josephine cutting the cake that closely resembles Grannie and solicits cognitive processes in the mind of the narrator. The narrator does not directly interact with the action, yet their observation alone is sufficient to create a cognitive process. In line with Rowlands' (22) description of cognitive processes, the cutting of the cake is an external influence without which this alternative world would not have been known to the narrator and the reader. It is important to make a distinction between the cognitive processes that are the result from the interaction between the mind of the narrator and the external object, i.e. the cake, and the consequences these cognitive processes has on the outside world. As can be inferred from the use of words such as "spitefully unconscious vindictive spoil-sport", the thoughts which are the results of these cognitive processes are largely negative. Much like the chair in *Visit* stood for death to Berry,

Josephine cutting the cake stands for, but is not the source of, the negative emotions the narrator feels. Instead, it is the memories the reader does not know of.

A recurring theme in the short stories and the collection in general is a visit to somewhere the narrator does not feel like going. In the second part of *Sunday* the narrator goes to visit Grannie. The reader gets to know the thoughts of the narrator and during the greeting it can be posited that Grannie herself acts like an exogram with which the narrator interacts:

> When I had secured the speaking end she said, how are you, my dear? Very well, thank you- how are *you*, I shouted slowly. The visit had begun; some of it had gone. Eh she quavered out of the years. If she could see into the middle of my head she would see the lawn of her old garden and the stone vase of geraniums and calceolarias in the bright sunlight, and would stop. Her tall figure tottering jerkily under its large black shawl, draped dress, the lapels of her lace cap, the bony oval of her face, the unconscious stare of her faded blue eyes as she moved and stood about the garden all *meant*. I was a ghost meaning nothing, then and now. She sat wearing the same Sunday clothes but her eyes were on my sliding silence. (27)

The narrator says that if Grannie could have an insight in the inner workings of the mind of the narrator, she would see herself as a much younger woman, the way the narrator remembers, or wants to remember her. What this paragraph illustrates is that despite the significant input the external world has on the cognitive processes of the narrator, these particular processes occur entirely internally without any active interaction with the environment. The thoughts of the narrator are obscured to anyone but herself and the reader, and it is unclear even whether they are memories or fantasies. One interpretation could be that the existence of Grannie in tandem with the visual perception of Grannie is sufficient to be able speak of the embodied mind. Although there is no active interaction between Grannie and the narrator in this paragraph, the narrator's cognitive process is influenced by the perception of Grannie as she is at that moment. Since there still is a degree of interaction between the perceived subject and the narrator, the resulting cognitive process can still be considered to be an example of the embodied mind. Because of the lack of input Grannie offers however, this instance of the embodied mind occurs

entirely internally. Regardless of the fact that for either of these interpretations the outside world provides the framework around which they are built, it is important to note that despite this external framework, cognition can often still be completely internal.

Much like in *Visit*, the narrator here also equates pieces of furniture with feelings of death. “I looked about the room. The furniture was death-soaked. It knew only of lives lived fearing death. I looked at Grannie again. … The loud beating of my heart filled space.” (28) The furniture in these sentences evokes thoughts and cognitive processes relating to death within the narrator. It is interesting to observe that she herself did not want to have these thoughts, as the following sentence demonstrates: “Lord. Lord Christ. Mr Christ. Jesus Christ, Esquire. I had thought the thought … Below the joys and wonders of my life was that. Me.” (28) It is obvious that she is ashamed of the thoughts she had, yet she regards them as examples and manifestations of her true internal cognitive processes: “I sat twisting my fingers together longing to get back into the incessant wonders and joys away from the room that had seen my truth.” (29). The narrator here appears to be unable to differentiate between different versions of herself, much in the same way as Berry was not. As stated in the beginning of this story, the narrator does not look forward to the visit and when something comes along to remind her of it, that action, person or object takes the position of the resentment and trepidation. On this day it was Josephine’s cutting of the cake which fulfilled that role. The cake serves as a symbol which represents Grannie and her significance to the narrator. It can be said that an entire visit to Grannie can be seen as an example of the embodied mind since simply the prospect of a visit is enough to illicit a reaction in the narrator. For that reason, it is safe to assume that the embodied mind can come to be because of the interaction between the mind and an external actor which superficially does not seem to be related to the subject of the cognitive process at all.

Ordeal, first published in 1930

The short story *Ordeal* follows the days and thoughts of an elderly lady, Fan, who is dropped off at a nursing home, where she is supposed to spend her final days. Her first impression of the nursing home is that the people who work there do their best to entertain her. One of

the ways in which the nurses aimed to keep her entertained was through the decoration of the room she would be staying in:

> It had created for her a miniature past in this house, and when presently she was shut up alone in her room, undressing, she did not feel a stranger there. The room had stated itself while she was talking with the sister and nurse, and was now a known room. It seemed long ago that Agatha had gone away through the hall. She had thought in advance that her sense of personal life must cease when she entered the door of the nursing home. But instead it was intensified, as if, brought up against a barrier from behind which no certain future poured into it, her life flowed back upon itself, embarrassing her with its vivid palpitation. (69)

Fan had anticipated the room to be nothing like she had known, seeing how she was in an environment completely different from normal. Yet as the final sentence in this passage shows, the room evoked in her positive feelings of the life that she left behind, making her realise just what a life she has led. Prior to entering the room, Fan had had a preconceived notion of both what the room would look like, and what the room would mean to her. This metaphysical version of the room that she had created did not correspond to her actual experience and instead the physical room acts as a mediator. It could be argued that because of this function the actual room has, it can be considered to be an example of the embodied mind, seeing how it elicits feelings she experienced in her past, and it encompasses all of her life.

Another example of the embodied mind can be found in the following passage: “Very carefully she arranged her hair, firmly putting in extra pins, being back while she did so within the final moments of arranging herself for parties in her girlhood.” (70) Although the pins she is using are not the actual pins she used when she was younger, they still act as artefacts of the embodied mind because they mentally transport Fan back to when she was younger. The pins themselves are not designed to hold or replicate structures and formatting of cognitive processes, yet as Sutton proposed, this is not required for something to be considered to be an extension of the mind. It is unclear whether or not it is the act of putting them in that leads to these emotions and feelings, or if looking at them would lead

to the same results. Regardless, both of these interpretations could still be argued to be manifestations of the embodied mind.

A recurring phenomenon in this short story is that Fan is thrown back into her past experiences through interaction with external objects or people, examples of which are the room or the pin. As these examples indicate, Fan appears to be pleased with being thrown back in time. This can be inferred by seeing how Fan only experiences the depicted introspective thoughts as predominantly positive. This is further corroborated by the following excerpt: “She was severed even from Tom. With a deep, blissful sigh she felt all the tensions of her life relax. She was back again in the freedom of her own identity, in pre-marriage freedom.” (72) Although she was severed “even” from Tom, Fan experiences this as positive, indicating that she, again, enjoys experiencing the feeling of her own identity which appears to exist exclusively in pre-marriage freedom. What this paragraph shows is how Fan herself makes the distinction between herself as an older woman, and herself before her marriage, and the freedom that came with that state of being.

This distinction is presented in the story through the act of smoking. Her habit of smoking and her active acknowledgement of the consequence smoking has on a cognitive level both serve as actors which facilitate the embodied mind. This act is perhaps the most explicit instance of embodied cognition in this short story. When Fan lights this cigarette she is thrown back into the past and for the first time this experience is negative:

> The act of smoking threw her back to the minute before last. It was occupation, distraction, waste of priceless opportunity, of time. No, of something that was more than time! It was cutting her off from her deep life. It was unnecessary, because now she was back in her pre-smoking state of existence, and it had brought her to the present surface of life, away from the state of being into which she had just plunged. (73)

After this paragraph she goes on to extinguish the cigarette, stating that it is only a memory. In this passage Fan distinguished between deep life and the surface life. It is the act of smoking which elicits interaction between the mind and the object, evoking cognitive processes. The first sentence of this extract explicitly states the exact workings of how the

cigarette serves as the embodied mind. As with the pins, in accordance with what Sutton (194) said, the cigarette here does not contain any textual information or resembles any similarities to other cognitive structures and processes. The cigarette serves as an exogram, rather than an engram. Cigarettes do not hold particular pieces of information in and of their own, instead the cigarette serves as a facilitator for the embodied mind through the interaction between the mind and the object. Fan herself explicitly states that the cognitive processes which result from this interaction are memories. Yet the act of smoking does not only transport Fan to her pre-smoking state of existence as she describes it, in a way it also signifies an escape. This is supported by Fan stating that smoking cuts her off from her deep life. As soon as she extinguishes her cigarette, she is able to divert her attention to the present, dismissing the cognitive processes as memories. This also supports the idea that the cigarette here fulfills the function of the embodied mind, since the cognitive processes disappear as soon as the cigarette is removed from the picture.

Conclusion

After analysing the three short stories and the protagonists' interactions with specific objects and actions, I argue that the embodied mind is more dominant in the stories, with a few examples of the extended mind also occuring. Dorothy Richardson's depiction of characters in different stages of life provides an insight in what she felt were characteristic traits of characters in those particular age groups. It can be argued that the characters who are on the opposite ends of the age spectrum use the embodied mind the most, but in different ways. Fan engages with external agents to reminisce about the past, with her entire interior monologue focusing on the life she had led and her current life. In an attempt to be careful not to tread into ageist descriptions of old age, I assert her being of advanced age provided her with more life experience. As the examples mentioned above show, these life experiences provide a framework which allows the narrator in the story *Sunday* to engage with her own mind through multiple different external agents. Berry on the other hand, being a child, lacks the multitude of life experiences Fan has. Yet, as the examples from the story *Visit* show, Berry still shows multiple uses of the embodied mind, despite this lack of past experiences. A potential reason for this could be that specific events evoked significant emotions which might be more difficult for a child to put into perspective. Because of this, Berry interacts with external agents and uses the embodied mind to not only reflect on these events, but she also attempts to create cognitive processes in fictional characters that are triggered by interaction with external objects. A potential explanation for the similarities between these two might be the view Richardson had of the child's limited attention span, or a more impressionable mind, while the older woman has enough life experience for an objective look at life, yet this is entirely speculative.

The narrator in *Sunday* shows the most entirely internal cognitive processes. There is a significant influence external actors exert on the narrator, yet the cognitive processes are made up almost entirely from internal processes. The reason for this could be that the narrator has more agency over her life than Fan or Berry. When the narrator does appear to show instances of the use of the embodied mind, the cognitive processes eventually lead to Grannie. This, as the text fragments from the story show, holds negative connotations to the narrator. For this reason, we might assume that the narrator actively attempts to avoid

engaging with the embodied mind. This is not to say that this is the result of the heightened degree of agency on this narrator's part.

The differences between physical capabilities are a major difference between the characters. These could be related to their position within the social structure in which they find themselves. Fan and Berry also resemble each other in terms of their agency and self-reliance. Where Berry, as a child, is not allowed to hold complete responsibility over her actions and choices, as supported by the examples found in the text, Fan is in a similar position at the nursing home where a lot of her decisions are made for her. Because of these limitations on the characters from outside, they revert to a more cerebral approach to life and search for solace in their own mind through the extension thereof. Where the two characters differ is in their perception of this situation. Berry appears to be quite oblivious to their agency being taken away where Fan feels liberated and empowered in the nursing home. This might be due to the fact that Berry is in full possession of at least her bodily functions, and because of this looks at the world as it having more possibilities, while Fan has accepted the fact that a lot of things will not happen and only looks at what has been, since there will be no change in that regard. It is interesting to note that the older you get, and assuming a progression of age implies a regression of control over bodily functions, the more inclined the characters are to use extended rather than embodied cognition. It appears that the younger a character is, the more they look at what could be. This could be because of a lack of a frame of reference or experience. Instead, they interact with the external world and see what could be rather than what is or was. The older a character gets, the more likely they engage with the external world in order to engage with their own past.

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