UNIVERSITEIT GENT

FACULTEIT POLITIEKE EN SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN

OS COMPLEXOS:

SPIRIT(S), GANGS, AND D.I.Y. PROPHETS IN A RIO DE JANEIRO FAVELA

Wetenschappelijke verhandeling

aantal woorden: 26.871

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MASTERPROEF MANAMA CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT

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ACADEMIEJAAR 2015 – 2016

ABSTRACT (English)

Pentecostalism has been called the world's largest religious development in the 20th century. Precarious places in urban territories have been quickly "pentecostalized," turning Latin-America and Africa into its most dominant territories. This religious current often uses the notion of a Christian 'community' to infer a religiously emancipative ideal and to convey the feeling of a *restoration* to an original, primordial and apolitical place. Yet what is actually meant by a 'true' community? And what kind of emancipation and changing experiences of the real does it offer to these often violent and neglected places? Does it really deserve the label as a religion *of* the dispossessed?

This dissertation seeks to reframe and answer these questions. First, it traces Brazilian Pentecostalism down, across borders, to its inception in Chicago, and connects its expansion to the dominant ideology of neoliberalism. Second, it unpacks the historical expansion of favelas and the recent arrival of criminal gangs as fragments of wider capitalist processes. Third, it highlights the *entanglements* and the *changing aesthetic figurations of power and mobility* running between Pentecostal communities and Brazilian drug factions in a Rio de Janeiro favela, i.e. qua religious rhetoric, subjectivity and the stubborn power of crime syndicates.

Written from the margins of history and sociology of religion, social ontology and anthropology of favelas, and assessed through the researcher's own ethnographic study, the primary goal of this dissertation is to *expose* the paradoxes and tensions within Pentecostalism's eschatological promises of communal salvation and conversion, and to reveal the neoliberal framework and sense of subjectivity it underpins. By prioritizing cross-frontier connections, material entanglements and subaltern relations over clear-cut dichotomizations like state/non-state, local/global, the larger aim of this dissertation, is to *de-essentialize* the operations of scale like 'local' and 'communal' and the power-relations that seem endogenous to a favela.

ABSTRACT (Nederlands)

Pentecostalisme, of de Pinksterbeweging, is benoemd tot 's werelds grootste religieuze ontwikkeling van de 20e eeuw. Armere zones in urbane streken "pentecostaliseerden" snel en transformeerden zo Latijns-Amerika en Afrika tot bastions van de Heilige Geest. Deze religieuze strekking gebruikt vaak de term 'gemeenschap' om een religieus emanciperend ideaalbeeld over te brengen, of om het gevoel van een herstel naar een originele, primordiale en apolitieke plaats te evoceren. Maar wat bedoelt men precies met een 'ware' gemeenschap? Welke soort van emancipatie belooft het aan deze armere plaatsen? Verdient het werkelijk een nominatie als religie *van* de onteigenden?

Deze masterproef beantwoordt deze vragen stapsgewijs. In eerste instantie analyseert het de transformatie van het Brazilaanse Pentecostalisme als een expressie van de huidige dominante neoliberale ideologie. Ten tweede, het ontrafelt de historische proliferatie van favelas en de recente aankomst van criminele bendes als fragmenten van bredere kapitalistische processen. Ten derde, het exploreert de verstrikkingen en de veranderende machtsrelaties die tussen Pentecostale gemeenschappen en Braziliaanse drugsbendes lopen, d.i. qua religieuze retoriek, subjectiviteit en de koppige macht van criminele organizaties.

Geschreven vanuit de marges van geschiedenis en sociologie van religie, sociale ontologie en antropologie van favelas, en getoetst aan de onderzoekers eigen etnografische studie, ontbloot deze masterproef de paradoxen en spanningen binnen de Pentecostale eschatologische beloftes van communale redding en bekering, en toont het de neoliberale modi van subjectiviteit die het onderschrijft. De priorisering van ambigue connecties, materiële verstrikkingen en subalterne relaties tegenover klassieke bifurcaties zoals staat/niet-statelijk en lokaal/globaal benadrukt de ruimere ambitie van deze masterproef: het de-essentializeren van modaliteiten van schaal zoals 'lokaal' en 'gemeenschap' en de machtsrelaties die slechts *a priori* endogeen aan het leven in een favela schijnen.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADA	Amigos dos Amigos (Friends of Friends)
AMs	Associações de Moradores (Residents' Associations)
BOPE	Batalhão de Operações Especiais (Special Operations Battalion)
CEASM	Centro de Estudos e Ações Solidárias da Maré
CV	Comando Vermelho (Red Command)
ISER	Instituto de Estudos da Religião
IAD	Igreja Assembleia do Deus (Church Assemblies of God)
IEQ	Igreja do Evangelho Quadrangular (Church of the Four-Square Gospel)
ISP	Instituto de Segurança Pública
IURD	Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus (Universal Kingdom of God)
KOIONIA	Presença Ecumênica e Serviço
PC	Polícia Civil (Civil Police)
PM	Polícia Militar (Military Police)
TC	Terceiro Comando (Third Command)
TCP	Terceiro Comando Puro (pure Third command)
UERJ	Universidade do Estado Rio de Janeiro
UNIRIO	Universidade federal do estado Rio de Janeiro

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research of this nature could not have been developed without the help of many people. Firstly, and foremost, I would like to thank the residents of Maré. They are the people who showed me their community, who introduced me to the code of conduct, who vouched for me on the streets, who granted me their trust and told me openly about their daily lives.

I would like to thank the different NGO's at work in Maré: *Luta Pela Paz*, *Redes da Maré*, *CEASM/Museu da Maré*. Some offered me a space to write. All of them strive to make life in Maré more visible and durable, making it the place its residents showed me it can be and can become for its generations to come.

I would like to thank *RioOnWatch/ComunidadesCatalisadoras* for accepting me as a research collaborator Pacification & Evangelization and for their endless struggle offering favelas a voice proper – often muted by the exaltation of mass events and the stubborn triangulate of violence, poverty and crime.

I would like to thank Alba Zaluar (UERJ), Frederic Vandenberghe (UERJ), Enrique Desmond Arias (George Mason University), Pedro Rocha de Oliveira (UNIRIO) & Diogo Silva Corrêa (UERJ) for their discussions and help. I would like to thank François Houtart for putting me in touch with André Corten and father Eduardo Hoornaert. I would like to thank Jorge Atílio Lulianelli, Ivo Lesbaupin and Clemir Fernandes, respectively from Koinonia, ISER assessorial and ISER for helping me understand the rise of Neopentecostalism as a political and neoliberal force in Brazil. I would like to thank Cedric Algoed, David Derriemaker and Lukas Uytterhaegen for their reflections on my analysis.

I would like to thank my promoter, Christopher Parker, for his motivation to let go of theory and clear-cut types of categorization. Theory does not necessarily precede practices; it generates them, alters them or testifies to them.

I would like to thank Rio Hostel for the times I'd exchange the Maré for the hilly environment of Santa Teresa, and Sarah Barreto and Ângela Pinheiro for their help with translations.

I would like to thank my girlfriend Michelle and my father for their endless support in the realization of my work.

Dedicated to my friend, Ernesto Lopez (1978-2015),

and my mother, Carine Waelkens (1964-2011).

Both remained closely tied to me as distant stars.

The only strength I needed to complete this,

stemmed from the frail memories

that persisted as testimonies to their lives.

Alles van waarde is weerloos.

~ Lucebert, 1974

El amor nunca trae nada bueno.

El amor siempre trae algo mejor.

~ Bolaño, *Amuleto*

Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world?

Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?

~ Corinthias 1:20

Complex (adj.) : *1650s, "composed of parts," from French complexe "complicated, complex, intricate" (17c.), from Latin complexus "surrounding, encompassing," past participle of complecti "to encircle, embrace," in transferred use, "to hold fast, master, comprehend," from com- "with" + plectere "to weave, braid, twine, entwine" ("Complex", 2016).*

Picture 1: Complexo da Maré 1970s-1980s

Acervo - Arquivo Dona Orosina Vieira

Museu da Maré/CEASM (Used with permission)

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. EXCERPT FROM MY LOG

Saturday 16 April 2016. This is my first weekend actually living in a favela in Complexo da Maré (literally, "complex of the tide"). In the evening, I overhear people at the corner of my atravessa talking about a party on Main Street. They tell me it is a baile funke *party, a specific rhythm I already associate with the local drug distribution spots (*a boca de fumo*, literally "mouth of smoke"). "Never look directly at them, always look like you know exactly where to go," are the words I always keep in mind whenever I pass such an armed trafficking zone alone. I ask Sebastião, a local neighbor, if I can go to the party. After discussing it with other neighbors, they decide it's too dangerous for me to go alone, so we're all going together.*

Excited!

1 AM. There is still no one there. I peruse the environment. Apparently the "one responsible for organizing this party" closed off the entire section of the street. Small tents with drinks pop up; huge flat screens fill the space showing provocative and at times explicit images. The notorious baile funke proibidão *(extremely prohibited music) resonates in the streets. Its sound is ridiculously loud. Inflated blue and red balloons in the form of big stars and cubes decorate the sky. Stroboscopes lit the air.*

♪ *Pode baquiar, pode baquiar ta minado,*
ponta a ponta pra quando a facção chegar ♫

2.30 AM. When we return a bit later, people start to arrive and gather. The diversity of the people is amazing: kids ride their bikes in between young girls and women who hold their babies, traffickers show up getting their arms out of their cars, adolescents start to show off their dance moves, etc. The street starts to get packed. 'Um tcha-tcha… Bum-tcha. The music is dirty and raw. Behind me youngsters are spraying and sniffing a new silent drug, lança perfume*, profusely…*

♪ Os soldados do Zezinho,
tudo pronto pó combate ♫

3.30 AM. A series of 10 heavily armed traffickers with monitoring devices and emblems of the gang passes left of me. The current hit song baile de favela *bursts through the speakers. Ten other guys armed with machine guns, grenades and pistols pass right of me. I ask Sebastião if there is a problem, but my friend puts me at ease: "*Tá tranquilão pó *(It's ok, be calm). For* 'eles' *(them), it's their Saturday night out. It's all about showing off your status and weaponry to local girls." He tells me we should get ready for the firework and whispers mockingly: "This party is 'organized' by the* Associacão Moradores*, but actually it's just the traffickers. Oh and these guys love fireworks and parties all week." He grins at me (I really got to experience that over the next few weeks during many sleepless nights – sigh).*

♪ Trabalhar com inteligência e o ritmo do patrão.
Niguém envover por dinhero,
sabe que vai comer na nossa mão ♫

*4 AM. Suddenly the decibels increase, people get excited, the screens show armed men and the nickname of the drug lord Zé (*o dono*). The forbidden funk music of the ruling faction* (facção) *booms through the stereo. The rapping funkeiro thanks the faction:* "Agradeçe pa' facção pó!" *Fireworks blast into the air. All people simultaneously raise their hands in the air and make the symbol of the dominant drug faction. A girl passing by sees me struggling and shows me how to do it. When I look around, a group of 20 traffickers waves their guns in the air. It's a mad, mad, mad scene. Then my friend abruptly halts me. I snap back to reality. "You're interested in religion right? Did you hear it? C'mon listen! It's the dono preaching, telling us Jesus Christ is the real Lord of the community:* "Jesus e o dono deste lugar." *I stand perplexed. I associated Brazilian drug factions with afro-brazilian Macumba syncretism like Candomblé and Umbanda but never with Pentecostal Christianity. What's going on?*

7.30 AM. I'm tired and decide it's time to call it a night. Sebastião takes me home. As we get out of the bewildering crowd, he introduces me to a heavily armed trafficker with bullet straps packed to his chest and a flak jacket. When we shake hands, the angst suddenly kicks in. He inspects me and nods approvingly: "Sempre seja bemvindo." *We pass another group of armed younger people, we shake hands, and my friend vouches for me once more. When we arrive back at my place, Sebastião suddenly stops and looks around. "Simão, remember the first guy I just introduced you to? You know, he's the actual drug lord currently in charge of multiple favelas in Maré and one of the most wanted men in Brazil. His name is Menor Zé." My feet are dirty, I'm exhausted and overwhelmed, but the coast is clear and I'm ready to plunge into bed. This is not real. Welcome to Maré's* complexos.

17th April 2016
Rio de Janeiro

1.2. HUNGRY PROPHETS

In his acclaimed *The War of the End of the World*, Mario Vargas Llosa presents a bleak account of the Canudos war. In 1897, Brazil's bloodiest war raged through the thorny and semi-arid backlands of what nowadays is known as the North-eastern state of Brazil: Bahia.[1] The story tells how, amidst economic decline, and instigated by severe droughts and the end of slavery, the poor and the neglected of the backlands (*o sertão*) became enchanted by the arrival of a sinister Christian sect lead by the charismatic, self-ordained 'prophet' Antonio Conselheiro. Bearded, cloaked in a purple gown and rail-thin, the counselor preaches of death, repentance, heaven and hell. His hand-made church, the Temple of the Blessed Jesus, lets a message of millenarian eschatology reverberate through the desolate and ragged fields.

Soon enough, the fresh army of the still fledgling New Brazilian Republic (*Novo Estado*) cracked down heavily on the insurgents and their religious sectarianism – killing over 30.000 people. When the Republic's victorious veterans finally made it back to the city to receive their payment, they settled on one of Rio's hills and renamed it Morro da Favela – after the oily leaved bush that thrived at the location of their victory against the rebels of Canudos. The government, neither able nor willing to fulfill its financial promises, granted them permission to continue the squatting instead. The Canudos War remains the bloodiest massacre in Brazilian history, part of the prosaic that constituted the new nation-state and is the founding myth of Rio's favelas.

In Llosa's novel, the messianic belief in a more original and truthful community is juxtaposed to the rise of a secular, technological and modern way of life in the Republic – two equally compelling yet competing worldviews. But the cult does not merely function as the antithetical 'primitive' to the progress modernity promises. It also counts as the, albeit fragmentary, primordial resistance to the totalizing power that is imposed. The sect is the 'underlife,' the 'outside' to the all-encompassing, universalizing narrative of state-lead utopian projects (Rabinow, 1984; Goffman, 1968).[2] The counselor's communal teachings propose a radical alternative to the persistence of suffering amidst the promises of modernity. Perhaps this incommensurability, or rather tension, is demonstrated best in the book when Galileo Gall, a Scottish revolutionary who eventually joins the sect, wistfully shrugs: "Honor,

[1] The novel, written in 1981, is based on the first-hand written account of the war by Euclides da Cunha's *Os Sertoes*, first published in 1903.

[2] To understand how for Simmel, Foucault, and Goffman, society and community-formation presupposes a notion of the outside, see Symons (2009).

vengeance, that rigorous religion, those punctilicious codes of conduct – how to explain their existence here, at the end of the world, among people who possessed nothing but the rags and the lice they had on them" (Llosa, 2011, p. 227)?[3] In other words, the novel explores a critique of nationalist progress by taking the perspective of what lies in its seam: the poor and the downtrodden.[4]

At the onset of the 21st century, we are confronted with a different *enchantment*. When Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba in 1959, the possibility of Latin-America turning communist still held the world captive. In 2016, we realize it is not Liberation Theology that increasingly spellbound the people, nor was it a revolutionary or anarchist ideology. No, Latin-America, and especially Guatemala and Brazil, turned Pentecostal. In just 40 years, Pentecostalism has radically changed the outlook of our world. From the early 1950s until now, it has transformed dramatically from a marginal, apolitical sect to what scholars denoted as the largest religious development of the 20th century (Martin, 2002).[5] Estimated to reach over 600 million people worldwide, its televised sermons lets newborn believers tune into the free market of religious mass consumption on a daily basis.

Let's read Llosa's account in a different way. Gall shakes his head once more: "Instead of speaking of justice and injustice, freedom and oppression, classless society and class society, they talked in terms of God and the Devil" (2011, p. 264).[6] We need to consider religion not as a backward, rural phenomenon. Rather, Pentecostalism shows us a modern adaptation. It makes clever use of the advances of new technologies and media, and gives an alternative answer to the challenges of our urbanized world. The popular answers did not lie in a human rights-based or leftist lexicon, but in an eschatological rhetoric that promises an end to the

[3] *"El honor, la venganza, esa religión tan rigurosa, esos códigos de conducta tan puntillosos, ¿cómo explicárselos en este fin del mundo entre la guerra del fin del mundo gentes que no tenían más que los harapos y los piojos que llevaban encima? La honra, el juramento, la palabra, esos lujos y juegos de ricos, de ociosos y parásitos, ¿cómo entenderlos aquí" (1991, p. 200)?*

[4] Compare with, for example Berlin's *Against the Current* (2012) and Adorno & Horkheimer's *Dialectics of Enlightenment* (1997).

[5] "Pentecostalism, charismatic religious movement that gave rise to a number of Protestant churches in the United States in the 20th century and that is unique in its belief that all Christians should seek a postconversion religious experience called baptism with the Holy Spirit. Recalling the Holy Spirit's descent upon the first Christians in Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost, or Shabuoth (Acts of the Apostles 2–4), this experience appears to have been common in the Christian movement during its first generations" (Pentecostalism, 2016).

[6] *"[E]ra indiferente que en vez de decir justicia e injusticia, libertad y opresión, sociedad emancipada y sociedad clasista, se hablara de Dios y del Diablo" (1991, p. 230).*

suffering by explicitly evoking the spiritual and the otherworldly on the one hand, and a return to a sense of community that consists out of saved individuals on the other.

1.3. WHAT'S IN A COMMUNITY?

The cloaked counselor and 20th century Pentecostalism both advocate a notion of community or communal life that plays into a shared sentiment of nostalgia and belonging. Hence, the word 'community' is not merely indicative or constative, but also evokes a set of feelings like arrival, home, unity, sameness and origin. Just like an individual can seek for a more 'truthful' self, the notion of community creates the desire for a more authentic, primordial and apolitical ideal.[7] For this reason, social scientists are often hopeful towards the emancipative potential of Pentecostal communities (Miller & Yamamori, 2007; Smilde, 2007). Below the state, yet above the people, Martin argues, Pentecostalism has established itself as a religion *of* rather than *for* the dispossessed (2002).[8] Yet imagining Pentecostal communities as an *immanent* constitutive power beyond politics, where neglected parts of the world restore to their original Christian state through self-care and autonomy, masks the underlying mechanisms of neoliberal rhetoric that seek to adopt and reify the trope of 'community' as a body for political intervention (Parker & Debruyne, 2012).

But what is actually referred to by a 'true' or 'original' community – or by a good, 'newborn,' and pure human being for that matter – in the first place? How can we understand the rapid proliferation of these communities? Exactly how apolitical and *outside* state power is this religion *of* the dispossessed? Does it truly reclaim the people as a constitutive power? If not, who or what is really exerting power? How can we sketch out the limits and boundaries of its emancipative and purifying jargon of sin and salvation? And how does a community that produces a religious framework of intelligibility, govern daily life and mold the experience of the real? Indeed, communities can put us in quite a peculiar state.

This dissertation traces the global Pentecostal current down to its inception in Los Angeles and follows *just one of its river branches*, across the Amazon River, to the impoverished favela-communities of Rio that proliferated during the 20th century and lay now, sticky and

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[7] See for example the notion of community Agamben uses. He frames this concept as a primordial and 'more authentic' social structure that is already present in the contemporary (2001). For a critique of notions like a deeper self, a true 'I' and psychologism, vis-à-vis a notion of consciousness that is always already pointed towards the outside, see Sartre (1966).

[8] "[Community] promises an immanent ground upon which the politics and particular interests of state power and class difference might be overcome" (Parker & Debruyne, 2012, p. 155).

lacquered over the city. During the 1980s, two new 'global' networks, rapidly gained a visual and symbolic foothold in most of Rio's favelas: a professionalization of retail drugs and arms trafficking and the upsurge of Neopentecostal communities (Corrêa, 2015; Cunha, 2008, 2014, 2015; Lins & Silva, 1990; Teixeira, 2008). Both changed the visual traits of the favela dramatically: small, big and mega-churches arrived; and heavily armed youngsters and drug lords started to dominate street-life.[9] The way residents in favelas engage with these new societal transformations, reveals how a changing aesthetic iteration of public life invites us to think about tensions and "emerging configurations of power" in terms of governability, legibility, domination and charisma – yet not necessarily as strict emanations of state power (Parker, 2009, p. 110; Mitchell, 1991).

Though located at the intersection of multiple disciplines, this dissertation runs along three main research lines that roughly coincide with its larger structure. First, I analyze the historic rise and organizational change of (Neo)Pentecostal communities through an understanding of neoliberal ideology. Second, I describe how the historical expansion of favelas and the recent arrival of criminal gangs are embedded within wider capitalist processes and politico-logistical changes. Third, through ethnographic observation, I explain how the increasingly *visual* dominance of Pentecostalism mirrors structural *aesthetic* changes in the favela's social reality. This aesthetic alteration is understood through culture (opposing Catholicism and afro-brazilian religions); subjectivity (sin, conversion, salvation); and the connection to gang hierarchy. In the last part, the underlying motive is to unveil the abstraction that surrounds the mythical connection between religion and violence. By sketching out the concrete practices of Pentecostal communities and drug gangs, how these differ and intertwine, I expose the cracks and paradoxes within Pentecostalism's promises of communal salvation in a place that increasingly spruced a violent narco-culture (Penglase, 2008).[10]

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[9] Throughout the dissertation I use the concepts 'visual' and 'aesthetic.' With visual I strictly refer to the visible changes and alterations like an increase in guns or the arrival of different types of churches. The notion 'aesthetic,' I use in its ancient Greek connotation to indicate the *human capacity* of sensation. In terms of a changing "iteration of public life" or set of power-relations (*vide infra*, Chapter 5), I use the interplay between *visual* and *aesthesis* to evoke the idea that a *mere* visual change often conveys changes in language, social reality, subjectivity and power that *affect* people in their personhood. This tension is also apparent in the notion 'community' itself. Communities are often visibly demarcated and often pertain to and require a specific type of behavior, personhood, and linguistic performativity.

[10] As shown in the opening excerpt, the notorious *baile funke* parties give a blueprint of social life in a favela, where the ruling faction has often become the symbolic center of power. During these parties, young traffickers show their status and power within the community, very often to the girls that frequent these parties. For more info on this phenomenon, see *Galeras funk cariocas* (Zaluar & Alvito,

In the first chapter of this dissertation, I introduce the reader to its methodology. I explain how the challenges involved in conducting research in a 'violent place' reflect specific forms-of-life and engagement. I elaborate the chosen methods of data-accumulation, the risks involved and the phase of knowledge-production. The next part of the dissertation is a chronology. First, I sketch out the rough history of Pentecostalism in Brazil over the 20th century. Next, I introduce the reader to Maré. I show how this 'local context' came to be, how it expanded, and how it changed over time. Its history is understood by following two fears that surged during conversations and that greatly affected my understanding of daily life in Maré: house removals and the brutal violence of trafficking. In the last chapter, the story finally arrives in 2016, where I sketch out the intricate relations between church and trafficking against the background of these earlier historical-genealogical detours.

Understanding a place many times amounts to uncovering its layers of history. Not placing Maré at the start of my dissertation, but at its heart, allows for it not to be understood as an isolated place from which singular phenomena *emanate,* but as a place *entangled* within histories and modalities of capitalist expansion that predated its rise. By showing how power, social relations and types of subjectivity in favela-life are being molded and altered *through* these entanglements, this dissertation not only debunks the myth that the notion of 'community' infers a return to some authentic, prepolitical state; but also that spirits, violence and gangs are endogenous to favela life.

2006), Vianna (2014) and Herschmann (1997). To understand the history of the funk music, see Essinger (2005).

2. ACCESS TO THE FIELD, RISKS AND METHOD

2.1. MY FIRST DAY

Wednesday 23 March 2016, 11.30 AM. Anxiously I take the freezing subway straight to Cidade Nova. Then a busy parador *(a bus that halts at every stop) swerves along Avenida Brasil, past the harbor and the army depot. Dirty, shaken and drenched in sweat I get off at one of the many* pasarelas*; footbridges that connect Maré to Bonsucesso. Trying to look as local as possible, I await my contact. In the shade, I become part of the background.*

The first time I visited Maré, I accompanied a staff member from a local NGO. *Nervous*. Not only was I about to enter a 'non-pacified' favela, which means that its territory is still controlled by rivaling drug cartels, but I also conducted my first general interviews with two residents during that scorching March afternoon.[11] When I returned to the center where I stayed in a *cortiço*, the landlady quickly asked me how many guns (*fuzils*) I had seen that day.[12] To my detriment I hadn't seen any. I had been so nervous I had blinded myself from the reality that was unfolding in front of me. Next time I went, I realized we had passed three heavily armed drug dens without me even realizing it.

I visited this *peculiar* field two more times during which I also visited the local museum.[13] Accompanied by residents I was introduced to its surroundings and took notice of the rules of conduct.[14] To cope with the "rapidly shifting stimulations of the nerves" or a sense of sensory

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[11] Initially, the topic of my research was planned to be the pacification of Rio de Janeiro's favelas. However, when I was presented with the possibility to visit Maré, it gave me the opportunity to research a favela that had resisted pacification so far. Though Maré was planned to be pacified, the policy received heavy backlash from gangs opposing the process: the police units were set ablaze and a military captain was killed during the attempts in 2014. This attempt roughly coincided with a military occupation of Maré prior and during the World Cup ("Brazilian security forces", 2014). I give a small overview of the most interesting policy papers and critical studies to understand the complexities involved in the pacification processes: Arias & Ungar (2009), Cardoso (2014), Rodrigues (2014), Suska (2012). For an excellent monograph within the perspective of critical criminology, see Brito & Oliveira (2013).

[12] Literally meaning "beehives," *cortiços* are large houses with interiors that have been divided into small rooms for rent. *Cortiço* residents are often families that share a single very small room, with access to a shared bathroom and shared kitchen.

[13] In the later part of this dissertation, I give a historic overview of the rise and expansion of Maré. My visits to the local museum *Museu da Maré*, helped me understand and visualize its powerful history. Through visual material collected at the museum archive 'Dona Orosina Vieira,' I try to evoke the same sentiment of disbelief I felt when I first heard the story.

[14] To get an anticipatory idea of life in Maré, I read the only ethnographic exploration that has been written to this day (Raposo, 2014). I also read the earlier ethnographic studies by Gay (1999, 2005) and Perlman (1976), and more recent work by Arias (2009), Arias & Goldstein (2010), Dowdney (2003), Goldstein (2003), Perlman (2010) and Penglase (2009).

“shock,” I took field notes in my notebook and added an analysis of my impressions of those notes in a more extensive log upon returning home (Simmel, 1950, p. 14; Benjamin, 1991, p. 631).[15] The idea was to create an in-depth account of life in a favela rooted in a more visceral language: describing life on the streets, the sounds, the buildings, the ways people laugh and the way its initial paradoxes entered my thoughts.

Picture 2: Street life in Maré, by Simon Marijsse

[15] I use this terminology to convey the feeling of sensory overload. In The *metropolis and mental life* and *Sociological Aesthetics* Simmel develops the idea of hypersensitivity (and in some cases ‘neurasthenic’) to describe the increase in internal and external stimuli that is experienced in modern urban life. In the essay *Über einige Motive bei Baudelaire* (1991, I-2), Benjamin describes the movie as form of art which is grounded in an experience of shock that only became possible through technological revolutions.

Thursday 31 March 2016, 3.00 PM. I take in the smell of the open gutter as we crisscross through connected alleyways. We pass by freshly painted corners and dodge the electricity wires (illegal gatos, literally meaning "cats") that swerve like Ariadne's thread above our heads. Follow these enmeshed wires and you will not find the exit to this labyrinth. Instead you will see how they connect rooms, houses, churches and families to their favorite telenovela or religious channel, and traffickers to their baile funke rhythm as they patrol the area wearing Rio's famous Hawaianas. Suddenly, we find ourselves back in the favela's main street. Large industrial buildings rise up as urban temples of God. On the other side, youngsters armed with guns and equipped with walkie-talkies and loud funk music sit at the boca de fumo. We pass the small plastic tables. Kids fill small bags with cocaine, crack and marihuana ready to be sold. Mototaxis and vans cruise by, taking families to the Avenida Brasil on their way to work at dawn. Maré is a spider's web: urban, intricate and sprawling with life.

Ethnographic method departs from first person impressions: the experiences that fascinate, the human interactions that halt or interpellate. The ethnographer "observes with his own eyes. He listens with his own ears. He can realize it by being a simple witness or by participating to the activities or ongoing events" (own translation).[16] His/her method focuses on the tension produced between *entering* and *leaving* a field and within this fracture establishing a field of knowledge (Zaluar, 2009). Sometimes distance is needed. However, in order to experience the complexity of daily life in Maré and to understand the friction between a religious life and a life of crime, I had to engage in a more direct way. More importantly, I had to earn trust and learn the language of the streets. Once more, as the ethnographer Ana Tsing put it, "it is necessary to begin again, and again, in the middle of things" (2005, p. 2).

2.2. METHOD

2.2.1. Is survival

As obvious as it might seem, Maré is not a place to venture alone and ask around for a place to stay. Backpacked and ready to spend my first day as a *morador* (resident) of Maré, I took bus 497 to Avenida Brasil. Because of a two hour traffic jam, understandably my contact had already left our meeting point at the bus stop. Since I had visited Maré a few times before, I

[16] *"Este observa, con sus propios ojos, escucha con sus propios oídos. Puede hacerlo en tanto que simple testigo o bien participando en las actividades o en los eventos que se desarrollan en su presencia" (Cefaï, 2013, p. 103).*

decided to enter alone. As youngsters on their motor bikes armed with machine guns cruised by, I addressed people on the street asking if they might knew Romulu. I noticed people were very cautious to help me; some of them wouldn't even bother responding and looked at me suspiciously. When a local waiter, who had seen me with Romulu the other day, recognized me; the mood shifted completely and we successfully found the place where my contact lived. Romulu opened the door looking shocked: "Simão, you are the craziest foreigner I've ever met." When I asked him if I had taken unnecessary risks, he told me: "One can never really tell… But now that you are a *morador*, you are part of the community. You should be safe."

Entering and residing in a non-pacified favela presupposes an introduction into its community life (Arias, 2009; Gay, 1999). Romulu had already announced my arrival to his neighbors and introduced me to almost everyone on the streets. Like Romulu, many residents spoke about 'survival.' How do you survive between the stray bullets and the gangs – and why doesn't it negate community life? I found out that here, survival is constituted on a mutual promise of human engagement. Before the rise of professional drug trafficking, people would depend on each other to establish access to water or other amenities, and the construction of their roads and pavements. Back then the residents called themselves the real "owners of the street" (*donos da rua*) and the mutual proximity and precariousness between people migrating from different regions, or displaced people from other parts of the city, generated a specific subjectivity of care. At the end of my stay I asked Romulu why he'd prefer not to move out of Maré. He looks at me and smiles: "Do you remember that after the first few days you spent here you returned to the center for a night or two, right? When you returned, everybody still knew you and even people who you hadn't met already knew who you were. That is its power" (interview, 17/05/2016).

The communal conviviality and collaboration that arose in these economically precarious places has increasingly shown its benefits in terms of security. When residents spoke about *a comunidade* (the community) they referred to the earlier days of collaboration and proximity. A shift slowly emerged where care and security blended during the 1980s. When the Comando Vermelho started to distribute cocaine in Maré, the faction started a policy of neighborliness or *boa vizinhança.* This policy needs to be understood in terms of a "forced reciprocity," where "traffickers provide security in favelas, outlawing theft, robbery or rape, in exchange for the silence or complicity of favela residents" (Penglase, 2009, p. 129). The infamous *Lei do Morro* (Law of the hillside) means turning a blind eye to trafficking, safeguarding their identity and following their code of conduct. A trafficker explained it as

follows: “They respect us, and we have to respect them back. Because we need them too, so we can run and hide in their houses, so if we don’t respect the residents, they won’t support us” (Dowdney, 2003, p. 56). As a foreign researcher, understanding the limits of what you can say (*o lei do silencio*) or ask, and more importantly when, is tantamount to ‘survival.’ “Mute, deaf, blind,” (*mudo, surdo, cego*) a local bartender advised me time and again, “Here no one messes with anyone. You don’t talk. You just watch. Get it?”

In Maré, the historic sense of proximity and care blended with the need to survive during gang wars. For example, people were proud of the absence of thievery – which is forbidden according to the law of the hillside. During the first month, I never locked my front door. Yet this notion of being secure becomes ambiguous or fictitious upon being confronted with gunshots and outbursts of gang violence. Even in the city center, favela identity could be a double-edged sword. Explaining that I live in that part of Maré could safeguard me from petty theft or let me enter another favela without problems. At the same time it could put me in danger when the robber or that favela is ruled by a different faction. The rise of narco-culture and gang rivalry heavily impedes inter-favela mobility.

Survival means establishing and maintaining relations in order to walk feely within a specific territory. Over the span of 6 weeks living in Maré, that network became paramount in maintaining my security. Security did not mean distancing or isolating myself from life on the streets, nor from trafficking. Security meant understanding and respecting the code of conduct that governs the streets, precisely through engaging with and learning from other people.[17] In the beginning people warned me if there would be a police intervention. Later, we found ourselves together at the corner of the street trying to decide if the short bursts of noise we overheard were fireworks or gunfire – *tao tao tao*.

2.2.2. Is ‘looking out’

My first general interviews were semi-structured and have been recorded. In the further stages of my research, when more fragile topics would enter, or when interviews with former traffickers took place, the usage of a recorder was abandoned and interviews would often ‘turn’ unstructured. Recordings could generate the idea of testimony or convey a sentiment of fear. It could also hamper with the authenticity and truth – or even therapeutic – value of the interview (Zaluar, 2009). During these interviews, angst, paranoia, the danger of confusion

[17] This reflection is partly inspired by Tsing’s exploration of survival and collaboration (2015, pp. 27-34).

(*perturbão*) and the fear of gossip (*fofoca*) would always surge. The possibility that the reason of your residency is being misunderstood, poses an actual threat for both the interviewer and the interviewee. Research can easily be interpreted as journalism, taking a picture for your log as a police informant's task.[18] Looking out in a favela means that you understand that your network of protection is always entangled with the network of trafficking. Proximity enables a researcher to establish a network quickly. Yet at the same time false accusations and inaccuracies can spread through the community via bad mouths like a wild fire (*linguaruda*).

The complexities involved in doing field work transformed the myth of immersion, i.e. trying to shift from a *participating observant* to an *observing participant*, into a very lucid and unattainable object of fascination (Malinowsky, 1932; Wacquant, 2006). I realized I would never truly *belong* in the favela: not a believer, worker or trafficker. Even though I was very aware of that impossibility, there was a strong sense of mutual acceptance in spite of the non-absolvable difference in physical features, idiomatic barriers and culture. In a pragmatic way, the obviousness of my traits, immediately exposing me as *the* foreigner of Maré, also safeguarded me from probable accusations like being a police spy (*x-9*), an undercover police officer (*a paisana*), or a member of a rivaling faction (*alemão,* literally meaning a german). Looking outwards from the favela to the city, I realized how urban stigma is dependent on how one is perceived – and how the perception of me 'living' there made me belong to the community.

In order to prevent the possibility of lies, priority was given to key-relationships over accumulating data from many contacts. Several residents were interviewed multiple times in order to build up trust and to maintain these relations for future research.[19] Halfway through my research stay, when I had difficulties meeting people who had a history in trafficking, suddenly a more reserved friend, Sebastião, suddenly came up to me: "I can help you. That which you want to understand; that was my life for over 7 years until the gang war ended in 2009. I was the security guard for two drug lords" (interview, 5/5/2016). On the one hand I felt confirmed in my discretion and position in the community as a person that is trustworthy.

[18] There is a passage in Cunha's ethnographic monograph (2015, pp.108-111) on favela de Acari, where she recounts a dangerous experience. She describes how taking a mere picture exposed her to a serious risk. Through gossip, the faction became aware of the fact that she had taken the picture of a religious depiction in the favela and subsequently interrogated her. Similarly, Raposo (2014) encountered a risky situation by walking around in Maré and not-knowingly passing into rivaling gang territory.

[19] This idea was advised by Desmond Enrique Arias. He told me that over time people open up to you in conversation. Sometimes by referring to a specific event or by posing small questions you can get to the actual point. But mostly you just have to let it happen.

On the other hand I was thrown back, confronted once again with the impossibility to immerse.

During these interviews small notes in Dutch, my native language, were made. It's a language unknown to police officers and traffickers – which is beneficial in case they would frisk or uphold me in the streets. Fortunately, this never happened. Upon arriving in my room, these interviews were reconstructed as accurately as possible. The accounts of these interviews and opinions stated during these discussions represent to its fullest extent to most accurate rendition of these interviews (Arias, 2009).[20] Over the duration of six weeks, sixteen residents were interviewed ranging from ex-presidents of local councils (AMs), preachers, Pentecostals, workers, Umbandistas and (ex-)traffickers. Some of them I interviewed individually over four times.[21] I conducted quasi formal in-depth interviews and focus groups. The latter proved to be important, because these exposed interesting frictions, and had the capacity to break through recurring *doxas*. To understand the wider rise of Pentecostal religion in Brazil, I discussed this topic with academics at various universities and think tanks and I visited local Pentecostal ceremonies. Accumulating data through triangulation of these different tools i.e. archival study, observations, interviews and focus groups was needed in order to mitigate the weaknesses and omissions inherent in every method and to connect wider historical and global trends to field observations (Suska, 2012).

2.2.3. *Is analyzing the global/local?*

Answering questions that pertain to a 'global' religious movement, yet rooted in messy field work, made me consider methods to represent 'the global' and to understand the reification of scale which the notion of community implies. It necessitated me to tread beyond binary politico-epistemic divides, like religious vs. scientific, primitive vs. modern, state vs. non-state, political vs. social, local vs. global, public vs. private. Ultimately, the objective became *to tell the story* I witnessed, by highlighting the fragmentary, heterogeneous and intricate

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[20] I've changed all the names of my respondents and the nicknames of the current drug lords to protect their privacy.

[21] "Afro-Brazilian religion that is characterized by a marked syncretism of traditional African religions, European culture, Brazilian Spiritualism, and Roman Catholicism. Of the several Macumba sects, the most important are Candomblé and Umbanda. African elements in Macumba rituals include an outdoor ceremonial site, the sacrifice of animals (such as cocks), spirit offerings (such as candles, cigars, and flowers), and ritual dances. Macumba rites are led by mediums, who fall prostrate in trances and communicate with holy spirits. Roman Catholic elements include use of the cross and the worship of saints, who are given African names such as Ogum (St. George), Xangô (St. Jerome), and Iemanjá (the Virgin Mary)" (Macumba, 2016).

connections that molded this space; and by pointing to some of the contradictions and elisions between these fragments.

In the case of Pentecostalism, this can be realized by looking at the "destinations" rather than the "destinies" where it operates (Parker, 2009, p. 119).[22] Then, the homogenizing power – and implicit teleology – dominant ideologies like neoliberalism appeal to is revealed to be nothing but a summation of different projects that lie equally dispersed and strewn about. Similarly, understanding how Pentecostal communities operate does not lie in seeking a deeper *telos* or essence of 'community' (Parker & Debruyne, 2012). It is rather by exposing the paradoxes, tensions and blind spots these communities conjure, that the inherent inertia within its ideal of emancipation and salvation becomes apparent, and its veil of authenticity can be lifted.

The method of knowledge-production used in this dissertation takes leave from a dichotomized worldview to represent 'the global' vis-à-vis 'the community.' The aim is to downplay the current global-local centered approach by mapping out specific connections, circulations, expansions and engagements (both human as non-human) that affect modalities of subjectivity in a 'local' context – or that generated this context in the first place. Just as life in Maré is affected by wider capitalist connections and engagements, as a 'local' context it originated from these contingent and structured entanglements. The point is that the "local contexts neoliberal globalism problematizes and seeks to transform are themselves reflections of earlier trajectories of global engagements" (Parker, 2009, p. 119). By moving the dialectics between local and global to the margin of my analysis, and by looking at how scale plays an important part in interventionist mechanisms, the clear-cut iterations of power in a local place themselves point past frontiers and across borders. The configurations of power become *de-essentialized* from their material or bodily representations. They become *mere* symbols of wider connections and power relations.

[22] The work of Ana Tsing (2005, 2015) and Christopher Parker (2009) count as a *general inspiration* that urged me to expand and connect field observations and material changes to questions on state-space relations and the limits of mobility and agency formation. Throughout this dissertation I frequently use terminology by Tsing, like patchiness, friction, contamination and entanglements in order to overcome top-down binary divisions. At the same time I've tried to stay clear from a reductionist perspective that understands human interactions solely on the basis of an economic rationale.

3. ASSEMBLAGES OF GOD

3.1. REVIVAL OF THE SPIRIT, LOS ANGELES

We leave Brazil for a moment, and travel ten thousand kilometers North-West. Early spring breezes a fresh April wind through the West Coast of the United States. We find ourselves amidst an impoverished shack at the outskirts of Los Angeles, California 1906. A revival meeting in a Black Holiness church lead by the African American preacher William Seymour gathered anxious believers of the Holy Spirit. When the baptism of Edward Lee, a janitor at a local bank, caused him to start speaking in tongues, a drastic outpouring of similar events sparked the original Pentecostal movement. Thousands of people gathered at the steps of this ramshackle church to receive the grace of the Spirit. Post-factum labeled as the Azusa Street Revival, this outburst inspired a first 'wave' of Pentecostalism (Freston, 1995, 1996; Martin, 2002; Yong, 2006).[23]

Where classic Protestantism univocally focuses on Divine Scripture, Pentecostals prioritize a *somatic experience* of the Holy Spirit. Through manifestations like speaking in tongues (glossolalia) and fainting, their convulsing bodies give expression to the presence of the Divine. In Latin-America, Pentecostalism can be seen as the direct opponent to Liberation Theology's intellectualism, because it prioritizes bodily experiences over knowledge. This pneumacentrality relates closely to rituals of divine cure, like exorcism, which make up the core of its ceremonies. They also assert the importance of the supernatural being experienced in daily life (Chestnut, 1997; Mariano, 2008). When visiting cults, testimonies of miraculous healings would very often precede the arrival of the preacher. It's rather self-explanatory, why a religion, which originated in a Black Holiness Church, and united people of different skin color and culture, and which offered healing practices, still appeals to those parts of the world where people stem from different backgrounds, and have low access to education and health care. Pentecostalism showed an alternative way to "cope with poverty" and became quickly known as a *religion of the dispossessed* (Mariz, 1989; Martin, 2002).

In the time span of a century this new form of American evangelicalism splintered into a worldwide multitude of different units with different tenors. Currently Pentecostalism and Charismatic Christianity count over 600 million members. It makes up the largest bulk of

[23] Freston uses the word 'wave', since "The concept of wave emphasizes Pentecostalism's versatility, but also the way each church carries the marks of the era in which it was born" (1995, p. 120). I use this concept in the same connotation.

Christianity with strongholds in Latin-America and Africa and poorer districts in Western megapolises like London and Paris, which are often connected to diaspora groups in the global south (Corten, 1999). During Latin-America's Neopentecostal boom in the 1970s and 1980s, Pentecostalism drastically changed the religious landscape of a territory that until then exclusively belonged to Catholicism, simmering through via Guatemala and Honduras, to Brazil.

3.2. *Holiness* in Brazil[24]

Two years after the revival, a young lay and a pastor of the Swedish Baptist church received separate prophecies at a Pentecostal conference in Chicago. The prophecy foretold that they were to spread the Word in Parà, a place they had never even heard of – or so the legend goes (Anderson, 2013). On the 19th of November 1910, these two young missionaries arrived at the harbor of Belèm; capital of Parà and gateway to the River Amazon. Only just turned twenty six, Daniel Berg accompanied the tall and slender Gunnar Vingren on their shared crusade. Together they founded the Missão de Fé Apostólica, which turned into Assembleia de Deus in 1918. The initial forms of the Assemblies of God in Brazil (and the Congregation of Christ in the South of Brazil in 1910) remained closely tied to the original Scandinavian Baptist religious teachings of Lewi Pethrus and William Durham's North American counterpart.[25] These original missionaries of historic Pentecostalism need to be imagined as small cults that preach a type of protestant asceticism.

This first *wave* of Pentecostalism (1910-1950) achieved modest success. It remained a religious minority largely ignored by the Catholic Church in most parts of Latin-America. They denounced any political activity and held strongly to a "true and original" reading of the

[24] There is an extensive literature on the rise of Pentecostalism in Latin-America and Brazil. For a general introduction to the religious development, see Anderson (2013) and Martin (2002). For Latin America, see Lehmann (1996) and Cleary & Stewart-Gambino (1997). Where Smilde's study (2007) focuses on Venezuela, Garrard-Burnett (2010) sketches it out for Guatemala. The most elucidating studies on Brazilian Pentecostalism I found to be Chestnut (1997), Corten (1999, 2014), Freston (1995), Mariz (1989) and Mariz & Gracino Jr. (2013). For Brazilian scholarly work, I refer to Almeida (2006) and Mariano (1996, 1999, 2004). For the intersection between Pentecostalism and Brazilian politics, I found the work of Figueredo (2012), Freston (1996), Machado (2006) and Oro (2005) to be important contributions. For sociological data on religious transition in Brazil, see Almeida & Monteiro (2001). For a specific study on IURD, see the work of Almeida (2009) and Mariano (2004).

[25] The first manifestations of the Holy Spirit Movement in Brazil were related to the teachings of William Durham. He became convinced by personal experiences of speaking in tongues when visiting the Azusa Street Movement. He greatly influenced Luigi Francescon who established the first Italian Pentecostal communities in Argentina and Brazil. Francescon arrived in Santo Antonio da Plantina, Paraná in 1910 where he founded the Congregação Cristã no Brasil. See Burgess (2002, pp. 594-595).

gospel. As "this truth is far beyond the grasp of the masses or the state" any participation of the church in politics was considered taboo as it occluded this truth from appearing (Troeltsch as cited in Freston, 1995, p. 10). Within these early teachings, priority is given to an original reading of the Bible and the reception of the 'Gifts of the Holy Spirit.' *Historic* or *classic* Pentecostalism entails a radical sectarianism and is characterized by an anti-Catholic stance through rituals of speaking in tongues, and an ascetic rejection of the world and its temptations (Mariano, 1996).

The second wave occurred in times of rapid urban expansion during the 1950s and 1960s. Until then, missionary communities of Pentecostalism never exceeded more than 5% of the population in most of Latin-American countries. Yet, when Fidel Castro took over Cuba in 1959, this new religion became part of a pre-emptive agenda to withstand a communist breakthrough in Latin-America, because it propagated a spiritual alternative to a leftist ideology. North-American Evangelicalism remained a politically conservative voice to this day and the rise of new technologies and media like radio and television back then, allowed for a large chunk of the American people to be addressed directly. Billy Graham's famous radio-program *Hour of Decision*, for example, emblematically reflects the era of televangelism and religious mass consumption. In turn, the availability of mass media allowed for a new potential of Latin-American believers to be introduced to America's free market of religion and its conservative ideology. Back then, the main spiritual good being offered and marketed through their radio programs was divine cure (Mariano, 1996).

Via door-to-door visits, televangelist practices, and the help of an increasing amount of "newborn" believers that started to preach and bring in new converts, non-pentecostal churches would 'pentecostalize.' This sudden religious-geographical change pressurized the Vatican to reconsider the status of Protestantism in the world. In the Second Vatican Council's decree *Unitatis Redintegratio*, signed in 1965, all Protestants became addressed by Pope John XXIII as "Separated Brethren." It symbolized a statement of acceptance and unity. Moreover, it referred to territories which had been the exclusive domain of Roman Catholicism, but had become increasingly torn between different currents of Christianity. These different factors gave the impetus for scholars to recognize Pentecostalism as a *global movement* rooted in the mobilizing potential of the dispossessed (Corrêa, 2015; Corten, 1999; Cunha, 2015). In the meanwhile, three large new groups appeared in São Paulo: The Church of the Four-Square Gospel (1951), Brazil for Christ (1955) and God is Love (1962) (Freston, 1995, p. 120). In spite of these new formats and its surging growth in Central-America, its

spread remained altogether slow and timid in South-American countries like Venezuela and Brazil (Smilde, 2007; Corrêa, 2015).[26]

The third wave is paramount to demarcate this new religious presence in Brazil as an *intervention*, and to grasp its increasingly *visual dominance* in the public space and its politics. Imagine Brazil at the end of the 1970s. The country underwent a golden age – economically speaking – and was modernizing at a fast pace under its military government (1964-1985). By the beginning of the 1980s, two thirds of its population had been urbanized, yet slowly the backlash of this fast growth was showing its Janus-faced character: the economic miracle halted abruptly, and the lost decade of the 1980s commenced (Freston, 1995, p. 120). An explosion of expectations and dreams quickly clashed with a bleak reality no longer able to make ends meet. Rio in those days symbolized decadence. Slowly the Comando Vermelho and rivaling drug factions started to dominate the cocaine business around the *boca de fumo*. Violence and mass consumption were on the rise in the marvelous city.

The third Pentecostal wave started in the late 1970s and its power consolidated during the 1980s with the arrival of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (1977) and the International Church of the Grace of God (1980). The Universal Church, now the largest Pentecostal Church in Brazil, was founded by the Brazilian billionaire Bishop Edir Macedo. Recently denominated as the Neopentecostal movement, this wave is considered to be an adaptation to the changes that occurred during the dictatorship.[27] In other words, Neopentecostalism catered to the necessities and changes caused by the Brazilian government during that epoch:

> *Industrial deepening, rapid urbanization caused by expulsion from the countryside; the modern mass media which reach virtually the whole population; the crisis of*

[26] "Until the end of the 1980s Venezuela provides relatively infertile ground for evangelical growth compared to other Latin American countries. But it has been dramatic since then as the percentage of population that considers itself evangelical roughly doubled in the decade of the 1990s" (Smilde, 2007, p. 29).

[27] In the aftermath of the third wave, academics have started to distinguish the historical format at the turn of the 20th century to its more recent modality, namely Neopentecostalism. In Brazil, the latter overlaps largely with the rise of the Universal Church. Corten states that this divide indicates a "polysemical" distinction, but that it "doesn't refer to radically different phenomena" (Corten, 1999, p. 63). The most important common traits are divine cure (exorcism), proselytes, sobriety and the Bible. IURD (or Neopentecostalism in general) adds a theology of prosperity (tithing), a political agenda and a discourse of millennialist hope to it. Classic Pentecostalism remains largely apolitical and ascetic. IAD adopted some of Neopentecostalism's traits, making a clear conceptual division between historic Pentecostalism and Neopentecostalism difficult to indicate.

> *Catholicism and the growth of Umbanda; and the economic stagnation during the 1980s (Freston, 1995, p. 129).*

In classic Pentecostal denominations, such as Assemblies of God, divine cure had been the central theme.[28] Yet when the Catholic Church failed to provide an effective response to the prevailing economic deprivations during the 1980s, Neopentecostalism proffered a new, hopeful eschatology to the new urban masses. Instead of an ascetic doctrine, its answer turned into a prosperity theology of the wealth and health gospel. Neopentecostalism offered a prospectus of imminent financial gain *in* this life.[29] Prosperity and wealth became inscribed in the religious practice of tithing: investing the famous 10% of your salary in your church. Based on the Franciscan adage "to give is to receive," investing in the work of God is said to capitalize in and generate revenues for the future.

This religious addendum quickly allowed for an entrepreneurial and capitalist model to govern the way these churches would manage the distribution of their *divine goods* (Mariano, 2008). In order to stimulate this model, people were being incentivized to leave their jobs and start local businesses. Becoming a business owner would generate better revenues. So, next to a practice of financial and economic liberation based on a system of saving and investing, an image of man as individual, entrepreneurial and self-emancipated became introduced. As Edir Macedo stated: "Faith is attached to obedience. This in turn is linked to action. Hence, faith is action" (own translation).[30] Through new technologies of mass communication, previously inaccessible places became increasingly malleable by and introduced to market-oriented interventions and neoliberal discourse.

Over time, churches like IURD became a brand; its early involvement in mass media and electronic evangelism provided a basis for commercial practices and marketing strategies like selling religious books, CDs & DVDs (Brenneman, 2011). Marketing became a *spiritual weapon* to spread the word (Mariano, 2008, p. 72). Another strategy that intensified the amount of conversions to IURD, was the inclusion of a *pentecostalization* or *re-sanctification* of eidola belonging to historical churches. Umbanda's rough salt (*sal grosso*), the Catholic

[28] The increase in popularity of the rituals of cure can be "said to reflect the effect of the lost decade of the 1980s on a population with an enchanted worldview" (Freston, 1995, p. 120).

[29] As I will elaborate later, two other characteristics are: a political program as part of its religious mission, and a jargon of spiritual war and demonization of afro-brazilian cults (*vide infra*, pp. 34-35; 60-63) (Mariano, 1996). I would add to this analysis that the local recruiting itself is also a recent change to its structure.

[30] *"A fé está ligada à obediência e esta à ação; logo, fé é ação" (Mariano, 1996, p. 37).*

cross, or the Jewish *menorah* were appropriated within its rituals. It transformed these images and integrated them in its theology of prosperity and status. Scholars started to call it a "supermarket of belief" where the religious "bricoleur" can mix and consume different beliefs and preferences (Birman, 2001, p. 63).

These practices, together with its (media-driven) *proselytistic* nature, caused the third wave to transform Pentecostalism from a marginal movement in Brazil, to a popular national and even worldwide phenomenon. From 7,886 million in 1980, Pentecostals grew to 42,275 million in 2010 in Brazil (Mariz & Gracino Jr., 2013, p. 161). The new Church became a force to be reckoned with. Nowadays, Pentecostals make up around 30% of the Brazilian population – with a specific stronghold in the strata of low education and low income: favelas (Mariz, 1989). On a global scale, Macedo's IURD has established over 3 million followers and registered churches in over 50 countries.[31] He also owns the second largest Brazilian television channel through which his Church maintains access to most of the Brazilian households (Corten, 1999; Mariano, 1996). To this day Brazilian Neopentecostalism reflects a close connection to forms of American televangelism, American new right doctrines, and an American Mc Holy Spirit Theology of Prosperity (Mariano, 2004).

3.3. The Political Turn

The rise of the Neopentecostal movement in Latin-America often occurred amidst processes of democratic transition. The ambiguous engagement between politics and a previously known apolitical religious movement has shown itself in many guises. In Guatemala, Neopentecostalism is often perceived as a derogatory term because people connect it to the massacres of General Rios Montt, known for his Guns and Beans Policy, during the dictatorship ('83-'84) – Montt himself being a devout Neopentecostal (Garrard-Burnett, 2010). Yet it's difficult to unequivocally connect Pentecostalism to right wing politics. In Mexico for example, some Pentecostals joined the revolutionary ranks of the Zapatistas.[32] Also indigenous preachers within Liberation Theology often converted to Pentecostalism

[31] By Universal's focus on the 'charismatic' they denounce any formal classification within historical churches or historical Pentecostalism (Corten, 1999). The move beyond national constraints is indicated by its name: Universal Church (Freston, 1995). It became internationally known as 'missions of belief' in which the focal point of divine cure becomes connected to the idea of a financial investment in the work of God.

[32] The relation between evangelicals and Zapatistas is ambiguous. Freston argues that in places where the expulsion of evangelicals was stronger, the ties between both grew stronger. Indigenous pastors within the Liberation Theology could also enlarge their scope for indigenous leadership by turning Pentecostal in EZLN (Freston, 2004, p. 210). See also, Vázquez Palacios (2008).

during this time to increase their following. In Brazil, the political turn within (Neo)Pentecostalism needs to be read simultaneously with Brazil's first democratic elections and the end of its dictatorship. Whereas Pentecostalism was considered to be modest and apolitical in Brazil, this feature changed rapidly after the arrest of the dictatorial regime.

The arrival of the first national democratic elections in 1986 held the symbolic appeal of a new Constitution (promulgated in 1988) and the possibility to rewrite the history of the Brazilian state (Figueredo, 2012). Brazil had always been the largest Catholic country in the world. The fear, shared by many Pentecostals, that democratic institutions would turn Brazil into a modern version of the earlier Catholic colony or 'secular' Republic – and the acknowledgment of Pentecostalism's own surging popularity – sparked their choice to turn to politics. During the 48th legislatorial elections, the Brazilian people were both confronted with the first democratic elections in twenty years; as with a Pentecostal church that launched and supported its own official political candidates (IAD; IURD and IEQ).

From a political perspective, Catholicism became its main competitor. Governed by a fear of losing religious rights to the Catholic Church within the new Constitution, the Pentecostal church left its apolitical nature at bay. The new Constitution offered the possibility to rewrite the religious history of Brazil and to oppose the return of Catholicism (Figueredo, 2012). Where the newly established Universal Church conflated the religious ethos with political aspirations from the start – considering this not to be a sin – in Mensageiro da Paz, the journal of the Assembly of God, a shift from an apolitical stance to a political one became explicitly noticeable in 1985 (Corten, 1999). One year later, the Assembly of God sent 13 deputies to congress.

The third wave translated a Manichaeist worldview, a clear moral bifurcation between good and 'absolute evil,' into the political domain. Politics became the territory of a "spiritual warfare" – an expression profusely used by IURD. A religious, yet simplified lexicon offered a gateway to direct political involvement (Hunt, 2010). During the 1990s, Brazil's public space increasingly encountered popular marches for Jesus. Thousands of people gathered to "break the curses over the city" or to "declare the spiritual dependence of Brazil" (2010, p. 173). "The purpose of God is that we should bind the powers, taking over government", a leader of a third wave church once wrote (Augusto as cited in Hunt, 2010, p. 173). Twenty years after the first democratic elections, the quantity of representatives in the conservative Bancada Evangelica quadrupled from 12 to 52 representatives (Figueredo, 2012). In a post-

dictatorship era, Pentecostalism, and especially Neopentecostalism, seemed to compel the ever-increasing urban masses, and a new relationship was being forged between state and church. A new political *movement* enthralled the Brazilian people.

3.4. Communal, enchanted and individual

The rise of Pentecostal communities in Brazil should be read in conjunction to its political metamorphosis. Univocally denominating it as a religion *of* the dispossessed omits this part in the analysis, because it introduces both a statist, conservative agenda and a framework of neoliberal legibility in often remote and neglected places. Yet this expansion does not solely depend on its political turn, its media-channels, its prophetic prowess or its empowering appeal (*vide infra*, pp. 58-60); there is also a shift in religious rhetoric practice in the background.

Pentecostalism shifted from a focus on asceticism and a negation of the world, a response to the state of global crisis in the early 20th century, to a focus on direct prosperity during the 1980s. Put in religious terms, within Pentecostal communities there has been a transformation from a mere apocalyptic worldview in which repentance counted as the only way out, to a post-millennarian hope where believers can contribute financially to the work of God, preparing for the return of the Messiah (Hunt, 2010).

This rhetorical transformation largely coincides with the nominal difference between Pentecostal and Neopentecostal churches – and suggests why many historic Pentecostal churches like Assemblies of God should be reconsidered as Neopentecostal. Where Classic Pentecostalism advocates a retreat from the world, Neopentecostalism locates the fight within the world (Corten, 1999). Salvation is no longer granted to the communities leaving the public space behind, but to the individual showing his/her private, spiritual struggle in the public space of the community. Neopentecostalism accommodates *communal* life, but prioritizes the individual within. Pentecostal salvation points to an *individual project,* where prosperity indicates emancipation from social sins (like participation in afro-brazilian religions). In this way, it *depoliticizes* economic inequalities and cultural differences in the city space, by inscribing it in a religious-ethical jargon where poor signifies sinful and prosperous devoted. Within a theology of prosperity, the ones that remain poor are in a lack of faith and devotion (Mariano, 1996). Edir Macedo, Bishop of the Universal Church, has become the living incarnation of this idea. By showcasing preachers as local success stories; and by reinventing salvation as a managerial and business-like process, Neopentecostalism has conflated a true

religious life with the emblem of prosperity. Prosperity and financial gain have become the mark of being a devout Christian where "salvation is individual."

Whereas in Europe the enlightenment and neoliberal capitalism transformed modern western identity around a narrative of technocratic individualism and rationality, in Latin-America subjectivity remained often closely knit to an *enchanted* form-of-life and a *passive* view of man as a being prone to temptation and deception. Neopentecostalism promised a way out of poverty by offering spiritual manuals and handing out divine D.I.Y. blueprints. In doing so, it proffered a new, radically individual and agile subjectivity in these neglected places.

Testimonies of private salvation and prosperity still resound through radio- and TV programs. People call it the advent of the return of the Messiah, but in the end Pentecostalism operates as a stage of neoliberal enchantment. As shown: "the community is not being restored to some natural [Christian] state, but reassembled to suit the conditions of a particular kind of political life" (Parker & Debruyne, 2012, p. 156). Neopentecostalism reinvents poorer places as sites of politico-religious intervention, whilst adopting an *enchanted* version of the neoliberal, "expressive individualism" in the global north. The solution to your problems lies no longer in a collectivized rejection of the world, i.e. a negation of the world and its temptations, but rather in actively emancipating from your social sins and *expressing* your individual salvation on the stage of your newly chosen religion. The secular "I make the best version of myself" mirrors the Pentecostal adage "I am purified through the Holy Spirit."[33]

[33] For an interesting analysis of the notion 'expressive individualism,' see Madigan (2013).

4. A TALE OF TWO FEARS: HOUSE EVICTIONS & BRUTAL VIOLENCE

Tempo do medo (Part 1)

Quais são os nossos medos?

No tempo do medo havia tabua podre,

Criança caindo na agua, ventanias, tempestadas, ratos, remoções…

(Museu da Maré)

Fear of death is the strongest passion in man, Hobbes wrote in *Leviathan* anno 1651. The poem reveals how life in Maré is heavily tainted by this passion. The memories of poor living conditions and the confrontations with *tiroteios* (gunshots, see Part 2) were part of daily talks at the corner of my street. In this chapter I write the history and changes of Maré through both images.

Picture 3: Me on top of Morro do Timbau during field work,

by Simon Marijsse

4.1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MARÉ

4.1.1. Contesting popular ideas

Nowadays, Complexo da Maré is a *seemingly* seamless conjunct of 16 favelas on the eastern outskirts of the City of Rio de Janeiro – making it the largest complex of favelas in the city of Rio both qua population and geography. Its geographical contours are defined by the Guanabara Bay and the intersecting highways: Linha Vermelha, Linha Amarela and Avenida Brasil. Home to approximately 130.000 people and covering over 800.000 m^2, it became officially recognized as a neighborhood in 1994. This recognition swiftly delineated everyone right of the Avenida Brasil as a resident of Maré and being '*favelado.'*



Map 1: Map of Maré

Redes da Maré/Observatório de Favelas

Maré, and for that matter also the famous Cidade de Deus, easily contests popular imagination and folk psychology surrounding favelas.[34] As you can see on the map and the picture, Maré only counts one hill: Morro do Timbau. All the other parts, including the one where I lived, are flat. Hence, the popular binary divide between *asfalto* (the asphalted center) and *morro* (the hilly favelas, *morro* means "hill") counts as a geographical simplification of an urban stigma. Second, the myth that favelas are fully auto constructed, and count as architectural topoi to look for spontaneous urban regeneration, meets its explanatory limitations. In Maré, though its initial stilt houses were handcrafted by its residents, the expansion of Maré and its current political configuration are in many ways the effect of capitalist industrialization, governmental projects and interventions – and the resistance to these. Third, there is a common understanding that the first favelas find their origin at the end of the 19th century. To some extent this is true, yet the process of intense 'favelification' happened later. The first occurred during a momentum of heavy industrialization in the 1930s and 1940s led by Getulio Vargas. The second can be seen as the effect of vast modernization projects and favela evictions in the South Zone (*Zona Sul*) of the city during the so-called economic miracle of the 1960s and 1970s, when the military dictatorship was in power.

4.1.2. Claiming the sea

Back in the colonial era, this region was a quiet, tranquil place: home to an archipelago of nine islands in the Guanabara Bay which had gathered fishermen for over 8000 years. Their ancestral memories are still contained in the pre-colonial names like Inhauma, Timbau and Pinheiro. At the beginning of the 20th century however, the newborn republic had another vision for this swampland: a large industrial ring.

In 1946 the Variante Rio-Petropolis, later named Avenida Brasil, was constructed to improve the connection between the center of the city and its suburbs (Silva, 2006, p. 70). This vast endeavor brought many industrial projects to the region creating an industrial zone offering all the proper conditions for people to move there to find work and inhabit the area: both the expansion of the rich southern region of the city like Copacabana and Botafogo and the construction of the Cidade Universitaria, a university campus envisioned on an imagined island, demanded huge amounts of manpower (Vieira, 2002, p. 47). Between 1949 and 1952, in order to construct that campus, the Fundão archipelago was drained and the original islands were annexed to form what is currently known as Ilha do Fundão located east of Maré.

[34] *Cidade de Deus* (Or *City of God*) was a major motion picture in 2002.

The construction of Avenida Brasil is fundamental to understand the rise of Maré, the way it evolved and the way it looks today. Not only does it indicate its boundary, more importantly it was the main reason for people to settle there and to find leftover material to construct their houses. Avenida Brasil signified work and progress. Even nowadays Avenida Brasil connects the *trabalhadores* (workers) to 27 other *bairros* (districts) in Rio, and to their jobs in the South Zone (*zona sul)*. The Avenida is always present in the in the lives of the *moradores* as it sustains the circulation of cheap labor to the city center.

Picture 4: Avenida Brasil, 1946
Acervo - Arquivo Dona Orosina Vieira
Museu da Maré/CEASM (Used with permission)

These early, large industrial projects happened at a time of severe drought in the northeastern region of the country. This stimulated a rural exodus from the northeastern *sertão* (backlands) to the city of Rio and São Paulo. In Maré, these first domestic migrants joined the local fishermen on the nearby hill. Back then Morro do Timbau was the only mainland surrounded by water and swampland. As migration would intensify, people built stilt houses (*palafitas*) on the water, creating the community of Baixa do Sapateiro (1940). The growth of these communities expanded rapidly during the 1950s and 1960s and also more sandy spots became

increasingly occupied by stilt houses. The communities Parque Maré, Parque Rubens Vaz and Parque União began to arise. Those were the days of the *rola-rola*, crossing the fresh Avenida Brasil with large wooden barrels to get water in Bonsucesso – its neighboring district. It was the epoch of the first category of fear according to the opening poem: the time of drowning, heavy winds, rotten wood, the evictions, etc.



Picture 5: ***Pontes das palafitas*** **(Stilt bridges)**
Acervo - Arquivo Dona Orosina Vieira
Museu da Maré/CEASM (Used with permission)

The process of 'favelification' occurred during a wider national trend of urbanization. Between 1950 and 1991 the percentage living in Brazilian cities increased from 36,2 % to 75,2 % (Vieira, 2002, p. 45). The decades 1950-1960 also coincided with large removal

processes of favelas and projects of modernization in the southern zone (Silva, 2006, p. 80). An ex-president of the Associação de Moradores do Timbau (AMs) told me that "from that time, there's news about the 'removal' process of those residents in the '1950s. Nevertheless it was also a process of resistance. Maré is built on that basis. The oldest AMs emerged at that time too. Residents started to form local associations and demanded their rights to be respected. The Associação de Moradores do Timbau was formed in 1954 and Baixa do Sapateiro in 1956 or 1957" (interview, 22/04/2016).

During the 1960s, under the governmental authority of Carlos Lacerda (1961-1964), a grand modernization project swept through the city. Tunnels, viaducts and parks would inaugurate the new postcard picture image of Rio de Janeiro. Many favelas in the south zone underwent forced eviction like favela do Pinto and favela do Esqueleto, housing its residents in the more impoverished and remote zones like Maré. The community Nova Holanda (1960), a temporary housing project built on a large landfill, was specifically constructed for housing evicted *favelados*.[35] The intensification of migration and governmental projects also changed the visual contours of the favela. Imagining Maré during the 1940s and 1950s delivers a picture of separated houses connected through wooden passageways. Urbanization changed this outer appearance in terms of density, proximity and 'verticality.' It necessitated houses to be built closer, attached to one another, but also to be constructed upwards (Vaz, 1994). Until the early 1980s, six closely-knit favelas formed the original configuration of Maré: Morro do Timbau, Baixa do Sapateiro, Parque Maré, Parque Rubens Vaz, Parque União and Nova Holanda.

In 1979, during the dictatorial regime, Projeto Rio was implemented by the National Housing Bank (Banco Naçional de Habitação).[36] This project, established by the Ministry of the Interior, envisioned making another big landfill in the Guanabara bay region. This time the Fundão archipelago was not its focus, but the stilted communities of Maré itself (Raposo, 2014). The project entailed removing the favelas in Maré and importing a 'modern' and

[35] "To this region came residents from Favela do Esqueleto, Favela da Praia do Pinto (Leblon). In 1966 there was a natural disaster in Rio with heavy rains, where a lot of favelas collapsed, so their residents also had to come here, from Morro do Querosene for example. Then with the 'removal policies' of Negrão de Lima's government, made by the federal government, people from those favelas like Macedo Sobrinho (dismantled in the 1970s - 1973/4), also came to Nova Holanda" (interview, 22/04/2016).

[36] "BNH emerged in 1967 as an action of the federal government during the military dictatorship, to fund housing programs in Brazil. Sandra Cavalcante, who was the biggest sponsor of all the removals (favela removals) during the government of Carlos Lacerda, later becomes the president of BNH" (*ibid.*).

‘civilized’ lifestyle. The different councils of the communities opposed this threat. They eventually compromised with staying in the region, having the palafitas removed, and moving the residents from those shacks to housing complexes that would be built on other nearby landfills: Vila do João, Vila do Pinheiro, Conjunto Pinheiro and Conjunto Esperança.

Picture 6: Complexo da Maré 1980s-1990s

Acervo - Arquivo Dona Orosina Vieira

Museu da Maré/CEASM (Used with permission)

Later in 1988 four new communities were created. In 1992 Nova Maré was built and its residents were removed from the last *palafitas* standing on Praia Ramos and Roquete Pinto. These two communities were then integrated in Maré. Finally Conjunto Salsa e Merengue was built by the government to house, primarily, the residents affected by the heavy rains in the 1990s. In 1994, the city council of Rio, through decree-law, officially declared Bairro da Maré to be the 30th administrative region of Rio de Janeiro.[37]

During my stay, residents recalled the days when they would walk down the hill of Timbau and then have to pass to the stilted streets or the time when they had to move from Baixa do Sapateiro to Vila do João. Some anthropologists argue that housing removal projects, however ironic, in fact furthered the growth of favelas (Zaluar & Alvito in Raposo, 2014, p.14). Yet, it's more important to notice that the *proliferation* of Maré as a neighborhood suddenly pertained to something other than the early governmental projects that attracted domestic labor migration. Out of the territorial ruin of capitalism, a fertile culture of resistance arose, together with new ways-of-life.

"There is something universal in the history that is transmitted through all of the communities of Maré," the president of CEASM asserted (Vieira, 2002, p. 99). However, ascribing universality simultaneously occludes a *patchwork* of stories and contingencies from which this 'seamless' homogeneity emerged. Formal recognition often abruptly cuts through and neglects these complexities. Communities in Rio are not a singularity, nor a *creatio ex nihilo*: they do not sprout from nowhere. When *noticing* their specific locality and history, they often testify to the story of industrialization, the rise of urban capitalism and the broken promises of imminent progress.

Maré is the fertile ruin; it's the amassed and abandoned human labor that glorified the advent of the Avenida. It's the *unruly edge* to the practices of industrial progress. When people are reduced to mobile assets; they can be removed, forcibly evicted and easily alienated from

[37] Some socio-economic background: Gavea and Copacabana are located in the south zone. Maré and Bonsucesso are both in the eastern part of Rio de Janeiro. Though neighbors, Maré is the fourth least developed region in Rio de Janeiro in terms of HDI; Bonsucesso the 40th most developed (IBGE, 2010).

	Age	Alphabetization	HDI
Gavea 1	80,4	98	0,970
Copacabana 11	77,78	98,71	0,956
Bonsucesso 40	74,5	95,7	0,861
Cidade de Deus 113	66,66	93,56	0,751
Maré 123	66,58	89,46	0,722

their “living-space entanglement” (Tsing, 2015, p. 5). Processes of rapid wealth concentration in the city made these stubborn places sticky, often glued to those projects which they helped construct. To visualize them *strewn about* in the city reveals not a binary, divided city; but a confused, dispersed patchwork of precarious spaces that hide, within themselves, the rough symbol of the attempts at rampant and unlimited progress.

4.2. BRUTAL VIOLENCE, GANGS AND RIFLE POLITICS

Tempo do medo (Part 2)

No tempo do medo existe a bala perdida,

a violencia, a morte bruta…

Os medos que nos assombran podem nos paralisar,

tanto quanto nos motivan a lutar,

pela transformação de realidade.

(Museu da Maré)

The second part of the poem evokes *fear for the stray bullet and brutal violence*. Rio de Janeiro experienced a steady increase in homicides from the early 1920s through halfway the 1990s (Corrêa, 2015). This increase peaked in 1995 when 67 homicides per 100.000 inhabitants were registered (Arias, 2014). In other words, simultaneously with Brazil's democratic turn in 1986, urban violence was proliferating (Caldeira & Holston 1999; Arias & Goldstein, 2010; Leeds, 1996). Ever since, a slow but steady decline, falling to 23 per 100.000 in 2011, has been registered (Koonings & Kruijt, 2009).

4.2.1. The violence of numbers

Generalizing numbers occlude a pervasive urban imbalance within the cityscape. This statistical decline often hides the fact "that specific urban areas display much higher levels of violence and that these may be sustained even if city averages are dropping" (Koonings & Kruijt, 2009, p. 36). In a recent study by Barcellos and Zaluar (2014), a more nuanced picture is given based on the data offered by ISP. They argue that the perimeter of a favela typically experiences a higher number of fatalities. The explanation is that the higher risk of an armed encounter between gangs and police produces a so-called "ecology of danger" (2014, p. 9). Inside favelas controlled by one of the three drug factions, these numbers are often similar to the quantity in the city center.

Brrrraaah- tao-tao-tao! Whilst vocally mimicking the sound of the gunshots and visually depicting the motion of seeking shelter, one of my neighbors explains the underlying idea: "The most dangerous part of living here is when you are outside and the police enter. It

happens mostly at dawn when you go to work because they don't dare to venture here at night. Then there are shots, a violent confrontation between them and the controlling gang." Very often residents find themselves *captured* between two distinct forms of often extra-judicial violence: the illegal violence of drug dealers and the official one of security forces (Leeds, 1996, p. 50).[38] Clashes between heavy-armed drug traffic factions and an imperfect police force, which often takes bribes from the factions it claims to be fighting, have become part of daily life (Arias, 2014). Yet the proximity to the people *involved* in trafficking, the knowledge that the faction needs trust from the residents, and their own private experiences with violent policing often causes residents to fear or associate the police more with violence or with an "ad hoc morbid creativity" than the local traffickers (Penglase, 2008, p. 132).

This focus on police presence should not be overtly generalized. Consider Maré. The district of Bonsucesso and Maré counted 77 violent deaths in 2014 (ISP, 2014). A closer look at the locality of these casualties indicate the largest amount of deaths around the communities of Nova Holanda/Parque Maré and Baixa do Sapateiro – 90 percent were masculine, the majority between 18 and 29 and black/mestizo.[39] When we look at the geography, the amount of homicides in these specific communities can be tied to the rivalry in between gangs.[40]

Even though there is a peace accord between CV and TCP since 2009, the border between Nova Holanda and Baixa do Sapateiro coincides with the territorial limits of these rivaling gangs. Though these gangs maintain a hierarchical structure, at the bottom of its organization

[38] The literature on police violence and brutality in Brazil is quite extensive. For a general study, see Misse (2006) and Silva (2008). To understand the rise of police violence vis-à-vis the democratic transition see Caldeira (1996), Caldeira & Holston (1999) and Holsten (2008, 2009). For an excellent study that exposes a "militarization of the poor" see Wacquant (2003). Within the same line of argumentation, see Brito & Rocha de Oliveira (2015). Surrounding the rise of private security companies and *milicias* (These are police-connected rogue protection groups. They oppose drug trafficking and have over time consolidated, often violently, political and economic power in favelas by taxing its residents) see, Huggins (2000) and Gay (2009). For the most extensive overview of the tension between democracy and violence in Latin-America, see Arias & Goldstein (2010).

[39] The data offered by ISP confirms the assertion by Waiselfitz (2015), that police and/or inter-gang violence profoundly affects the young, male, black population.

[40] Complexo da Maré is the only favela complex where all three major crime syndicates are/were at play. CV has always been present in Maré. Its most notorious territories are and remain Parque Uniao and Nova Holanda. In the past, its power often stretched as far as Vila do João. During the 1990s, opposing syndicates TC and ADA started to arise. TC ruled over Morro do Timbau and Baixa do Sapateiro, and held a pact with ADA to share Vila do Pinheiro. Back then, ADA 'owned' all the other, southern territories of Maré. In 2003 ADA regained full territorial power over Vila do Pinheiro, igniting a gang war with TC that that lasted two years. In 2009, TCP invaded Maré, expelled ADA from its territories, and established a peace accord with CV. Currently, TCP reigns over the largest chunk of Maré, with the exception of Parque União, Nova Holanda and Nova Maré (CV). The northern favelas Praia ramos and Roquette Pintos are ruled by *milicias*. ADA is still active in Rocinha and other major favelas in Rio and has been trying to reestablish ground in Maré.

a loose network-like structure is maintained (Penglase, 2008). Small, contingent incursions between young, rivaling *soldados* can easily spark small inter-gang conflicts. When residents of Maré talk about peace, this does not mean that gunshots have stopped. It rather indicates that the amount of it is manageable to continue with their lives as they wait for the next gang war to erupt. There is a "fiction of predictability," a "myth of stability" at play that makes daily life manageable (Penglase, 2009, p. 59). Also, the amount of deadly confrontations between gangs and the police at the perimeter of the favela is codependent on the singular relation between each specific drug lord and distinct police squads. For example, in Nova Holanda CV maintained a violent stance towards police interventions, whilst TCP currently favors a format of negotiation and bribery.

4.2.2. The Movement

So, while "violent policing, proliferation of handguns, growth of petty crime, highly unequal distribution of wealth and the legacies of authoritarianism" help explain the violence, consensus remains that drugs trafficking and inter-gang rivalry are the most important explanations (Penglase, 2008, p. 120).[41] True retail drug trafficking, however, does not find its origin in favelas. This small genealogy traces its roots back to the Andean highlands, the Colombian capos, and the Brazilian prison cells.

Historically, The Movement (*O Movimento*), a network of Brazilian criminals, originated in the cells of the Candido Mendes prison on Ilha Grande during the dictatorship. It first emerged in the 1970s when political *guerrilleros* and common criminals, both convicted under the *Lei de Segurança Nacional* (LSN), found themselves to be sharing the same prison unit called Galeria B (Koonings & Kruijt, 2009; Penglase, 2008).[42] *Guerrilleros* passed on their organizational expertise, like vertical command lines and cell structure, and anti-statist ideology to criminal leaders who first used it to secure their power within the prison (Koonings & Kruijt, 2009; Leeds, 1996). For The Movement, maintaining their power within prison was made possible by subjecting the inmates to a rigid code of conduct, describing it as "*um modo de pensar e agir*" (A way of thinking and acting) (Penglase, 2008, p. 123).[43] Soon, the collective and the inmates identified themselves more personally with the law which

[41] See also Gay (2005) and Leeds (1996), e.g.

[42] Penglase also refers to the Movement as *o organização da fumaça* or *O Coletivo* (2008, p.126).

[43] "The *coletivo* was integrated into the rest of the prison population and came to be known as the *lei de segurança* (the law of security), presumably because they maintained order within the prison population by punishing inmates who engaged in robbery and rape" (Leeds, 1996, p. 53).

convicted them, and conflated the name of the law that indicted them with 'their code.' The Falange LSN became its official birth name; its *bandeira* (flag).

During the 1980s, The Movement started to gain territorial power in most of the *illegible* favelas. The inmates often originated from these regions and other criminals joined in order to have a security network in case they'd be arrested (Penglase, 2008, p. 128). Paradoxically, the streamlining of a criminal organization produced a matrix of intelligibility and governability. As recalled by a memoir of a trafficker: "We began to install ourselves in favelas as a matter of security. We respected the community and were welcomed" (Lima as cited in Leeds, 1996, p. 85). *Installing* not only produced the introduction of the prison-based code of conduct in favela culture, but also meant that the old, traditional, and often small *boca de fumo,* where *malandros* (scoundrels) used to play *jogo de bicho* and smoke marihuana, became *contaminated* with the interests of The Movement.[44] Contamination, following Tsing's usage, allows us to consider the encounter and interaction between a professional gang structure and the territorial practices of the *boca de fumo* (2015). It's the story of how a marginal way-of-life that had been embedded in favela culture for decades became a functional asset in forging a new, lucrative and calculable economy.

Initially limited to selling marihuana in the favelas and *cortiços* in the periphery of Rio de Janeiro, The Movement or *movimento de vendas* (movement of sales) expanded and intensified over time (Corrêa, 2015). The expression 'the movement grows strong' (*O Movimento fortaleçe*) indicated that sales occurred frequently, that its monetary profit rose and that its protection was stable (Misse, 2002). Instead of a marginal sideways in favela life, *boca de fumo* became a trading place and brand within a wider supply chain. It became cemented in a network, and introduced to marketwise terminology like production, profit and demand.

The rapid spread and expanse of the Falange in the city's favelas is not an isolated or singular phenomenon. Drug gangs are not endogenous to favelas – or rather, one can't derive their function purely from the space where they operate. More importantly, it requires an understanding of the networks and connections these gangs need. When Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria replied to the upsurge in demand of Cocaine of North American merchants and contrabandists based in Colòn, Panama City and Turbo in Urabá; the Colombian city of Medellin rapidly became the beating heart of an organized international network of narcotics

[44] *Jogo de bicho* (literally "game of animals") is a game of lottery and gamble.

trade that focused on commercialization and export. Instead of coastal marihuana trade, Escobar started to establish networks with coca producers in Bolivia and Peru. When North American producers started to produce a seedless marihuana variant, it completely vanquished Colombia's marihuana economy (Roldán, 1999). This gave the final impetus to Escobar and other Colombian *capos* to monopolize the cocaine trade. Starting in 1972, the Medellin cartel became the face of Latin America's "first indigenous multinational enterprise" and "its first true form of economic integration: the production, processing, and international distribution of cocaine" (Quijano as cited in Leeds, 1996 p. 48).

When Colombia's cocaine production was fully up and running during the mid 1980s, the physiognomy of the Falange LSN altered radically. Neoliberalism, free market reforms, and revolutions in technology, logistics and communications facilitated this peculiar *encounter* (Penglase, 2008). Soon, transnational shipment networks across the Atlantic and in Latin-America were up and running. Cocaine presented itself as a "lucrative new commodity" for prison-based gangs (Leeds, 1996, p. 54). Cocaine is both more profitable and easier to transport than Marihuana. The days of shipping marihuana in bulk had finally ended when capital intensive hard drugs like cocaine hit the market. Having access to favelas located in the vicinity of large highways and industrial shipment zones like harbors, caused these urban labyrinths to quickly become suitable depots for the arrival of the white lady. In other words, the intensification of drug gangs in Brazil is both dependent on the capitalist and material conditions of the production of cocaine, as well as other preliminary conditions that over time had been forged: long-lasting relations in the Galeria B unit and a more-or-less permanent territory that is on the one hand remote and isolated to police, yet in the vicinity of important logistic shipment corridors on the other.

4.2.3. Politics out of the barrel of a gun

Consider the material necessities of cocaine and arms distribution. These illicit businesses always presuppose an encompassing and sustainable politico-economic structure.[45] In this perspective, large inaccessible territories, reminiscent of the Parisian *Banlieus* during the Haussmann era and located in the vicinity of logistical arteries and industrial zones, prove to be a valuable asset. Very often, the rise of banditry and gangs urges political scientists to

[45] "Greater capital inputs, a wider and more long-lasting set of social relationships, including relationships with suppliers and consumers, and investments in shipments of drugs, weapons and manpower. It also requires a more-or-less permanently established territory for distribution, and areas for stockpiling drugs and weapons, "cutting" cocaine, and packaging of larger shipments of cocaine and marihuana in smaller units" (Penglase, 2008, p. 130).

argue that in Rio a divide exists between state power and its territory – its shell.[46] The strong presence of 'non-state' actors like criminal gangs or even vague hybrid forms like militias feeds into the argument that these peripheral areas are to be called 'territories without government,' and that an initial "retreat of the state" allowed for the rise of criminal gangs and organizations to fill this political vacuum (Strange, 1996).

However, a rigid dichotomy between state vs. non-state actors often occludes the way connections and power-relations have been forged in the past. During the 1970s, in order for gangs to sustain a perception of economic autarchy towards its residents, they needed to establish a network of cooperation with the state. The local political councils that arose during the 1960s (AMs) were an easy target. These turned into clandestine façades that maintained relations between the ruling gang and its suppliers. Even though the supply and taxation of communication services, electricity, water and other services became fully dominated by the faction; the resources themselves were delivered to the favela through networks that implicate both private and state agents. In return for votes, state power is converted and recalibrated via local power brokers in full accordance to the demands of the traffickers. During interviews, residents directly associated the AMs with the power of the governing faction. In return for a vote to a candidate appointed by trafficking, the community would get more resources – these clientelist relations and forms of patronage politics are called *voto de bique d'agua* (politics of the watertap) and *voto cabresto* (coerced voting).

In conversation with a former president of an AM, he/she indicated that the relationship between trafficking and the local councils varied over time. This variation largely depended

[46] An exhaustive analysis of the literature on this subject is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, it is important to show the argumentative evolution when considering state-space power-relations in favelas. A more visual allocation of the divide between the state/non-state is argued for by O'Donnell (1993). In his study he divided urban geographies into different zones dependent on the amount of state power is established. So called Brown Zones indicate a complete absence of state power. In Rio de Janeiro, as Goldstein (2003) argues, these brown zones are the favelas. A more nuanced version of this perspective is offered by Migdal (1988) when tackling state-society relations in Third world countries. He states that the fragility of the state exposes these spaces to competing groups of governance rivaling over the monopoly of social control. Though Leeds (1996) argues that favelas have become "parallel states," her study does not show a disconnect between state power and drug trafficking gangs in Rio. Rather she advocates an intricate network of neo-clientelist relationships between the state and drug factions. Arias (2004, 2009) finally showed that connection established between the state and the factions are mediated via local political councils (AMs), arguing favelas are not the anarchic territories scholars believe them to be, rather translations of subaltern modalities of state-power. Although there is a difference between criminal gangs and rebel groups in the extent to which they offer social services, in both cases these spaces do not indicate a radical absence of the state apparatus but rather a reconfiguration of the way the new power relations are established (Duffield, 2014; Verbrugge & Adam, 2016).

on the intensification of trafficking and the “savy and survival skills” (*jogo de cintura*) of the president in the AM (Leeds, 1996, p. 71). This fluid spectrum made politics range from a “relationship of bargaining or negotiation, to a more direct involvement where the faction would indicate who would be elected” (interview, 24/04/2016). This network-based relationship became a more prominent necessity when trafficking changed from a mere drug trafficking business to controlling community resources like electricity (*gatonet*) and gas, where the AM would serve as a clandestine mediation between state resources and the faction (Arias, 2004, 2009). A ‘dangerous liaison’ between criminals and agents of the state had been established (Misse, 2006).

The original leaders of The Movement, mostly bank robbers, left the larger part of their initial leftist ideas behind and morphed into a professional drugs and arms trafficking business.[47] In order to gain full economic control and stability over the resources in its territory, this professionalization amounted to a consolidation of political power by blocking out the mobilizing capacity of the AMs. Paraphrasing Gay: the rise of power of *quadrilhas* has often negated the mobilizing capacity of social movements (2005, pp. 54-58). The Red Falange, nowadays called the Red Command, was born out of the *engagement* between a rising criminal organization, the mass production of and demand for Colombian cocaine, and manageable political territories (Penglase, 2008).

Unable to consolidate a monopoly over drug trafficking, the CV splintered into opposing syndicates: Amigos dos Amigos and Terceiro Comando (Koonings & Kruijt, 2009). In 2002, TC underwent an internal split and was renamed Terceiro Commando Puro. The culmination of lethal violence during the nineties is often ascribed to this inter-gang rivalry and the increase of sophisticated weaponry, turning favelas into protracted warzones. Over time most favelas became increasingly identified with a “violence stew”: places where illicit businesses had become sustainable and where violence is perceived as endemic to favela-life itself (Perlman, 2010, p. 173).[48] When mass distribution of cocaine made its way from Medellin in the mid 1980s, the Avenida Brasil had become a pulsing artery inside Latin-America’s coronary cocaine circulation. By the 1990s, Maré had established itself as Brazil’s largest

[47] “By 1994, sophisticated weaponry had been added to the portfolio of commodities to be traded. Certain groups of traffickers, mainly in favelas located near the airport and port areas have begun to specialize in selling weapons to drug trafficking in other favelas for defense against invasion by police and rival drug-trafficking groups” (Leeds, 1996, p. 55). For other work on the Comando Vermelho, see Barcellos (2016) & Amorim (1993).

[48] In addition, a pervasive urban culture of fear (Wacquant, 2003), in most cases permanently nurtured by media, reports and ‘talk of crime’ (Caldeira, 2000) help to maintain this stigma of violence.

cocaine storage room and became the much wanted territorial cake for each of these three gangs. Each of them prowl over Timbau to this day. Indeed, drugs truly “are protean and relational things [...]” (Gootenberg, 1999, p. 7).

4.2.4. Down the Cocaine Express

When the Falange branded the traditional *boca de fumo* as a popular drugs shop, both encountered capitalist circulation. Forms of capitalism did not arrive through the Falange, even though its modern organizational structure seems eerily adapted to its demands. Capitalism is not a solitary factory, nor a mere depot of goods (Tsing, 2015; Parker, 2009). The cocaine industry and other illicit businesses show us the ramifications and proceedings of capitalism, precisely because it is not derived from the assumed, structured progress capitalism promises. The cocaine industry needs to be imagined as a rough supply chain that succeeded in connecting desires to their satisfaction across space and time in the gap between the demand and the criminalization of drugs (Misse, 2006).[49] Maré is the outer edge to this chain, it’s the deregulated “wildness (…) made by collaborations among legitimate and illegitimate partners: armies and bandits, gangsters and corporations; builders and despoilers” (Tsing, 2005, p. 27). Maré claims the sea; it’s the handmade frontier of capitalism that connects the Avenida to the Atlantic ready for export.

When we then look at how wealth is accumulated and distributed in Rio de Janeiro, it is equally important to notice how dispersed inequalities of capital amassment and expansion are prevalent “because value produced in unplanned patches is appropriated for capital” (Tsing, 2015, p. 5). Capitalist structures are often contingent, unplanned and *patchy*. They are produced in the material difference between the rich ‘state’ neighborhoods and the poorer ‘non-state’ *barrios* in Rio, and between the cash crops in the Andean highlands and Rio’s pleasure seeking tourist industry that precisely enables the flow between supply and demand.

Capitalist globalization does not eclipse all differences. Globalization does not radically flatten the world (Parker, 2009). Circulation, amassment and concentration of capital presuppose concepts like difference, proximity, heterogeneity, and the preservation and active production of difference. The industrial projects that unintentionally harvested Maré, like the Avenida, turned into large-scale transportation systems and inserted the community within an

[49] “Distribution and sale of cocaine from these communities primarily to the middle and upper classes have created a complex set of economic and political relationships among communities, the drug gangs, and the state” (Leeds, 1996, p. 49).

international supply chain. From the blackthorn bushes of the coca farms, to the female hands of the *quadrilha's endoladoras* (cocaine wrappers), the Bolivian marching powder rambles a long way down the cocaine express to meet the demands of the partying consumer on sunny Copacabana beach.[50] Everything goes down the Avenida. It's the asphalted tentacle that transported me to Maré and from which Maré itself was born and preserved.



Picture 7: Avenida Brasil by night, by Simon Marijsse

[50] Brazil is the second largest consumer of cocaine worldwide, second in line after the states ("Brazil 2nd only", 2012)

5. RELIGIOUS D.I.Y.

5.1. A FRICTION OF TWO 'WORLDS'

*Tuesday 10 May 2016 (personal reflection). When I walk in Maré two transversal images halt and guide my thoughts. On the one hand you there is the image of the local drug den; on the other there is the greatly imposing Pentecostal church. Each has its own set of personnel. Traffic has the lord (*o dono*), the women who wrap packages of cocaine (*endoladoras*), the lookouts (*olheiros*), the delivery boys (*aviões*), the security at the entry of the communities (*a segurança*), and the managers (*gerentes*) who take care of the guns. The church has missionaries, preachers, singers of the gospel, the exorcists, and the ones in the streets trying to turn in new souls for conversion. In addition, each world has its own irreducible language. Jargon of traffic like* menor *and* muro não ta baixo *lose their potentiality when introduced in the context of a Pentecostal ceremony where people chant* Gloria *and* Deus. *To an extent they become nonsensical expressions of a different world and way of life. The first one being territorially indicated by the local drug stands,* a boca de fumo*, the other one by the churches,* a casa do Deus. *Two distinct antinomian sets of symbolism direct the contours of favela life. Yet when looking closer at the* boca de fumo*, youngsters armed with guns are orating and reading the Bible. Pentecostal cults dedicated to the salvation of the life of the imprisoned chefão gather both traffickers as non-traffickers at dusk in ceremony. Traffickers ask pastors for orations of protection. The pastor in turn exorcises the bad, the devil and evil demons. The Bible turns a spiritual arm in the hand of the preacher gunning down the possessed.*

The argument is easily put forth that a Pentecostal cosmology of prosperity relates closely to the daily living experiences of traffickers: money, demons, war.[51] A "Pentecostal grammar" often reads as a *jus ad bellum* (Cunha, 2015, p. 187). As explained, it offers an antagonistic worldview where the world is caught in a spiritual war (*a batalha spiritual)* against absolute evil. But an all too exclusive focus on their relation occludes the peculiar entanglements, connections and circulations Pentecostalism generates. From the perspective of the workers, believers and traffickers of Maré, the arrival of Pentecostalism and its increasing *friction* with criminal gangs reflect larger changes than the simple adoption of a religious grammar. In the following chapter, I start by describing the altered religious space in Maré. Next, I sketch out the most important societal tensions and changing power-relations (*aesthesis*) this *visual* change represents: the embracement and demonization of Macumba; the conversion and

[51] Compare with Brenneman's study on Guatemalan drug gangs and Pentecostalism (2012).

salvation of traffickers; and the persistence of the faction's power over, against and within Pentecostalism. The goal of this chapter is to further explore the framework of circulation Pentecostalism generates, and to expose its underlying limits and elisions.

5.2. Painting the walls:

5.2.1. From Ogum

Eu andarei vestido e armado,
com as armas de Ogum.

Para que meus inimigos,
tendo pés não me alcancem,
tendo mãos não me peguem,
tendo olhos não me vejam,
e nem em pensamentos,
eles possam me fazer mal.

Armas de fogo o meu corpo não alcançarão.
Facas e lanças se quebrem,
sem o meu corpo tocar,
cordas e correntes se arrebentem
sem o meu corpo amarrar.

Picture 8: Small *terreiro* of Ogum, by Simon Marijsse

Excerpt of the oration of Ogum/Saint George

To a certain extent, the traditional *boca de fumo* was just as marginal as historic Pentecostal communities: a fragment at the edge of social life in Rio's favelas (Corrêa, 2015). Pentecostals did not engage with social affairs or politics, because this was the profane domain of the Catholic Church and its large civilization projects. Pentecostalism envisioned an ascetic retreat from the world, just as frequenting the *boca* bore the sign of marginality.

Imagine social life in favelas prior to the 1980s. The connection between these two morally incommensurable worlds was still unthought-of. When *The Movement* first arrived in the favela, smalltime marihuana dealers were still notorious frequenters of Umbanda sanctuaries and there was a very strong presence of *terreiros* in the public space.[52] In Nova Holanda, for example, the patron of trafficker Jorge Negão was Zé Pelintra; a Macuma entity who represented *o Malandro* (the Scoundrel).[53] Traffickers consulted guides or protectors to predict the future and to take precautions in their daily lives (Lins & Silva, 1990). Consider the following passage from the blockbuster hit *Cidade de Deus*. To strengthen his power, the future drug lord Zé Pequeno frequents a Macumba *terreiro* and subsequently announces this metamorphosis by way of a name change: "Li'l dice my a**, now my name is Li'l Zé."[54]

The story of Jorge Negão and the movie scene sketch a peculiar connection between the *boca de fumo* and afro-brazilian religions. The original traffickers, so-called 'trafficker kings,' were born and raised in the community. They related intimately to their surroundings and held strongly to their traditions (Cunha, 2015). Lord Negão organized traditional afro-brazilian holidays dedicated to the syncretistic spirits: long queues filled the streets, *terreiros* were part of public life, and the Umbanda mother (*mãe*) had a strong social status. Back then, the religious symbols drawn on the walls behind the small drug dens were images of Catholic Saints and Umbanda protectors like the spirit of Ogum – the Umanda spirit embodied through the image of Saint George.

5.2.2. To Jesus

The first visible steps towards a vast Pentecostal expansion in Maré occurred during the 1980s. The first church of the Universal Church was established in Rua da Proclemação near Timbau hill in 1982 (Eliano & Silva, 2016). A Catholic *trabalhadora* (a local woman who works) recalled:

> *During the devastating decade of the 1980s lots of factories went bankrupt. These buildings got immediately bought up or were rented by local self-ordained preachers of Pentecostal churches like Assembleia do Deus or Universal. You could see it*

[52] *Terreiros* are altars where the rituals of Macumba are being practiced.
[53] See also, Ferrándiz (2002) for a similar study in Mexico.
[54] "*Dadinho é o caralho, meu nome agora é Zé Pequeno porra!*"

change! Former coffee factories or cinemas turned houses of the Lord (interview, 05/05/2016).

Bankruptcy, mass media and a hunger for a voice proper made a new religious current sweep through the streets and conquer the souls of Maré. A study of ISER shows that between 1989 and 1991 at least five churches were founded every day in Rio de Janeiro (Fernandes, Sanchis, Velho, Piquet, Mariz, & Mafra,1998). The rise of Pentecostal churches in favelas was dramatic during the 1980s and 1990s (Corrêa, 2015). Tiny, large and mega-churches became cemented in the bullet-ridden houses, garages and industrial buildings of Maré. Under its uniting flag, locals made their own do-it-yourself, self-help churches when violence increased in the streets.

Picture 9: IURD in Maré, with bullet marks, by Simon Marijsse

This change reflects a more general structure operating within Pentecostalism. Instead of sticking to foreign missionary work, which could easily be banned and expelled by the dictatorial regime, the church turned to the local people during the Neopentecostal boom. The underlying reasoning was: ‘as everyone figures as a potential receptacle of the Holy Spirit, everyone has, at least potentially, the authority to preach.’ In historic Pentecostalism, a theological education of four years and a rigorous knowledge of the Holy Scripture had been a necessity. Neopentecostalism, however, transformed the Holiness Movement into a *popular*

religion where the prerequisites of becoming a preacher were lessened. Being converted, dedicated to the work of God, and perhaps even an intense coursework of six months already sufficed to become a preacher (Mariano, 2008). Neopentecostalism started to tap into the potential of 'poor' people and mobilized them as D.I.Y. prophets. Pentecostalism's global *fissaparity*, meaning that the initial movement, the Azusa revival, gave rise to a wide spectrum of different though not necessarily contradictory churches, is characterized by a local organizational adaptability in which everyone has the capacity to start their own church on the one hand, and a mode of coexistence on the other (Smilde, 2007).

Reinventing locals as self-ordained preachers allowed for an unlimited supply of new churches to gain territorial ground in more remote places rife with violence. Confirming believers as emancipated, saved and entrepreneurial allowed for the locals to deliver or become the building bricks themselves to construct the work of God. Inciting people to turn into small time business owners, imploring people to tithe and invest in their Church, and turning people into self-emancipated preachers, turned Pentecostalism into a religion not *for* the dispossessed but *of* the dispossessed. The Neopentecostalist boom needs to be visualized as a circulation, where the economic demands and desires for social visibility and autonomy were turned on themselves. Rooted in the invention and appropriation of neglected people as neoliberal, individualist, yet enchanted subjectivities, an unprecedented *proliferation* of these newly found religious communities splurged through the streets. Through the imagery of communal salvation, self-restoration, and authentic and true Christianity; Pentecostalism started to epitomize the idea of an apolitical, religious community. Yet what it really created, was a social reality and mode of governability that started to mimic neoliberal assumptions and ideology.

5.3. MOBILIZATION: CIRCULATION AND FLEXIBILITY

5.3.1. Macumba, demons and exorcism

Maré is an *enchanted* place where stray bullets and the image of death remain closely entangled to a fear of the otherworldly. Who enters knows that here, spirits, prophets and demons are real and to be feared. When I entered the field for the first time, images of catholic saints or *terreiros* were no longer part of the favelas visual atmosphere. When I read through ethnographic studies ranging from favela de Acari (Alvito, 2001; Cunha, 2015) to Cidade de Deus (Corrêa, 2015), the story remained largely the same. All of the representations of the Orixas (Umbanda spirits) had been repainted by images of Jesus,

slogans like ‘God is the Lord of the community’ and depictions of psalm 91. Whenever I passed by drug distribution spots, these depictions would stand out and I would often glimpse at the name of Jesus Christ tattooed on traffickers’ forearms.

Picture 10: Psalm 91 outdoors in Maré, by Simon Marijsse

When frequenting Pentecostal cults, I often felt intimidated by the loud militancy of the preacher. “Satan,” “armies of God,” and “angels armed with guns” resonated through the stereo and served as rhetoric to provoke a spiritual battle. Neighbors recollected stories about pastor Marcos Pereiro executing an exorcism by shooting the demon out of traffickers with his Bible.[55] Yet what demons were they talking about? Lots of Pentecostals I met during these cults were Macumbista once. According to some, converting to Pentecostalism indicated a rupture with a cultural identity related to an afro-brazilian past. For others, Macumba belonged to an era closely tied to marginality, or the orations of protection and bloody sacrifices like the closed body ritual (*corpo fechado*) evoked sentiments of fear. Where in the

[55] It is interesting to remark that, however morally exclusive the world of Pentecostalism and the world of traffic seem to be, the gun functions as a transversal image that overlaps in both their world’s cosmology of war.

past, Umbanda mothers operated as a feared Delphian oracle, foretelling the lives of traffickers and residents, nowadays it's the Bible that counts as the "past, present and future."

I frequently asked Pentecostal believers if they believed in these African spirits. Directly they said no. Yet, when I asked if they existed, they affirmed instantly, but whispered silently: "Sssst, they *are* demons, *Malandros*." As far as Pentecostalism opposes Catholicism on a political level, it is equally important to consider Umbanda as a popular competitor, or even worse, a direct *enemy* in terms of culture, symbolic narrative and cosmology. As Soares calls it, there is a 'Holy War' entering the land of syncretism (1990). Ethnographic studies conducted during the 1980s no longer considered Pentecostalism solely to be a foreign intervention. Pentecostalism became increasingly pronounced as a spectacular fight against sorcery after a deposition against the devil (Corten, 1999).

> *In traditional Pentecostalism, the demons are kept at a distance; in IURD, they are sought out and confronted. The pastors call the demons, under the names of the various Umbanda entities, to manifest themselves in people present, so they can be exorcised (Freston, 1995, p. 130).*

Demonizing afro-brazilian spirits presupposes a reality status ascribed to them. A direct confrontation between Macumba spirits with Pentecostal pastors is only possible within the confines of a worldview where both the divine and the African spirits are *perceived* immanently and form part of a shared culture. Unlike Catholic priests, Pentecostal preachers are mostly born and raised in the local community, so there is a shared cultural past which is found to be fought against in these rituals. On an ontological level, the Holy Spirit stands in direct competition to the African syncretistic Orixas which also substantiate through the tongue of the mother oracle or in the mystic motions of convulsing bodies. Both religions appeal to an immanent, somatic *experience* of the otherworldly.

The focus on social sins during Pentecostalism's political turn caused the abstract notion of 'absolute evil' to be tied into a war against social problems and manifestations of urban violence (Mariz, 1997; Birman, Novaes, & Crespo, 1997; Zaluar & Teixeira, 2011). This has caused for many people to associate depictions of Umbanda directly with marginality, violence and social stigma. In other words, Macumba is perceived as a disease society needs to be cured from. The increase of conversions from Macumba to Pentecostalism is often explained by the latter's religious intolerance, the benefits it promises through a theology of prosperity, and paradoxically an assimilation of other religious symbols within its theology.

Churches like IURD are religious supermarkets for the newly born, neoliberal believer to browse, shop and consume. Pentecostalism reflects a tendency of religious embracement and circulation (everyone is welcome), and cultural intolerance (demonization) at the same time.

5.3.2. "Save them from the demon. Sai, espírito! Sai!"

When meeting with Umbanda practitioners, we met in secrecy. "It's such a shame that we need to execute the rituals outside of Maré. You know it's the drug lord that forbids it? There is not a single *terreiro* left here. 'They' are afraid. They call it demonic" (Focus group interview, 01/05/2016).[56] When asking former traffickers about this, they told me: "Umbanda traffickers are still around, but they need to hide it." Ex-traffickers often held strong to the idea of religious pluralism and tolerance within the faction, yet always added to it: "It doesn't matter which religion you like, Catholic or Pentecostal, as long as you believe in God. Salvation is individual" (interview, 17/05/2016).

"There has been a lot of suffering. But God stands with the people even as the enemy calls them out, understood? It tried to knock down the people. The devil tried to manifest itself. But God, God is known!" A fieldnote taken after one of my visits to church? Actually not. It is one of the most notorious drug lords of Rio addressing the residents of Maré. Just like pastors use the Bible-gun to slay demons during cults, drug lords increasingly use a Pentecostal jargon at the *baile funke* parties, revealed to me by residents as the "ceremony" or "real stage of traffic."[57]

Scholars have described the relationship between Brazilian bandits and Pentecostalism as "two extremes that touch," and have over time asserted its intensification (Lins & Silva, 1990; Teixeira, 2008; Cunha, 2015; Corrêa, 2015). In spite of the common understanding that churches are accessible places, it was still very uncommon for non-evangelists to frequent these during the 1980s. Nowadays, visitors are no longer just evangelical or "on their path to find Jesus," but also non-members like traffickers are welcomed. Pentecostal churches have changed into open communities where trafficking is not necessarily rejected *a priori,* but is introduced as part of the social problems that need to be fought. In the meantime, traffickers would often ask preachers for an oration of protection. And where prisons counted as the origin of crime syndicates in Rio, nowadays it is the place where most traffickers come to

[56] See also the article "Traficantes proibem Candomblé", (2013).
[57] See the documentary on Mexican cartels *Narcocultura*, and Brazilian factions *Dancing with the devil*.

repent. It's where they seek salvation in the Bible often accompanied by a local preacher (Corrêa, 2015). One of the most notorious drug lords in Maré for example, asked for a 'light and a Bible' upon being imprisoned. In turn, maintaining relations to trafficking has caused for local preachers, often with a past in trafficking themselves, to be accepted and respected at the *baile funke* to orate and to convince sinners to join the right path. It also gave preachers the possibility to intervene in the world of trafficking when someone's life is in peril.

In her recent monograph *Oração de Traficante*, Cunha (2015) argued that these symbols of interaction between the faction and the church have given rise to a very peculiar type of trafficker: a 'Pentecostal trafficker.' Though Cunha focused on a Pentecostal grammar that is being adopted, when I addressed traffickers and believers about this sense of subjectivity, no one recognized it as a reality as such and most of the times this idea was received with mockery and disbelief. Though I often saw traffickers read the Bible when preparing for their day at the *boca*, and *baile funke* rhymes often use religious references, this does not necessarily made the church, nor the faction, consider Pentecostalism as a part of trafficking. Debunking this myth necessitated me to consider an important social dynamic that increased over the last decade: the conversion of traffickers (Teixeira, 2008; Corrêa, 2015).

The salvation Pentecostalism offers traffickers is often linked to the idea that a treacherous Macumba demon is deceiving them. "God hates the sin, but loves the sinner," Sebastião mumbles, "*bandidos* are all people with families, kids… They know it's not good what they are doing. But the Holy Spirit can save them from the scoundrels, the demons and their deception" (interview, 13/05/2016). By 'accepting Jesus,' traffickers can become ex-traffickers: salvation presupposes sin. Sebastião stands up and resumes his argumentation: "*A vida do crime* (the life of crime) is different from the path to Jesus." The conversion introduces the possibility of a way out. It symbolizes the transformation from a life of crime to a religious and righteous life. The possibility of this transformation – often instigated by a personal life event – depends on the preservation of a rigid divide between a trafficker and a Pentecostal. "All traffickers believe in God, all bandits believe in something. I always did," Sebastião recalls, "but we were not members of the church. That's impossible. A trafficker knows he's not doing the work of the Lord. In order to do so, you must step out" (*ibid*.). In other words, if a 'Pentecostal trafficker' would be an ontologic reality or type of subjectivity, it would negate the possibility of Pentecostalism to facilitate a way out, or to serve as an alternative way-of-life. As Sebastião starts to describe the guns he had and starts depicting the

war, I linger utterly confused in the background. A student, Pentecostal believer and resident of Maré, explained the underlying logic the next day:

> *The world of traffic and the world of God are different houses. When you leave trafficking, you need to purify yourself from the demon which compelled you. God hates the sin, but loves the sinner. He will save that person through his glory. This purity is what we mean with* 'santo.' *A trafficker however, even though he believes in God, lives in a world of neglect. He may believe in God but he is not yet saved. For him the Bible is his possession, it is* 'sagrado'*, but not yet* 'santo.' *When Pentecostal cults pray for the imprisoned drug lord, they pray for his life, but not yet for his salvation (Interview, 14/05/2016).*

The altered visual depictions in the streets and corners of Maré reflect a social change. The arrival of Pentecostalism cut through the intimate relation between afro-brazilian religions and favela culture. Unlike Pentecostalism, afro-brazilian religions are not connected to a notion of salvation and conversion (Ferretti, 2008). The ideas of conversion, purification and salvation appeal to traffickers because they envision the prospect of a way out. They also cause a rupture between a belief in the otherworldly on the one hand, and an authentic, religious and 'good' way of life on the other.

Because Pentecostalism deems trafficking, Macumba and drug consumption to be a sin, a trafficker cannot truly belong to the church unless he leaves it all behind. Like Macumbistas need to become ex-Macumbistas, a trafficker needs to overcome his demons by receiving the Spirit. Pentecostalism is characterized by a one-size-fits-all solution for all the sins it indicates, and a very confined idea of who makes the cut as a 'newborn' human being. This binary matrix of human circulation and religious transformation allows for believers to exert and to regain a form of social influence over the *boca de fuma* – which has increasingly turned more distant, armed and professional. The production of a new sense of counter-mobility against a professional gang structure co-depends on the maintenance of the divide between traffickers (*traficantes*) and Pentecostal believers (*crentes*); their incommensurable ways-of-life as their interconnection; a specific framework of moral legibility; and the D.I.Y. prophetism of Pentecostalism – a sense of *emancipation* that is perceived to belong to the people.

5.3.3. O lei do Deus?

"Drug lords are not marginal here, Simão. Sure, when you read about them in the center in Rio, when you are safe. Here my friend, they are the symbolic center," Romulu mutters. Visual depictions of gang signs, weekly baile funke parties, rap texts adoring the faction, etc. Narco-culture runs deep in Maré. "What can you do when you need to survive, when you have a family," he continues, "even the kids from rich families want to be part of it because you get status and girls. Imagine having a daughter growing up here when you can't defend her from that part of life" (interview, 17/05/2016). When wandered through the streets of Maré, I often wondered how far the power of these gangs could reach. As far as Pentecostals convince traffickers to convert, to what extent do traffickers 'convert' church?

"I accept God, but when you enter my community, you are entering my territory. Here I am the lord," tongue in cheek, a drug lord addresses a visiting preacher.[58] In the public domain, traffickers always subsume the *lei do morro* (law of the hillside) to the *lei do Deus* (law of God), which they praise as primordial and timeless. In the margin however, a more complex relation is revealed. Rather than looking at how religion affects the world of crime, which I did in the previous sections, via the next two small anecdotes, I try to sketch out how the local don, the *patria potestas*, bends the *lex divina* and the social space of the churches.

When I conducted interviews at the last stage of my fieldwork, I pointed believers towards the following curiosity: "There is a lot of 'ex-' going to church. You have ex-traffickers, ex-alcoholics, ex-addicts and even ex-liars. However, there are two types which you don't see, which are not welcomed: ex-rapist (*ex-estuprador*) and ex-snitch (*ex x-9*)."[59] These are two types of crime which do not transform from a crime into a sin, because they are to be punished according to favela law with the death penalty. They remain within traffickers' law. By keeping his right to kill, the drug lord suspends the law of God, shows the limits of forgiveness, and equally those of the preacher's territory.

Sebastião looks at me and shrugs: "I wanted to start a family, so I left it all behind. It was difficult. You lose respect, girls and money. I really hope I can make it one day, live freely without this sense of paranoia. I want to preach; show the right way. That's my dream" (interview, 17/05/2016). Even if there is often no coercive pressure from the drug lord to stay,

[58] This is an indirect quotation. It was witnessed by an ex-trafficker, who shared this event with me.
[59] I'm grateful to Diogo Silva Corrêa for having shared this insight with me. I immediately introduced this during my interviews.

social status, money and the attraction of girls make it very difficult for youngsters to leave the business behind. For traffickers, a way to regain social and financial status after having left, is by frequenting church and starting to preach. After conversion, ex-traffickers often use church to enjoy a new form of social visibility within the community.

Thiago, an ex-Pentecostal resident, scratches his hair and then starts to recollect his memories: “In IURD it was all about the money. When traffickers leave the one business behind, they are drawn to the other one. But you know, I saw what was happening. The hierarchy of the faction continued in church” (interview, 14/05/2016). Traffickers who had a status as drug lord earlier, who already had power, a following and charismatic leadership are often seen in the higher echelons of Pentecostal communities. Traffickers are drawn to it because salvation is being showcased as prosperous. Thiago explains the logic: “The miracle needed for a drug lord to convert is larger than the one of a mere foot soldier. Often Neopentecostal churches make profit of these miracles, for example when a trafficker turns bishop. Then they market it as a great salvation. They sell it” (ibid.).

Practices of conversion and salvation not only create a peculiar form of mobility away from trafficking, at the same time they inform a *continuation* of gang hierarchy in Pentecostal communities. The original hierarchy becomes recalibrated and reorganized within a new set of rules and laws. Though morally incommensurable, *o lei do morro* and *o lei do Deus* do not imply a sterile division between places of power. These heterogeneous ways-of-life assemble and reassemble in a perpetual tension, because the forms of authority to which they appeal are not very dissimilar. Their power is often invested and grounded in a mode of charismatic leadership and the people’s desire to receive status, gifts and financial prosperity.

From the microcosm of Maré, residents perceive the faction as a rigorous powerhouse where the drug lord has the absolute power. But the strict representation of power as a solitary powerful gun-wielding drug lord occludes the multitude of elisions and tensions that are being produced. The law of the hillside is a pact. It is an *aesthetic* relation that is always noticed by and affecting the residents of the favela. It is a form-of-life that is continually altered and molded in between the faction and the different changing fragments of social reality and power that lie dispersed in and outside the favela’s territorial bounds.

6. CONCLUSION

6.1. Salvation?

During the 1990s, a professionalization of retail drugs and arms trafficking, together with a drastic surge in the rates of homicides, reshaped social life in the favela. The *boca de fumo* became visibly surrounded with heavy-armed youngsters, residents became witnesses to their own tragedies and the fear of death became part of their mindset. On the other side of the street, local churches opened every week. But did it bring a redeeming answer to their woes and prayers?

The local potential on which these churches are founded, counterbalances the increasing disconnect between a professional gang structure and favela residents in a peculiar way. Pentecostal communities establish a way for believers to regain a sense of control over traffickers and even to convince them to leave the business behind. Converting to Pentecostalism also offers a roadmap to overcome social stigma (often indicated by Pentecostalism itself), and to separate oneself from or to cope with an increasingly violent place. In sum, Pentecostal communities reinvent and alter the social patterns between traffic and residents by *rehumanizing* traffickers in an increasingly distant and violent drug trafficking scene (love the sinner) and by offering traffickers the redemptory possibility to convert. This not only asserts the interconnection between both frameworks, but it also demonstrates the charismatic power of the church to mitigate the power of the drug lord.

But there is another side to the story. Afro-brazilian religions are increasingly being demonized by criminal gangs through a Pentecostal grammar; trafficking delivers a fresh supply of sinners, ready to be saved and marketed; and there is a continuation of the faction's hierarchy running deep within Pentecostal communities. These complex interconnections and elements of co-dependency and coexistence which I briefly touched upon equally denote the limits of Pentecostalism to emancipate. Focusing one-sidedly on the proactive side within believers' agency, leaves out the inherent passivity that is being generated within a wider structure. The charismatic power of the drug lord equally relies on the relations he establishes with Pentecostal communities and their framework – and vice versa.

6.2. The community of your desires

The shift towards democracy in Brazil needs to be read in the direct prolongation of a counter reaction against totalitarian regimes. Assumptions currently shared by many post-Cold war

European nations are concepts of tolerance, pluralism and multiculturalism. However, for many Latin-American countries and Brazil in particular, the combination of a democratic transition and a shared fear of governmental atrocities, created a political space which lauded pluralism and tolerance, but which allowed for a multiplication of violent actors to surge at the same time (Arias & Goldstein, 2010). The persistence and proliferation of drug gangs, brutal police forces and *milicias* revealed a vile remnant of the military dictatorship within Brazil's newly established democracy. Pentecostalism was believed to turn the other cheek. It was a force that could bring a voice of autonomy and communal restoration to these increasingly violent places.

Social scientists were quick to nominate Pentecostal communities as an 'authentic' space of social life because it did not operate "through the mediation of the party-state complex" (Smilde, 2007, p. 27).[60] From the perspective of the governed, Pentecostalism held *the* alternative. It was *the* authentic and primordial 'outside' to the problematic rationale fast urbanizing countries fostered. An alleged apolitical religion *of* the dispossessed allowed for an unparalleled proliferation of churches and religious media channels to sweep through the households by propagating a type of self-government, and by televising rituals of divine cure.[61] Within this narrative, Pentecostalism brought hope to the parts and locations that had largely been neglected by *the* state. In Brazil, however, Pentecostalism did not produce communities beyond state-power. Rather they asserted a recalibration of a conservative, political agenda, and introduced a framework of neoliberal legibility in places where the state is *perceived* to be absent.

Though the *aesthetic* transformations and modalities of circulation Pentecostal communities produce are real; the original, Christian community to which they refer, presupposes a peculiar sense of subjectivity that is autonomous, prosperous and saved from sin. Its narrative reduces human beings to linear, individual projects – each on their own way to salvation. Its

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[60] Similarly, it is argued that Pentecostalism does not seek to validate itself in terms of "the programmatic political rationality that was traditionally offered to the country as the path to the construction of a modern society" (Uribe & Lander as cited in Smilde, 2007, p. 23).

[61] In his seminal study in Venezuela, Smilde contends that through evangelicalism, "(People) develop a proactive sense of agency with which they can change aspects of their life circumstances. Evangelical meanings provide individuals with a way to get a cognitive fix on the processes that are affecting their lives, gain control over their selves, reformulate social relationships, and overcome obstacles to associational mobilization." He denominates Pentecostal communities as "reactive movements of communal resistance," because other than the new social movements that erupted during the 1960s, these churches actually offer a voice to the voiceless (2007, p. 28).

success as a politically conservative powerhouse both depends on a rhetoric of self-care, autonomy and D.I.Y. propheticism, and a religious *depoliticization* and preservation of the inequalities and cultural stigmas which it promises to absolve: poor is sinful; only prosperity is divine. The pristine promise of salvation becomes part of maintaining and reproducing the *status quo*. The Holy Spirit always needs new sinners to refuel its tank.

Neopentecostalism's political eagerness unveils a trait of its mystique until it almost turns transparent. A "jargon of authenticity" speaks through it in the notions of community and salvation (Adorno, 2013). Yet at the same time this rhetoric occludes the ramifications of its neoliberal assumptions. Through the boundaries, elisions and limits of Pentecostalism's theology of prosperity, a framework of neoliberal enchantment is revealed in which the ethos of an authentic, Christian community is recognized as a valuable scale for political intervention (Parker & Debruyne, 2012). Through it, people living in neglected and remote parts of the city *are* possessed, governed and disciplined. Pentecostalism actively seeks to delete the complexities and heterogeneous modalities of resistance to the state by prescribing a flattened sense of subjectivity where a good life equals – and is reduced to – a purified, conservative, managerial and prosperous life. Yet from the perspective of the dispossessed, the sick and the neglected, these assets of financial idolatry remain sacred, i.e. unattainable. Only Baron von Munchhausen can pull himself out of a swamp by his own hair.

Picture 11: ***Mulher das palafitas*** **(Woman of the stilt houses)**
Acervo - Arquivo Dona Orosina Vieira
Museu da Maré/CEASM (Used with permission)

7. CODA

Ideas are to objects, as constellations are to stars

(Benjamin, 1998, p. 34).[62]

During my research stay, the urge to find causal explanations amidst "a mosaic of open-ended assemblages of entangled ways of life," broke down when I witnessed the heterogeneity and contingency that was happening in front of me (Tsing, 2015, p. 4). How to tell the stories as they were told? Was it merely enough to become a *chronicler*; the one who "recounts events without distinguishing between the great and small" (Benjamin, 2003, p. 390).[63] True ontology and knowledge production then becomes a summation of storytelling, a translation of events that occurred. Plain things merely are, paraphrasing the late poet Wallace Steven, thus ethnographic writing becomes mimicry (Critchley, 2005).

In retrospect, the method I used to unpack these stories could be called translation. Like a translation, mimicry is not mere passive copying. Translation and mimicry tend to expose the contingencies at work in a precarious place. Each story is the translation of an original voice. Each translation causes a reverberation: an echo of a tone, fractured over wide expanses of space and time. Sometimes abandoned, yet often recalibrated, it can find new life when engaging with other elements foreign to it – like a different language that meets an original work of literary art (Benjamin, 1991, IV-1). Translation is a movement. It presupposes circulation and connection instead of teleological transitions. People are not reducible to "goal-pursuing entities in the harmonious pyramid they collectively form" (Berlin as cited in Said, 2003, p. 70). Though rife with demons and spirits, the world is not a "cosmic place" in which it strives aside the *angel of progress* to its logical, historical culmination. Understanding diverging histories as a form of translation, places contingency at its very heart. After all, what were American Pentecostal churches, Ogum, Brazilian drug traffickers, Peruvian Cocaine, the devil, and me doing in Maré – the rough, outer seam of Rio de Janeiro?

Though drug trafficking and Pentecostalism seem endogenous to favela life at first sight, they are not. In their antique connotation both are *bacchian*: they praise the convulsing body, they offer physical exaltation in drug consumption or religion. This is their primordial affinity. But

[62] *"Die Ideen verhalten sich zu den Dingen wie die Sternbilder zu den Sternen" (Benjamin, 1991, I-1, p. 214).*

[63] *"Der Chronist, welcher die Ereignisse hererzählt, ohne große und kleine zu unterscheiden, trägt damit der Wahrheit Rechnung, daß nichts was sich jemals ereignet hat, für die Geschichte verloren zu geben ist" (Ibid, I-2, p. 694).*

the way they mutually arose in place and time during the 20th century, shows them as radically modern but different phenomena. When analyzing each of these separate histories, not only do they lose that endogenous façade, but the favela becomes unpacked as a *de-essentialized* territory within a larger network of connections without fully overlapping, anticipating or referring to these connections. Those connections in turn, reverberate with other elements and assets past frontiers and oceans to other networks, cultures and languages. Telling the story made us travel in mind across borders to Medellin, Colombia; Chicago, USA; and Sweden. Tracking down the genealogy of each history *de-centered* the locus of power which seemed endemic to a place like Maré. Power is not the sovereign king, the drug lord, nor God. Capitalism is not a solitary factory; religion is not a church on a hill.

Chronicling from within the middle of things exposed a story that, once analyzed and dissected, started to refer to something different than the mere ethnographic observation. There is no Sirius perspective to tackle an idea like 'the global' – there is no view from beyond. Starting from the perspective of the ragged and the stigmatized, 'the global' is revealed to be something other than a homogenizing force. Getting lost amidst specific forms-of-life in between the cracks and material remnants of capitalism is just another method to verge beyond our epistemic capacities to intend and represent. In Benjamin's metaphor, the materiality of the stars is needed to refer to and represent a meaningful constellation. Knowledge of the constellation itself, however, is never fully captured from the perspective of a single star. What I saw in Maré was the rubble of neoliberal globalism; a mere clue, a lost star that reveals a constellation if only it were possible to distance my scope far enough. The idea of the global remains represented in the dispersed, material objects that dwindle on the scalp of the earth. However detached, these starry objects remain part of and etched into the daily lives of children, women and men of Maré. The rags and lice of Canudos might have been conquered over time, but the bullet hole in the door and the painted ecclesiast murals figure as *mementos* of a connected yet heterogeneous world.

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Annex I: Os Complexos





Expansion of Maré
'80s
AMs '60s
Global export, harbor of Rio, Domestic supply
Boca de Fumo, Macumba
Comando Vermelho
Falange CV
Amigos dos Amigos
Neopentecostal Boom '70s
Terceiro Comando
Televangelism '50's
Avenida Brazil
Terceiro Comando Puro
Pará 1910
Peru
Azusa Street revival 1906
Colombia
Coup Cuba
Swedish Baptist Church
USA cocaine demand
Maré during the '80s, The rise of The Movement, and the Pentecostal boom.


Maré è complexo
Terreiros
Maré
Preacher
D.I.Y. Church
Dono
Faction
AMs
IURD, IAD, IEQ
Bancada
Evangelica
The State
Alemaos
PM, PC, BOPE

Annex II: Translations

Local *probidão*
(Forbidden faction funk music)

You can go crazy, you can go crazy,

from end to end it's full,

for when the faction arrives.

Zezinho's soldiers all ready for the battle,

to work with dexterity, that's the boss's rhythm.

And whoever is in it for the money,

will eat out of our hand.

Time of fear

What are our fears?

During the time of fear there were rotten planks,

kids falling in the water,

wind, storms, mice, removals...

During the time of fear, there are stray bullets,

violence, brutal deaths...

The fear that haunts us can paralyze us,

as much as it can motivate us to fight for a change.

(Museu da Maré)

Part of the oration of Ogum/St.-George

I will be dressed and armored

with Ogum's weapons.

So that my enemies,

having feet won't reach me,

having hands won't catch me,

having eyes won't see me,

and not even in thought,

will they harm me.

Fire weapons will not reach my body,

knives and spears will shatter without touching my body,

ropes and chains will break without tying my body.