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Socio-psychological barriers and bridges to peace

political discourse analysis of the Israeli and Palestinian speeches to the United Nations General Assembly between 1988 and 2016

Promotor: Prof. dr. Walter Weyns

Medebeoordelaar: Prof. dr. Gert Verschraegen

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Eveline Nieuwveld

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Abstract

Het Israëlisch-Palestijns conflict is 'intractable', 'complex', 'multi-layered' en 'insoluble' genoemd. Veel van de Israëlische en Palestijnse narratieven bestonden al voor de oprichting van de Verenigde Naties. Aan de Israëlische zijde van het conflict is een opkomst van studies die de narratieven en metaforen analyseren die ingebed zijn in de Israëlische maatschappelijke discourse. Echter, het Palestijnse onderzoek op dit gebied is marginaal en comparatieve studies die beide zijden vergelijken is vrijwel onbestaand. Dit gebrek aan onderzoek wordt in de thesis aangekaart met de volgende onderzoeksvraag: *Welke socio-psychologische barrières en bruggen naar vrede kunnen geïdentificeerd worden in toespraken door Israëlische en Palestijnse leiders aan de United Nations General Assembly tussen 1988 en 2016?*

Een politieke discourse analyse met een 'discourse dynamics approach' was uitgevoerd met behulp van kwalitatieve softwareprogramma's *NVivo* en *Leximancer*. De analyse toonde aan dat metaforen en thema's die voorheen beschouwd werden als typisch Israëlisch, effectief prominenter bleken te zijn in de Palestijnse toespraken. In contradictie met de bestaande literatuur was dat Israëlische 'cultural codes' niet terug gevonden werden in de toespraken aan de Verenigde Naties. De 'extend a hand for peace' metafoor, die in bestaande literatuur als Israëlisch wordt beschouwd, is veel frequenter gebruikt door de Palestijnse leiders. Bovendien bleken Palestijnse leiders in hun toespraken vaker te refereren naar veiligheidszorgen dan de Israëlische leiders terwijl Israël zogezegd een 'obsessie' zou hebben met veiligheid.

Sleutelwoorden: socio-psychologische barrières, vrede, political discourse analysis, metaforen, Israëlisch-Palestijnse conflict, United Nations General Assembly, toespraken

Acronyms

CCDA	Cultural approach to Critical Discourse Analysis
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
EOC	Ethos of Conflict
GPI	Global Peace Index (measures negative peace)
IEP	Institute for Economics and Peace
PDA	Political Discourse Analysis
PPI	Positive Peace Index (measures positive peace)
UN	United Nations
UNBIS	United Nations Bibliographic Information System
UNCLOS	United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly

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1 Introduction

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been called '*complex*', '*multi-layered*', '*insoluble*' and '*intractable*' (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Eisenberg & Caplan, 2010; Sherwood, 2013). The Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat called the conflict the oldest problem of the United Nations. Furthermore, many of the Israeli and Palestinian narratives surrounding the conflict predate the United Nations¹. This thesis will argue that language used by Israeli and Palestinian leaders has the potential to strengthen socio-psychological barriers that prevent an ongoing dialogue between the adversaries.

The topic of this thesis is inspired by peace research done by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). Firstly, the research by IEP will be briefly explained, followed by the research topic and an overview of the existing literature. Secondly, the research question that will guide the thesis will be formulated. And lastly, the introduction will conclude with an overview of the structure of the thesis.

1.1 Institute for Economics and Peace – positive and negative peace

The IEP is the global think tank that developed the Global Peace Index (GPI) that ranks countries according to their peacefulness (IEP, 2015a). Israel scores low on the index (148 from 162). The reason for the low score is because the index measures peace as the absence of violence and therefore ignores the presence of peace. For example, a country can have good institutions to promote and ensure peace but nevertheless experience ongoing violent clashes with others. To avoid confusion, Galtung separated peace into two definitions: he defined the absence of violence as '*negative peace*' and the presence of peace as '*positive peace*' (Galtung, 1969). Positive peace can be further explained as the attitudes, institutions and structures of countries that are likely to contribute to a more peaceful society (Galtung, 1969; IEP, 2015). Because the GPI only measures negative peace, the IEP addressed the measurement gap with

¹ This is especially true for the Israeli (Jewish) meta-narrative of the 'Jewish people' as described in the Bible. A meta-narrative is a term by Auerbach (2010) based on Lyotard's Grand Narrative.

a Positive Peace Index (PPI) in 2015². The PPI statistically measures the attitudes, institutions and structures of countries that are likely to contribute to a more peaceful society (IEP, 2015b). The index thus gives an overview of the existing ground for peace in quantitative terms³.

Interestingly, Israel is ranked significantly higher ($p < .0001$) on the PPI compared to the GPI (37 from 162). The difference or gap between the two indexes for Israel is 111 ranks (148-37=111). Israel has the largest gap between the two indexes compared to other countries measured by the IEP. Israel is followed by Laos with a gap of 98 ranks between the two indexes, but in the opposite direction of Israel, Laos scores high (41) on the GPI (negative peace) and low (135) on the PPI (positive peace).

If the IEP included the Palestine under 'Israel', is not further explained in the report of 2015. The initial research question was: how do Israel and Palestine score on the GPI and PPI when separated and does the gap between positive and negative peace increase or decrease over time for the two parties?⁴ To answer this question, the correct method would be to replicate IEP's research and split 'Israel' into 'Israel' and the 'Palestine'. This is a complicated task, as the data used by IEP is not freely available and splitting the data up into the two territories would not always be possible due to the aggregated data collection. Secondly, what is considered Palestine has changed over time. And thirdly, IEP's focus is mainly on macro level of national attitudes, perceptions and structures while other important elements for researching peace in conflict situations are the peace negotiations.

According to the anthropologist and sociologist Michael Agar (1996), peace research '*has moved from a concern with macro-variables that describe conflict cases down toward the actual details of negotiation processes*' (p. 424). Following Agar, this thesis takes a step further and will argue that researchers are now taking all discourse by political figures involved in a

2 As Steve Killelea, the founder of the IEP, states: '*when you want to understand what creates lasting peace you are not gonna learn from studying conflict*' (Killelea, 2015, minute 1:40).

3 More specifically, the PPI summarizes in one score how stable the circumstances are for peace to endure in a certain country by comparing: free flow of information, government services, economic conditions, distribution of resources, acceptance of the rights of others, relations with neighbouring countries, levels of human capital and low levels of corruption (IEP, 2015b).

4 In the latest GPI release by the IEP in June 2016, 'Palestine' was included. Palestine scores slightly lower (3 ranks) on the GPI compared to Israel (IEP, 2016). The PPI of 2016 has not been released to date.

peace process as influencing the outcomes of the peace process. Language is not only shaped by reality but also actively shapes reality (Halliday, 1992). Language in the political discourse might not only influence the outcomes of a peace process but actually decide whether there is a peace process at all.

1.2 Socio-psychological barriers to peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Most of the potential barriers to a peaceful dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian leaders can be categorized as strategic, structural or socio-psychological barriers (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2010). Strategic barriers involve security risks, unwillingness to make territorial concessions and postponing negotiations to maximize potential gains (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2010). Structural barriers arise from certain political structures, and institutional and bureaucratic constraints (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2010). Socio-psychological barriers are embedded in national narratives, collective memories and interpretations of events (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2010).

According to Israeli scholars, *'the lack of a peaceful resolution'* to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can largely be attributed *'to the functioning of very powerful socio-psychological barriers that inhibit and impede progress'* (Halperin, Oren, & Bar-Tal, 2010, p. 28). Sociological and psychological barriers *'promote the importance of absolute values – justice, fairness and equality – and undermine willingness to make concessions, to compromise, or to take risks'* (Bar-Siman-Tov 2010 p. 17). The *'pillars'* of socio-psychological barriers are functional societal beliefs (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013). These beliefs are necessary for the society in conflict to survive hardship, deal with stressful situations and give the world around them meaning even when relief of their situation does not seem plausible on the short term (Bar-Tal, 2014; Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). Functional beliefs are supported by narratives, which are in turn based on, and inspired by, functional beliefs. Analysing how metaphors and the term 'peace' is used in the political discourse can uncover narratives (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010a). Narratives strengthen functional beliefs of societies in conflict and therefore increase the socio-psychological barrier to allow for the story of the adversary to claim an existence in their reality. By creating awareness among people of their psychological bias in information filtering due to functional beliefs, researchers found that *'openness to [the] adversary's narrative'* increased in an experiment conducted with Israeli Jewish and Israeli Palestinian participants (Nasie, Bar-Tal, Pliskin, Nahhas, & Halperin, 2014, p. 1549). This indicates that there is great potential and

relevance to analysing metaphors and the associated narratives that are supporting barriers to peace. The use of metaphors by adversaries can also contribute to the process of reconciliation because conversation partners can slowly come to an agreement by using each other's metaphors and making adjustments (Cameron, 1999; 2007). Thus, the way metaphors are used in discourse surrounding conflicts can divide and unite parties.

1.3 Research gap

For the Israeli side of the conflict there has been an emergence over the past three decades of sociological, psychological, linguistic and anthropological research regarding the use of language and barriers to peace (Auerbach, 2010; Bar-Siman-Tov, 2010; Bar-Tal, 2014; Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Gavriely-Nuri, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2012a, 2012b, 2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2016; Gavriely-Nuri, 2009; Halperin et al., 2010; Halperin & Sharvit, 2015; Nasie et al., 2014; Reykowski, 2015; Tzoreff, 2010). For the Palestinian side this field is still under developed (Baukhol, 2015; Gavriely-Nuri, 2010b; Jawad, 2006). Unexpectedly, research comparing the two sides considering psychological and sociological barriers is virtually inexistent (Baukhol, 2015). Most Israeli researchers prefer to focus on a culture they are familiar with (Bar-Siman-Tov, 2010; Gavriely-Nuri, 2012a) while the Palestinian researchers do not have access to an institutional framework and resources comparable to the Israelis (Haidar & Zureik, 1987; Sowula, 2015). A comparative study that illuminates how metaphors are connected to socio-psychological barriers to peace for both the Israeli and Palestinian side, is thus missing from the literature. Following from this, the research question that will guide this thesis is; *What socio-psychological barriers and bridges to peace can be identified in the discourse of Israeli and Palestinian leaders?*

1.4 Structure thesis

The first part of this thesis will briefly review the existing literature on peace, reconciliation and the Israeli-Palestinian peace discourse. This will inform the methods and subsequently shape the results. The thesis will then demonstrate that the political discourse of Israeli and Palestinian leaders refers to socio-psychological barriers and bridges to peace. In conclusion, directions for further comparative research that reviews the use of metaphors in the broader Israeli and Palestinian discourse will be outlined.

2 Literature review

The literature review is divided into three parts in order to position the topic of this thesis in the existing frameworks. Firstly, the focus on socio-psychological barriers will be further explained. Secondly, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be positioned as an *'intractable conflict'* and *'identity conflict'*. And thirdly, the literature on discourse analysis with a focus on peace and reconciliation will be reviewed. The third part consists of three parts, namely; 1) the analysis of 'peace' as used in political discourse; 2) the use of discourse analysis to uncover barriers to peace and; 3) Israeli and Palestinian socio-psychological barriers to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

2.1 Socio-psychological barriers to peace

There is a wealth of research on barriers to conflict resolution. However, when narrowing the search to *socio-psychological* barriers, the number decreases vastly and the key scholar is the Israeli social psychologist, Daniel Bar-Tal.⁵ Intractable conflicts in Bar-Tal's definition are not necessarily insoluble, but involve such barriers that *'some people (or many of them) have lost their hope for finding its satisfactory solution'* (Reykowski, 2015, p. 11). The Israeli-Palestinian conflict started as a claim by two national movements to the same territory, but according to Reykowski, was *'not mere a conflict of interests'* (p. 11). Fundamental values and existential needs were involved from the beginning of the conflict. In order to transform an intractable conflict into a tractable one, the socio-psychological infrastructure supporting the conflict and keeping it alive must be altered. Reykowski calls this *'an "unfreezing" of the existing system of conflict related beliefs (...) that belong to the ethos of conflict'* (Reykowski, 2015, p.12).⁶

⁵ In the preface of *The Social Psychology of Intractable Conflicts*, Bar-Tal is celebrated by his successors as 'one of the most influential scholars of intractable conflicts' (Halperin & Sharvit, 2015, p. v).

⁶ The ethos of conflict (EOC) is a theory developed by Bar-Tal and the majority of his research is about the Israeli population's beliefs regarding their conflict and society. Bar-Tal considers EOC as a *'relatively stable worldview'* that allows people to *'organize and comprehend the prolonged context of conflict in which they live and to act toward its preservation'* (Bar-Tal et al., 2012, p. 42). EOC serves as *'a major socio-psychological barrier to peace building'* (Bar-Tal et al., 2012, p.43). According to Bar-Tal, a better understanding of the ethos of conflict ultimately means better understanding how to build peace (Bar-Tal et al., 2012; Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005).

The prevalence of socio-psychological structures in the Israeli and Palestinian society cause Auerbach (2010) to frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an *'identity conflict'* as opposed to a *'material conflict'*. An identity conflict is a *'conflict in which at least one side sees the national identity of the other side as a threat, or (...) as a danger to its independent national identity'* (Auerbach, 2010, p. 100). According to Auerbach, identity conflicts are *'anchored in opposing meta-narratives and national narratives, and are therefore difficult to resolve'* (Auerbach, 2010, p. 100).⁷ Meta-narratives are the *'super-stories'* that Auerbach references to Lyotard's Grand narratives. Meta-narratives establish *'the national identity of each side in an identity conflict and are very hard to modify'* (Auerbach, 2010, p.103).

Discourse analysis is often used as tool to uncover narratives. Nevertheless, as Schöffner and Wenden (1995) indicate, in the field of peace studies, discourse analysis is underrepresented. Hoffman and Hawkins (2015) agree that although the acknowledgment of links between communication and peace are not new, *'academic efforts (...) focus primarily on the links between communication and conflict, rather than on peace'* (p. 1).

2.2 Researching peace discourse

Use of ambiguous concepts such as peace are scrutinized in the academic discourse for being *'an empty idol'* (Biletzki, 2007, p. 352). Likewise, the founder of Peace Studies, Johan Galtung, writes about peace in particular that few *'words are so often used and abused'* and continues to explain that *'peace' serves as a means of obtaining verbal consensus'* because *'it is hard to be all-out against peace'* (Galtung, 1969, p. 167). Instead of being an end in itself, peace becomes a mean in the political discourse. But as Galtung writes, what *'happens when 'peace' itself, that is to say, the word, the term, the concept of 'peace', becomes a means? And the following question is, of course, a means to what?'* (Webel & Galtung, 2007, p. 353). Bar-Tal and Teichman (2005) explain that in *'order to receive support, rival parties try to convince the international community that they are pursuing peace as their ultimate goal'* (p. 65). To argue their case, peace negotiators *'use arguments to gain information, to establish procedures, to*

⁷ However, as Auerbach continues, *'the gap between the two sides can be reduced by distinguishing between meta-narratives and national narratives'* (Auerbach, 2010, p. 99). Auerbach writes that distinguishing between the two will help *'lowering expectations for the revision of contradictory meta-narratives'* and instead will allow for focusing *'on efforts to bridge clashing national narratives'* (Auerbach, 2010, p. 99).

modify their adversary's perceptions and expectations, and to shape favorable outcomes' (Walker, 1990, p. 98). Thus, analysing their arguments as strategies to achieve a certain goal can shed light on the underlying intentions of a peace speech. There are several theoretical frameworks to analyse discourse, in the next section the ones relevant to this thesis will be discussed.

2.2.1 Discourse Analysis

Discourse is defined by Van Dijk as *'language use'* and discourse analysis is then the *'study of talk and text in context'* (Van Dijk, 1997, p.3). The main goal of discourse analysis in general is to *'provide a critical understanding of how language is deployed'* (Jacobs, 2010, p.352).⁸ After a brief discussion of two varieties of discourse analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis and Political Discourse Analysis, the tools for discourse analysis will be reviewed.

2.2.1.1 Critical and Political Discourse Analysis

With Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), Fairclough (1995) took the politics of language a step further by viewing it as a potential mean to maintain or enforce inequality. As Fairclough writes, the *'primary focus of CDA is on the effect of power relations and inequalities in producing social wrongs, and in particular on discursive aspects of power relations and inequalities'* (Fairclough, 1995, p.7). Peace scholars such as Anita Wenden are largely influenced by Fairclough. According to Wenden language contributes to the development and persistence of ideologies and *'are expressed in text and talk'*, it is therefore *'essential that we learn to look critically at discourse as a means of identifying these ideologies that challenge the achievement of a culture of peace'* (Wenden, 2003, p. 171).

However, as Cobb identified, the *'sharp dichotomy between passive (objects) and active (subjects)'* that the theory of CDA proposes, fails *'to provide accounts of action that can simultaneously describe persons both as agents and as inscribed into a unique moment in social*

⁸ Influences that led to many different varieties of discourse analysis were philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michel Foucault and J.L. Austin (Chouliaraki, 2008; Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012). They and many others with them, brought about a more political view on language and uncovered the inherent link between power and knowledge (Foucault & Gordon, 1980; Van Dijk, 1993). What these influential thinkers clarified was that language is not a neutral medium to describe reality, but rather actively contributes to the construction of reality; *'language has the power to shape our consciousness'* (Halliday, 1992, p. 145).

life' (Cobb, 1994, p.136). One of the requirements for using CDA is to address '*social wrongs in their discursive aspects and possible ways of righting or mitigating them*' (Fairclough, 1995, p. 8). As the aim of this thesis is to identify socio-psychological barriers and bridges to peace instead of '*social wrongs*' which require a passive recipient and active perpetrator (Cobb, 1994), CDA is not an appropriate method to use. However, Giddens (1981) notion of the '*duality of structure*' that Fairclough used as an inspiration will shape this thesis and subsequently the methodology section. Fairclough explained Giddens' notion further as the idea that actions at 'micro' level '*can in no sense be regarded as of merely "local" significance to the situations in which they occur, for any and every action contributes to the reproduction of "macro" structures*' (Fairclough, 1995, p. 8). In other words, language is both '*socially shaped*' and '*socially constituent*' (Fairclough, 1995, p. 135).

Another type of discourse analysis as proposed by Van Dijk (1997) is Political Discourse Analysis (PDA). PDA focuses on political discourse, although what is considered political discourse, and what is not, remains undetermined (Van Dijk, 1997, p. 1). Van Dijk specified the object of study for PDA as '*discourse structures*' (Van Dijk, 1997, p. 23). Discourse structures consist of several elements⁹ that were divided by Wenden (2003) into macro and micro linguistics. In the next section, Wenden's division of macro and micro linguistics will be further explained by exploring research conducted at both levels.

2.2.1.2 Linguistic macro structures

Linguistic macro structures of a text (or talk), are structures that arise from the content of a text as a whole. These macro structures are decisions by the author on the structure of their text, the kind of information presented on the topic and the scope of identification (Wenden, 2003, p. 172). The structure of the text or talk is the *discourse schema* which '*defines the order of the information presented in a discourse and, therefore, it can be used to highlight what is*

⁹ Discourse structures defined by Van Dijk (1997) are: topic, textual schemata (arguments, stories, new reports), local semantics (coherence, indirectness, presuppositions), lexicon and syntax (lexical choices), rhetoric (repetition, metaphor, deletion), expression structures (volume, pitch, intonation) and speech acts (pause, formality etc.).

important or relevant' (Wenden, 2003, p. 173). Additionally, *text schema categories* refer to *'the kind of information that will be selected to develop the topic of the discourse and so to shape the propositions'* (Wenden, 2003, p. 174). And the third macro strategy to present propositions is the *scope of identification* that defines how authors see themselves: *'as a part of the whole human family or of certain nation groups'* (Wenden, 2003, p. 174).¹⁰

2.2.1.3 Linguistic micro structures

Linguistic micro structures are structures that function within the macro structure and entail aspects at sentence or even word level. When analysing micro-structures, the researcher focuses on metaphors, arguments, and lexical choices. A word is a metaphor when it is used referring to a different meaning than the literal meaning (Pragglejaz Group, 2007). This does not necessarily entail a poetic usage of words; metaphors are often used in our day-to-day conversations (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Take for instance the question: 'do you see what I mean?'. The verb 'seeing' in this question is not used literally, as we cannot 'see' what someone means (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). In the next subsection, a review of the literature on metaphors in relation to peace and reconciliation in specific will follow.

2.2.1.3.1 Metaphors

The book *Metaphors we live by*, written by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in 1980, brought about a shift in the thinking about metaphors. The idea that metaphors are mainly a device for poetry and a matter of aesthetics is fundamentally flawed according to Lakoff and Johnson.¹¹ However, Lakoff and Johnson's claim that metaphors underlie understanding is questioned by metaphor analysts such as Naomi Quinn and Lynne Cameron. Quinn explains that speakers select particular metaphors *'just because they provide satisfactory mapping onto already*

¹⁰ In his article of 2005, Van Dijk analysed the discourse strategies used by the then Spanish Prime Minister Aznar to justify the war in Iraq in his UN speeches. One of the recurring patterns found by Van Dijk relates to the scope of identification. Aznar repeatedly referred to 'the international community' (Van Dijk, 2005). According to Van Dijk, Aznar's goals were firstly, to 'legitimate the war and his support for it' and 'secondly to hide that the war in Iraq was precisely not supported by the UN or the Security Council' (Van Dijk, 2005, p. 86).

¹¹ On the contrary, we can not live without metaphors, as our 'ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature' (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 3). Metaphors 'structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we relate to other people' (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 3).

existing cultural understandings' (Quinn, 1991, p. 65). Likewise, Cameron *'resists'* the *'strong assumptions about the pre-existence of conceptual metaphors in the minds/brains of individuals'* and is less concerned with understanding the nature of metaphors than with using metaphor as a *'research tool in exploring discourse data'* (Lynne Cameron, 2012, p. 346).

According to Cameron (2012), metaphor *'is what we turn to when we have trouble expressing or capturing an idea in discourse'* (p. 351). Cameron explains that *'by making analogies or comparisons between what we are trying to express to someone else and something they are more familiar with, we try to get them to see the world as we do'* (Cameron, 2012, p. 351).¹²

Research on the IRA conflict by Cameron (2007) has shown that the more parties reiterated each others metaphors, the more both parties changed their discourse about each other. In stead of criminalizing the other and victimising themselves (Van Dijk, 2007), the adversaries started humanizing each others' actions by using *'reconciliation metaphors'* (Cameron, 2007).¹³

2.2.1.3.2 Limitations of metaphor analysis

Although Cameron's analysis is certainly interesting to read and will enrich the reader with a feeling of insight into the process of reconciliation, Cameron also indicates several issues with the analysis of metaphor. For instance, metaphor as the only focus of analysis will never cover all that happens in a discourse event. The metaphor analysis should therefore be complemented with an alternative method of discourse analysis. Also, researchers must *'guard [themselves] against unwarranted interpretations or too much idealization of the complexity and messiness'* (Cameron, 2012, p. 353). Additionally, added to Cameron's concerns there is *'no single template for the process of combining analyses of metaphors and discourse activity'* (Cameron, 2012, p. 353) it is hard to compare research findings across studies. It is therefore

¹² Most of Cameron's research on reconciliation is based on a *'dialogic view of interaction'* which she references to Bakhtin (1981). This view sees interaction not as putting ideas into words but as *'taking the Other into account'* and thus reaching out into *'the "alien territory" of the Other and attempting to put themselves into the Other's perspective'* (Cameron, 2007, p. 199).

¹³ Cameron analysed the conversations between Jo and Pat and shows how the speakers start repeating each others metaphors while sometimes altering, adjusting, taking away elements and adding elements and slowly come to a consensus on the metaphor that is appropriate for both sides of the story.

necessary to apply certain standards or systems that can be replicated across studies (Low, 1999, p.48; Shutova, 2015, p. 379; Pragglez Group 2007). The next section will discuss the literature on the Israeli-Palestinian discourse in specific.

2.3 Discourse analyses for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Dalia Gavriely-Nuri has written extensively on the Israeli discourse with a particular focus on Israeli cultural codes (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2012a, 2012b, 2014a, 2014b, 2015; Gavriely-Nuri, 2009). First, a discussion of the most relevant aspects of Gavriely-Nuri's work in the scope of this thesis will be provided. Second, Yohanan Tzoreff's analysis of the Palestinian narrative will be discussed.

2.3.1 Israeli cultural codes as a barrier to peace

Gavriely-Nuri's theoretical framework and research methodology is based on Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). However, Gavriely-Nuri's approach distinguishes itself by a *'cultural approach to critical discourse analysis (CCDA) which aims at exposing the various ways in which cultural codes are embedded in discourse, and contribute to the reproduction of abuses of power'* (Gavriely-Nuri, 2012a, p. 77). Following sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, Gavriely-Nuri (2014) writes that when using peace as a means to receive support, political actors borrow from the *'discursive capital'* of a culture. According to Gavriely-Nuri, *'discursive capital refers to the arsenal of verbal practices (...) contributing to the construction of a specific discourse'* (p. 6). Verbal practises are *'phrases, idioms, images, metaphors (...) as well as cultural codes (such as ethos, myths, historical narratives and collective memories)'* (p. 6). Gavriely-Nuri claims that discursive capital is used for the *'achievement of social dominance and the promotion of social interests'* (Gavriely-Nuri, 2014b, p. 6).

Nuri categorised peace phrases used by Israeli politicians into negative/positive, abstract/concrete and unilateral/bilateral. A peace phrase consists of the term 'peace' partnered by a noun (f.i. peace and security) or an adjective (f.i. just peace, stable peace, safe peace) (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010a)(see table 1). While some of her categorisations might be culturally particular for the Israeli political discourse in Hebrew, most seem applicable to all cultures.

When a speaker combines peace with an adjective or noun he or she implies that there are different kinds of peace. For instance, 'peace and security' implies that peace by itself is not secure, 'just peace' implies that there is such a thing as 'unjust peace'. Because a substantial amount of the peace phrases is implying that peace by itself is not good enough, Nuri categorized most peace phrases as negative (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010a). Table 1 gives an overview of her categorisations for the Israeli peace discourse that is divided into an oppressive and supportive peace discourse.

Table 1 Peace phrases used in the Israeli Knesset categorised by Gavriely-Nuri

Supportive peace discourse			Oppressive peace discourse		
Positive	Concrete	Bilateral	Negative	Abstract	Unilateral
Want peace	Peace	Peace	True peace	Peace process	Peace seekers
Live in peace	agreement	relationships	Just peace	True peace	Peace
	Negotiation for	Partner for	Peace and security	Achieving peace	for..[shalom
Peace-oriented	peace	peace	Obstacle for peace	Making peace	temurat]...
behaviour	Peace initiative		Peace for	Wanting peace	Pursue peace
(idiom)			...[shalom	Just peace	Price of peace
Peace			temurat]...	Peace	
relationships			[they] don't want	arrangement	Internal peace
Desire for			peace	Peace seekers	Victims of peace
peace/aspire to			safe peace	Road to peace	
peace			peace of the world	Comprehensive	
			price of peace	peace	
			cold peace	Talking about	
			stable peace	peace	
			victims of peace	Chance for peace	
				Peace-oriented	
				behaviour (idiom)	
				Full peace	
				Yearned for	
				peace	
				Pursue peace	
				Hope for peace	
				Safe peace	
				Peace of the	
				world	
				Desire for peace	
				Stable peace	

Source: Gavriely-Nuri (2010a)

One of the peace phrases in particular, just peace, was discussed in a round table conversation between Yossi Beilin¹⁴ and Edward Said¹⁵ (Allan & Keller, 2006). Both Said and Beilin agreed that *'whereas it may have appeared to the parties that not making peace was justified, in hindsight it had become clear that greater injustice, in fact, lay in not making peace'* (Allan & Keller, 2006, p. vii). Said is a proponent of a just peace and in his article that followed the round table discussion he outlines several aspects¹⁶ to achieve a just peace for the Palestinians (Said, 2006, p. 193).

Opposite to Said, Beilin pleads strongly for *'a search for peace first'* and views 'justice' as a harmful addition to the term peace (Beilin, 2006, p. 146). 'Just Peace' legitimates unjust peace according to Beilin. Beilin claims that both the Israelis and Palestinians have rejected peace agreements or settlements because they felt the conditions were unjust. However, according to Beilin *'if peace brings forth reconciliation and prevents the loss of lives and possessions, it is just by definition'* (Beilin, 2006, p. 147). It does not matter if peace is imperfect, Beilin continues, even if it damages both sides, it could be called an unjust solution but it can not be called an 'unjust' peace. The statement: 'It is either Just Peace or No Peace', adds 'just' to 'peace' resulting in justifications for the choice of No Peace and thus creates a barrier to a peaceful solution (Beilin, 2006).

Similar implications to Beilin's description of Just Peace are identified by Gavriely-Nuri (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010b, 2015). The 'extend a hand for peace' metaphor was used in the Israeli Knesset more than 50 times since 1980 (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010b). In Gavriely-Nuri's article *If both opponents "extend hands in peace" – Why don't they meet?* she deduced four Israeli models that make use of the metaphor. The four models differ in the level of willingness towards the

¹⁴ Yossi Beilin is an Israeli statesman involved in the peace negotiations with Abbas during Rabin's leadership and served as the Minister of Justice under Barak.

¹⁵ Edward Said is a Palestinian intellectual, rights advocate and professor of literature at Columbia University influenced by Foucault.

¹⁶ For instance: rethinking the history of the two peoples combined in one narrative by constructing 'an emergent composite identity' that is based on shared history and the antinomies. A role for education with an emphasis on the Other. Additionally, Said referred to Palestinian rights and rethinking the Law of Return and states that citizenship should be based on 'the just solidarities of coexistence and the gradual dissolving of ethnic line' (Said, 2006, p. 193).

Arabs to negotiate peace. Gavriely-Nuri describes the different discourse strategies used to maintain the status quo within certain periods of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The first model is the *European model*, which refers to Israeli leaders born in Europe and use the metaphor to accentuate *'the perceived moral asymmetry between the adversaries'* (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010a, p. 457). This model is followed by the *Sabra model* referring to native Israeli leaders born between 1930 and 1960 that *'reflects a unilateral use of the metaphor'* (p. 457). The most positive model is the *Peacemaker model*, which represents the timeframe surrounding the peace agreements with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994). In this model, leaders use the metaphor in a reciprocal way¹⁷.

The fourth model is the *Postmodern model*, in this model *'[t]he concept "peace" has been emptied of content; it has become illusory, something that neither the user nor the listener believes is possible to achieve'* (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010a, p.460). Apart from giving Israeli leader Ehud Olmert as an example, who uses the metaphor in a postmodern way, Gavriely-Nuri mentions that Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat has also used the metaphor several times. By using the metaphor, according to Gavriely-Nuri, *'Arafat demonstrated his rhetorical proficiency and thorough knowledge of Israel's cultural heritage as it is related to peace'* (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010a, p. 461). Gavriely-Nuri explains that like *'Olmert and other Israeli leaders, (...) [the] slogan was meant to improve his international image'* (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010a, p. 461). Gavriely-Nuri finishes her article stating that *'a parallel challenge awaits Palestinian peace research, which can open a window to Palestinian cultural codes and the cultural heritage surrounding its conception of peace'* (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010a, p. 463). In the following section existing literature of Palestinian narratives will be discussed.

¹⁷ Instead of using the metaphor unilaterally and from a perspective of moral superiority, the metaphor was used with the intention of symmetry, *'readiness and in capacity to make peace'* according to Gavriely-Nuri (2010, p. 459). For instance, of positive use of the metaphor are *'Let us join hands'* and *'Let's stretch out our hands'*. However, as Gavriely-Nuri states, these *'expressions of mutuality would have become a rarity in future uses of the metaphor'* (2010a, p. 460).

2.3.2 Palestinian socio-psychological barriers to peace

According to Israeli scholar and former Advisor on Arab Affairs at the Israeli Civil Administration in the Gaza Strip, Yohanan Tzoreff (2010), Palestinians have a long way to go before they could call themselves ready to become a state. Firstly, because the current Palestinian identity is based on the *'sanctity of resistance'* (Tzoreff, 2010). Tzoreff explains that because resistance in the Middle East predominantly became a specialisation of Islamic organisations, resistance obtained a holy status. Those who resist can argue against the opposition that they are *"not giving in" and maintaining a strong position, a complete antithesis to the continuing defeatism'* (Tzoreff, 2010, p. 70).

Secondly, all ingredients for state-hood, as Tzoreff mentions, like: progress, *'new construction, individual development, the state, the national interest, and society'* are absent in the Palestinian culture (Tzoreff, 2010, p. 74). Tzoreff continues that *'none of these is at the forefront of this culture's interests'* (p. 74). The former Advisor explains that the Palestinians view the external forces as taking *'advantage of our weakness, of our resources... to extort concessions from us... to make us a pawn in their hands ... to control us...' and so on'* (Tzoreff, 2010, p. 74). The narratives of the Palestinian people as Tzoreff describes are charged with an internal *'defeatism, excessive concession, submissiveness, and betrayal anyone who tries to think differently or to reach an agreement with the "other"'* (Tzoreff, 2010, p. 74). The narratives paralyze change and *'block any leader who tries to take the fate of his people into his own hands and enter into negotiations with the non-Arab other'* (Tzoreff, 2010, p. 74).

Apart from Tzoreff's description of the Palestinian socio-psychological barriers to peace, there is little literature on the topic available on how Palestinian barriers to peace are expressed in discourse. As Gavriely-Nuri indicated, a *'parallel challenge still awaits Palestinian peace research'* (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010, p.463).

2.4 Conclusion

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an identity conflict that is intractable because of the intensity of socio-psychological barriers on both sides of the conflict. There is an emergence of research for the Israeli side that analyses the ethos, narratives and metaphors used in discourse or embedded in societal beliefs. However, the Palestinian peace research is far behind and comparative research is virtually non-existent when it comes to political discourse analysis. As Van Dijk, Gavriely-Nuri, Cameron and Wenden have demonstrated, discourse analysis can be used as a tool to uncover barriers or steps towards a peaceful resolution. Discourse is the *use* of language and therefore political per definition. Although social reality shapes language, language also constitutes the social reality. Politicians are masters in discourse and influence our social reality with every word they utter in their role. Speeches are a politicians' platform to constitute what the social reality should look like and therefore an excellent starting point to identify potential socio-psychological barriers and bridges to a peaceful solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

3 Methodology

Discourse is spoken or written language directed to an audience (Van Dijk, 1997). Israeli and Palestinian peace discourse in this thesis refers to the political discourse of Israeli and Palestinian leaders that speak about peace at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) between 1988 and 2016. The research question is: *What socio-psychological barriers and bridges to peace can be identified in speeches by Israeli and Palestinian leaders to the UNGA between 1988 and 2016?* To answer this question, three sub-questions were developed based on word frequencies that arose from the sample and concepts identified in the literature review;

1. *What key themes recur throughout the speeches with regards to the term 'peace'?*
2. *How do the leaders giving the speeches position themselves in relation to the other?*
3. *How do the leaders position themselves in the international community?*

First the theoretical framework and theoretical concepts that guided the analysis and shaped the methods applied in this thesis will be discussed. Then the sub-section research method summarizes how the units of analysis were determined and how the data collection process was performed for all four sub-questions. The methodology section of this thesis is then concluded with an assessment of the quality of the used methodology.

3.1 Theoretical framework

The epistemology in this thesis is based on peace studies that views the world as flexible and as producing *'equally flexible images of that world'* (Galtung, 1996, p. 22). A social constructivist perspective will be applied, arguing that discourse plays a crucial role in the construction of reality in general and for peace and reconciliation in particular. This study focuses on socio- psychological barriers to peace inherent in discourse.

Following Lakoff and Johnson (1980), this thesis recognizes and adopts the perspective that metaphors are extremely powerful in shaping our world and cognition. By combining the theoretical concepts of Lazar and Lazar, Bar-Tal, Van Dijk, Wenden, Auerbach, Garviely-Nuri

and Cameron, the peace discourse of Israeli and Palestinian leaders was analysed at two levels: macro and micro linguistic level.

The empirical analysis was informed by findings of linguists, metaphor analysts, natural language processing, sociology, psychology and anthropology. The macro and micro linguistics as proposed by Wenden and Van Dijk as political discourse analysis were used as a method and social constructionism and the discourse dynamics approach (this will be further explained in section 3.3.2) as theoretical framework. However, a top-down approach was avoided as much as possible. To allow for new findings to arise from the sample, the analysis started bottom-up guided by patterns and word frequencies arising from the data. The approach was similar to grounded theory, because patterns that arose in the coding phase refined the research question and sub-questions. Nevertheless, because no additional data was sought after the coding process, the analysis is not based on grounded theory but is rather an inductive approach: when the theory of the researcher is merely grounded in the data, then *'grounded theory is more or less synonymous with an inductive approach'* (Bryman, 2012, p. 568).

3.2 Research methods

3.2.1 Sample

The units of analysis of this study were the verbatim transcripts of speeches given by Israeli and Palestinian leaders to the UNGA between 1988 and 2016. Five decisions resulted in selecting this sample, namely deciding to analyse; (1) transcripts rather than spoken language, (2) speeches meant for an international and English speaking public, (3) speeches given to the same international platform, UNGA, (4) speeches of leaders and (5) speeches between 1988 until 2016. The below paragraphs will provide a justification and a discussion of the sample.

3.2.2 Transcripts

The choice for analysing transcripts in stead of spoken or video recorded speeches was influenced by finding a balance between the comparability of findings over time and the richness of the data. In video recorded speeches the researcher can also take intonation, pauses in the speech and body language into account. However, with the time and resources

available the sample would have been much smaller. Furthermore, working with transcripts allows for the use of software programs such as NVivo¹⁸ and Leximancer¹⁹.

3.2.3 English translations and the UNGA platform

Two major aspects were considered when deciding which speeches will be analysed. First and foremost, most research analysing the peace discourse of Israelis concentrates itself on national discourse (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010c, 2014a; Gavriely-Nuri, 2009). National discourse is the discourse by political actors towards their own people. The aim of this study is to investigate in what way and to what extent meta-narratives are upheld by political actors in an international environment. At a national platform, the leaders usually merely need to reaffirm the meta-narrative by using narratives and metaphors. While at an international platform, political actors might need to convince the audience first of the meta-narrative.

A second consideration resulting in the UNGA sample was comparability. Because the aim of this study is to compare the attitudes to peace by Israeli and Palestinian leaders over time it is important that the data is comparable *between groups* and *over time*.

The *ceteris paribus* assumption will not hold in any discourse analysis of natural language²⁰, because there are always factors that influence the comparability of two groups²¹. Nevertheless, the researcher should always aim to have the most stable background variables as possible. The UNGA platform is therefore ideal for the purpose of this study; it is an international platform that has been recording their speeches since the founding of the United Nations and documenting them online since 1983 onwards. Thereby, all speeches to the UNGA are translated into English by professional translators and the speakers are aware that their speech is translated into English as they speak. In addition to this, their speeches are directed

18 NVivo is a qualitative data analysis software that allows the analyst to code text by highlighting and sorting it under categories or themes, also called 'nodes'. NVivo can also create word webs and perform text queries and word frequencies.

19 Leximancer is an automatic content analysis software and calculates the likelihood of certain words or concept pairs to be used by certain groups compared to others. Leximancer uses Bayesian statistics and algorithms to identify themes and corresponding concepts. I was given the opportunity to try this software by Prof. Andrew Markus.

20 Natural language in linguistics is language that was not staged for the purpose of research.

21 For instance, the UN might have altered standards for the translation of speeches over time. Also, the Palestinian speeches are all translated from Arabic, while most of the Israeli speeches were given in English.

to an international public. This unique situation improves the comparison between the two groups for two reasons. Firstly, because it takes away issues of subjective interpretation of unprofessional translators that will not be checked upon by an official body. Secondly, because the speeches by the Israeli and Palestinian leaders are not only written for, and given to, the same platform but also took place at the same location, the United Nations (UN) headquarters in New York. Only one speech did not take place in New York, the 1988 speech by Yasser Arafat. This happened when Arafat was denied a visa to enter the United States and the UN voted to move the assembly to Geneva.

3.2.4 Speeches by leaders between 1988 and 2016

The sample was limited to speeches given to the UNGA between 1988 and 2016 for three reasons. Firstly, it is only from 1988 onwards that a dialogue between the Israelis and Palestinians starts to develop.²² Moreover, unlike other existing research, this thesis is focused on the dialogic level²³ demonstrated by speeches of both the Israelis and Palestinians (Cameron et al., 2009). Secondly, although Israeli speeches at the UN start from 1947, the first speech by a Palestinian politician at an internationally recognized platform only was given by Arafat in 1974. However, because the United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBIS) starts from 1983, the speeches in the sample start from Arafat's second speech in 1988. By limiting the sample to the available UNBIS speeches, the comparability between the speeches improves.

Thirdly, starting from 1988 also allows for comparison with research undertaken by Gavriely-Nuri (2015) on peace in war speeches between 1982-2008. In this thesis however, a similar timeframe (1988-2016) will be investigated from an opposite perspective; peace in speeches surrounding negotiations. Although this period comprises the first and second intifada and several Israeli military operations, it was in 1993 that the first peace negotiations between the two parties were held, followed by several meetings between the adversaries.

22 Until 1988, as Auerbach states, 'the Palestinians saw their struggle with Israel as geared towards eliminating Israel as a Jewish state, as expressed in the Palestinian Covenant' (Auerbach, 2010, p. 101).

23 Dialogic level of speeches can be understood as the level of willingness to negotiate, to be in dialogue with the adversary and to what extent the discourse shows that the speaker relates to the other party (Cameron et al., 2009).

Only speeches by Israeli and Palestinian leaders were selected, more specifically speeches by Prime Ministers and Presidents. All speeches to the UNGA by other UN representatives were excluded from the analysis. This limitation was made for three reasons.

Firstly, because political leaders compared to UN representatives, live closer to the reality of the people they represent. UN representatives often live and work in the United States and their role from the perspective of their people is much more in the background than the leader's role is (Rosen, 1984; Teltsch, 1975). Furthermore, country leaders are found to have a great influence on the attitudes of their country at macro level (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2013; Bullock, 2011) while this is yet to be tested for UN representatives.

Secondly, most of the speeches by UN representatives address detailed issues that do not always entail the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while the speeches by the leaders address the most fundamental and urgent issues from a macro level perspective. Thirdly, because of the limited time and resource constraints for master students; narrowing down the sample to only comprise leaders allowed for a longitudinal analysis of almost three decades (1988-2016). Limiting the sample to include only leaders, narrowed the number of speeches since 1988 from almost 2500 Israeli and Palestinian speeches to 18 speeches by Palestinian leaders and 22 by Israeli leaders.

For consistency of the sample speeches made by Israeli and Palestinian politicians that were not Prime Minister or President at the time of delivering the speech were also excluded. For example, Benjamin Netanyahu gave several speeches to the UNGA before and after he was Prime Minister of Israel (Netanyahu was Prime Minister twice). This limitation resulted in a dataset of 14 Israeli speeches and 18 Palestinian speeches. In order to make the two sets comparable, 4 Palestinian speeches to the UNGA in the years when there was no speech given to the UNGA by an Israeli leader were excluded. Therefore, the 1999 and 2001 speeches by Arafat, 2007 speech by Abbas and 2012 speech by Fayyad were excluded. Consequently, the corpus²⁴ for the analysis of the first two stages comprises the transcripts of 28 entire speeches.

24 In linguistics, corpus is the set of texts on which the analysis is performed.

3.2.5 Data collection process

All speeches were collected from the Index of Speeches from the website²⁵ of the United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBIS).²⁶ After downloading the English pdf versions of all transcribed (verbatim) speeches, the transcripts had to be cleaned from irrelevant data²⁷ and reformatted to allow usage by software programs NVivo and Leximancer. After a full quality check of the 28 entire speeches, the word documents were converted back to pdf files to ensure a correct reading by software programs NVivo and Leximancer. All 28 speeches in the sample are tabled in Appendix 1.

3.3 Data analysis

In this section an overview will be provided of the method and tools used for the data analysis. The analysis was performed in two stages, the first stage focused on macro linguistic structures in the speeches while the second stage delved deeper to sentence and word level by looking at micro linguistic structures.

3.3.1 Stage 1: Macro linguistic analysis – key themes

The theoretical concepts that shaped the framework for stage 1 of the analysis were based on macro linguistics (Van Dijk, 1997; Wenden, 2003). The key concepts of macro linguistics that were used to interpret the speeches were 1) text schema categories and 2) scope of identification (Wenden, 2003).

3.3.1.1 Text schema categories

Text schema categories refers to *which* information is used to present a topic. Recurring information in the speeches was identified through word frequencies using the software program NVivo. The default frequency settings of NVivo were maintained, therefore only

25 The UNBIS website URL is <http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/>.

26 The following search terms resulted in the collection of 28 speeches: (shamir OR rabin OR peres OR netanyahu OR barak OR olmert OR sharon) AND .SC=(israel) AND (abbas OR fayyad OR Arafat OR hamdallah OR duwaik OR haniyeh OR qurei OR shaath OR fattouh) AND .SC=(palestine OR palestinian authority OR plo). The search terms 'palestine', 'palestinian authority' and 'plo' are based on how representatives were registered in the UNBIS.

27 As the UNBIS pdf files comprise the transcript of the full General Assembly meetings, several steps had to be taken to make the speeches 'analysis' ready. First the relevant sections by Israeli and Palestinian leaders were copy pasted into word in order to edit them. Then the word document was checked for errors alongside the pdf files, some pdf files did not copy accurately and had to be adjusted by hand.

words of three characters or more were included and the default list of stopwords²⁸ was excluded from the analysis. NVivo calculates frequencies based on how often the word appears without accounting for words being used twice or more in the same sentence. However, on average, the Palestinian leaders used 29 words per sentences while the Israeli leaders used only 18 words per sentence. Comparison at sentence level seemed therefore more meaningful. Because NVivo is not able to do this, Leximancer was used to extract spreadsheets that calculated the frequencies of words at sentence level.²⁹ Whenever results in this thesis report on ‘percentage of sentences’, Leximancer was used. The default stopwords by Leximancer (see Appendix 3) were all maintained except the word ‘just’. Normal word frequencies were calculated at ‘word level’ and were performed with NVivo.

Additionally, *prominence scores* of certain concepts for one of the two groups were calculated by using Bayes’ theorem. The calculations were done manually but inspired on Leximancer’s calculations. Prominence scores encapsulate how likely it is that a sentences contains a certain word for a particular group and are used by linguists and NLP Analysts (Bishop, 2006). The calculation of the prominence scores is further explained in Appendix 2.

For the term ‘peace’ additional analysis was performed by hand coding 505 sentences containing peace into common ‘peace phrases’. Peace phrases consist of the term ‘peace’ in combination with a noun or adjective (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010), for instance ‘just peace’ or ‘peace and security’. The coding was performed by exporting all sentences containing peace from

28 NVivo stopwords for the English language are: *a about above after again against all am an and any are aren't aren't as at be because been before being below between both but by can can't can't cannot could couldn't couldn't did didn't didn't do does doesn't doesn't doing don't don't down during each few for from further had hadn't hadn't has hasn't hasn't have haven't haven't having he he'd he'll he's he'd he'll he's her here here's here's hers herself him himself his how how's how's i i'd i'll i'm i've i'd i'll i'm i've if in into is isn't isn't it it's it's its itself let's let's me more most mustn't mustn't my myself no nor not of off on once only or other ought our ours ourselves out over own said same say says shall shan't shan't she she'd she'll she's she'd she'll she's should shouldn't shouldn't so some such than that that's that's the their theirs them themselves then there there's there's these they they'd they'll they're they've they'd they'll they're they've this those through to too under until up upon us very was wasn't wasn't we we'd we'll we're we've we'd we'll we're we've were weren't weren't what what's what's when when's when's where where's where's which while who who's who's whom whose why why's why's will with won't won't would wouldn't wouldn't you you'd you'll you're you've you'd you'll you're you've your yours yourself yourselves*

29 Leximancer’s calculations are based on ‘context blocks’. The default setting in Leximancer is two sentences per context block, but because speeches are short texts compared to the kind of texts Leximancer was developed for, the context block was set to one sentence in the analysis.

NVivo into Excel. The sentences were listed in one column in different rows. Each sentence was manually coded in Excel by giving it a code, for instance 'just peace' or 'threat for peace'. Sometimes a sentence contained multiple nouns and adjectives that were 'partnering' with the term peace, the most important word (closest to the word peace) was then chosen as code. The column with codes was then altered into an Excel pivot table which calculated the frequencies for each of the 'peace phrases'.

The frequencies of the words and prominence scores that arose from this analysis were used to consolidate the information in the speeches into key themes and aimed to answer the first sub-question: *What key themes recur throughout the speeches with regards to the term 'peace'?*

3.3.1.2 The scope of identification

The scope of identification defines how the speaker positions himself in relation to others and the international community. Sentences in the speeches referring to a scope of identification were hand coded after reading the entire speeches and additionally identified through automatic text queries in NVivo by searching for 'international community' (as Van Dijk (2005) suggested) 'Palestine' 'Israel' and the names of all political actors involved. This method aimed to answer the two sub-questions; 1) *how do the leaders giving the speeches position themselves in relation to the other and;* 2) *how do the leaders giving the speeches position themselves in the international community?*

3.3.2 Stage 2: Micro linguistic analysis – peace phrases and reconciliation metaphors

The second stage further refined findings from the first stage by analysing the micro linguistics of the speeches. This stage was informed by research undertaken by Gavriely-Nuri (2010a) on supportive and oppressive peace discourse and by Cameron's reconciliation metaphors (Cameron, 2007; Cameron et al., 2009). Neither of the studies were fully replicated, but rather adjusted to the context of the UNGA speeches. After a short explanation of both studies the limitations and adjustments will be discussed before moving on to the operationalization of the theoretical framework.

For her research, Gavriely-Nuri uses CDA with a cultural twist; Cultural approach to Critical Discourse Analysis (CCDA). Decoding cultural code and heritage *'requires more than literal translation'*, according to Gavriely-Nuri it *'demands intimate familiarity with the entire culture'* (2010, p.453). Because of the required familiarity with the Israeli and Palestinian culture and for reasons outlined in the literature review about the objectives of CDA (mitigating social wrongs), the approach in this thesis will *not* be based on CCDA. Instead, this thesis focuses on the generalizability and transferability of Gavriely-Nuri's findings.

Gavriely-Nuri devised a binary axis with an oppressive and supportive peace discourse. Oppressive peace discourse is aimed at reaffirming barriers and obstacles to peace negotiations between two opposing parties. On the other hand, supportive peace discourse emphasizes the possibility of a successful peace process. Supportive peace discourse highlights similarities instead of differences between the adversaries and has as objective to relate to the 'other' instead of victimizing oneself and criminalizing the other (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010a; Lazar & Lazar, 2004). The three categories on the oppressive axis developed by Gavriely-Nuri are 'negative', 'unilateral' and 'abstract'. The categories on the supportive axis are 'positive', 'bilateral' and 'concrete'. However, for this analysis, only the unilateral and bilateral categories devised by Gavriely-Nuri were considered. The reason for this limitation is twofold.

Firstly, it was the ambiguity of the divide between positive/negative and concrete/abstract that led to the exclusion of those four categories. In the case of the UNGA speeches analysed in this thesis, sometimes a sentence containing peace was positive, but the sentences surrounding the peace phrase were criminalizing the other party to a great extent. Therefore, reading the sentence in its context and taking the discourse dynamics of the speeches (Cameron et al., 2009) into account often resulted in having to conclude that the sentence is actually negative.

Secondly, another reason for focusing on two of the six categories was the supporting theoretical framework developed by Cameron. Cameron (2009) uses a discourse dynamics approach to metaphor in which she takes the local context into account. More specifically, Cameron not only contextualizes metaphors in the entire text, but also the order in time that metaphors appear. Ideas and perceptions change while the speakers speak or the author writes (Cameron, 2009). This is a crucial element to reconciliation processes. Therefore,

Cameron takes this as the key focus of the analysis. Cameron derived four metaphors that particularly frame the reconciliation process.³⁰ The speakers in the conversation analysed by Cameron, framed the process as 1) ‘a journey’; 2) ‘connection’; 3) ‘changing a distorted image’ and; 4) ‘listening to the Other’s story’ (2007, p. 216). This allowed the speakers to go from sympathy to empathy and eventually be able to imagine themselves in the others’ position. The discourse dynamics approach and the reconciliation metaphors defined by Cameron are embraced by the analysis in the second stage.

To summarize; in the second stage of the analysis, *peace* was analysed as a 1) journey, 2) connection, 3) changing a distorted image and 4) as listening to the others’ position. Additionally, Gavriely-Nuri’s categories were also incorporated; peace was analysed by focusing on bilateralism and its opponent, unilateralism.

3.3.2.1 Operationalization

The first step of this stage comprised coding all 426 sentences containing ‘peace’ into two categories; bilateral & unilateral. For coding purposes, the definitions as outlined in table 2 were used to code instances of ‘peace’ as uni or bi –lateral.

Table 2 Coding schedule for bilateral and unilateral usage of peace in speeches by Israeli and Palestinian leaders to the UNGA between 1988 and 2016

Bilateral usage of peace in sentence	Unilateral usage of peace in sentence
The other side is mentioned as an equal party or partner in the peace process	The speaker mentioned only their side and not the other side The other side was mentioned, but in a negative way

Some instances of peace could not be coded into either of those categories and were therefore coded in an ‘unclassifiable’ category. This was for instance the case when leaders were

³⁰ In her articles Cameron describes in great detail how she analysed reconciliation metaphors in several studies (Cameron, 1999, 2003; Cameron, 2007; Cameron, 2012; Cameron et al., 2009; Cameron & Stelma, 2004). Cameron investigated the conversations recorded over two and a half years between Jo Berry, who’s father was killed in a bombing by the IRA, and Pat Magee, who performed the bombing (Cameron, 2007).

speaking of world peace, peace between other nations or when peace was mentioned without any concrete parties mentioned trying to achieve peace.

The software program NVivo was used to code the sentences into one of the two categories. A 'node', was created for three categories (unilateral, bilateral and other). Then by selecting and dragging the sentence into the correct node the sentences was coded. This qualitative method of coding the sentences then resulted in quantitative data; the amount of sentences coded to each category. This information was exported from NVivo into Excel to compare the quantitative data over time and between leaders.

The second step of the micro linguistic analysis consisted of text queries to identify the use of peace as a journey, connection, listening to the other and changing a distorted image. In other words, this analysis aimed to identify usage of words as reconciliation metaphors that could bridge the gap between the two sides of the conflict. Table 3 provides an overview of the words that were used in the text query.

Table 3 Words that were entered into the Nvivo text query to identify a reconciliation process

Journey	Connection	Listening to the other	Change distorted image
step	bridge	exchanging stories	seeing a human
way	crossing distances	listen	bigger picture
path	breaking down	sit down and talk	true light
journey	barriers		set straight
travel	sharing stories		suffering of the other
	closeness		rectify

This stage of the analysis aimed to answer the sub-questions in more detail with a specific focus on the question: *How do the leaders giving the speeches position themselves in relation to the other?* Additionally, the analysis had as objective to consolidate all results together towards answering the research question: *What socio-psychological barriers and bridges to peace can be identified in speeches to the UNGA between 1988 and 2016 by Israeli and Palestinian leaders?*

3.4 Quality of the methodology

The two stages of the analysis aimed to answer the three sub-questions. Sub-questions 2 and 3, on the scope of identification, answering with the proposed methodology seems fairly reasonable. Namely, by qualitatively analysing how adversaries refer to each other and to the international community, the two sub-questions can be answered. Furthermore, identifying key themes (sub-question 1) by reading the speeches and running word frequencies also seems straightforward. However, interpreting the answers to the questions requires a more intricate approach. This requires an extensive background knowledge of the Israeli and Palestinian history and a thorough familiarity with the cultural codes as Gavriely-Nuri (Gavriely-Nuri, 2012a) indicated. Nevertheless, because this thesis addresses the research gap of comparative studies, the thorough familiarity with cultural codes is a lesser priority. Instead, the analysis based itself on literature on narratives by Israeli and Palestinian scholars and the key themes that arose from the sample itself. The unfamiliarity with the cultural codes is a limitation of this study but at the same time also an advantage for two reasons.

Firstly, by having an outsider perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict my position as a researcher might be less biased. Because my daily life is not directly affected by this conflict in the way it is for Israeli and Palestinian researchers. However, it must be taken into account that my partner comes from a Jewish background and has family living in Israel, although he is not a Zionist. This might result in my perspective being more pro-Israeli, as I heard narratives from the Jewish-Israeli perspective, while I have not heard the Palestinian perspective apart from those on social media. My personal political standpoint is that both peoples have equal rights to live in the contested territory and I support a two state solution. I do not have an opinion on how this should work in practise because of the complexity of equal rights and security for the peoples. Above all, my aim is not to favour or support one side over the other in this thesis. I will not focus on social wrongs with a perpetrator and recipient, but instead choose a pragmatic approach by looking at how the use of language can either stagnate or progress the dialogue between the two parties.

Secondly, because the focus of this thesis is more general than Israeli or Palestinian cultural codes, the method and results are likely to be more transferrable to other contexts. As the

insights that arise from the analysis are not based on particular cultural codes they can inform discourse analysis for different conflicts.

Additionally, replicability was very important in developing the methodology for this thesis: nothing that was coded was arbitrary or based on the subjective interpretation of the analyst. All of the results obtained by the methods described in this section were based on objective word frequencies. Those word frequencies in some cases resulted in text queries. However, text queries were only performed when the words came up as frequent. This was to avoid the 'finding what you looking for' self fulfilling prophecies. Additionally, all statements on likelihood are based on calculated probabilities to minimise subjective comparison.


4 Results

Firstly, an overview will be provided of the relevant results obtained through macro linguistic analysis. Two aspects of macro linguistic structures were considered for the analysis, text schema categories and the scope of identification. The focus on text schema categories resulted in four key themes, namely; *people, peace, justice* and *security*. By analysing the scope of identification, three recurring themes were identified; referring to the *international community* and the *extending a hand for peace* phrase. The latter was further analysed in the sub-section on the micro linguistic analysis. During the micro linguistic analysis, key themes were further explored by text queries. In this stage, the term ‘peace’ was coded as *bilateral* or *unilateral* and *reconciliation metaphors* were identified.

4.1 Macro linguistic results

‘Peace’ is the second most frequent word in the UNGA speeches by Israeli and Palestinian leaders. For Palestinian leaders ‘people’ or ‘peoples’ is the most frequent word in all their speeches combined, while for Israeli leaders this is ‘Israel’. The ten most frequent words are shown in figure 2 for Palestinians on the right (orange) and Israelis on the left (blue).

Figure 1 Most frequent words in the speeches by Israeli and Palestinian leaders to the UNGA between 1988 and 2016



In the speeches by Palestinian leaders there was less variety of words compared to the Israeli speeches. Therefore, higher frequencies among words were more likely to be found in the Palestinian speeches compared to the Israeli speeches³¹. The table below provides an overview

³¹ Less frequent words in the Israeli speeches were also examined to identify whether similar words combined would result in higher frequencies for the speeches in the sample. This was not the case and for all key themes identified.

of the words with a prominence greater than 1³². A score above 1 indicates the concept is more likely to be found in the speeches of that group compared to the speeches of the other group.

Table 4 Prominence scores for frequent words in the Israeli and Palestinian speeches to the UNGA between 1988 and 2016


		secur(e)(ity)	just(ice) ³³	rights	recognition	respect	suffering	threat
Palestinian	Frequency	64	111	66.5 ^a	20	16	29.5 ^a	3
	Prominence	1.3	1.6	2.1	1.3	1.5	2.3	0.3
Israeli	Frequency	53	52.5 ^a	9.5 ^a	17	9	1	22
	Prominence	0.8	0.5	0.2	0.8	0.6	0.1	1.5

^a Because in 2008, two speeches were given for both the Israeli and Palestinian leaders, an average of the two speeches was calculated in the frequency scores. Therefore, .5 or ½ frequencies are possible.

4.1.1 People(s)

Frequencies for the term ‘people’ or ‘peoples’ at sentence level were calculated with Leximancer. Figure 3 provides an overview of the percentage of sentences containing ‘people(s)’ in the UNGA speeches by Israeli and Palestinian leaders between 1988 and 2016.

Figure 2 The percentage of sentences containing the term ‘people’ or ‘peoples’ compared to all sentences in the speeches to the UNGA by Israeli and Palestinian leaders between 1988 and 2016³⁴



³² See Appendix 2 for the calculation of prominence scores.

³³ The usage of the term ‘just’ only includes references to a ‘moral’ just. For instance, the sentence ‘let us just make peace’ was excluded from the frequency and prominence calculations.

³⁴ The categories on the x-axis represent years in which a speech was given, the x-axis is therefore not continuous as a speech was not given every year. Therefore, caution must be taken when interpreting the lines in the graph. Lines were chosen above dot points to allow for an easier interpretation of the graph. However, a line in between two years merely indicates if there was an increase or decrease in percentage compared to the previous speech given in the sample.

4.1.2 Peace

In total, approximately 15% of the sentences in the speeches of the sample (505) contained the term 'peace'. In figure 4, the orange line represents the use of peace by Palestinian leaders compared to the total sentences in their speeches, while the blue line reflects the usage of peace by Israeli leaders.

Figure 3 The percentage of sentences containing the term 'peace' compared to all sentences in the speeches to the UNGA by Israeli and Palestinian leaders between 1988 and 2016³⁵



³⁵ The categories on the x-axis represent years in which a speech was given, the x-axis is therefore not continuous as a speech was not given every year. Therefore, caution must be taken when interpreting the lines in the graph. Lines were chosen above dot points to allow for an easier interpretation of the graph. However, a line in between two years merely indicates if there was an increase or decrease in percentage compared to the previous speech given in the sample.

Table 5 provides an overview of all peace phrases used four or more times in the speeches by Israeli and Palestinian leaders. The percentages are calculated by comparing the frequencies to the total amount of peace phrases, for the Palestinian leaders this was 257 peace phrases and for the Israeli leaders 221 peace combinations with 478 peace phrases in total. Some sentences containing 'peace' were 'unclassifiable' because no noun or adjective was combined with 'peace'.

Table 5 Peace phrases by the Palestinian and Israeli leaders in the UNGA speeches 1988-2015

Palestinian peace phrases	Freq	%	Israeli peace phrases	Freq	%
just(ice) (and) peace	34	13.2%	(unclassifiable)	17	7.7%
peace process	29	11.3%	peace with Egypt	10	4.5%
security and peace	17	6.6%	security and peace	8	3.6%
(unclassifiable)	13	5.1%	want peace	8	3.6%
land for / of peace	9	3.5%	peace agreement	7	3.2%
comprehensive peace	8	3.1%	negotiate peace / peace negotiation(s)	6	2.7%
freedom and peace	7	2.7%	hand of peace	5	2.3%
international peace	6	2.3%	world peace	5	2.3%
achieve peace	5	1.9%	achieve peace	4	1.8%
occupation and peace	5	1.9%	advance peace	4	1.8%
peace agreement	4	1.6%	comprehensive peace	4	1.8%
culture of peace	4	1.6%	desire (for) peace	4	1.8%
peace in our region	4	1.6%	genuine peace	4	1.8%
love and peace	4	1.6%	seek(s) peace	4	1.8%
-			they don't want peace	4	1.8%
-			threat to peace	4	1.8%

4.1.3 Justice and security

Security is frequently mentioned in the Israeli speeches, especially when paired up with peace. In figure 4 and 5, word frequencies of the terms 'security', 'secure' and 'justice' and 'just' for all of the UNGA speeches of the leaders between 1988 and 2016 are visualised (the terms in figure 5 and 6 are not necessarily paired with 'peace').

Figure 4 Percentage of sentences containing 'secure' or 'security' compared to all sentences in the speeches to the UNGA by Israeli and Palestinian leaders between 1988 and 2016³⁶





Figure 5 Percentage of sentences containing 'justice' compared to all sentences in the speeches to the UNGA by Israeli and Palestinian leaders between 1988 and 2016¹⁸




³⁶ The categories on the x-axis represent years in which a speech was given, the x-axis is therefore not continuous as a speech was not given every year. Therefore, caution must be taken when interpreting the lines in the graph. Lines were chosen above dot points to allow for an easier interpretation of the graph. However, a line in between two years merely indicates if there was an increase or decrease in percentage compared to the previous speech given in the sample.

4.1.4 The scope of identification: the ‘international community’

In the UNGA speeches by Israeli and Palestinian leaders between 1988 and 2016, the international community was addressed 66 times. The international community is mentioned more often by the Palestinian leaders than by the Israeli leaders in the sample.

Figure 6 Frequencies of Israeli and Palestinian leaders referring to the ‘international community’ in the UNGA speeches between 1988 and 2016



Sometimes Palestinian leaders mention the international community in relation to world peace or the United Nations. But mostly the international community is called upon to pressure the Israeli side (see Appendix 4 for an overview).

4.1.5 The scope of identification: the adversary

The Palestinian leaders do not address Israeli leaders directly in their speeches, but mention them occasionally. Of the Israeli leaders, Netanyahu addresses his adversary Abbas directly only once. Table 6 and 7 provide an overview of Israeli and Palestinian leaders mentioning the adversary by name.

Table 6 Palestinian leaders mentioning Israeli leaders in their speeches to the UNGA between 1988 and 2016

Speech	Mentioning the ‘Other’
Arafat 1998	assassination of the late Yitzhak Rabin, my partner in the peace When the Government of Benjamin Netanyahu took office in Israel, a by the Government of Mr. Netanyahu have caused the current
Abbas 2013	leader, Yasser Arafat, and Yitzhak Rabin, the late Israeli Prime
Abbas 2015	late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1976, when he stated cancer. That is what Yitzhak Rabin said. Why do they do

Table 7 Israeli leaders mentioning Palestinian leaders in their speeches to the UNGA between 1988 and 2016

Speech	Mentioning the 'Other'
Rabin 1995	<i>I wish to congratulate Chairman Arafat on being our partner in</i>
Netanyahu 1998	<i>the Palestinian Authority and Chairman Arafat agreed to dismantle the</i>
Barak 2000	<i>I call out to Chairman Arafat to join me in this</i>
Peres 2008	<i>an agreement. And knowing President Abbas as well, I am sure</i>
Netanyahu 2011	<i>all the Palestinian demands. Chairman Arafat rejected it. The even more sweeping offer. President Abbas did not even respond to keys of Gaza to President Abbas. worked out, and that President Abbas and the Palestinian Authority. President Abbas just said from this rostrum I explained this to President Abbas. He answered that if a President Abbas just stood here and said Bank. So, if what President Abbas is saying was true, then I would ask President Abbas to stop walking around this continue to hope that President Abbas will be my partner in direct negotiations without preconditions. President Abbas did not American ideas. Why does President Abbas not join me? We have court of public opinion. President Abbas has dedicated his life to and a half years, President Abbas and I have met in peace without an interlocutor. President Abbas, I extend my hand —</i>
Netanyahu 2012	<i>President Abbas just spoke here. I say</i>
Netanyahu 2014	<i>crime. I say to President Abbas, these are the crimes — the</i>
Netanyahu 2015	<i>Unfortunately, President Abbas said yesterday that he is again only yesterday from President Abbas. How can Israel make would like to tell President Abbas that I know it is a good place for President Abbas to begin. He should stop status quo there. What President Abbas should be speaking out</i>

When addressing their speech to the adversary indirectly, both parties often use metaphors. One of the metaphors that was a recurring trend was the 'extending my hand for peace' metaphor. The next sub-section on micro linguistic structures provides an overview of hand metaphors and the varieties of hand metaphors that were found in the UNGA speeches.

4.2 Micro linguistic results

4.2.1 Extend a hand or olive branch?

Table 8 provides an overview of the Palestinian usage of the ‘extend a hand’ metaphor. It was found that the Palestinian leaders used the hand metaphor together with ‘an olive branch for peace’. Palestinian leaders referred to the olive branch and olive trees 15 times in their UNGA speeches as table 9 shows. Israeli President Peres referred once to olives.

Table 8 Palestinian leaders using a hand metaphor in the UNGA speeches between 1988 and 2016

Speech	Extend/hand for peace
Arafat 1988	<i>place among you to join hands with you in consolidating the entente be raised. Let all hands join in defense of an of my People, offering my hand so that we can make</i>
Abbas 2006	<i>olive branch fall from my hand” (A/PV.2282, para. 82 olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat: do not let olive branch fall from my hand. The meeting rose at 8.40</i>
Abbas 2008	<i>committed to international legitimacy. We extend our hands for dialogue international legitimacy. We extend our hands for dialogue and</i>
Abbas 2010	<i>will not diminish. Our wounded hands are still able to carry for preserving our cause and extending a helping hand to our cause and extending a helping hand to our people through its</i>
Abbas 2011	<i>olive branch fall from my hand.” (A/PV.2282, para. 82 Palestine Liberation Organization that we extend our hand to the Israeli Organization that we extend our hand to the Israeli Government and</i>
Abbas 2012	<i>disappointment, we continue to sincerely extend a hand to the Israeli continue to sincerely extend a hand to the Israeli people to</i>
Abbas 2015	<i>Court. All that notwithstanding, my hand remains outstretched for the</i>

Table 9 Palestinian and Israeli leaders referring to an olive branch or tree in the UNGA speeches between 1988 and 2016

Speech	Olive branch
Arafat 1988	<i>the mainstreams that watered the olive branch I carried that day ability to protect our green olive branch in the hotbeds of those who are for the olive branch, peaceful coexistence, and international If we offer the olive branch of peace it is</i>
Arafat 1995	<i>and peace, now that the olive branch has been raised over</i>
Abbas 2006	<i>call: "Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand call. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand repeat: do not let the olive branch fall from my hand</i>
Fayyad 2008	<i>President Yasser Arafat, raised an olive branch, a symbol of peace the land of peace. The olive branch is deeply rooted in</i>
Peres 2008	<i>the same trees — the old olives and tall dates. Their declaration</i>
Abbas 2010	<i>still able to carry the olive branch picked from the splinters</i>
Abbas 2011	<i>stating: "Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand lands and uproot and burn olive trees that have existed in</i>
Abbas 2013	<i>our mosques and churches, our olive trees, our agricultural fields and</i>
Abbas 2014	<i>land, mosques, churches, property and olive trees. Again as usual, the</i>

Apart from Barak in 2000 and Netanyahu in 1998 and 2011, none of the Israeli leaders in the sample used a hand metaphor while referring to the Palestinians. Table 10 outlines Barak and Netanyahu's references.

Table 10 Israeli leaders using a hand metaphor in the UNGA speeches between 1988 and 2016

Speech	Extend/hand for peace
Netanyahu 1998	<i>of Israel stretched out the hand of peace to our neighbours</i>
Barak 2000	<i>life. It is in our hands.</i>
Netanyahu 2011	<i>Mr. Netanyahu (Israel): Israel has extended its hand in peace from Israel): Israel has extended its hand in peace from the moment and the Jewish people, I extend that hand again today. I Jewish people, I extend that hand again today. I extend it that hand again today. I extend it to the people of we have made peace. I extend it to the people of with respect and goodwill. I extend it to the people of build a democratic future. I extend it to the other peoples forge a new beginning. I extend it to the people of Most especially, I extend my hand to the Palestinian Most especially, I extend my hand to the Palestinian people, with one cannot applaud with one hand. Well, the same is true an interlocutor. President Abbas, I extend my hand — the hand of President Abbas, I extend my hand — the hand of Israel — in I extend my hand — the hand of Israel — in peace. I that he will grasp that hand. We are both the sons</i>

4.2.2 Bilateral and unilateral peace


This sub-section provides an overview of the results obtained from coding 426 sentences with the term peace into two categories; unilateral and bilateral. Of the total amount of sentences containing peace (505), 79 sentences were excluded because peace was referred to as a name of something (for instance: the Arab Peace Initiative). Some peace sentences could not be coded in either of the categories and were therefore not considered for this analysis, in total 52.3% of the peace sentences (223) were coded in one of the two categories.

Figure 7 Frequencies of sentences containing 'bilateral peace' and 'unilateral peace' compared to the total of sentences containing 'peace' in speeches at the UNGA between 1988 and 2015



Figure 8 shows the relative frequency of bilateral and unilateral peace sentences out of all peace sentences in a particular speech. For instance, in the 1998 speech by Arafat, none of the peace sentences was unilateral, while only one sentence (this is 3.2% of all peace sentences) was categorized as bilateral. The remaining 96.8% of the sentences containing peace was not classifiable in either of the categories.

Figure 8 Percentage of bilateral and unilateral peace sentences of all peace sentences in the UNGA speeches by Palestinian and Israeli leaders between 1988 and 2015



4.2.3 Reconciliation metaphors

Cameron (2007) identified four reconciliation metaphors, namely: peace as a journey, connection, listening to the other and changing a distorted image. Only three were found in the UNGA speeches and an overview is provided in Appendix 5 for peace as a journey, peace as a connection, peace as listening to each other. In addition, ‘peace as building or construction process’ was identified in the speeches. Further it was found that ‘suffering’ was mentioned most often in the Palestinian speeches. Of all mentions of ‘suffering’ only one was referring the ‘others’ suffering, this was by Netanyahu in his 1998 speech.

5 Discussion

Almost every sixth sentence of the UNGA speeches, analysed in this thesis, by Israeli and Palestinian leaders between 1988 and 2016 contains the term 'peace'. As stated in the literature review, peace is often (mis)used in political discourse to gain international support (Bar-Tal, 2014; Galtung, 1996; Gavriely-Nuri, 2010a). Because 'peace' is used in 15% of sentences spoken at the UNGA over several decades, it became meaningless and an 'empty idol' (Biletzki, 2007, p. 352). Gavriely-Nuri articulated more clearly that 'peace' became 'something that neither the user nor the listener believes is possible to achieve' (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010a, p. 460).

However, understanding how 'peace' as a 'mean' is used to support certain narratives can uncover the socio-psychological barriers to a dialogue between two parties. Additionally, it can shed light on positive developments, such as an increasing 'openness' to the other that adversaries express in their speeches. The method and framework applied in this thesis – inspired by discourse analysis, linguistics, metaphor analysis, natural language processing, sociology, psychology and anthropology – has shown to be a useful approach. In the UNGA speeches by Israeli and Palestinian leaders between 1988 and 2016, both socio-psychological barriers and bridges to reconciliation or a peaceful solution were identified. Bridges to a peaceful solution are considered calls for a dialogue between the adversaries as equal partners. Bridges to a dialogue in the UNGA speeches were often established through the use of metaphors and on rare occasions by connecting together the meta-narratives of the two peoples by the speakers. Before concluding with the barriers and bridges that could be identified in the language of the UNGA speeches, the next two sub-sections will answer the following three sub-questions:

1. *What key themes recur throughout the speeches with regards to the term 'peace'?*
2. *How do the leaders position themselves in the international community?*
3. *How do the leaders giving the speeches position themselves in relation to the other?*

5.1 Key themes and underlying meta-narratives

Some of the prior findings on the usage of the term 'peace' in the Israeli discourse were confirmed in the results section of this thesis (Auerbach, 2010; Bar-Tal, 1998; Gavriely-Nuri, 2010a, 2010b, 2015). However, unlike previously conducted studies, the findings also show that the Palestinians apply similar strategies to the Israelis in their usage of the term 'peace' as described by Gavriely-Nuri (2010a, 2010b, 2015). In addition, this thesis found three new recurring trends in the UNGA discourse with regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:

1. the theme 'people'
2. references to the 'international community', and
3. 'extending an olive branch for peace' metaphor.

After linking the identified key themes 'people', 'peace', 'justice' and 'security' to previous findings mentioned in the literature review, references to the 'international community' and the 'olive branch' will be discussed in the sub-section on the scope of identification.

It is important to note that all inferences made in this thesis apply to the language in the UNGA speeches by Israeli and Palestinian leaders between 1988 and 2016. Therefore, no grounded statements can be made about the reality of the conflict itself, which is far more complex than language used in the speeches. As Cameron states, researchers must be wary of idealisations when interpreting '*the complexity and messiness*' of language (Cameron, 2012, p. 353). Nevertheless, in the discussion that follows some of the key themes will be linked back to the literature review, and results will be interpreted and presented in a meaningful context within the scope of this thesis.

'People(s)'³⁷ was the most frequent word in the Palestinian speeches, Palestinian leaders referred to their people twice as often compared to Israeli leaders. It can be argued that Israeli leaders have an advantage over the Palestinian leaders when referring to their 'people' because of a Judeo-Christian discursive capital³⁸. Not having a written history in contrast to the

37 This includes references to other 'peoples' and to the Israeli people. However, over 80% of the references by Palestinian leaders are to their own people.

38 The insight of the discursive advantage of the Jewish people over the Palestinian people is by Emmanuel Gruzman.

Israeli people, could potentially explain why the Palestinian leaders refer to their peoplehood more often when they speak at the UNGA (Tzoreff, 2010, p.76).³⁹

The peace phrases identified and presented in table 5 were very similar to the peace phrases identified by Gavriely-Nuri (2010a) as shown in table 1. In fact, in this thesis, the three most frequently used phrases by the *Palestinian* leaders actually replicated peace phrases identified by Gavriely-Nuri to be specifically an *Israeli* peace discourse. This opposite finding might indicate that the phrases are not necessarily culturally specific as her method of CCDA implies. However, to better understand the link between cultural codes and peace phrases when spoken at an international platform such as the UNGA, further research is necessary.

For the Palestinian speeches, in more than 1 out of 8 peace phrases (13.2%), peace was linked to 'just' or 'justice' while the Israelis mentioned 'just peace' only once. This could potentially be explained by the difference between the Israelis and Palestinians: an existing and recognised state like Israel does not need to call for justice and freedom compared to a people under occupation and is still struggling for autonomy and official recognition by the UN⁴⁰. Thereby, the Palestinians are also weaker compared to Israel considering their military abilities.

Israel as a state, on the other hand, needs to protect what it already has and is often called 'obsessed' with security (Palestinian Observer, 1992; Sakofsky, 2015). In table 4, the only term that could be interpreted as confirming this supposed Israeli security 'obsession' compared to the Palestinian speeches, is the term 'threat' with a prominence score of 1.5. This indicates a dependent relationship between the term 'threat' and the Israeli speeches in the sample. However, more than half of the mentions of the term 'threat' by the Israelis referred to (Iranian) nuclear threats.

39 For the Israeli leaders, the existence of a Jewish people with a link to the territory now called Israel and the Palestinian territories can be referenced to the bible. Israel and the link of the Jewish people to the land was already written about in the book of Exodus, which is dated over 2000 years old (Meyers, 2005). Thereby, contrary to the Jewish people, there is no history written by Palestinians themselves (Tzoreff, 2010, p.76). According to Tzoreff, Lebanese author Elias Khouri, 'claimed that the Palestinians have not written their own history because they do not want to recognize what has happened' and that the Palestinians are in denial of everything 'that came to be after 1948' (p.76).

40 Palestine is recognised by 135 member states of the United Nations, however, the US, most of Europe and Australia do not recognise Palestine as a state.

Nevertheless, the peace phrases in table 5 show a trend opposite from the supposed Israeli obsession: 'security and peace' is used relatively more often by the Palestinian leaders (in 6.6% of the peace phrases) compared to the Israeli leaders (3.6%). Furthermore, when analysing the term 'security' separately from 'peace' (see table 4 and figure 4), the term is not only used more often by the Palestinians, it is also more prominent in the Palestinian speeches (1.3) compared to the Israeli speeches (0.8). Moreover, the prominence score of 1.3 indicates a dependent relationship between the term secure or security and the Palestinian speeches in the sample. This means that although 'rights' and 'just(ice)' are more frequent than 'secur(e)(ity)' in the Palestinian speeches, security is still more frequently used by the Palestinians compared to the Israelis. The next sub-section will discuss how the leaders position themselves, firstly in relation to the international community, secondly in relation to the other peace party.

5.2 Scope of identification

Of the Israeli leaders, only Rabin mentions the international community in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Netanyahu merely comments on the international community in relation to Iran's potential nuclear capacity. On the contrary, the Palestinian leaders mention it on average almost 3 times in their speeches (2.85). The international community is mentioned by the Palestinian leaders mostly as a call to pressure the Israelis (see Appendix 2). This could potentially be explained in line with what was argued on the Palestinian usage of the term 'justice': because the Palestinians are militarily weaker, they address the international community for support.

Netanyahu on the other hand, approaches it differently by mentioning Abbas himself as a key figure in the peace negotiations (see table 10). While Palestinian leaders do not address Israeli leaders directly in their speeches. However, after Rabin's assassination, Rabin is mentioned in a positive way by both Arafat and Abbas in contrast to Netanyahu who is mentioned in a negative way by the Palestinian leaders (see table 6). All direct and indirect references by the Israeli leaders to Palestinian leaders are outlined in table 7.

When addressing their speech to the adversary indirectly, Israeli and Palestinian leaders often use metaphors. As shown in Cameron's (2007) study, this indicates that their relationship to the other is not clearly defined and open for interpretation and alteration. One of the metaphors that was a recurring trend was the 'extend my hand for peace' metaphor, this is in line with Gavriely-Nuri's (2010b) findings. However, the 'extend my hand for peace' metaphor identified by Gavriely-Nuri as an *Israeli* metaphor is in fact used more extensively by the *Palestinian* leaders in the UNGA sample. It is possible that Gavriely-Nuri is correct in referring to the metaphor as profoundly Israeli before 1988 (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010b), but in the UNGA speeches the likelihood of using the metaphor was much higher for the Palestinians (prominence score of 1.4) compared to the Israelis (0.7). Additionally, the Palestinian leaders modified the 'extend a hand' metaphor further by applying it to a symbol that is not only closely related to a Palestinian symbol but also understood by the international community: the olive branch⁴¹ for peace.

Similar to Olmert and Arafat, as described by Gavriely-Nuri (2010) (see section 2.3.1), many of the references by leaders to the 'extended hand' were intended to improve the international image of their own people rather than showing a willingness to their adversary to negotiate (see table 8, 9 and Appendix 6). However, some references to the metaphor did show a willingness to negotiate. For instance, the former Minister of Defence, Israeli leader Barak stated in a bilateral tone; '*it is in our hands*', referring to both parties. Unilateral examples of the metaphor are when Abbas (2008) speaks of the Palestinian people as extending their 'hands for dialogue and negotiations'. The Palestinian people are waiting for the adversaries to grasp that hand. Likewise, Netanyahu's 2011 speech employs a perspective of moral superiority, suggesting that he is on the peaceful side extending his hand to a side that is yet to become peaceful. However, in the same speech, Netanyahu also mentions similarities between him and his adversary. By speaking of the similarities between the two peoples, and emphasising a common Abrahamic background (see Appendix 6).

Gavriely-Nuri's model of postmodern peace can also be applied to the 'extend a hand' metaphor. Netanyahu starts his speech in 2011 with mentioning the extended hand 8 times in

41 The olive branch is a Palestinian symbol but also internationally recognized as a symbol for peace.

his first 8 sentences. Instead of focusing merely on the Palestinian people, Netanyahu extends his hand to Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. He is not extending his hand to one party, instead he involves all the countries in his region into the metaphor. Netanyahu's repeatedly extended hand becomes rather illusory and therefore fits a *postmodern* usage of the metaphor (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010a).

Instead of extending a hand Arafat extends an olive branch for the first time in his 1974 speech to the UNGA and repeats this in his 1988 speech. The olive branch becomes something worth nurturing and protecting in Arafat's speech: *'we are fully confident of our ability to protect our green olive branch in the hotbeds of political confrontation'*. Offering an olive branch is referring to being the peaceful 'victim' and 'the fighter for freedom and peace'. Arafat links the olive branch to his people and by doing that, he links peacefulness to his people.⁴² Arafat's 1995 speech uses bilateral terms such as *'living side by side'* and *'mutual respect'*. However, in 2006 this change seems to be reversed again in Abbas' speech. At the closing of his speech, Abbas mentions Arafat's olive branch from 1974, but without mentioning the peace and love of 1995. Arafat's 1974 *'do not let the olive branch fall from my hand'* sounds more like a threat than an offer for peace. In 2014, Abbas mentions the olive trees briefly; *'[a]t the same time, armed gangs of racist settlers persisted in their crimes against the Palestinian people and their land, mosques, churches, property and olive trees'*. The olive tree is a highly politicised commodity in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: land covered with olive trees cannot be taken over by Israeli settlers. Protecting the olive trees is therefore not only important only as an income to Palestinian farmers, but also territorially (Bowen, 2014). However, Abbas' symbolisation of the olive branch is more like a threat towards Israel ('do not let it fall from my hand') than as something worthwhile protecting as Arafat portrayed the symbol.

Similar to the 'extend a hand' metaphor, the majority of references to peace were unilateral. Only 22% of the coded sentences referred to the other as a partner for peace or an equal in the peace process (see figure 7 and 8). As figure 8 shows, a bilateral usage of peace in more

42 The olive branch is used to improve the international image of the Palestinian people. 'If we offer the olive branch of peace' Arafat explains, 'it is because it sprouts in our hearts from the tree of our homeland, the tree of freedom'.

than 25% of the peace sentences occurs in Barak's 2000 speech, the 2005 speech by Sharon, the 2006 speech by Abbas and 2013 speech by Abbas. Also of interest are the speeches by Netanyahu in 1998, 2011 and 2012 with more than 20% of bilateral peace sentences. Peres' second speech in 2008 likewise contains more than 20% bilateral sentences. However, Peres' speech was directed mainly at the Arab Peace Initiative instead of the Palestinians as a partner for peace. There is no clear upward or downward trend visible over time for either of the sides in the UNGA speeches.

Additionally, four reconciling peace metaphors were identified, namely, peace as a journey, connection, building/construction and listening to the other. As Cameron showed, metaphors allow for a *'re-humanization of individuals away from the limited stereotypes as 'enemy' and offers affordances for empathetic understanding of the Other'* (Cameron, 2007, p.219). The reconciliation metaphors are therefore understood as socio-psychological bridges to peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Table 13 and 14 in Appendix 5 provide an overview of peace as a 'journey' and as 'building' or a 'construction process'. As shown in table 14, the Israeli side spoke of building partnerships while the Palestinian side referred to 'paving the way for peace' and mentioned 'pillars' and 'foundations' for peace.

The reconciliation metaphor peace as a connection was less common. The Palestinian leader Abbas mentions 'bridges instead of walls' in 2013. Although his call to build bridges is a step towards reconciliation, the reference to walls is to contrast Israeli 'wall building' with the Palestinian 'bridge building'. In line with Gavriely-Nuri's argument, it seems therefore that Abbas uses the metaphor to improve his own image. Nevertheless, in his 2014 speech Abbas does refer to 'building bridges' without referring negatively to Israel. The 'bridge' metaphor is not used by Israeli leaders, except for once in the 2008 speech by Peres as *'the bridge we build (...) will render the barriers useless'*.

The strongest reconciliation metaphor that shows a willingness to understand the Other's story (Cameron, 2007) is not used by Palestinian leaders in reference to the adversary. Of the Israeli leaders, Shamir mentions it once; *'[l]et us listen to each other directly'* but only after first stating clearly that it is the Palestinians that do not want peace. However, in 2011 Netanyahu repeats Shamir's call without referring to the Palestinians as the ones not wanting peace: *'I suggest we*

talk openly and honestly'. Similar to Abbas' with the 'extending a hand' metaphor, Netanyahu emphasizes that *he* suggests to talk (see Appendix 6). However, contrary to Abbas, Netanyahu makes a direct offer to negotiate peace: *'Now we [referring to Abbas] are in the same city; we are in the same building. So let us meet here today, at the United Nations'*. After 2011 Netanyahu does not mention talking anymore but instead states *'[w]e have to sit together, negotiate together..'* and repeats this call in 2015 as: *'negotiations with the Palestinian Authority without any preconditions whatsoever'*. Yet, no negotiations took place between the adversaries to date. The last section of the discussion will synthesise the findings discussed and attempt to answer the research question: *What socio-psychological barriers and bridges to peace can be identified in speeches to the UNGA between 1988 and 2016 by Israeli and Palestinian leaders?*

5.3 Barriers and bridges

People from different cultures use and are convinced by different arguments (Walker, 1990). Walker found that during the UNCLOS, first world countries used facts and concrete proposals, second world countries accusations and third world countries moral appeals to argue their case.⁴³ Applying Walker's insight to the findings of the Israeli and Palestinian speeches would direct this thesis to argue that the Palestinians speeches in the sample were culturally more likely to use moral appeals and are therefore more similar to third world countries in this aspect. While the Israelis in the sample were more likely to propose a concrete plan and sum up facts and are therefore more similar to first world countries. However, Walker's findings can also be interpreted differently. Instead of viewing argumentation differences as only cultural first/second/third world differences, it can be argued that there is also a power relation at play. Those who are on the weaker side, economically, militarily and socially, need support from their surrounding. Whereas those on the stronger side are arguing from a stronger position and are therefore more likely to confront the other directly with a concrete proposal.

⁴³ Walker referred to first world as Western Europe, United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand while the second world is considered Eastern Europe, Slavic states and the richer countries of Asia. The third world is referred to as predominantly countries from the African continent.

The relationship between the Israelis and Palestinians is asymmetrical. This could be identified in the speeches based on word frequencies with high rankers in the Palestinian speeches such as 'justice', 'freedom', 'occupier', 'victim', 'suffering', and the frequent calls upon the international community to put pressure on the Israelis. The findings in this thesis show that there is no clear upward or downward trend in a bilateral approach of speech to the other as a partner for peace. However, the use of reconciliation metaphors and calls for negotiations can be viewed as socio-psychological bridges towards appeasement between the two parties.

6 Conclusion

Grounded in literature, this thesis recognises that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is intractable and an identity conflict. To shed light on the socio-psychological barriers and bridges to reconciliation, a political discourse analysis was performed on the speeches by Israeli and Palestinian leaders to the UNGA between 1988 and 2016. The analysis confirmed already existing literature on the Israeli side of the conflict and addressed the discrepancy in the literature by adding to the literature on the Palestinian side of the conflict.

In addition to existing literature, three recurring trends in the UNGA sample were identified: references to 'people', 'the international community' and 'the olive branch for peace'. Three findings contradicted existing literature. Firstly, the three most frequently used phrases by the *Palestinian* leaders replicated peace phrases identified by Gavriely-Nuri to be specifically an *Israeli* peace discourse. The results showed that the 'rhetorical proficiency'⁴⁴ of the Palestinian leaders peers with the Israeli leaders. Secondly, the Palestinian usage of the 'extend a hand' metaphor surpassed that of the Israeli leaders in the sample. Thereby, in applying a previously used metaphor to Palestine's national symbol, the olive branch, the Palestinian leaders show a 'rhetorical creativity' that fits well with their territorial concerns. Adding to this is the flexibility of the metaphor as demonstrated by the Palestinian leaders: 'the olive branch' was used uni and bilaterally and has the potential to 'build' socio-psychological 'bridges' and 'barriers' (see Appendix 6). Thirdly, a trend opposite from the supposed Israeli security 'obsession' was identified: 'security and peace' is used relatively more often by the Palestinian leaders (in 6.6% of the peace phrases) compared to the Israeli leaders (3.6%). The findings show that although 'rights' and 'just(ice)' are more frequent than 'secur(e)(ity)' in the Palestinian speeches, security is still more frequently mentioned by the Palestinians compared to the Israelis.

⁴⁴ As noted by Gavriely-Nuri (2010a, p. 461), see section 2.3.1 in this thesis.

As Fairclough (1995) rightly noted, language is not only shaped by social reality, but also constitutes social reality. Metaphors have a particularly strong role in either maintaining the status quo or in the establishment of a new order. Metaphors can also help facilitate reconciliation and allow for adversaries to indirectly address each other and to ease painful issues. By analysing how a certain use of language strengthens barriers or bridges to a dialogical relationship, this thesis wishes to add to the literature that promotes a 'culture of peace' (Gavriely-Nuri, 2015, p. 3). Cameron's (2007) findings show that in dialogue adversaries can form an understanding of each other's story by exchanging metaphors. This could lead to reconciliation and a peaceful solution to the conflict. To better understand the role of metaphors in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, further research that compares both international and national Israeli and Palestinian discourse is necessary. This would also allow further research to the existence of cultural codes. In addition, situating the metaphor usage in general in the historical contexts of different conflicts would allow for a better understanding of the potential power of metaphors in the process of reconciliation.

7 Bibliography

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Appendix 1

Figure 9 Israeli and Palestinian Prime Ministers and Presidents between 1988 and 2016




Table 11 All UNGA speeches between 1988 and 2016 included in the sample

Meeting Record	Speaker	Date	Language	Word Count
A/S-15/PV.11	Shamir, Yitzhak	7/06/1988	English	2050
A/43/PV.78	Arafat, Yasser	13/12/1988	Arabic	6603
A/50/PV.35	Arafat, Yasser	22/10/1995	Arabic	914
A/50/PV.39	Rabin, Yitzhak	24/10/1995	English	733
A/53/PV.13	Netanyahu, Benjamin	24/09/1998	English	2836
A/53/PV.18	Arafat, Yasser	28/09/1998	Arabic	3592
A/55/PV.3	Arafat, Yasser	6/09/2000	Arabic	948
A/55/PV.3	Barak, Ehud	6/09/2000	English	569
A/60/PV.5	Sharon, Ariel	15/09/2005	Hebrew	1688
A/61/PV.15	Abbas, Mahmoud	21/09/2006	Arabic	1540
A/63/PV.7	Peres, Shimon	24/09/2008	English	1532
A/63/PV.11	Abbas, Mahmoud	26/09/2008	Arabic	2294
A/63/PV.47	Fayyad, Salam	12/11/2008	Arabic	2306
A/63/PV.46	Peres, Shimon	12/11/2008	English	1630
A/64/PV.5	Netanyahu, Benjamin	24/09/2009	English	2720
A/64/PV.7	Abbas, Mahmoud	25/09/2009	Arabic	1478
A/65/PV.3	Peres, Shimon	20/09/2010	English	816
A/65/PV.16	Abbas, Mahmoud	25/09/2010	Arabic	2303
A/66/PV.19	Abbas, Mahmoud	23/09/2011	Arabic	3590
A/66/PV.19	Netanyahu, Benjamin	23/09/2011	English	4005
A/67/PV.44	Abbas, Mahmoud	27/09/2012	Arabic	3303
A/67/PV.12	Netanyahu, Benjamin	27/09/2012	English	3343
A/68/PV.12	Abbas, Mahmoud	26/09/2013	Arabic	2982
A/68/PV.23	Netanyahu, Benjamin	1/10/2013	English	3054
A/69/PV.12	Abbas, Mahmoud	26/09/2014	Arabic	3365
A/69/PV.17	Netanyahu, Benjamin	29/09/2014	English	3537
A/70/PV.19	Abbas, Mahmoud	30/09/2015	Arabic	3808
A/70/PV.22	Netanyahu, Benjamin	1/10/2015	English	3830

Appendix 2

Leximancer prominence scores

Prominence scores of certain concepts for one of the two groups were calculated by using Bayes' theorem. The calculations were done manually (using Excel) but inspired on Leximancer's calculations. Prominence scores encapsulate how likely it is that a certain word was used by a certain group in the corpus analysed.

For instance, when the corpus for group A consists out of 50 sentences by speakers and in 10 of those sentences the word 'justice' is mentioned, the likelihood for a sentence in this group to contain 'justice' is 10 divided by 50 ($10/50=0.2$). Likewise, the likelihood of the 'justice' to be mentioned in both groups is then calculated by dividing the total amount of sentences, for instance 50,000, by the total amount of sentences that contain 'justice', for instance 6,000; $6,000/50,000=0.12$. The prominence score for 'justice' in group A is then $0.2/0.12=1.67$. Whenever the prominence score is greater than 1, the likelihood of the word or word pair for a particular group is higher than both groups taken together. The formula below was used for the calculations, $P(A|B)$ is the probability of the concept A to appear in group B and $P(A)$ is the probability of the concept A in the total sample.

$$Prominence = \frac{P(A|B)P(B)}{P(A)P(B)} = \frac{P(A|B)}{P(A)}$$

if Prominence > 1, then A and B are not independent

Whenever the prominence score is greater than one, the concept and group are considered *not* independent; there is a higher likelihood for the concept to appear in that group compared to the other group.

Appendix 4

Table 12 Calls upon the international community by Palestinian leaders in the UNGA speeches between 1988-2016

Speech	Address to the international community
Arafat 1998	<i>'...to effectively and tangibly pressure the Israeli side'</i>
Abbas 2006	<i>'...provide tangible evidence that it will support an unconditional'</i>
Fayyad 2008	<i>'...respond firmly to all the abhorrent phenomena that undermine' '...give Jerusalem and its inhabitants the protection they deserve' '...provide urgent and effective assistance to put an end to the occupation'</i>
Abbas 2009	<i>'...uphold international law and international legitimacy and to exert pressure on Israel to cease its settlement activities, to comply with the agreements it has signed, to cease its policies of occupation and colonial settlement'</i>
Abbas 2010	<i>'...[assume] the main responsibility for ending the Israeli occupation, the longest occupation in modern history'</i>
Abbas 2012	<i>'...compel the Government of Israel to respect the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to investigate the conditions of detention of Palestinian prisoners and detainees'</i>
Abbas 2013	<i>'...condemn and put an end to any actions on the ground that would undermine negotiations'</i>
Abbas 2015	<i>'...Is it not time for the longest occupation in history, which is suffocating our people, to come to an end? These are the questions we ask the international community.'</i>

Appendix 5

Table 13 Excerpts referring to the reconciliation metaphor 'peace as a journey' In the UNGA speeches of Israeli and Palestinian leaders between 1988 and 2016

Peace as a journey		
Year	Israeli speeches	Palestinian speeches
1988	and seek together a new path that will lead us away	shall have come a long way toward a just solution, and
1995	the entire Middle East. The road is still long. However,	-
1998		took the well-known historical step leading to the Oslo
05/06	conflict and embark on the path which leads to peace that it is the right path for the future of Israel our policy. After the long journey of wandering and the	our strategic choice and the path which we relentlessly adoption of negotiations as the path towards reaching a a qualitative achievement — not a step backwards or a a limited regression from the path to which we have provides them with a dignified path to a secure future so
2008	the country and cut the road to peace. regression and failure in our journey , today I can identify a road leading in the right direction to do this; the initial steps are promising. The Jewish friend and partner in our journey , who was murdered	undermining any achievement on the road to peace. The solution must obstacles that stand in its way . I also wish to commend continue to follow that same path with firm determination and resolve
2009	-	our rights and opening the way towards genuine peaceful relations with
2010	I am confident that our path is available to everyone.	
2011	go down this same perilous path again. We read what response. I took the unprecedented step of freezing	a painful and very difficult step for all of us, especially in a pioneering and leading way to the cultural, we decided to adopt the path of relative justice, justice 1967. By taking that historic step , which was welcomed to adopt dialogue as a path to the restoration of our

Table 14 Excerpts referring to the reconciliation metaphor 'peace as building/construction' In the UNGA speeches of Israeli and Palestinian leaders between 1988 and 2016

Peace as building/construction		
Year	Israeli speeches	Palestinian speeches
1988	-	positive way in order to pave the way for peace and up the laying of the foundations of a just peace based of war and fighting and pave the way to peaceful responsible resolutions which pave the way for us to the occupation and lay the foundations of peace in their supported by many states— to pave the way for the so that we can build peace in the land of
1998	can produce the important building blocks of peace.	
05/06	to develop their economy and build a peace-seeking and we shall continue to build it until it is completed	
2008	in Israel's dynamic realities: the building of security; the past; however, we can build and shape a new peace than to wage war. Building is more difficult than all peoples, the bridges we build will render the	the 1967 borders. This will pave the way for ending the 1967 borders. This would pave the way for real noble and peaceful objectives of building of a new Middle East
2010		which constitute an unshakeable foundation for peace.
2011	admiration for those trying to build a democratic but to enslave; not to build , but to destroy. That the Palestinian Authority could now build a peaceful	to them: let us urgently build together a future for our security and prosperity. Let us build bridges of dialogue walls of separation. Let us build cooperative relations resolution comprising the pillars and foundations for a
2012		
2013	achieving a historic reconciliation and building Jewish homeland and help to build a future for the J	reference and the basis and foundations of the peace to tear down walls, to build bridges instead of walls and
2014	a productive partnership that would build a more	State living in peace and building bridges of mutual
2015	I hope that we will build lasting partnerships for	

Table 15 Excerpts referring to the reconciliation metaphor 'peace as a connection' In the UNGA speeches of Israeli and Palestinian leaders between 1988 and 2016

Peace as a connection		
Year	Israeli speeches	Palestinian speeches
1988	to terrorist attacks. We all share the pain and agony of war. We all share an overwhelming	
1995	tell us to do, that distance would be reduced would be reduced to the distance between this	
1998	owing us just how close we are in our hopes	
2000		have agreed to share it and to eliminate barriers share it and to eliminate barriers and borders
2008	felt like sorrow had shattered barriers. daughters of all religions. Our shared agony agony shed light on our shared hopes, our resulting in a region of barriers and walls that and higher and destroying any bridges that with the Palestinians and the sharing of the widen the abyss and erect barriers; those who our children, let us break the bonds of and for all peoples, the bridges we build will e build will render the barriers useless. Let us of the Middle East. Our shared history has	and trends, shares that desire with me, and not by walls and barriers. I am certain that and most painful of those barriers are those that
2011	We share the same patriarch. We dwell	build bridges of dialogue instead of checkpoint
2013		to build bridges instead of walls and to
2014		living in peace and building bridges of mutual
2015	Israel is working closely with our Arab peace	

Table 16 Excerpts referring to the reconciliation metaphor 'peace as talking/sitting together' In the UNGA speeches of Israeli and Palestinian leaders between 1988 and 2016

Peace as a together, talking and listening to each other		
Year	Israeli speeches	Palestinian speeches
1988	and reason together. Let us listen to each other directly.	-
2011	I suggest that we talk openly and honestly. Let us listen to one another. Let us say in the Middle East, talk dugri. That means "straightforward".	them feel that someone is listening to their narrative and that
2012	of statehood. We have to sit together, negotiate together and reach	-
2015	to try. If we actually sit down together, if we negotiation, and if we actually sit down to try to resolve	-

Table 17 Excerpts referring to 'suffering' In the UNGA speeches of Israeli and Palestinian leaders between 1988 and 2016

Suffering		
Year	Israeli speeches	Palestinian speeches
1988	experienced virtually all the sufferings, ravages, brutalities and atrocities that	assurance to every people that suffers injustice, oppression by history towards our long-suffering people, who only want considering our long years of suffering and the harsh a witness to the immense suffering of our people and their
1995		a witness to the immense suffering of our people and their
1998	around us. No people have suffered more from war and the Palestinian people, whose prolonged suffering has been one of	the Palestinian people and the suffering they endure as a Nakba, the dispossession and the suffering of the Palestinian land still suffers under occupation and colonial settlement despite the long and grave suffering and pain, and with long contributions aimed at alleviating the suffering of our people of the pain and lengthy suffering that has lasted for 52
2000		
05/06		efforts to rectify wrong, alleviate suffering, and set the weak the experiences of war and suffering that we have been
2008		the ages, and whose people suffer today from the pain of mistrust. Our world is still suffering from all forms of throughout the world continue to suffer from the pain of irrational him. The Holy City has suffered from occupation for over forty This is our responsibility. The suffering of the Palestinian people in all regions that are suffering crises and that pose threats outstanding role, we would have suffered even more severe and perilous since 1967 and to the suffering of the millions of our area of land, continues to suffer the fragmentation and discontiguity of especially Egypt, to alleviate the suffering and to help us save
2009		and deeper tragedy remains the suffering of our Palestinian people since have not been implemented. The suffering of the Palestinian people as a result of the continued suffering of the Palestinian people under homeland despite all of the suffering caused by the detentions, the In spite of all our suffering from the occupation and its
2010		and completely, and the tragic suffering being inflicted on our people must be put to their suffering. This is essential for creating despite the profound and continued suffering they have endured, hold s
2011	dispersed throughout the lands and suffered every evil under the sun	say, after 63 years of suffering the ongoing Al-Nakba: enough has come to end the suffering and the plight of millions occupation, under which they have suffered terribly, are not being displacement, colonial occupation and ceaseless suffering, to live like
2012		Strip, who to this day suffer from the disastrous impact of endured it. They continue to suffer from its ongoing effects today
2014		freedom of its people, who suffer terrorism at the hands of time when we are still suffering from the horrors of war
2015		point, which is that Gaza's suffering will never be completely over of patience in exile and suffering, and our acceptance of peace Gaza Strip, deepening the immense suffering of our people there, in not time to stop this suffering? Is it not time for

Appendix 6

Netanyahu's references to Abbas

Contrary to the Palestinian leaders in the UNGA speeches, Netanyahu mentions Abbas as a key figure in the peace negotiations. In 2010 Netanyahu said the following in his UNGA speech;

I continue to hope that President Abbas will be my partner in peace. I have worked hard to advance that peace. The day I came into office, I called for direct negotiations without preconditions. President Abbas did not respond.

And continued with;

Why does President Abbas not join me? We have to stop negotiating about the negotiations. Let us just get on with it. Let us negotiate peace.

Netanyahu uses 'us' which suggests a positive bilateral approach to the negotiations. However, the sentence '[w]hy does Abbas not join me?', implies that it is Abbas not wanting to negotiate, not the Israelis. By asking this question, Netanyahu implies that he is sitting at the negotiating table waiting for Abbas to join, if only he would. From 2011 until 2014 Netanyahu is more focused on the nuclear threat of Iran but in 2015 Netanyahu mentions Abbas again several times, this time more directly:

***President Abbas, I extend my hand — the hand of Israel — in peace.** I hope that he will grasp that hand. We are both the sons of Abraham. My people call him Avraham; his people call him Ibrahim.' (Netanyahu 2010)*

The sentence in the quote above emphasized in bold, is a direct address to Abbas, followed by an indirect mention Abbas. Netanyahu continues with a bilateral: '**we are both sons**' and links together the two peoples based on their common Abrahamic background.

Extend a hand or an olive branch

In 1988 Arafat gives his second speech to the UNGA. The leader uses a hand metaphor twice in this speech, both uses of the metaphor are not directed towards Israel but rather towards the international community, first Arafat advocates to put an end to the '*destruction of villages and cities*' and continues with '*[l]et all hands join in defense (...) to end a tragedy*'. Directly after Arafat uses a hand metaphor again; '*I have come to you in the name of my People, offering my hand so that we can make real peace, peace based on justice*'. Arafat's speech in 1988 is not directed towards Israel. Likewise, in his speech of 1988, Netanyahu mentions an extending

hands metaphor without directly addressing the Palestinian people. Netanyahu employs a past tense in his sentence:

*It was in fact in that spirit that the founders of **Israel stretched out the hand of peace to our neighbours** in our Declaration of Independence some 50 years ago. Now, half a century later, as we view with pride our nation's extraordinary accomplishments and achievements, we are determined to complete the circle of peace around us.*

Although Netanyahu states: '*we are determined to complete the circle of peace around us*', he does not change the 'stretched out' hand to the present tense. His statement emphasizes a positive perspective on Israel: Israel as a peace seeking nation and Israel as accomplishing and achieving. Both the statement of Arafat in 1988 and of Netanyahu 10 years later are intended to improve the international image of their own people rather than showing a willingness to their adversary to negotiate peace (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010). Contrariwise, a speech given by the Israeli leader Barak two years later (2000) shows more willingness to negotiate. The former Minister of Defence states strongly; '*[i]t is in our hands*', referring to both parties. Likewise, in 2008 Abbas uses a hand metaphor for dialogue and negotiation:

We extend our hands for dialogue and negotiation to resolve the conflict in a way that provides all that is required for coexistence and openness to the future so we can build our societies and nations in accordance with the aspirations of our peoples to progress and in the spirit of the times.

Abbas speaks of 'our' peoples, which could be viewed as a positive bilateral tone, however the extending 'our hands for dialogue and negotiations' is not bilateral but refers to the Palestinian people only extending their hand. In other words, the Palestinian people are waiting for the adversaries to grasp that hand. Abbas retains an ambiguous tone and does not direct his hand for dialogue and negotiation to a concrete party. However, in 2011 Abbas refers more directly to the Israeli government and Israeli people;

*I am here to say on behalf of the Palestinian people and the Palestine Liberation Organization that **we extend our hand to the Israeli Government and the Israeli people for peacemaking.***

Abbas continues;

*I say to them: **let us urgently build together** a future for our children where they can enjoy freedom, security and prosperity. **Let us build bridges** of dialogue instead of checkpoints and walls of separation.*

Although Abbas makes a bilateral proposal of creating peace ('let us build bridges'), he starts off by stating '*I say to them*' (emphasis by author). By adding the "I" into his speech, Abbas takes

away the bilateral tone deployed in the 'us' and employs a perspective of moral superiority, portraying himself and the Palestinian people as the one wanting peace.

Then, twelve years after his first speech as a leader at the UN, Netanyahu refers to the extended hand again. Netanyahu starts his speech in 2011 with mentioning the extended hand 8 times in his first 8 sentences:

*Israel has **extended its hand** in peace from the moment it was established 63years ago. On behalf of Israel and the Jewish people, I **extend that hand** again today. I **extend it** to the people of Egypt and Jordan, with renewed friendship for neighbours with whom we have made peace. I **extend it** to the people of Turkey, with respect and goodwill. I **extend it** to the people of Libya and Tunisia, with admiration for those trying to build a democratic future. I **extend it** to the other peoples of North Africa and the Arabian peninsula, with whom we want to forge a new beginning. I **extend it** to the people of Syria, Lebanon and Iran, with awe at the courage of those fighting brutal repression.*

*Most especially, I **extend my hand to the Palestinian people**, with whom we seek a just and lasting peace.*

Instead of focusing merely on the Palestinian people, Netanyahu extends his hand to Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. He is not extending his hand and making eye contact with one party, instead he involves all the countries in his region into the metaphor. Netanyahu's repeatedly extended hand becomes rather illusory and therefore fits a *postmodern* usage of the metaphor (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010a). Much later in his speech Netanyahu addresses the Arab community while referring to 'one hand': '[t]here is an old Arab saying that one cannot applaud with one hand'. Netanyahu then continues;

Well, the same is true of peace. I cannot make peace alone. I cannot make peace without an interlocutor. President Abbas, I extend my hand — the hand of Israel — in peace. I hope that he will grasp that hand. We are both the sons of Abraham. My people call him Avraham; his people call him Ibrahim. We share the same patriarch. We dwell in the same land. Our destinies are intertwined.

While Netanyahu employs a perspective of moral superiority, suggesting that he is on the peaceful side extending his hand to a side that is yet to become peaceful, he also mentions similarities between him and his adversary. By speaking of the similarities between the two peoples, Netanyahu applies a bilateral positive tone that could allow for reconciliation (Cameron, 2007).

In 2012 Abbas expresses his disappointment with the settlement expansions and the Israeli government policies that disadvantage the Palestinian people. After a sum up of what is wrong about the Israeli government from Abbas' perspective, the leader continues;

Despite our disappointment, we continue to sincerely extend a hand to the Israeli people to make peace. We realize that ultimately the two peoples must live and coexist, each in their respective State, in the Holy Land.

In 2015 Abbas reaffirms the extended or 'outstretched' hand despite his discontent with the Israeli government:

All that notwithstanding, my hand remains outstretched for the just peace that will guarantee my people's rights, freedom and human dignity. I say to our neighbours, the sons and daughters of the Israeli people, that peace is in their interest and in our interest and in the interest of their future generations and our future generations.

Note however, that Abbas is clearly talking of a unilateral 'just' peace, as he says '*that will guarantee my people's rights*'. Abbas shifted from a moderate exchange of uni and bilateral discourse to an openly unilateral discourse when using the metaphor. Additionally, comparable to his speech in 2011, Abbas reiterates the fact that he is saying it to an abstract 'them': '*I say to them*'.

Another metaphor similar to the 'extend a hand' is the 'extending an olive branch' by Palestinian leaders. In stead of extending a hand Arafat extends an olive branch for the first time in his 1974 speech to the UNGA and repeats this in his 1988 speech; '*the olive branch I carried that day, and made that branch, which we have watered with our blood, sweat and tears, grow into a tree firmly rooted in the ground and reaching for the sky*'. The olive branch grew and is now firmly rooted in the ground. The olive branch becomes something worth nurturing and protecting in Arafat's speech; '*we are fully confident of our ability to protect our green olive branch in the hotbeds of political confrontation*'. Arafat continues directly with pointing out that;

The world-wide embrace of our just cause, pressing for the realization of peace based on justice, clearly demonstrates that the world has come to realize, unequivocally, who the executioner is and who the victim is, who the aggressor is and who the victim is, who the fighter for freedom and peace is and who the terrorist is.

Offering an olive branch is referring to being the peaceful 'victim' and 'the fighter for freedom and peace'. Arafat links the olive branch to his people and by doing that, he links peacefulness to his people. The olive branch is used to improve the international image of the Palestinian

people. *'If we offer the olive branch of peace'* Arafat explains, *'it is because it sprouts in our hearts from the tree of our homeland, the tree of freedom'*.

In 1995 Arafat refers back to his speech in 1974 and speaks of a change;

I came to this Assembly 21 years ago as a fighter for freedom, liberation and independence, carrying with me the torments of my struggling people. Today, however, I come to you with a heart filled with love and peace, now that the olive branch has been raised over the peace of the brave.

Our people yearns for peace.

Arafat's 1995 speech uses bilateral terms such as *'living side by side'* and *'mutual respect'*. However, in 2006 this change seems to be reversed again in Abbas' speech. At the closing of his speech, Abbas mentions Arafat's olive branch from 1974, but without mentioning the peace and love of 1995;

Thirty-two years ago, from this rostrum, the late President Yasser Arafat issued his famous and resounding call: "Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand" (A/PV.2282, para. 82). I now reiterate that call. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat: do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.

Arafat's 1974 *'do not let the olive branch fall from my hand'* sounds more like a threat than an offer for peace. Nevertheless, Abbas choose to reiterate the 1974 threat instead of the 1995 offer by Arafat. Conversely, in 2008, Palestinian leader Fayyad chooses to emphasize the peacefulness of the symbol instead of the risk of the branch falling.

When a representative of Palestine spoke for the first time from this rostrum, he, the late President Yasser Arafat, raised an olive branch, a symbol of peace in the land of peace. The olive branch is deeply rooted in our land as a symbol of coexistence and tolerance.

In 2010 Abbas victimizes the Palestinian people further by using the olive branch as a metaphor; *'[o]ur wounded hands are still able to carry the olive branch picked from the splinters of the trees that the occupation forces uproot every day'*.

Further, in 2011 Abbas repeats again Arafat's 1974 falling branch;

In 1974, our leader the late Yasser Arafat came to this Hall and assured the members of the General Assembly of our affirmative pursuit for peace, urging the United Nations to realize the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, stating: "Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand." (A/PV.2282, para. 82)

Abbas uses the metaphor to link it the the Palestinian people as victims again: *'[t]hey build their settlements on our lands and uproot and burn olive trees that have existed in Palestine for*

hundreds of years'. In 2015 the metaphor is not used by Abbas and in 2014, Abbas mentions the olive trees briefly; *'[a]t the same time, armed gangs of racist settlers persisted in their crimes against the Palestinian people and their land, mosques, churches, property and olive trees'*.

Reconciliation metaphors

The strongest reconciliation metaphor that shows a willingness to understand the Other's story (Cameron, 2007) is not used by Palestinian leaders in reference to the adversary. Of the Israeli leaders, Shamir mentions it once; *'[l]et us listen to each other directly'* after first stating clearly that it is the Palestinians that do not want peace. However, Netanyahu repeats Shamir's call without referring to the Palestinians as the ones not wanting peace in 2011; *'I suggest we talk openly and honestly'*. Similar to Abbas' with the 'extending a hand' metaphor, Netanyahu emphasizes that *he* suggests to talk but contrary to Abbas, Netanyahu makes a direct offer to negotiate peace;

Now we [referring to Abbas] are in the same city; we are in the same building. So let us meet here today, at the United Nations. Who is there to stop us? What is there to stop us? If we genuinely want peace, what is there to stop us from meeting today and beginning peace negotiations?

After 2011 Netanyahu does not mention talking anymore but instead states *'[w]e have to sit together, negotiate together..'* and repeats this in 2015 by saying;

I would like to tell President Abbas that I know it is not easy. I know it is hard. But we owe it to our peoples to try, to continue to try. If we actually sit down together, if we actually negotiate and stop negotiating about the negotiation, and if we actually sit down to try to resolve the conflict between us, recognizing each other and not using a Palestinian State as a stepping stone for yet another Islamist dictatorship in the Middle East but as something that will live at peace next to the Jewish State, we can do remarkable things for our peoples.

Netanyahu calls for *'direct negotiations without preconditions'* in 2011 and in 2015 repeats his call for *'negotiations with the Palestinian Authority without any preconditions whatsoever'*, yet, no negotiations took place between the adversaries to date.