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LEUVEN

# Multiculturalism, and its implications for crime

Promotor: Prof. S. PARMENTIER  
Correctors: M.C. FOBLETS, and J. D. JANSING

Academic Year 2004-2005

M.A. Paper presented to obtain  
the degree of Master in European  
Criminology (M.A.) submitted  
by Sara DE MEYER



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## ABSTRACT

This paper works towards a hypothesis of the implications multiculturalism can have on crime. Multiculturalism is one of the ways in which a nation can react to a state of diversity of people and cultures in the same society. Multiculturalism is about “living together with differences”, but also about valuing this diversity as inherently positive. Each of the different cultures is encouraged to preserve their heritage, and they are not asked to give up their values and habits. At the same time they are encouraged to interact peacefully with each other within one nation, and to find in citizenship a countervailing identity that unites the disparate groups within a polity. Multiculturalism has developed throughout history, and nowadays there are several forms of it that are existent. Three countries in the world have adopted multiculturalism as their official policy, many other countries use its principles in certain policies. In this paper I focus on multiculturalism as it is adopted in Canada, which can be called “communitarian multiculturalism”. The official policy was proclaimed by Pierre Trudeau on October 8, 1971, and the program is organised by the Department of Canadian Heritage. They lay the emphasis of the program on Identity, Civic Participation, and Social Justice. Canadian multiculturalism is based on the notion that the state must recognize cultural identity, for political identity must rest on a particular identity. This results in the acknowledgment of some collective rights for culturally defined groups. Communitarian multiculturalism regards *equality* as more than formal sameness of treatment, and embraces treatment that recognises and accommodates conditions of difference and disadvantage. To find out which implications Canadian multiculturalism can have on crime, I researched the existing literature that makes the link between culture and crime. The first school of thought are the conflict theories. The most important is SELLIN and his theory of culture conflict. He argues that different cultures have different conduct norms (the set of rules each culture has). When in contemporary societies several cultures come together through immigration, conflicts between them will come into being. Some kinds of behaviour that are normal in one culture, might be regarded as deviant in another culture. The economically and/or culturally powerful group makes the laws, and defines who is deviant. Members of ethnic and cultural minority groups are relatively powerless, and their reaction against the majority culture will likely be defined as deviant and/or criminal. The second school of thought focuses on the issue of poverty and inequality. Because of several reasons cultural and ethnic minorities are treated unequal and consequently are poor. MERTON formulated the Strain Theory, and argued crime would follow when some groups are not given the resources to meet the goals that society sets for them. I argue that multiculturalism will have an impact on these two causes of crime committed by members of ethnic and cultural minorities. Multiculturalism is meant to increase respect for cultures different from your own. It is developed to value diversity, to accept people as they are. This, I argue, will have an effect on the risk of culture conflicts. When a multiculturalism policy is working to its fullest extent, the differences will not be a reason for conflict, but rather a cause for exchange of experiences and ideas. Conduct norms of ethnic and cultural minorities will not be regarded automatically as deviant anymore. Acceptance of differences will lead to a search for solutions for differing opinions, rather than to locking them away. A multiculturalism policy, with the Canadian Diversity Model as example, also increases the economic opportunities of members of ethnic and cultural minorities. In its ideal form, multiculturalism will uproot racism and discrimination, which will lead to more opportunities for members of minorities in the labour market. They will be treated as equals. And all this will influence the need or urge to commit crimes. The hypothesis defended in this paper is that crime decreases when multiculturalism has its fullest effect.

## INTRODUCTION

Globalisation, immigration, diversity, world-wide politics, tolerance, assimilation, discrimination, unemployment, crime committed by “foreigners”, ... These – among others - are subjects of academic and political discussions all around the globe. A lot has been said, yet no ultimate solution has been found. In some countries multiculturalism and related topics are already subject of public and academic debate for many years, such as in Canada and the United States. In other countries the debate has only just awakened, as it did for example in Germany<sup>1</sup>. The need for discussion was created by the intrusion of international migration and other aspects of globalization, even in those parts of the globe that used to consider themselves ethnic nations, and thus monocultural. The multicultural diversity of national or regional populations has become a universal phenomenon. Our contemporary condition is marked by the emergence of new forms of identity politics all around the globe.<sup>2</sup> Every country deals with such problems in its own way, based on its history and on the cultures existent within those nations.

Canada was originally a “white settler dominion” in the British empire. However, Canada became an “immigrant-country”, where people from all over the world came to built up a new life. A few decades ago Canada adopted the official policy of multiculturalism to deal with the increasing diversity. The body of research done on topics related to multiculturalism as an ideology is vast. Researchers dealing with the results of the official policy adopted by the Canadian government is not very extensive, however, it is sufficient to be able to make some grounded conclusions.

As a criminologist, I am interested in the eventual influences of multiculturalism – as an ideology or in the format of an official policy – on crime. This coupling is both necessary and timely. Despite the increasing importance – because of an increasing diversity – this area remains under-researched. The official multiculturalism policy in Canada is not specifically aimed at reducing crime, however, in its objectives and programs several links can be found. Within the criminological body of theories there are some writers who have been thinking about the link between culture and crime, and the influence of diversity on crime. I will combine the characteristics of multiculturalism with those theories, to create a hypothesis about the implications that multiculturalism can have on crime. Since there are many forms of multiculturalism, and differing ideas about some aspects, I will focus on multiculturalism as it is understood in Canada. It would be a good idea to compare this form of multiculturalism with others, for example to how it is understood in the US, or in Europe, and then see if there is a difference in the implications for crime. I will, however, not include this sidetrack since it is a vast subject matter demanding a lot of research, it can’t be properly addressed in a few pages, which would have been all the space available for it in the limited framework of this paper. I will also restrict my research to the implications for crime and deviant behaviour committed by the members of cultural and ethnic minorities. However, multiculturalism also influences in other areas that fall within the scope of criminology, such as criminal justice, policing, and crimes committed by members of the majority culture (such as hate crimes,

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<sup>1</sup> W. SOLLORS, “Beyond Multiculturalism”, in: H. BREINIG, J. GEBHARDT, and K. LÖSCH (eds.), *Multiculturalism in Contemporary Societies: Perspectives on Difference and Transdifference*, Erlangen, Erlanger Forschungen, 2002, 169-172.

<sup>2</sup> V. HAVEL, “A Conscience Slumbers in Us All”, cited in: S. BENHABIB, *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002, vii.

racism, discrimination, .... These themes are related to the coupling I make in this paper, but will only be mentioned briefly.

Practically this paper will be divided into three chapters. The first chapter will give the reader an idea of what multiculturalism is. I will start this chapter with explaining the most important terms that will be used throughout the paper. Then an overview of the different ways in which multiculturalism is understood throughout the world, and over time, will follow. Also the visions on multiculturalism now, and some sceptical notes will be treated. The second chapter focuses on multiculturalism in Canada. The history will be discussed, and the way Canadians changed in their understanding of the ideology, as well as how the official policy changed. I will analyse the policy using the Canadian diversity model. The third chapter I will dedicate to the actual topic of this paper; the implications of multiculturalism on crime. I will develop a hypothesis by first giving the reader two ways in which theorists have identified the links between ethnicity and crime; namely the conflict theories, and the inequality theories. Since these theories can not explain all the effects, I will give some questions and answers that need further research around this theme. Then I will analyse what influence multiculturalism could have on crime, situated in the context of the Canadian model of multiculturalism. I will conclude this paper by summarizing everything I have written.

The research method used for this paper was a literature research. I examined many books, articles, periodicals, reports and so on. This paper is an analysis of the vast body of literature existent on multiculturalism, on multiculturalism in Canada, and on the relation between culture and crime – without claiming to cover all existing literature. This analysis is inevitably a personal interpretation of this body of literature. Almost every theorist on these subjects exclaims a different view and theory, which makes it impossible to include every view in the framework of a final paper. However, I remain objective at all times and cover at least the most essential and/or influential theories and practices.

The goal of this paper is to give the reader a comprehensive analysis of multiculturalism in general, of the Canadian form of it, and a coupling between multiculturalism and crime. It is also intended as a start for further research. The topic of multiculturalism, and that of the coupling with crime, is far from exhausted. This paper will broaden the knowledge of the layman as well as that of the student, researcher or professor that has already a thorough understanding of multiculturalism, crime, culture, ethnicity, and/or other related themes. The paper can serve as a basis for further research since it gives an elaborate overview of the existing perspectives on the themes, several suggestions about a different way to think about contemporary crime, and a way of dealing with it, and it also hands a theoretical framework on which empirical research could be based.



## **CHAPTER 1: MULTICULTURALISM – A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS**

In contemporary Western societies, cultural and social diversity is a fact. This diversity arose from decolonization and waves of immigrant workers. Each society has to find means to manage that diversity. The early ways of dealing with diversity were different than the contemporary methods. It also differs from country to country. Each country has a different history and a differently composed population and therefore differing ways of dealing with diversity are developed.

This chapter will start with an explanation of some basic terms with which will be worked throughout the paper. Terms such as “culture”, “cultural identity”, “ethnicity”, “ethnic group”, “diversity”, and “policy” need a clarification so that there would be no confusion as to what the ideologies and policies are based on. However, some terms will be explained throughout the rest of the paper to place it in its context. Examples of that are “group rights” and its difference with individual rights, “assimilation”, and “integration”.

The second section will describe the three main different ways of dealing with diversity; assimilation, cultural fusion, and multiculturalism. The terms will be explained and where possible illustrated with contemporary examples.

The third section will be devoted to multiculturalism. It is hard to define multiculturalism since there are so many formats of it. Some forms have disappeared already, others are simultaneously existent in different nations and societies throughout the world. This section will be an extensive theoretical, sociological and philosophical survey of all dimensions of multiculturalism.

### 1. Terminology

#### 1.1. Culture and Cultural Identity

The term “culture” has been described by many authors, and definitions range from the long, complicated and all-embracing to the short and specific. One that I like particularly because of its completeness, is this one by DE FLEUR et al.:

A culture is a specific system of norms, beliefs, practices, techniques, and objects that the people of a society have inherited from their forebears, have invented, or have adopted from other sources. Members of every society face similar problems. Some of these have to do with biology, such as surviving under difficult circumstances, procreation and childbearing, and the inevitability of death. Different cultures have found ways of dealing with climate and have different forms of family issues, such as why we are here, our relationship to the cosmos and whether there is life after death. In response, cultures have resorted to legends, myths, folk tales, religions and philosophies.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> DEFLEUR, cited in: C. E. JAMES (ed.). *Possibilities & Limitations : Multicultural policies and programs in Canada*, Halifax, Fernwood Publishing, 2005, 22.

Though culture can be a correlate of race, it is not considered genetic, or biological. Rather, cultural characteristics are considered to be learned.<sup>4</sup> Individuals can not be regarded as isolated units, they are all members of social groups, and especially from cultural groups. Each individual is born into and grows up in a certain culture. Culture provides a perspective from which to view the world, and to interpret events in it. We make choices as persons who have been shaped by our cultures and our historical experiences. Our culture helps us to map out the available options and to give significance to them.<sup>5</sup> SELLIN describes the way that culture influences our reaction in life situations that arouse questions as “conduct norms”; “the rules or norms each individual follows in his daily life, to react to new or difficult situations, questions, and so on.”<sup>6</sup>

A culture will not only influence its members, but will also be itself influenced by them. By participating in a culture, an individual will change it. A culture is not a fixed structure of which there is no way out, it is a flexible collection of norms, beliefs and so on, but also a collection of the characteristics of its members and how they interpret the culture each in their own way. A culture will change over time. In a society with many cultures living closely together, cultures will also be influenced by other cultures.

Each individual in every society identifies with one – sometimes more than one – culture. The intimate links between persons and their cultures create a sense of identity and belonging. Members of a cultural group are provided with a sense of continuity and transcendence that is the basis of solidarity with other members of the group who are part of the same historical process. This sense of identity and solidarity is partly defined in terms of what is distinctive in the culture and therefore in terms of what sets it apart from other cultures.

Some authors make a distinction between internal and external cultural membership. The internal membership is indicating with which culture an individual identifies himself or herself. But outsiders often also identify an individual with a culture, and this culture is not necessarily the same one as the one the individual identifies with. For example, a Chinese, who feels somewhat alienated from what is normally regarded as Chinese culture, and feels himself better when surrounded by people belonging to a more “Western” culture, might still be the object of racial discrimination directed to all individuals with Chinese features.<sup>7</sup>

The description of culture just given, is a rather holistic concept implying that culture comprises every aspect of life of a circumscribed human population that is not biologically given and that, for the individual member of this group, it is a complex of knowledge and behaviour acquired by socialization defined as enculturation. However, as BREINIG and LÖSCH point out, this must not lead to ignoring the fact that there exist intracultural variations, that individuals still have a range of choices within their culture, that cultures change constantly, that each culture has asymmetrical power relations, that there is a constant influence of other cultures and that – when we extend the meaning of “culture” to refer not only to ethnic but to a wide range of social groups – all individuals belong to more than one

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<sup>4</sup> T. F. WYNKOOP, and M. S. KISELICA, “Multicultural Issues and Perspectives”, in: J. E. HENDRICKS, and B. BYERS (eds.), *Multicultural Perspectives in Criminal Justice and Criminology*, Springfield, Charles C Thomas, 1994, 9.

<sup>5</sup> C. L. TEN, *Multiculturalism and the Value of Diversity*, London, Marshal Cavendish International, 2004, 2.

<sup>6</sup> T. SELLIN, *Culture Conflict and crime*, New York, Social Science Research Council, 1938, 27-29.

<sup>7</sup> C. L. TEN, *Ibid*, 3.

cultural group at the same time.<sup>8</sup> These extensions of the concept culture are only recently developed and are used by some critics of multiculturalism to argue that this model can not be a valid model for organizing society anymore. In section three of this chapter there will be an elaboration on this.

WYNKOOP and KISELICA point out that “at present, experts in multiculturalism define the concept of culture broadly. Included are ethnicity, gender, age, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status (SES), religious orientation, the disabled, and so on.”<sup>9</sup> In this paper this definition will be used only when specifically mentioned, otherwise the classical concept will be the point of departure.

## 1.2. Ethnicity and Ethnic Groups

The term “ethnicity” has its roots in the Greek word *ethnos*, meaning “foreign people” or “nation”. Today it indicates the sense of belonging to a peoplehood, a the set of cultural characteristics connecting a particular group or groups of people to each other.<sup>10</sup>

Each individual identifies himself or herself as a member of a group, “my” people. This group of people share a common and distinctive racial, national, religious, linguistic, or cultural heritage. Several individuals sharing a sense of peoplehood are referred to as “an ethnic group”. ISAJIW has offered a particularly useful definition of an ethnic group, which I would like to use as a starting point. It goes like this: “an involuntary group of people who share the same culture or the descendants of such people who identify themselves and/or are identified by others as people belonging to the same involuntary group.”<sup>11</sup> Although ISAJIW, and others with him, presume that – because of their common heritage – members of an ethnic group are culturally or biologically similar, this is in fact not necessarily the case. Another characteristic of ethnic groups that has to be highlighted in addition to ISAJIW’s definition is continuity in time, that is, a history and a future as a people. This is achieved through the intergenerational transmission of common language, institutions and traditions. It is important to consider this characteristic of ethnic groups if we are to distinguish them from a group of individuals who share a common characteristic, such as ancestry, in a specific point in time. On the political front, ethnic groups are distinguished from nation-states by the their lack of sovereignty. ISAJIW’s definition also mentions that – just as belonging to a certain culture – belonging to an ethnic group can be a label that others put on an individual, and not only a category to which an individual describes himself or herself belonging to.

In many cases the term is used to refer to groups who have been marginalized. SILVERMAN noted this more than a decade ago: “A group is ethnic only if they are ‘outsiders’ and if it exists within a wider political field. Dominant groups are never referred to as ethnic

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<sup>8</sup> H. BREINIG, and K. LÖSCH, “Introduction: Difference and Transdifference”, in: H. BREINIG, J. GEBHARDT, and K. LÖSCH (eds.), *Multiculturalism in Contemporary Societies: Perspectives on Difference and Transdifference*, Erlangen, Erlanger Forschungen, 2002, 18-19.

<sup>9</sup> T. F. WYNKOOP, and M. S. KISELICA, “Multicultural Issues and Perspectives”, in: J. E. HENDRICKS, and B. BYERS (eds.), *Multicultural Perspectives in Criminal Justice and Criminology*, Springfield, Charles C Thomas, 1994, 9.

<sup>10</sup> C. J. JANSEN, “Canadian Multiculturalism” in: C. E. JAMES (ed.), *Possibilities & Limitations: Multicultural policies and programs in Canada*, Halifax, Fernwood Publishing, 2005, 24.

<sup>11</sup> W. ISAJIW, cited in: KIVISTO, P., *Multiculturalism in a Global Society*, Malden, Blackwell Publishing, 2002, 14.

groups.”<sup>12</sup> WILMSEN noticed that “ethnicity” appears to come into being most frequently in just such instances when individuals are persuaded of a need to confirm a collective sense of identity in the face of threatening economic, political, or other social forces.<sup>13</sup> FRIEDRICH suggests as well that ethnicity is not necessarily something that is objectively inherent to the people belonging to it, but that it is “a subjective classification on a stage of social practice”.<sup>14</sup> Or as COMAROFF puts it, “ethnicity takes on a cogent existential and experiential reality when sociocultural features are reified into a justificatory premise for inequality.”<sup>15</sup> NEDERVEEN PIETERSE deconstructed ethnicity, looking at its varieties and at the logic governing the processes of identity construction. He came to the conclusion that “it is largely under conditions of forced assimilation and simultaneous discrimination followed by a process of mobilization that an ethnic discourse, and a leadership, emerges”.<sup>16</sup> To conclude this discussion, I would suggest looking at “ethnicity” as a term constructed and reinforced in relation with the repression or forced assimilation by a dominant culture. However, one cannot deny the roots of an ethnic group in history; the aspect of a common heritage *next to* the relationship to a dominant culture also has to be taken into account.

JANSEN points out that not all people consider themselves belonging to an ethnic group, at least not a recognizable one. JANSEN gives the example of “the Coloureds” of South Africa, who do not identify with any of the recognized white or black ethnic groups and yet maintain a distinct sense of peoplehood among themselves and have difficulty “fitting into” official categories of ethnicity.<sup>17</sup>

Finally it is still necessary to say a few words about the distinction between *ethnicity* and *race*. Distinguishing between the two is not easy, although much has been written about it. JIOBU hands a very useful guideline for the distinction: “Amalgamation is a biological process, the fusion of races by interbreeding and intermarriage. Assimilation, on the other hand, is limited to the fusion of cultures.”<sup>18</sup> Based on the implications of this statement, race becomes a biological category and ethnicity a cultural one. For example, the Dutch, the Germans, the French, and the Irish all belong to the white race, however, they are each belonging to a distinct ethnic group. WYNKOOP and KISELICA formulate the distinction in a similar way: “Race refers to genetic or biological differences between groups. There are three broad racial groups identified in the literature: Caucasoid, Black, and Mongoloid. Ethnicity refers to within race distinctions between groups in terms of customs, language, religion, and behaviour.”<sup>19</sup> This is the distinction used in this paper.

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<sup>12</sup> S. SILVERMAN, cited in: WILMSEN, E. N., and MCALLISTER, P., *The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1996, 4.

<sup>13</sup> WILMSEN, E. N., and MCALLISTER, P., *The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1996, 4-5.

<sup>14</sup> P. FRIEDRICH, as cited in: E. N. WILMSEN, and P. MCALLISTER, *The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1996, 6.

<sup>15</sup> J. COMAROFF, as cited in: E. N. WILMSEN, and P. MCALLISTER, *The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1996, 6.

<sup>16</sup> J. NEDERVEEN PIETERSE, “Varieties of Ethnic Politics and Ethnicity Discourse”, in: E. N. WILMSEN, and P. MCALLISTER, *The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1996, 25-44.

<sup>17</sup> C. J. JANSEN, “Canadian Multiculturalism” in: C. E. JAMES (ed.), *Possibilities & Limitations: Multicultural policies and programs in Canada*, Halifax, Fernwood Publishing, 2005, 24.

<sup>18</sup> R. M. JIOBU, *Ethnicity and Inequality*, New York, State University of New York Press, 1990, 6.

<sup>19</sup> T. F. WYNKOOP, and M. S. KISELICA, “Multicultural Issues and Perspectives”, in: J. E. HENDRICKS, and B. BYERS (eds.), *Multicultural Perspectives in Criminal Justice and Criminology*, Springfield, Charles C Thomas, 1994, 8.

### 1.3. Minorities

In sociology and in voting theory, a minority is a subgroup that forms less than half of the population, and historically refers to a numerical inferiority, as opposed to the majority, which is the segment of the population that outnumbers all others combined. Current usage of the term includes any group that has a history of oppression by the majority, whether or not it is numerically inferior. Also “majority” does not refer solely to the largest numerical group anymore, but has come to refer to white middle class males.<sup>20</sup> In this paper, both terms will be used in their current meanings.

“Minority” may also be used to categorize people of a different language, nationality, religion, culture, lifestyle or any characteristic, provided these people are accepted as part of the referent group. In the politics of some countries, “minority” is the term used to indicate an ethnic group that is recognized as such by respective laws of its country and therefore has some rights that other groups lack. Some minorities are so relatively large or historically or otherwise important that the system is set up in a way to ensure complete equality. As an example, the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognizes the three main nations, none of which constitute a numerical majority.

When a minority group is unusually successful in a country, they are called a “model minority”. An example of this are the Asian Americans in the 1960’s. They were depicted as an exceptionally accomplished and industrious minority group. The media connected African Americans and Latinos with social problems, but Asian Americans represented the hope and possibility of the American dream.<sup>21</sup>

### 1.4. Diversity

Diversity of every sort is a matter of stable coexisting differences. It refers to the presence in one population of a wide variety of cultures, opinions, ethnic groups, socio-economic backgrounds, nationalities, races and so on.<sup>22</sup>

“Cultural diversity” and “ethnic diversity” will be the terms used throughout this paper. This indicates a diversity of different cultures or different ethnic groups coexistent in one society. There will not be a specific distinction between the two. They are not synonymous, however, their meanings lay very close to each other, and both are subject of the research done for this paper.

Sometimes the term “multiculturality” will be used to denote cultural diversity. Multiculturality is not to be confused with multiculturalism<sup>23</sup>, the former indicates a state of

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<sup>20</sup> T. F. WYNKOOP, and M. S. KISELICA, “Multicultural Issues and Perspectives”, in: J. E. HENDRICKS, and B. BYERS (eds.), *Multicultural Perspectives in Criminal Justice and Criminology*, Springfield, Charles C Thomas, 1994, 10.

<sup>21</sup> E. MIN, “Demythologizing the ‘Model Minority’”, in: M. KRAMER (ed.), *The Emerging Monoculture: Assimilation and the “Model Minority”*, Westport, Praeger, 2003, 191.

<sup>22</sup> C. DYKE, and C. DYKE, in: ALPERSON, P. (ed.), *Diversity and Community: An Interdisciplinary Reader*, Malden, Blackwell Publishing, 2002, 65.

<sup>23</sup> Some do use the term “multiculturalism” as a synonym for diversity, especially in the older literature. “Diversity” is a relatively new term. Using “multiculturalism” in this way is not necessarily wrong, but to avoid confusion I use these terms as described above. KIVISTO has used a similar distinction between the two terms, see P. KIVISTO, *Multiculturalism in a Global Society*, Malden, Blackwell Publishing, 2002, 36.

several cultures coexisting within one society, the latter is an idealism or a policy and will be thoroughly described later in this paper.

Diversity has increased a lot in recent decades, and this has manifested itself in two ways: by the migration of newcomers into various nations throughout the world, and as a result of resurgence of nationalism among long-established minority groups within existing states.<sup>24</sup>

### 1.5. Policy

A “policy” is a plan or course of action, as of a government, political party, or business, intended to influence and determine decisions, actions, and other matters. It is a plan of action for tackling political issues. It is often initiated by a political party in government, which undergoes reforms and changes by interested actors (for example, opposition parties and lobby groups). A policy designates a process. This process includes the elaboration of programs by different, usually public and private collective actors, and the way the programs are then applied as concrete programs and actions. Policies in short can be understood as political and administrative mechanisms arranged around explicit goals.<sup>25</sup>

The above definition is a very useful one for this paper, however, it is a fairly simple one. It should be noted that “policy” is a term related to a number of different processes and terms. It is for example related to power relations, to the kind of government that is in power, to “authority”, and to politics. ROTH formulates it as follows:

“Political science includes the ways that policies are made, implemented, and evaluated. The most immediate revelation from political science is that policy is far more complicated, indeed messy, than is revealed in many texts on the subject. Another contribution from political science is more profound: *policy is the precipitate of politics*. Though not epiphenomenal, policy cannot be understood without understanding politics. And politics cannot be understood without comprehending power.”<sup>26</sup>

## 2. Dealing with Diversity

Generally there are three possible ways in which a nation can react on the existence of diversity within its borders. As has been mentioned before these are assimilation, cultural fusion, and multiculturalism.

### 2.1. Assimilation

Assimilation is the technique that a nation can use when aiming for a culturally homogeneous society. Members of minority cultures will be expected to assimilate into the dominant culture by giving up that which they regard as crucial to their sense of identity and well-being. One group has the power to demand – either by enforcement or by strong encouragement – that all others abandon their cultures and conform to a single set of cultural and behavioural expectations. As part of this process, some are compelled to suppress their language, heritage and sometimes even alter their physical appearance.

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<sup>24</sup> P. KIVISTO, *Multiculturalism in a Global Society*, Malden, Blackwell Publishing, 2002, 2.

<sup>25</sup> P. MÜLLER, and Y. SUREL, *L'analyse des politiques publiques*, Paris, Montchrestien, 1998, 54.

<sup>26</sup> W. ROTH, *The Assault on Social Policy*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2002, 11.

Assimilation is not thought to be harmful by most persons, since the cultures of immigrants and ethnic minorities are not considered to have the same stature as the ideals that are at the base of mainstream society.<sup>27</sup> However, those who refuse to be assimilated will be marginalized and ostracized from society. Many of those who accept assimilation will still be faced with the prospect of a bitter struggle as they seek to internalize the values and adopt the way of life needed for success in a homogeneous society. TEN argues that because of the strength and pervasiveness of many people's attachments to their culture, a policy of assimilation will breed deep resentment and divisiveness, which is exactly that what assimilationists seek to avoid. He says it will be perceived as a policy of cultural imperialism, and it will not provide a basis for a unified society.<sup>28</sup>

The process of assimilation is considered necessary for social mobility, supporters of this theory say it is natural or inevitable. Society will be weakened, possibly beyond repair, if minorities and immigrants will not culturalize. Minorities are anathema to a sane and coherent culture when they refuse to assimilate. Basic values will collapse into a morass of conflicting opinions and interests, culture will become diluted and the norms that hold society together will subvert. To many people, this assimilation policy makes sense and anything more than a moderate pluralism (a term that will be explained further on) is perceived to pose a threat to society and to the national order.<sup>29</sup> Many assimilationists consider their culture as having a recognized universal value, to which others have to adapt.

GORDON is one of the leading academics writing about assimilation. In his highly influential book *Assimilation in American Life*, he identifies seven types of assimilation: (1) cultural or behavioural assimilation; (2) structural assimilation, which involves the entrance into the organizations and institutions of the host society at the "primary group level"; (3) marital assimilation; (4) identificational assimilation, which means the creation of a shared sense of peoplehood at the societal level; (5) attitude receptional assimilation, which refers to the absence of prejudice; (6) behavioural receptional assimilation, which refers to the absence of discrimination; and (7) civic assimilation, where interethnic conflicts over values and power are overcome by the shared identity of citizenship. GORDON refers to the structural assimilation as the most important one, once that is working, all the other forms will follow almost automatically.<sup>30</sup>

## 2.2. Cultural Fusion

Cultural fusion is another technique aiming at a culturally homogeneous society. Under this model the different existing cultures will be blended into a new composite culture in which no previous single culture stands out. The new culture will be a common culture, compounded out of the diverse elements of existing cultures. This process is not likely to happen automatically, it is more likely that each culture will change through interaction, but that there will still remain several different cultures, and not a single culture shared by all. TEN writes that trying to create a common culture by artificial means, will likely lead to producing something bland

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<sup>27</sup> C.-A. CHUNE, and J. M. CHOI., "The Violence of Assimilation and Psychological Well-Being", in: M. KRAMER (ed.), *The Emerging Monoculture: Assimilation and the "Model Minority"*, Westport, Praeger, 2003, 33-40.

<sup>28</sup> C. L. TEN, *Multiculturalism and the Value of Diversity*, London, Marshall Cavendish International, 2004, 3-4.

<sup>29</sup> J. W. MURPHY, and L. ESPOSITO, "The Hidden Justification for Assimilation, Multiculturalism, and the Prospects for Democracy", in: E. M. KRAMER (ed.), *The Emerging Monoculture: Assimilation and the "Model Minority"*, Westport, Praeger, 2003, 33-40.

<sup>30</sup> M. GORDON, *Assimilation and American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1964, 71-80.

and lacking vitality. An artificially created cosmopolitan culture will very likely wipe out all those differences which give strength to particular cultures, and which are the objects of deep commitments.<sup>31</sup>

Other words used to denote cultural fusion are *amalgamation*<sup>32</sup> or *melting pot*. The melting pot is an metaphor strongly associated with the cultural policy in the U.S., particularly in reference to the “model minorities” of the past. The process of assimilation is also often used to describe the situation in the U.S., however, immigrants were not just assimilated; contemporary culture in the U.S. includes elements from their cultures, and thereby became a *melting pot*, a newly formed culture. Using the term “assimilation” ignores the fact that not only the immigrants take over elements of the host society, but that the host society also takes some elements over of their culture. Some use the term “acculturation” to describe this process.<sup>33</sup> However, it is difficult to label the U.S. – and actually any country – as being determined by only this particular policy. There are also aspects about how the U.S. deals with immigrants and minorities that would fit more into a multicultural idealism. Moreover, the melting pot never really fully happened. Ethnic groups have continued to persist over time in America, they didn’t totally disappear into a new common culture.<sup>34</sup> This is why the American society now often is described as a cultural pluralist society and the metaphor of the melting pot is replaced by a *salad bowl*. However, the theory of cultural fusion and assimilation both still receive a lot of support.

### 2.3. Multiculturalism

In The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia multiculturalism is defined as: “a term describing the coexistence of many cultures in a locality, without any one culture dominating the region. By making the broadest range of human differences acceptable to the largest number of people, multiculturalism seeks to overcome racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination.”<sup>35</sup> FLERAS describes it as simple as “living together with differences”.<sup>36</sup> SUE et al. proposes: “the provision of human services to persons outside of one’s own culture, or group.”<sup>37</sup>

Multiculturalism, thus, is a policy, ideal or reality that emphasizes the unique characteristics of different cultures in a society, especially as they relate to one another in immigrant receiving countries. What the previous definition doesn’t include is that immigrants, ethnic groups and other foreigners, are actively encouraged to preserve their cultures. At the same time they are encouraged to interact peacefully with each other within one nation, and to find in citizenship a countervailing identity that unites the disparate groups within a polity. Multiculturalism speaks to the quest on the part of ethnic groups to maintain a distinctive identity, engaging in what the Canadian political philosopher Charles Taylor has referred to as the “politics of recognition.”<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> C. L. TEN, *Multiculturalism and the Value of Diversity*, London, Marshal Cavendish International, 2004, 5.

<sup>32</sup> For an explanation of this term, see 2.1. in this paper.

<sup>33</sup> P. KIVISTO, *Multiculturalism in a Global Society*, Malden, Blackwell Publishing, 2002, 28-29.

<sup>34</sup> P. KIVISTO, *Ibid*, 30-34.

<sup>35</sup> THE COLUMBIA, *The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2003, [www.cc.columbia.edu/cu/cup/](http://www.cc.columbia.edu/cu/cup/).

<sup>36</sup> A. FLERAS, “Multiculturalism as a critical discourse: contesting modernity”, *Canadian Issues*, Feb. 2002, 9.

<sup>37</sup> SUE et al., *cited in*: T. F. WYNKOOP, and M. S. KISELICA, “Multicultural Issues and Perspectives”, *in*: J. E. HENDRICKS, and B. BYERS (eds.), *Multicultural Perspectives in Criminal Justice and Criminology*, Springfield, Charles C Thomas, 1994, 10.

<sup>38</sup> P. KIVISTO, *Ibid*, 36.



The metaphor used to describe multiculturalism is *cultural mosaic*. A synonym sometimes used in literature is *cultural pluralism*. Cultural pluralism indicates a situation in which each group maintains its distinctive identity, subculture and infrastructure.<sup>39</sup> It rather indicates a situation in which several cultures live in the same society, independent from each other, than several cultures living *with* and *in interaction with* each other. Thus, even though the term “cultural pluralism” is sometimes used as a synonym of multiculturalism, it actually denotes a slightly different ideal. To avoid confusion, this paper will not use cultural pluralism in the same meaning as multiculturalism.

### 3. Different Dimensions of Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism is an essentially contested term, having many different meanings. It is a term commonly used, and frequently misunderstood. The idea of multiculturalism means different things to different theorists and it frequently involves an unspoken mixing of what is and what ought to be. The term is employed both as an analytic concept and as a normative precept.

In some places multiculturalism is understood different than in other because of the differences in national histories, the confrontation with other coexisting cultures, and the making of different political choices. Multiculturalism in Europe for example, emerged in the 1960's and 1970's, and was essentially an extension of liberal tolerance rather than aiming at participation of immigrants in citizenship. It never intended to be a model for bringing about wider change in society. Its aim was – and still is – merely the management of cultural diversity within the established structures.<sup>40</sup> Multiculturalism is very different in North America. Canada and the U.S. are both immigrant countries, they had to manage diversity from the very start of their existence. Multiculturalism was not a means of protecting the established society from the new cultural communities, but rather a policy to give different cultures a place in it. Still the U.S. and Canada have very different approaches to multiculturalism. The difference will become clear in section 3.1. where the different forms of multiculturalism will be explained.

The older models of multiculturalism assumed that common ground had to be limited to the public sphere given the alleged diversity of cultures, whereas more recent models have introduced the idea of group differentiated rights for large-scale organized groups. Some are even saying that the presuppositions of multiculturalism have been undermined now, and are looking for a new model that goes beyond multiculturalism.<sup>41</sup> I would rather argue for a flexible kind of multiculturalism, the older types of multiculturalism can easily be adapted to fit the current findings about the flexible nature of cultures, ethnicities and race. In this way the valuable core of the multiculturalist ideal can be maintained and continue to have its benefits in contemporary society.

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<sup>39</sup> R. M. JIOBU, *Ethnicity and Inequality*, New York, State University of New York Press, 1990, 10.

<sup>40</sup> G. DELANTY, *Community*, London, Routledge, 2003, 92-94.

<sup>41</sup> G. DELANTY, *ibid*, 94; W. SOLLORS, “Beyond Multiculturalism”, in: H. BREINIG, and K. LÖSCH, “Introduction: Difference and Transdifference”, in: H. BREINIG, J. GEBHARDT, and K. LÖSCH (eds.), *Multiculturalism in Contemporary Societies: Perspectives on Difference and Transdifference*, Erlangen, Erlanger Forschungen, 2002, 163-194; ...

### 3.1. Models of multiculturalism

In this section the main variations within the multiculturalism model will be listed.<sup>42</sup> There are different opinions about this division between different models, and some definitely resemble each other or can be existent at the same time. The listing will go chronological in as far as possible. Some models do not exist anymore, some might pop up again, and they definitely all influenced and continue to influence each other. However, this list should provide the reader with a useful overview of a general evolution of the multicultural ideal and give an idea about the variations existent within this ideology.

The first four models (a-d) are not strictly speaking multiculturalist, since they regard cultural difference as something that needs to be more or less eliminated. They are mainly older models and can nowadays not be found anymore in their pure original format. The three following models (e-g) may be said to be the main existent models of multiculturalism. They all recognize the reality of cultural diversity and the need for pluralist policies. The three last models (h-j) are reflecting a turn in multiculturalist ideals towards more radical forms. These models go further than the equality of all groups in society, they suggest a move towards difference as itself a goal to be achieved. Some of those ideas have been incorporated in the existent models of multiculturalism.

#### a) Monoculturalism

Strictly speaking, monoculturalism is the opposite of multiculturalism since it privileges the cultural identity of the majority, making political identity coeval with a dominant ethnic cultural identity. It is in its strict format the denial of cultural diversity. The Japanese society is based on this strict monoculturalism. Germany also has monoculturalism as its policy; only one cultural identity has official recognition, and citizenship rests generally on German ethnicity or on the *jus sanguinis*<sup>43</sup>. In Germany monoculturalism is not employed as suggested by its theoretical meaning. At regional levels there are laws which give people from non-German descent plenty of civic rights. And even the national immigration policies are more flexible than a monocultural policy would allow. In practice, there are no pure monocultures existent anymore. Nowadays, Bhutan would be the country closest to a monoculture, but also they recently became more flexible.

#### b) Republican Multiculturalism

In the republican form of multiculturalism there can be no recognition of cultural differences in the public domain of civil society which is supposed to be a domain of strict equality. Multiculturalism is reduced to the private sphere. This model is culture-blind and it assumes the absolute separation of cultural and political identity. The reality of diversity is accepted at a prepolitical level, seeking only a shared political identity. France is often cited as the ultimate example of republican multiculturalism. Diversity can not be tolerated in the public sphere, there everybody must be “French”. The republican ideology in France indicates that there is only one political identity – the republican values of the constitution are guaranteed

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<sup>42</sup> The list is partly based on the ten models DELANTY describes in his book *Community* (G. DELANTY, *Community*, London, Routledge, 2003, 94-106). I added information and similar variations that can be considered belonging in the same category, based on literature written by other prominent thinkers about multiculturalism and its different forms.

<sup>43</sup> *Jus Sanguinis* is the Latin term used to indicate the importance of blood (=sanguinis) ties as the basis for receiving citizenship rights (“jus” means “law”).

by the absolute neutrality of the state with respect to culture and all forms of ethnicity, be they those of the dominant groups in society or those of recent immigrants. This is reflected in their notion of citizenship. It is called “jus soli”, which means that if you are born on French territory, you receive French citizenship, whatever ethnicity or culture or race you belong to.<sup>44</sup> However, also this form of multiculturalism ceased to exist in its original inflexible way. The classic republican model has been diluted in practice by vast immigration and by the interest of the state to move closer to a pluralist model of integration. It has shown to be unrealistic to separate the cultural from the political, as has been demonstrated for example by the heated debates around wearing headscarves in schools in France.

#### c) Pillarization

This model also ceased to exist in its original form. Pillarization is based on religious diversity, which was considered to be the essence of cultural diversity. In The Netherlands for example, there were two pillars, the Catholic and Protestant one, and both had means of organizing – among other things – their own education system. From 1983, with the recognition that The Netherlands was a multicultural society, this principle was extended to the other religious traditions, such as the Jewish and Hindu groups. However, the model was limited because it was deemed to apply only to religious groups, not ethnic groups as such. Moreover, it was intended to be a means of negotiating the main ‘pillars’ of society, and was thus ineffective in dealing with groups with lesser influence. Today, this model is no longer regarded as an appropriate model for multiculturalism in what is also a predominantly secular society. Switzerland could be regarded as a contemporary example of this kind of multiculturalism, with subnational groups as a basis in stead of religious groups.

#### d) Liberal Multiculturalism

This model is an attempt of integrating multiculturalism in a liberal society. It is based on the reality of diversity on the level of a private cultural identity and an absolute commitment to the neutrality of the shared public culture of the political domain. The American “melting-pot” can be seen as an example of this. The French policy on cultural diversity is also sometimes mentioned as liberal multiculturalism, although it is more coercive and more based on the official identity of the constitutional state. And, as we saw before, early French policy fits more into the category of republican multiculturalism. Strictly speaking, this model is not a model of multiculturalism either, since the aim is to have common way of life, and not the preservation of differences. It is, however, often cited a multiculturalist policy.

#### e) Communitarian Multiculturalism

The multiculturalism policy in Canada can be situated in this model of communitarianism. Two other terms used to indicate this form are *consensus multiculturalism* and *modernist multiculturalism*.<sup>45</sup> Criticizers of this model sometimes call it *monocultural multiculturalism*.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Under Charles Pasqua the Law was modified in such a way that, effective 1 January 1994, children born in France whose parents are not French do no longer acquire French citizenship at birth, but only at age 16. This had as a consequence that currently the French model is in fact a modified form of *jus sanguinis*. See: W. SOLLERS, “Beyond Multiculturalism?”, in: H. BREINIG, J. GEBHARDT, and K. LÖSCH (eds.), *Multiculturalism in Contemporary Societies: Perspectives on Difference and Transdifference*, Erlangen, Erlanger Forschungen, 2002, 170.

<sup>45</sup> A. FLERAS, “Multiculturalism as a critical discourse: contesting modernity”, *Canadian Issues*, Feb. 2002, 9.

<sup>46</sup> A. FLERAS, *Ibid*, 10.

Communitarian multiculturalism clearly encourages groups to retain their cultural identity. It differs from the liberal model in that it recognizes that the neutrality of the state must be compromised in order to maximize inclusion on the social level. Charles Taylor, who has been cited already in this paper, fits in this model. He argued that the state must recognize cultural identity, for political identity must rest on a particular identity. What this translates into is a plea for collective rights for culturally defined groups.<sup>47</sup> The three ways in which cultural groups can be treated under this form of multiculturalism are: federal autonomy in the form of self-government (e.g. for French speakers and Aboriginal people in Canada), poly-ethnic rights for the various ethnic minorities, and special representation right for various disadvantaged groups.<sup>48</sup> The notion of citizenship includes equality under and before the law. In this model equality requires more than formal sameness of treatment, and embraces treatment that recognizes and accommodates conditions of difference and disadvantage.<sup>49</sup> Communitarian multiculturalism is a product of the post-industrial society; it is an expression of a society in which immigrant groups can organize themselves in quasi-corporate orders and gain access to a form of political organization that is more regulatory than liberal in its fundamental assumptions.

#### f) Liberal Communitarian Multiculturalism

This form is often to be found at the sub-national level and can coexist with other more official kinds of multiculturalism. In many of its conceptions it is not essentially different from the previous model but it may be distinguished from communitarianism in that it reflects a weaker form of multiculturalism. Its emphasis lays on cooperation and peaceful coexistence rather than a formal policy of containment. It is an official recognition of diversity, but measures stop short of positive programmes to empower groups. Ethnic groups are not seen as being on equal footing with the dominant cultural group in society, however, there is a general sphere of tolerance. The metaphor of the “salad bowl” captures best this kind of multiculturalism, which is one of the most prevalent traditions in western Europe and in much of the rest of the world. In sum, this model is largely a strategy to accommodate within a broadly liberal framework the reality of cultural diversity. DELANTY describes it as supplementary rather than innovating and frequently indistinguishable from intercultural tokenism.<sup>50</sup>

#### g) Interculturalism

This is a more recent soft kind of multiculturalism that seeks to promote cultural difference as a positive virtue. It is expressed in programmes of cultural awareness and seeks to encourage tolerance and knowledge of other cultures. It is the philosophy of exchanges between cultural groups within a society. Most countries today have educational policies designed to promote cultural understanding. It is a multiculturalism model that has resonances in particular kinds of consumerism and in advertising and is often used as an instrument to fight racism, overcome prejudice and misunderstanding of others.

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<sup>47</sup> G. DELANTY, *Community*, London, Routledge, 2003, 101.

<sup>48</sup> W. KYMLICKA, “Three Forms of Group-Differentiated Citizenship in Canada”, in: S. BENHABIB (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1996, 45.

<sup>49</sup> A. MACKLIN, “Looking at Law through the Lens of Culture: A Provocative Case”, in: W. CHAN, and K. MIRCHANDANI (eds.), *Crimes of Colour: Racialization and the Criminal Justice System in Canada*, Peterborough, Broadview Press, 2001, 88.

<sup>50</sup> G. DELANTY, *Community*, London, Routledge, 2003, 103.

#### h) Radical Multiculturalism

This is the view that disadvantaged groups must be privileged in order to empower them against the dominant groups. In this more radical conception of multiculturalism, the state must intervene actively in granting recognition to marginal groups. It is a question of making institutions more representative of their social environment rather than shaping a common way of life, or even accommodating cultural identity. The form it takes is that of affirmative action, since multiculturalism is now a matter of positive programmes, in particular in education and in jobs. Some argue that this has been more divisive than integrative, and that it is racist in conception since its key element is the proposition of essential difference (as opposed to equality).

#### i) Critical Multiculturalism

Critical multiculturalism is close to the communitarian model discussed above, but is more radical in that it is ultimately a theory of cultural plurality that goes beyond all traditional understandings of multiculturalism. BROOK describes it as *civic multiculturalism*, which is based on the notion of a *civic nation*. A civic nation is established based on the principle of consent and is ostensibly open to persons of a variety of ethno-racial affiliations.<sup>51</sup> It differs from radical multiculturalism in one respect: the groups in question are largely post-ethnic – they can be found as much in the dominant cultural groups as in ethnic groups – and the state is expected to be proactive, as opposed to reactive, in promoting citizenship.<sup>52</sup> YOUNG's conception of a strong communitarianism would fit in this model of group-differentiated rights around issues of bilingual education, women's rights and rights for disadvantaged groups such as disabled people.<sup>53</sup> FLERAS describes this critical discourse as predicated on the premise that cultural institutions are fundamentally racist in privileging Eurocentric values at minority expense. Under a critical discourse, there is an interrogating of the patterns of power that once secured mainstream definitions of truth, rules of normalcy, and standards of legitimacy, but often at odds with minority lives and life-chances.<sup>54</sup> The critical multiculturalists also highlight the conflict of collective rights for groups and individual rights, i.e. the right of the individual to dissent from the ethnic group. As HABERMAS puts it: nations should recognize the "right to cultural membership": the "right to develop and maintain" one's identity in the life and traditions into which one is born. But one should also have the right to break from such membership if one finds it constraining.<sup>55</sup> This model is not brought into practice in its pure form, but can be recognized in some multicultural programs within a different model, such as a communitarian multiculturalism.

#### j) Transnational Multiculturalism

The emphasis in this model is on a more flexible kind of citizenship that is emerging with globalization and new kinds of governmentality. Especially in Southeast Asia, as ONG has

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<sup>51</sup> T. BROOK, "Civic Multiculturalism and the Myth of Liberal Consent: A Comparative Analysis", *The New Centennial Review*, 1:3, 2001, 6.

<sup>52</sup> D. HOLLINGER, "Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism", in: G. DELANTY, *Community*, London, Routledge, 2003, 105.

<sup>53</sup> I. M. YOUNG, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990, 286 p.

<sup>54</sup> A. FLERAS, "Multiculturalism as a critical discourse: contesting modernity", *Canadian Issues*, Feb. 2002, 11.

<sup>55</sup> J. HABERMAS, "Multiculturalism and the Liberal State", cited in: T. BROOK, "Civic Multiculturalism and the Myth of Liberal Consent: A Comparative Analysis", *The New Centennial Review*, 1:3, 2001, 8.

documented, the state is often willing to let corporate entities set the terms for regulating citizenship. The results, she claims, are different regimes of rights, discipline, caring and security.<sup>56</sup> One consequence for citizenship is the need for dual and even multi-nationalities. The implications of this model for multiculturalism are unclear, and never used in practice.

### 3.2. Beyond multiculturalism?

Some researchers argue that the multiculturalist model has reached its limits. DELANTY summarizes this way of thinking very clear:

“If we have reached the limits of multiculturalism today it is because the assumption that ethnic groups are internally homogeneous and therefore distinct from the national community is no longer valid: cultural diversity had penetrated the heart of the cultural ethos of society and has diluted the distinction between a pre-political cultural identity and a neutral public culture that is the guarantee of the national community’s identity.”<sup>57</sup>

MICHAELS writes: “The modern concept of culture is not a critique of racism; it is a form of racism.”<sup>58</sup> This describes very succinctly the concern of critics of multiculturalism that the current understanding of cultures and ethnic groups is limiting peoples’ choices and putting them into categories which define them as being different and thereby inferior. To go beyond multiculturalism HOLLINGER promotes a new, “post-ethnic” universalism that would be informed by the particularist challenges: “A post-ethnic perspective recognizes the psychological value and political function of groups of affiliation, but it resists a rigidification of exactly those ascribed distinctions between persons that various universalist and cosmopolitans have so long sought to diminish.” This is connected with the idea that it would be more productive to promote voluntary membership in varied and multiple social groupings.<sup>59</sup> However, I would rather suggest to incorporate this development into the multiculturalist model. That way we keep the positive valuing of diversity, the encouragement for cultural groups to maintain their heritage, the promotion of respect and tolerance, but also realise that people can not be put into categories, and give people a choice of where they want to situate themselves. HOLLINGER starts from the idea that the multicultural policy is rigid and inflexible, that it is based on cultural groups that are strictly incompatible with each other. However, the last models of multiculturalism show that there is a possibility of including also social and other groupings, next to cultural groups. The model of critical multiculturalism even includes the possibility of choice for individuals to part from their culture and chose for a different group. Which is exactly the argument HOLLINGER uses to defend his posing that multiculturalism isn’t valid anymore.

SOLLORS suggest that it is time to go beyond multiculturalism and thereby towards interculturalism and interracialism. He departs from the actuality of the dramatic rise in intermarriage rates in the U.S. and points out that multiculturalists sometimes act as if racial mingling were a form of caving in to what is sometimes believed to be “the dominant

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<sup>56</sup> A. ONG, “Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality”, cited in: G. DELANTY, *Community*, London, Routledge, 2003, 106.

<sup>57</sup> G. DELANTY, *Community*, London, Routledge, 2003, 110.

<sup>58</sup> W. B. MICHAELS, “Our America: Nativism, Modernism, and Pluralism”, cited in: in: H. BREINIG, J. GEBHARDT, and K. LÖSCH (eds.), *Multiculturalism in Contemporary Societies: Perspectives on Difference and Transdifference*, Erlangen, Erlanger Forschungen, 2002, 167.

<sup>59</sup> W. SOLLERS, “Beyond Multiculturalism?”, in: H. BREINIG, J. GEBHARDT, and K. LÖSCH (eds.), *Multiculturalism in Contemporary Societies: Perspectives on Difference and Transdifference*, Erlangen, Erlanger Forschungen, 2002, 164-165.

assimilationist ideology.” Going beyond multiculturalism than means going beyond the division between different races and cultures.

Another way of going beyond multiculturalism is offered by BENHABIB, who proposes a “deliberative democratic model that permits maximum cultural contestation within the public sphere, in and through the institutions and associations of civil society.” BENHABIB wants to *expand* the circle of democratic inclusion instead of *preserving* minority cultures within the liberal-democratic state. He – as a democratic theorist – accepts that the political incorporation of new groups into established societies will result most likely in the hybridization of cultural legacies on both sides, and claims that multiculturalists do not want to accept this. He argues that democratic inclusion and the continuity and conservation of cultures need not be mutually exclusive.<sup>60</sup> Again, I would like to remark here that this is not in contradiction with contemporary multiculturalist theories.

#### 4. Conclusion

This chapter contained a theoretical overview of what multiculturalism is. First some terms that will be used frequently in this paper were clarified. Then the three main methods used to deal with diversity in contemporary societies were given. Assimilation demands from the immigrants and ethnic groups that they lay aside their cultural identity and take over the identity of the country they want to live in. Cultural fusion is a method to come to a homogeneous society, but with this method the host society also takes over cultural elements of their new-comers and ethnic groups, which results in a new, previously non-existent culture. Multiculturalism is the third form and stands for respect and preservation of the diversity in a society.

The third section of this chapter contained an overview of the different forms that multiculturalism has taken throughout history and in several nations in the world. There is a wide variety, and the policy adopted in Canada that will be discussed in the next chapter is only one of the possibilities. Some forms of multiculturalism have been found unpractical or not ideal, and have faded away over the course of time. Nowadays there are more radical theories within multiculturalism that see diversity as a positive virtue, ask for active intervention of the state to protect the marginalized groups, or even defend the creation of multi-nationalities. With these turning perceptions of multiculturalism also comes a changing interpretation of what “culture”, “race” and “ethnic group” means. The new interpretations are much more flexible and they see the reality more as intercultural, interracial and interethnic. This is the basis of theorists who suggest that the multicultural ideal is no longer valid and that we should go beyond it. Their main arguments have been pointed out at the end of this chapter, together with a critical assessment of them. However, this is a discussion too complex to summarize in a few lines and readers who are interested in this are directed to the literature of the authors mentioned in that last section.

In the next chapter the Canadian multiculturalism policy will be discussed. Its history will be explored and there will be given an overview of what the official policy consists of. Some programs will be given as example so that the reader can imagine what this policy is like. At the end there will also be an evaluation and analysis of the model.

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<sup>60</sup> S. BENHABIB, *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002, ix-xi.

## CHAPTER 2: MULTUCULTURALISM IN CANADA

In this chapter the essentials of Canadian multiculturalism will be explained. The first section describes the evolution of multiculturalism from the efforts of the Canadian government during the Second World War onwards, until the form that the official multiculturalism policy takes nowadays. The exact meaning of Canadian multiculturalism will become clear in the second section. In the third section the reader will find a short, but comprehensive, discussion and analysis of Canadian multiculturalism, based on the texts of some academics who have critically analysed the current policy and its roots.

### 1. How Official Canadian Multiculturalism Evolved

The beginning of multiculturalism in Canada is often situated on October 8, 1971, when Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau proclaimed a policy of “multiculturalism in a bilingual framework.” However, the origins of the official multiculturalism policy can be traced to programs and policies that were initiated in the 1940’s. It is rooted in the Second World War and the efforts of the federal government to marshal ethnic support behind the Canadian war effort.<sup>61</sup> JOSHEE describes how multiculturalism was understood since the Second World War:

“After the War, until the early 1950’s, the term “multiculturalism” was used as a synonym for naturalization. Through the 1950’s it became associated with citizen participation. In the early 1960’s, the cultural diversity policy began to shift and become more closely aligned with a complex of policies meant to address national unity and national identity. Since the early 1980’s human rights and social justice have been the focal point of the policy. Successive policies and programs have not replaced the existing ones. Instead they have been added to them. As a result, the current policy is part of three larger policy fields - citizenship, identity, and social justice.”<sup>62</sup>

In 1969, the *Official Languages Act* established English and French as the two official languages of Canada. This act mentioned the positive value of Canadian diversity, and included recommendations that addressed non-English and non-French groups, encouraging federal institutions and agencies to promote “...the preservation of human rights, the development of Canadian identity, the reinforcement of Canadian unity, the improvement of citizenship participation and the encouragement of cultural diversification within a bilingual framework.”<sup>63</sup> The Official Languages Act, and the earlier manifestations of multiculturalism in Canada all had their influence on Trudeau’s proclamation of official multiculturalism in 1971.

Multiculturalism as an official policy thus started in a bilingual context. It came into play largely as a result of a negative response to the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Biculturalism and Bilingualism in the 1960’s by a “Third Force” – groups which represented

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<sup>61</sup> R. JOSHEE, “Federal policies on Cultural Diversity and Education”, in: DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, *Strategic Evaluation of Multiculturalism Programs: Final Report*, Ottawa, Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1996, 12.

<sup>62</sup> R. JOSHEE, *Ibid*, cited in: DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, *Strategic Evaluation of Multiculturalism Programs: Final Report*, Ottawa, Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1996, 12.

<sup>63</sup> Official Languages Act, R.S. 1985, c. 31, 4<sup>th</sup> Supp.



immigrant ethnic collectivities. The Commission itself was brought forward by Prime Minister Pearson in 1963 as a response to the rise of a re-invigorated Québec nationalism through the Quiet Revolution, and the subsequent questioning of Québec's collective place in a federation dominated largely by Anglo-Canadians in economic, cultural and political affairs. Representatives of the "Third Force" sought recognition of their cultural contribution to Canada, and felt that they would be relegated to second-class citizenship status if the country was to be formally defined as "bicultural and bilingual."<sup>64</sup> Trudeau wanted to provide national unity by defusing the power of Québécois nationalism<sup>65</sup> and brought in 1971 the solution forward to adopt a policy of official multiculturalism in a bilingual framework. In doing so, he believed that language could be dissociated from culture – and individuals would be free to decide whether or not to endeavour to preserve their ethnic identity. Implicit in such an approach is the primacy of individual rights – the right of all individuals to freely dissociate themselves from their cultural communities.<sup>66</sup> In Trudeau's view,

"We cannot have a cultural policy for Canadians of French and British origin, another for Aboriginals, and still another for all the others. Although we will have two official languages, there will be no official culture, and no ethnic group will have priority [...]. All men will see their liberty hindered if they are continually enclosed in a cultural compartment determined uniquely by birth or language. It is thus essential that all Canadians, regardless of their ethnic origins, be required to learn at least one of the two languages in which the country conducts its public affairs."<sup>67</sup>

"Official Canadian multiculturalism aimed to weaken the segments formed by the British population, the Québec nationalists and the Aboriginal People, by delegitimizing any idea of a society based on a single ethno-national community."<sup>68</sup> By separating language and culture, "Canadian identity" was to be constructed on universal principles.<sup>69</sup> In 1971, the population of Canada was predominantly of European origin, and thus Trudeau's multiculturalism policy addressed itself principally, if not entirely, to the many cultures of European origin. Peoples from places other than Europe accounted for only 3 percent of the total population.<sup>70</sup>

In March, 1972, a special joint committee of the House of Commons and the Senate recommended that Canada's constitution should recognize Canada as a multicultural rather

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<sup>64</sup> A.-G. GAGNON, "Problems and Limits of Multiculturalism: A View from Québec", in: BREINIG, H., GEBHARDT, J., and LÖSCH, K. (eds.), *Multiculturalism in Contemporary Societies: Perspectives on Difference and Transdifference*, Erlangen, Erlanger Forschungen, 2002, 132-133.

<sup>65</sup> T. BROOK, "Civic Multiculturalism and the Myth of Liberal Consent: A Comparative Analysis", *The New Centennial Review*, 1:3, 2001, 22.

<sup>66</sup> This is a characteristic of *critical multiculturalism*. The acceptance of this principle indicates that in contemporary Canada there can not be distinguished one pure form of multiculturalism. Canada's official policy is based on *communitarian multiculturalism*, and also strongly influenced with some other variations of multiculturalism, mainly more recent ways models that are more adapted to the contemporary cultural, economical and political composition of Canada and the world. The inclusion of this principle during the foundation of the Canadian official multiculturalism policy also implicates that some of the critics on this policy dealing with this aspect are not valid.

<sup>67</sup> TRUDEAU, cited in: A.-G. GAGNON, "Problems and Limits of Multiculturalism: A View from Québec", in: BREINIG, H., GEBHARDT, J., and LÖSCH, K. (eds.), *Multiculturalism in Contemporary Societies: Perspectives on Difference and Transdifference*, Erlangen, Erlanger Forschungen, 2002, 133.

<sup>68</sup> D. HELLY, "Canadian Multiculturalism: lessons for the management of cultural diversity?", *Canadian Issues*, Summer 2004, 8.

<sup>69</sup> This is a characteristic that can be attributed to *republican multiculturalism*, showing once more that Canadian multiculturalism is not purely communitarian.

<sup>70</sup> C. E. JAMES (ed.). *Possibilities & Limitations: Multicultural policies and programs in Canada*, Halifax, Fernwood Publishing, 2005, 26.

than a bicultural nation. That same year, the government made the Citizenship Section of the Department of the Secretary of State responsible for multiculturalism and announced its intention to create a council on multiculturalism to make recommendations to ensure the full participation of all Canadians in the cultural development of Canada. In May, 1973, the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism was formed, and in October, the first Canadian Conference on Multiculturalism was held.<sup>71</sup>

The next thirty years of the century were to see a fundamental change in the origins of Canada's immigrants and, as a result, in the ethnic makeup of the Canadian population.<sup>72</sup> New concerns over racial and ethnic equity led to the "Equality Now" federal parliamentary report in 1984, in response to the concerns of "visible minority" groups about discrimination and inequality in Canadian society. It offered eighty recommendations for change, including several for affirmative action.<sup>73</sup> Another result was the reiteration of the multiculturalism policy in the 1988 *Canadian Multiculturalism Act*<sup>74</sup> by the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney. The Act builds on Section 27 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*<sup>75</sup>, which calls for the Charter to be interpreted "in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians." The Act acknowledges multiculturalism as a fundamental characteristic of Canadian society with an integral role in the decision-making process of the federal government. Designed to preserve and enhance multiculturalism in Canada, the Act seeks to assist in preserving culture, addressing the question of inequality, reducing discrimination, enhancing cultural awareness and understanding, and promoting culturally sensitive institutional change at the federal level. Federal institutions and agencies implement the Act by incorporating sensitivity and responsiveness to the multicultural reality of Canada into their programs, policies and services.<sup>76</sup>

GAGNON's analysis of the evolution of Canadian multiculturalism suggests that the Canadian Multiculturalism Act did little to change the general thrust of the original policy, and simply refined and strengthened the terms of recognition with respect to the contribution of cultural groups. He argues that the entrenchment of Multiculturalism in the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was of more significance. The Charter reinforced the existing policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework. Multiculturalism thus became "a visible component of the patriated constitution, leading to the perception among ethno-cultural groups that they had achieved the status of legitimate constitutional actors." The balance between bilingualism and multiculturalism established at the statutory level by Trudeau was duplicated at the constitutional level in the Charter.<sup>77</sup> It is important to note that the Charter does not create any collective right for any specific immigrant culture, but that it

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<sup>71</sup> DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, *Strategic Evaluation of Multiculturalism Programs: Final Report*, Ottawa, Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1996, 24-25.

<sup>72</sup> C.E. JAMES (ed.), *Ibid*, 27.

<sup>73</sup> T. P. SEILER, "Thirty years later: reflections on the evolution and future prospects of multiculturalism", *Canadian Issues*, Feb. 2002, 6.

<sup>74</sup> Canadian Multiculturalism Act, R.S., 1988, c. 31, assented to 21st July, 1988.

<sup>75</sup> Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, enacted as Schedule B to the *Canada Act 1982* (U.K.), R.S., 1982, c. 11, which came into force on April 17, 1982.

<sup>76</sup> DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, *Annual Report on the Operation of The Canadian Multiculturalism Act 2002-2003*, Ottawa, Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2004, 3-6.

<sup>77</sup> A.-G. GAGNON, "Problems and Limits of Multiculturalism: A View from Québec", in: BREINIG, H., GEBHARDT, J., and LÖSCH, K. (eds.), *Multiculturalism in Contemporary Societies: Perspectives on Difference and Transdifference*, Erlangen, Erlanger Forschungen, 2002, 134.

is geared towards individuals. The Charter guarantees multicultural diversity in Canada, making it an interpretative clause when it comes to deciding about individual rights. It creates an obligation to preserve and promote the multicultural heritage of Canadians, but only if it does not come into conflict with individual rights.<sup>78</sup>

“In the Spring of 1995, the Department of Canadian Heritage launched a strategic review of its multiculturalism programming activities... to ensure that the federal Multiculturalism Program kept pace with the needs of our evolving and increasingly diverse society.”<sup>79</sup> This review included an analysis of what was funded and how the program was delivered, demographic projections, an assessment of federal government support, a review of policies, surveys on public attitudes, and an examination of relevant research. Three fundamental goals were expressed:

1. Identity: recognizing and reflecting a diversity of cultures so that people of all backgrounds feel a sense of belonging and attachment.
2. Civic participation: developing active citizens who have the opportunity and capacity to participate in shaping the future.
3. Social Justice: ensuring fair and equitable treatment that respects the dignity of and accommodates people of all origins.<sup>80</sup>

Every year the Department of Canadian Heritage identifies priority objectives within the policy goals, and key objectives to meet those goals. Around those key objectives it will develop new programs and strategies and support initiatives from organisations within the country. For example, in 2002 one of the key issues identified was “the relations between police forces and ethno-cultural and ethno-racial communities.” To meet this need, the Secretary of State called a Forum on Policing in a Multicultural Society. “The Forum, organized in partnership with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, built and strengthened partnerships between police and communities and showcased tools and best practices.”<sup>81</sup> Also some local projects were supported by the program.<sup>82</sup>

## 2. How Multiculturalism in Canada is Different Today Than in 1971

Canada’s multiculturalism policy has evolved considerably since it was first introduced. One of its initial principal objectives was support for the ethno-cultural heritage of Canadians. Today the policy is primarily focused on combating racism and promoting social justice.<sup>83</sup> KYMLICKA describes it as follows: “the policy now typically refers to the rights of immigrants to express their ethnic identity without fear of prejudice or discrimination.”<sup>84</sup> Moreover, the focus nowadays lays more on “visible minorities” than in 1971, since the

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<sup>78</sup> D. HELLY, “Canadian Multiculturalism: lessons for the management of cultural diversity?”, *Canadian Issues*, Summer 2004, 10.

<sup>79</sup> DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, *Annual Report on the Operation of The Canadian Multiculturalism Act: 1999-2000*, Ottawa, Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2004, 1.

<sup>80</sup> DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, *Ibid*, 2.

<sup>81</sup> The result of these discussions and the strategies proposed by the participants can be found in the report of the Forum: [http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/multi/pubs/police/index\\_e.cfm](http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/multi/pubs/police/index_e.cfm).

<sup>82</sup> DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, *Annual Report on the Operation of The Canadian Multiculturalism Act: 2002-2003*, Ottawa, Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2004, 10-11.

<sup>83</sup> J. JEDWAB, “Melting mosaic: changing realities in cultural diversity in Canada and in the United States”, *Canadian Issues*, February 2002, 21; and, T. P. SEILER, “Thirty years later: reflections on the evolution and future prospects of multiculturalism”, *Canadian Issues*, Feb. 2002, 6.

<sup>84</sup> W. KYMLICKA, cited in B. M. JHONES, *Ibid*, 112.

composition of the Canadian population was very different. Half a century ago, most immigrants came from Europe. Now most are from Asia and, as a result, the number of visible minorities in Canada is growing. In the 1990s, visible minorities made up 73 percent of all immigrants to Canada, compared to 52 percent in the 1970s. From 1996 to 2001, the visible minority population increased by 25 percent, compared to 4 percent for the population as a whole. Visible minorities now make up 13.4 percent of the Canadian population. This figure rises to 37 percent in Vancouver and Toronto; Toronto has one of the highest proportions of foreign-born residents of any city in the world. It is predicted that visible minorities will make up 20 percent of the Canadian population by 2016.<sup>85</sup> Because of this strong increase of visible minorities, multiculturalism is now more perceived in terms of colour.<sup>86</sup> Unfortunately this has sometimes the effect that members of non-visible minorities are neglected or forgotten in the government policies. However, they still form a part of the Canadian society, and are culturally different from the majority. They as well need special attention.

Multiculturalism nowadays may be seen as a process-driven concept or movement aimed at modifying Canadian laws, institutions, thinking, and other aspects of mainstream society to make them more accommodating of cultural differences. It is a social engineering process to shape ethno-cultural relations, relying on the central building blocks of “integration,” the manipulation of theories of “citizenship,”<sup>87</sup> and the changing educational philosophy and strategies. The multiculturalism policy is now moving the concept beyond ethnicity to include broader “human rights” with the principle of equal opportunity relative to issues about race, class, gender, age, sexual orientation, and the physically and mentally challenged.<sup>88</sup>

TEMELINI argues that multiculturalism today is primarily a principle of procedural justice, and a rule of law. Nowadays it is by many regarded as essentially a liberal theory of minority rights. “Multiculturalism was originally articulated and defended by Canadians in the language of civic humanism: a good, a moral commitment, and a civic virtue that must be willingly accepted by citizens in a practice of ongoing dialogue.” Multiculturalism was formulated as the “good” rather than as the “right”. TEMELINI regrets that its emphasis now lays different, and that many commentators on multiculturalism forgot the roots of Canadian multiculturalism; the recognition that understanding other cultures would lead to the enrichment and flourishing of Canada. This original expression of multiculturalism is expressed in the House of Commons debates that led to the setting up of Canada's Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, as well as in the recommendations of its Volume IV, the subject of which was “the contribution by other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution.”<sup>89</sup>

SEILER succinctly describes the multiculturalism policy as moving in two seemingly opposite directions. On the one hand, she recognizes the increasing popularity of the Canadian multiculturalism policy. The influence of not only a different composition of the Canadian

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<sup>85</sup> DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, *Annual Report on the Operation of The Canadian Multiculturalism Act: 2002-2003*, Ottawa, Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2004, 5.

<sup>86</sup> B. M. JOHNES, “Multiculturalism and Citizenship: The Status of “Visible Minorities” in Canada”, *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 2000, Vol. 32, Issue 1, 111.

<sup>87</sup> The emphasis recently shifted to “inclusive citizenship”, see for more explanation: , T. P. SEILER, “Thirty years later: reflections on the evolution and future prospects of multiculturalism”, *Canadian Issues*, Feb. 2002, 6-8.

<sup>88</sup> B.M. JOHNES, *Ibid*, 113.

<sup>89</sup> M. TEMELINI, “The first stage of the multiculturalism debate”, *Canadian Issues*, June 2003, n/a.

population, but also economical trends and the globalisation of the market place. Diversity now has – apart from a value on itself – also an economic value:

“On the one hand, Canada has become more and more ethnically and racially diverse. As well, many of the key ideas of multicultural ideology (such as the notion that cultural diversity is a central and valuable part of Canadian life) have gained wide acceptance, embodied in a variety of mainstream institutions, from school systems to law courts. Canada has also become well known internationally as a leader and a model in the area of managing diversity. Moreover, the neo-conservative ideology that has become increasingly pervasive over the past decade has brought with it an emphasis on the globalization of the market place. This emphasis has focused the rhetoric of multiculturalism on the economic value of diversity, which has in a certain way broadened its appeal as Canada's means to achieving a competitive advantage in the world of global business.”<sup>90</sup>

On the other hand, SEILER realizes that official multiculturalism is coming under greater attack than ever before, and its profile and budget are shrinking. There is a “... reduction in spending on virtually all of the federal government's social and cultural programs, as well as fostering a non-nonsense mindset unsympathetic to such “politically correct” liberal causes as fostering an appreciation of cultural diversity and a commitment to social justice.”

### 3. Analysis of Canadian Multiculturalism as a Valid Policy for Today's Society

#### 3.1. Canadian Multiculturalism is still Contested

The Canadian multiculturalism policy is – despite its successes and broad acceptance – still very contested. Concerns about preserving the Canadian cohesion is the most influential of the many different criticisms that are brought up by several authors analysing multiculturalism in Canada. Neil BISSOONDATH's book *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada*,<sup>91</sup> which he wrote in 1994, is still *the* book on which most contemporary critics of the policy base themselves. BISSOONDATH argues that multiculturalism has seen segmentation of society as an effect, rather than the intended integration. He also writes that multiculturalism has its limits, and that it ends there where the western notions of human rights and dignity begin.<sup>92</sup> However, his arguments cannot be fortified with sufficient proof. Other thinkers about multiculturalism have come with arguments that show that integration has improved; that ghettoization of ethnic groups – if existent – is not caused by multiculturalism programs but rather curbed by them, that the intermarriage and naturalisation rates have gone up, and so on.<sup>93</sup> Moreover, contemporary multiculturalism policy has its emphasis on human rights – as we have seen in the previous section – and, up to now there is no sign of the two not being compatible.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> T. P. SEILER, “Thirty years later: reflections on the evolution and future prospects of multiculturalism”, *Canadian Issues*, Feb. 2002, 6.

<sup>91</sup> N. BISSOONDATH, *Selling Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada*, Toronto, Penguin Books, 1994, 234 p.

<sup>92</sup> N. BISSOONDATH, *Ibid*, 138-139.

<sup>93</sup> Will KYMLICKA is one of the authors that have described and researched these phenomena. He argues that they are indicators of integration, *see*: W. Kymlicka: “Immigrants, Multiculturalism and Canadian Citizenship,” Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa, paper presented at the symposium “Social Cohesion Through Social Justice” organized by the Canadian Jewish Congress, Ottawa, November 1997.

<sup>94</sup> The discussion between supporters and opponents of multiculturalism are endless. With this paragraph I just wanted to briefly touch some of the most frequent arguments. I do not intent to be complete in describing this

### 3.2. The Canadian Diversity Model

Nobody will deny that social cohesion in a context of cultural diversity is necessary for Canada to sustain throughout the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Therefore the multiculturalism policy must take this need into account. The Canadian Diversity Model that was developed by Jane JENSON and Martin PAPILLON<sup>95</sup> forms a very helpful framework to situate contemporary multiculturalism in. With the help of this framework the different demands of Canada's diverse society can be identified, and a balance between them can be found to maintain social cohesion and still value and support cultural diversity.

#### a. The four dimensions of the Canadian Diversity Model

Multiculturalism is only one of the three pillars of the diversity model. The other two pillars are linguistic duality and the recognition of Aboriginal People's rights. JENSON and PAPILLON describe the Canadian diversity model as a series of choices made along four dimensions of competing values: uniformity–heterogeneity; individual rights–group rights; symmetry–asymmetry; and economic freedom–economic security, as presented in Figure 1.<sup>96</sup>

Figure 1: The Canadian Diversity Model

<b>The Canadian Diversity Model: Its Four Dimensions</b>	
Uniformity .....	Heterogeneity
Individual Rights .....	Group Rights
Symmetry .....	Asymmetry
Economic Freedom .....	Economic Security

The four dimensions each involve tensions among different values. The first dimension for example involves the question of how homogenous a political society should be. The four dimensions can be understood as concrete expressions of the fundamental debate about equality in liberal democracies, and the closely related question of the best way to integrate and achieve cohesion in a diverse society.

The classical liberal conception is at the left end of the spectrum of each of the dimensions in Figure 1. This is the procedural, or formal, conception of individual equality, where everyone must be treated the same so as to achieve inclusion and cohesion. However, in a society that acknowledges the value of diversity, we have no choice but to move further to the right on the dimensions, seeking institutions and practices that are more cognizant of differences. The question for Canada has been “how far” can we move to the right without jeopardizing the values of equal treatment and liberal freedoms as well as the shared sense of belonging essential for the cohesion of the political community? The answer to such a fundamental question is arrived at by collective choice in democratic institutions of all sorts, that is via the democratic process and practices that are a key component of the model itself.

The Canadian diversity model requires a strong and healthy public sphere of deliberation where political leaders, representative of various groups in society, and individual citizens

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discussion, for it is not within the scope of this paper. For more information the two authors cited (W. KIMLICKA and N. BISSOONDATH) are a very good starting point.

<sup>95</sup> J. JENSON and, M. PAPILLON, *The “Canadian Diversity Model”: A Repertoire in Search of a Framework*, Ottawa, Canadian Policy Research Network, 2001, 55 p.

<sup>96</sup> J. JENSON and, M. PAPILLON, *Ibid*, 7.

discuss issues and influence decisions together, a space where conflicts over the nature and boundaries of the political community are constantly negotiated and debated. In a highly diverse society, such deliberation is essential for minorities' inclusion in the broad citizenry. It reinforces the legitimacy of public institutions and policies for groups that feel excluded from the classic democratic process, where the rule of the majority tends to obscure their voice. Only in that way the challenge for the Canadian diversity model to reach a balance that respects fundamental values and is accepted by most Canadian citizens, can be reached.<sup>97</sup>

b. Canada situated in the four dimensions of the Model

The first, and basic, dimension of the Canadian diversity model involves the recognition and valuing of diversity itself. This means a strong tendency towards heterogeneity, and less towards uniformity. However, the tension between a homogenous and a more heterogeneous model of citizenship remains important. JENSON and PAPILLON mention two aspects to that tension. First, the question about “how much” diversity is possible or desirable. Some authors have argued that too much diversity may lead to fragmentation, economic inequalities and erosion of social capital. While cultural heterogeneity is generally valued in Canadian society, there are also voices calling for limits on public policies favouring diversity. The second question is about “what kind” of diversity should be acknowledged. While ethno-cultural, or multicultural, differences are generally accepted, the recognition of Canada as a multinational state for example is still controversial.<sup>98</sup>

With respect to the second dimension, rather than adhering to the standard liberal model – where rights are treated as if they were “neutral” or “blind” in relation to specific social conditions – Canadians have always chosen some measure of protection and differentiated treatment for certain groups in society, and therefore *group-based* rights<sup>99</sup>. The compromises that were institutionalized in the 19th century required protections for language (French–English) and for religious communities (Catholic–Protestant). In the 20th century, human rights commitments, institutionalized in Canada’s signature of international covenants as well as the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* and human rights commissions, have extended protections against discrimination and the possible resort to affirmative action to a range of groups.<sup>100</sup>

The dimension of symmetry-asymmetry, the conception of equality among citizens is at issue, but with a specific focus on institutional arrangements to provide some level of political autonomy for specific groups on the basis of their distinct cultural identity and history. If everyone would be treated the same (= symmetry), all citizens would share the same political institutions, with no distinction based on cultural, linguistic or ethnic criteria of spatial location. Canada is already since the beginning of its history more focused on asymmetry. Setting up federal institutions in 1867 was seen by contemporaries of the time as a way of recognizing cultural diversity and its territorial expression through the creation of a province with a French-speaking majority. This notion of asymmetry, then, is an element of the

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<sup>97</sup> J. JENSON and, M. PAPILLON, *Ibid*, 6-10.

<sup>98</sup> J. JENSON and, M. PAPILLON, *Ibid*, 11.

<sup>99</sup> Group-based rights may be exercised either individually or collectively. This means that group-based rights are not necessarily collective in the fullest sense; many are exercised individually rather than by the group as a whole. For more information about this, see: W. KYMLICKA, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, 383 p.

<sup>100</sup> J. JENSON and, M. PAPILLON, *Ibid*, 12-15.

Canadian diversity model important for addressing the place of national minorities within the country.<sup>101</sup>

In the fourth dimension – economic freedom versus economic security – Canada is also more inclined to the left end. Many Canadians point with pride to a commitment to social justice embedded in public policy. Moreover, concerns about the relationships between economic and social conditions and culture are frequent. Self-government for First Nations is for example often justified as a way of achieving economic security and social well-being after centuries of poverty and ill-health. Discrimination on the basis of race or ethno-cultural background is understood to have consequences for social inclusion and, therefore, economic security.<sup>102</sup>

### 3.3. Conclusion

Multiculturalism has been declared in 1971 as an official policy in Canada by prime minister Trudeau, to deal with the French-English divide and with the demands of the “Third Force”; immigrants demanding recognition. Since then Canadian multiculturalism has been confirmed in the 1988 Multiculturalism Act, as well as in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 which guaranteed equality and multicultural diversity at the same time. In the 90’s specific programs were developed to put the ideas of multiculturalism in practice, and until today the Department of Canadian Heritage evaluates its progress every year, and at the same time identifies new areas that need to be changed.

During that period multiculturalism has changed. It is understood differently now, than at the time of its proclamation. This is partly because of the changing composition of Canadian society; there are significantly more members of visible minorities and the number of foreign-born Canadians is rising every year. Cultural diversity became more accepted, and therefore the focus of the multiculturalism policy shifted to human rights, combating racism and promoting social justice. However, there also seems to be a recession in the willingness of the government to uphold the financing and the support for the multiculturalism programs.

In the last part of this chapter the Canadian Diversity Model was discussed, and the Multiculturalism policy was situated on the lines between the four dimensions of the model. Canada seems to go more to heterogeneity, group-based rights, asymmetry and economic security.

Much has been said about multiculturalism, and about the Canadian policy in particular. Opponents and supporters have both come up with many arguments and some tried to substantiate their theories with empirical data. None of them are completely right or completely wrong. The policy is influenced by its history, however, it is constantly changing, following public opinion, demographical and political changes, economic fluctuations, globalisation, and so on. Also the principles underlying the policy are changing, due to the increasing experience with multicultural policies in practice, due to flaws and successes. Although some might argue that multiculturalism is not a valid policy anymore, it still has a lot of possibilities, the ideology is still very much alive, and if it will be carefully implemented, it will live happily ever after!

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<sup>101</sup> J. JENSON and, M. PAPIILLON, *Ibid*, 15-17.

<sup>102</sup> J. JENSON and, M. PAPIILLON, *Ibid*, 18-19.



## CHAPTER 3: THE IMPLICATIONS OF MULTICULTURALISM ON CRIME

Chapter 3 deals with the implications multiculturalism can have on crime. The hypothesis about these implications will be based on a few theories existent in criminological science about the coupling of ethnicity/culture, and crime. There are two conceptual relationships that will be elaborated in this chapter; 1) the links between culture and crime, and 2) the relation between inequality and crime.<sup>103</sup> The first relationship deals with social conflict and power having an influence on crime. The second relationship points to the inequality of members of minority groups compared to members of the dominant culture, leading to economic deprivation, poverty and eventually to deviant behaviour.<sup>104</sup> Once we know the relationship between those two subjects it is time to examine the influence of a multiculturalism policy – such as the one existent in Canada – on the vision on and experience of culture. I will argue that this will be changed, that people will slowly change attitudes, that multiculturalism leads to a greater tolerance, to greater possibilities for members of ethnic and cultural minorities, and for immigrants in the labour market, to a greater acceptance of differences between people. This change will then have its influence on crime. I will argue that crime and delinquency will logically decrease under the influence of multiculturalism.

### 1. From Culture to Crime

#### 1.1. Conflict Theories

There are two types of conflict theories of crime; liberal conflict and Marxism. Both highlight the roles of social conflict and power in producing deviance and crime. Marxist perspectives see society as comprising two competing groups, one of which owns or controls the economy while the other does not. Since this paper deals with *multiculturalism*, and thus with more than two groups, Marxism will not be discussed here. The liberal conflict perspectives view society as composed of a variety of competing groups with different and fluctuating sources of power. The theory of *culture conflict* is one of several forms liberal conflict theories can take. Others are group conflict, authority-subject conflict, and the social construction of crime.

The general model of conflict theory looks as follows:<sup>105</sup>


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<sup>103</sup> The link will only be sought in one direction: from culture and inequality to crime; this is not an attempt to explain every kind of crime, nor to define a strict cause-and-effect relationship, nor to explain the overrepresentation of minorities in the criminal justice system, nor to defend that they would commit more crimes than members of the majority culture. The theories focus on explaining criminalization that results from the effect of cultural contexts. As QUINNEY said: “The objective of any science is not to formulate and verify theories of causation but [rather] to construct an order among observables...”, see: E. R. QUINNEY, *The Social Reality of Crime*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1970, 2. Some “holes” in the explanatory effectiveness of the following conflict and inequality theories will be treated of in section 3.

<sup>104</sup> These two themes have been used throughout criminological research to explain the link between culture and crime; economic deprivation and inequality - which I call simply “poverty” - on the one hand, and conflict theories on the other hand, see: G. S. BRIDGES, and M. A. MYERS, *Inequality, crime, and social control*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1994, 102.

<sup>105</sup> Based on the model in: I. M. GOMME, *The shadow line : deviance and crime in Canada*, Toronto, Nelson Thomson Learning, 2002, 91.

Figure 2: General model of conflict theories



#### a. Culture Conflict

“The failure of a person to follow a prescribed pattern of behaviour is due to the inconsistency and lack of harmony in the influences which direct the individual... The conflict of cultures is therefore the fundamental principle in the explanation of crime [and]... the more the cultural patterns conflict, the more unpredictable is the behaviour of the individual.” These are the basic hypotheses of E. H. SUTHERLAND’s *Principles of Criminology*<sup>106</sup>, with which he labelled “culture conflict” as a cause for crime. In 1938, Thorsten SELLIN based himself partly on SUTHERLAND’s theory to develop his theory of culture conflict.<sup>107</sup> SELLIN stated that in societies where culture is homogeneous, the values to which people adhere and the norms to which they accede are essentially the same for all people. Cultures in which this sort of consensus reigns are governed by a single set of rules, which he termed “conduct norms.” When different cultures come into contact with one another or when a variety of subcultures exists within a single society, the different groups will inevitably subscribe to different conduct norms. Where this is the case, the different groups are likely to come into conflict with one another. SELLIN describes three situations in which conflicts between the norms of divergent cultural codes may arise:

1. “When these codes clash on the border of contiguous culture areas;
2. When, as may be the case with legal norms, the law of one cultural group is extended to cover the territory of another; or
3. When members of one cultural group migrate to another.”<sup>108</sup>

The English and French settlers in Canada have since the beginning of their presence in Canada imposed their laws on the native Indians, although they had lived on the land long before they came. The English and French settlers had different conduct norms than the Natives, however, the Natives suddenly had to obey rules they did not always consider just. This is an example of a possible situation of culture conflict. The same goes for all the immigrants who came to Canada to help the country to grow economically in its early stages, and for all the immigrants who still come in today. Their culture – and thus their conduct norms – is different than the Canadian one, therefore culture conflict is possible to appear. Thus “...culture conflicts are the natural outgrowth of processes of social differentiation, which produce an infinity of social groupings, each with its own definitions of life situations,

<sup>106</sup> E. H. SUTHERLAND, “Principles of Criminology”, in: T. SELLIN, *Culture Conflict and crime*, New York, Social Science Research Council, 1938, 61.

<sup>107</sup> T. SELLIN, *Culture Conflict and crime*, New York, Social Science Research Council, 1938, 116 p.

<sup>108</sup> T. SELLIN, *Ibid*, 63.

its own interpretations of social relationships, its own ignorance or misunderstanding of the social values of other groups.”<sup>109</sup>

Culture conflict has an important role in the definition of what kind of behaviour is defined as deviant. The dominant culture will have the power to make this definition, and the subordinate cultures have to follow this, even though some of their conduct norms might be opposing that definition. SELLIN describes this as logically following out of the theory:

“The transformation of a culture from a homogeneous and well-integrated type to a heterogeneous and disintegrated type is therefore accompanied by an increase of conflict situations. Conversely, the operation of integrating processes will reduce the number of conflict situations. ... the conduct of members of a group involved in the conflict of codes will in some respects be judged abnormal by the other group.”<sup>110</sup>

It also has to be noted that the culture conflict is viewed differently by the various disciplines. It is often regarded a mental conflict, as WIRTH states: “conflict can be said to be a factor in delinquency only if the individual feels it or acts as if it were present.”<sup>111</sup> Freudian psychiatrists for example, regard it as a struggle between deeply rooted biological urges which demand expression and drive them below the conscious level of the mind, whence they rise either by ruse in some socially acceptable disguise, as abnormal conduct when the inhibiting mechanism breaks down, or as neuroses when it works too well.<sup>112</sup> Sometimes there is, however, no internal conflict present, as when for example a member of a cultural minority does something that is not a crime in his or her eyes afterwards is surprised that he or she is arrested because the law of the country does regard it as a crime.

#### b. Group Conflict

VOLD developed in his book of 1958<sup>113</sup> the theory of group conflict. He envisaged humans as compelled by necessity to become involved with one another in group contexts. Through working as individuals, people come to see that they can most effectively achieve their own best interests through collective action, so they form groups. When a number of groups form and several of them pursue similar collective goals, it is common for one group to encroach upon the other’s domains. When such encroachments occur, competition for scarce resources produces conflict. VOLD’s view of society is one of competing groups locked in a continuing struggle to maintain or to improve their positions in relation to those of their competitors. Consequently, from VOLD’s perspective, conflict is an essential part of a functioning society. Each group will use the state to try to introduce laws that favour themselves.

The randomly composed social groups of VOLD’s theory of group conflict can easily be extended to or replaced by cultural groups. Different cultural groups brought together in one country will be competing to get their perceptions of good and bad as the standard, and to attain power over economic and political resources.

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<sup>109</sup> T. SELLIN, *Ibid*, 66.

<sup>110</sup> T. SELLIN, *Ibid*, 66-67.

<sup>111</sup> L. WIRTH, “Culture Conflict and Misconduct”, in: T. SELLIN, *Ibid*, 67.

<sup>112</sup> W. A. WILLIAM, “Crimes and Criminals”, W. HEALY, “Mental Conflict and Misconduct”, and F. ALEXANDER, and W. HEALY, “Roots of Crime”, in: T. SELLIN, *Ibid*, 67.

<sup>113</sup> G. B. VOLD, “Theoretical Criminology”, in: I. M. GOMME, *The shadow line : deviance and crime in Canada*, Toronto, Nelson Thomson Learning, 2002, 91.

### c. Authority-Subject Conflict

The authority-subject conflict theory is developed by Austin TURK.<sup>114</sup> TURK builds on the more general theory of conflict of Ralf DAHRENDORF<sup>115</sup>, which emphasizes differences in power among various factions in society. This power is based on “institutional authority,” which includes – apart from control over economic production, which is the only basis of power in the Marxist theories – the control exercised by the church, the school and the government. The foundation of social division is according to DAHRENDORF whether or not a group possesses the legitimate authority to control, through the institutional structure, the actions of other groups. TURK divides society into two groups: those with power, “the authorities,” and those without, “the subjects.” When a balance exists between consensus-building and coercion and when social conditioning is successful, conflict in a society is minimal. Under certain conditions, however, social and cultural differences between different groups are likely to lead to social conflict and subjects are likely to be criminalized by active law enforcement. TURK defines cultural norms as verbal formulations of value, and social norms as actual behaviours. Conflict and crime is then caused by a difference in cultural norms, but as well by a difference in social norms. The dominant group in society – the authorities – bring their values into practice in everyday life. The minorities – the subjects – also want to bring their values into practice, but where these values result in different behaviours they will be criminalized by the dominant group. TURK also mentions that the more sophisticated the subjects are, the more overt the conflict is. Highly sophisticated subjects will more likely assess the position taken by the authorities and, on the basis of that knowledge, will be able to manipulate them. An example of this could be found in the French-speaking population in Canada, who in the end reached an equal position as the English-speakers.

### d. Social reality of Crime

QUINNEY formulates his conflict theory in six propositions.<sup>116</sup> His first two propositions are the most important ones in the context of this paper. According to him “crime is a definition of human conduct that is created by authorized agents in a politically organized society... Crime is created and ... not inherent in behaviour.”<sup>117</sup> Criminal definitions describe behaviours that conflict with the interests of the segments of society that have the power to shape public policy. To QUINNEY a segment is as a broad statistical aggregate containing persons similarly disposed on certain characteristics such as age, sex, class, status, occupation, ethnicity, and religion.<sup>118</sup> His definition of a segment is thus very similar to a cultural group. The rest of his conflict theory goes parallel with the previous ones.

## 1.2. Feministic theories

Feministic theories in criminology started in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and were concentrated mainly on voting rights and education.<sup>119</sup> It developed further to criticizing the way sociological

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<sup>114</sup> A. TURK, “Criminality and the Legal Order”, in: I. M. GOMME, *The shadow line : deviance and crime in Canada*, Toronto, Nelson Thomson Learning, 2002, 91-93.

<sup>115</sup> R. DAHRENDORF, “Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Societies”, in: I. M. GOMME, *The shadow line : deviance and crime in Canada*, Toronto, Nelson Thomson Learning, 2002, 91-92.

<sup>116</sup> E. R. QUINNEY, *The Social Reality of Crime*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1970, 15-23.

<sup>117</sup> E. R. QUINNEY, *Ibid*, 15-16.

<sup>118</sup> E. R. QUINNEY, *Ibid*, 17.

<sup>119</sup> S. DE MEYER, *Feministic methodology*, December 2004, not published paper.

theories of deviance and crime as being “androcentric”; women judged that past theories were heavily governed by male experiences and understandings. Androcentric social theory treats women, where they are included at all, as being the same as men.<sup>120</sup> The feministic theories thus started from the notion “difference”. Henrietta MOORE called it a “passion for difference.”<sup>121</sup> They emphasize that there is a difference between men and women, that they react and think different, and therefore that the androcentric theories do not apply entirely – or not at all – to women. Gender and culture are related notions. In elaborating the basic premises of feministic theory, DALY and CHESNEY-LIND describe gender as “not a natural fact, but a complex social, historical, and cultural product.”<sup>122</sup>

Before the 1980’s the issues identified by the feminist movement were primarily concerns of white middle class or professional women.<sup>123</sup> Feminists had assumed unity *across* groups, such as ethnicity and race. In 1990 WALBY contended that the neglect of ethnic difference and inequality in many white feminist and non-feminist writings has come under intense scrutiny.<sup>124</sup> Following concerns of ethnocentrism, a re-examination of perspectives within feminism was initiated, first by Black feminism in the United States, then the concerns were implemented all over. Feminism in general arrived at the understanding that the concepts of race and class – diversity – needed to be unilaterally incorporated into its analyses of gender.<sup>125</sup> This tendency in the feministic ideology to go *beyond* gender, is only very recent, new perspectives are in development right now. Quite often these attempts have resulted in frustration and anger, and in the belief that different “sides” are unable to listen and learn from the other. FRIEDMAN analyses that feminist discourses about race and ethnicity are too often caught up in repetitive cultural narratives structured around the white/other binary.<sup>126</sup>

DELL pleads for “sensitivity to cultural distinctiveness, gender inclusivity – transcendence beyond the male, European, middle class perspective – and acknowledgement of the influence of economic class.”<sup>127</sup> This can be understood as a plea for a multicultural attitude; understanding difference is one of the essential elements of multiculturalism.

FRIEDMAN, in her book *Mapping: Feminism and the Cultural Geographies of Encounter*, argues that “to move forward, the feminist agenda against racism requires not only an examination of power and privilege; it also requires interrogation of the cultural narratives about race that affect what we see, say, write, and do.”<sup>128</sup> She focuses on difference instead, but also on relation processes to be able to go *across* differences, and calls this way of thinking a *multicultural* feminism. FRIEDMAN emphasises the cultural differences result in differing power relations, and therefore comes close to the conflict theories discussed above.

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<sup>120</sup> I. M. GOMME, *The shadow line : deviance and crime in Canada*, Toronto, Nelson Thomson Learning, 2002, 111.

<sup>121</sup> H. MOORE, cited in: S. S. FRIEDMAN, *Mapping: Feminism and the Cultural Geographies of Encounter*, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1998, 69.

<sup>122</sup> K. DALY, and M. CHESNEY-LIND, “Feminism and Criminology”, in: I. M. GOMME, *Ibid*, 111-112.

<sup>123</sup> I. L. MOYER, *Criminological Theories : Traditional and Nontraditional Voices and Themes*, Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 2001, 258.

<sup>124</sup> S. WALBY, “Theorizing Patriarchy”, in: I. L. MOYER, *Ibid*, 259.

<sup>125</sup> C. A. DELL, “The Criminalization of Aboriginal Women: Commentary by a Community Activist”, in: W. CHAN, and K. MIRCHANDANI (eds.), *Crimes of Colour: Racialization and the Criminal Justice System in Canada*, Peterborough, Broadview Press, 2001, 133.

<sup>126</sup> S. S. FRIEDMAN, *Mapping: Feminism and the Cultural Geographies of Encounter*, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1998, 38.

<sup>127</sup> C. A. DELL, *Ibid*, 133.

<sup>128</sup> S. S. FRIEDMAN, *Mapping: Feminism and the Cultural Geographies of Encounter*, Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1998, 39.

## 2. From Inequality to Crime

In this section the following proposition will be defended: members of cultural minorities are generally treated unequal; they receive less opportunities on the labour market, they undergo racism, they suffer from economic deprivation, and therefore they are poorer than the average citizen, which will result in higher crime rates. Higher levels of inequality and experienced injustice will increase stress among the members of cultural minorities by virtue of their meager resources, and by invidious comparison with the more affluent members of the dominant group in society. This increased level of systemic frustration for a substantial proportion of the population increases the size of the stream of total violence. UNNITHAN suggests that the greatest economic disadvantage in overall society is experienced among minority populations, defined in terms of income-inequality. The income gap between college graduates and others, especially high school drop-outs, is especially notable.<sup>129</sup>

That members of ethnic and cultural minorities are generally poorer than the members of the dominant culture, is a proven fact. LEE distinguished several categories, and compared them every time with the rest of the population in Canada.<sup>130</sup> For example, when he divides the population by immigrant status, he finds that that an average of 30.0 percent of the immigrant population in cities lived below the poverty line in 1995. This share was considerably higher than the 21.6 percent poverty rate among Canadian-born residents in cities. Among the non-permanent population, there was a very high incidence of poverty, at 62.4 percent – nearly three times the incidence of the Canadian-born population.<sup>131</sup> LEE also compared the poverty of visible minorities with that of non-visible minorities. He found that the visible minorities in cities were far more likely to live below the poverty line than non-visible minorities. Although visible minorities accounted for an average of 21.6 percent of the city populations, they accounted for 33.1 percent of the poor populations. The data for Aboriginal People are even more impressive. On average, 55.6 per cent of the Aboriginals in cities were living in poverty in 1995, compared to 24 percent of the non-Aboriginals.<sup>132</sup>

SPIGELMAN points out that one might not expect immigrants to be more at risk of being in poverty than Canadian-born residents. He lists a number of characteristics associated with the immigrant population in British Columbia that would theoretically work against high poverty rates. These characteristics are associated not only with immigrants in BC, but also with immigrants across the country:

- Most recent immigrants gained entry through the points system, which admits persons with skills and resources supposedly in demand by Canadian businesses. In 1996, 53 percent of landed immigrants to Canada were considered to be in the “economic class.” Of these, 81 percent were in the skilled immigrant class and 19 percent were business-class immigrants.
- Immigrants are more likely than persons born in Canada to have a university degree.
- The immigrant population is older than the Canadian-born population. As such, a larger proportion of this population is of working-age.

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<sup>129</sup> N. P. UNNITHAN, L. HUFF-CORZINE, J. CORZINE, and H. P. WHITT, “The Currents of Lethal Violence: An Integrated Model of Suicide and Homicide”, *cited in: J. F. Jr., SHORT, Poverty, Ethnicity, and Violent Crime*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1997, 134-136.

<sup>130</sup> K. K. LEE, *Urban Poverty in Canada: a statistical profile*, Ottawa, Canadian Council on Social Development, 2000, 31-40.

<sup>131</sup> K. K. LEE, *Ibid*, 32.

<sup>132</sup> K. K. LEE, *Ibid*, 37-39.

- The labour force participation of working-age immigrants is close to that of Canadian-born citizens. A larger share of working-age persons in the population, combined with participation rates similar to those of the Canadian-born population, suggest a larger-than-average share of workers in the labour force.
- Immigrant families are far less likely to be headed by lone parents. Lone-parent families have significantly higher poverty rates.<sup>133</sup>

Despite these characteristics, immigrants who gained landed immigrant status have difficulty staying above the poverty line, as has been demonstrated by LEE. He attributes this to difficulties that some immigrants have entering the labour force and the low wages that many of them receive. Many immigrants, particularly newcomers, face a variety of serious employment challenges, beyond those experienced by other Canadians. LEE mentions cultural barriers, discrimination, unfamiliarity with the Canadian institutions, the fact that immigrants' skills, credentials and employment histories are often not recognized by employers or accreditation agencies, and the employment in sectors that pay lower-than-average wages as causes for these inequalities.<sup>134</sup> LEE argues that also for the incidence of poverty among visible minorities and Aboriginal employment earnings are the cause. "Whether they are immigrants or Canadian-born, visible minority persons have lower labour market earnings than their non-visible counterparts."<sup>135</sup> In case of the Aboriginal people, he argues: "Aboriginal people face discrimination in hiring and employment. They earn about one-third less in wages. They are less likely to hold down fulltime, year-round jobs. They are much more likely to be employed in manual trades such as construction than in white collar jobs as professionals, administrators, managers or clerks."<sup>136</sup>

Research about poverty leading to crime, is often related to inequality and economic deprivation issues. The types of crime that are researched, are often violent crimes, such as collective violence and homicides, property crimes, or engagement in illegal markets. For example, HANSMANN and QUIGLEY suggest that inequality produces both absolute and relative poverty<sup>137</sup>, and that both raise homicide rates.<sup>138</sup> SHORT formulates it as follows:

"...access to resources – economic, political, status, human and social capital – varies among social strata. ... grievances of persons disadvantaged by virtue of SES<sup>139</sup>, race, and/or ethnicity arise as a result of limitations related to the ability to secure such resources – that is, the *efficacy* of attempts to control them and the *perceived* capacity for control of them (the two are positively related to one another as an axiom of the theory) – and that such grievances lead to a higher prevalence of disputes, hence to non-lethal interpersonal violence and homicide."<sup>140</sup>

In this context Robert K. MERTON's Strain Theory has to be mentioned. MERTON argues that the social structure in a society holds out the same goals to all its members, without giving them equal means to achieve them. It is this lack of integration between what the dominant culture calls for, and what the structure permits that causes deviant behaviour. MERTON noted that cultural themes define what is valued, and rules based on these themes

<sup>133</sup> SPIGELMAN, *cited in*: K. K. LEE, *Ibid*, 32.

<sup>134</sup> K. K. LEE, *Ibid*, 33-34.

<sup>135</sup> K. K. LEE, *Ibid*, 38.

<sup>136</sup> K. K. LEE, *Ibid*, 39.

<sup>137</sup> Absolute poverty can be defined as somebody living under the poverty line, and relative poverty is about the *feeling* somebody has about his or her poverty state.

<sup>138</sup> B. H. HANSMANN, and J. M. QUIGLEY, "Population Heterogeneity and the Sociogenesis of Homicide", *cited in*: J. F. Jr., SHORT, *Poverty, Ethnicity, and Violent Crime*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1997, 134.

<sup>139</sup> SES = Socioeconomic status.

<sup>140</sup> J. F. Jr., SHORT, *Poverty, Ethnicity, and Violent Crime*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1997, 137, emphasis by the author.

prescribe acceptable ways of achieving what is valued. Western societies place extraordinary value on achieving material success, yet opportunities for achieving success are unevenly distributed by, for example, age and gender, as well as SES, race, and ethnicity. MERTON thus defines deviance as a symptom of the social structure.<sup>141</sup>

### 3. What the Former Theories Lack

As has been said before (see page 27), the theories elaborated in section 1 and 2, cannot account for the full explanation of criminality and deviancy of members of ethnic minorities. There are, for example, differences in representation in the criminal justice system among groups – both white and non-white minority groups – who appear to be socioeconomically similarly situated. The Chinese and Japanese are called “model minorities,” this is partly based on their low level of involvement in crime.<sup>142</sup> Other minority groups – like for example Native people and immigrants from African descent – have significantly higher crime rates. The former theories could also not give a sufficient explanation for its unique treatment of the poor, non-white population. They have been subjected to greater deprivations and more intense social control than the similarly situated groups of whites.<sup>143</sup>

The study of ethnicity and social control has received relative inattention by social scientists. This is partly because of the lack of reliable measures of ethnicity, and thus of reliable data. No crime or punishment statistics identify the ethnicity of those persons enumerated.

The conflict theories and the theories focusing on economic deprivation and inequality, do not explain the differences within ethnic groups thoroughly. HAWKINS formulates it as follows:

“In these accounts, the greater social control of some ethnic/racial groups as compared to others is attributed to their lack of power and influence rather than their skin colour, ethnic heritage, or the sometimes unique experiences that individual groups encounter. Race and ethnic differences are seen as important determinants of group differences in social control, but only to the extent that they are coterminous with dimensions of power and privilege. This attempt to ground social control in class divisions rather than on considerations of race and ethnicity has obvious ideological and heuristic appeal. But it may also conceal or ignore significant differences in the treatment of ethnic/racial groups and de-emphasize the need to study them.”<sup>144</sup>

HAWKINS suggests some elements that might explain these shortcomings, and questions that need to be posed. These themes should be explored more in further research:

1. Insularity: Two propositions can be made; a) The nature and extent of the social control of an ethnic or racial group is partly a function of its relative insularity, vice-versa dominant groups or their agents, and b) Given similar levels of insularity, those ethnic/racial groups that are characterized as having the greatest “social distance” from the dominant group will be subject to the greatest social control. The level of social control that a group experiences may be partly in function of the extent to which members of the group can isolate

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<sup>141</sup> R. K. MERTON, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, New York, Free Press, 1968, 702 p.

<sup>142</sup> D. F. HAWKINS, “Ethnicity: The Forgotten Dimension of American Social Control”, in: G. S. BRIDGES, and M. A. MYERS (eds.), *Inequality, crime, and social control*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1994, 104.

<sup>143</sup> R. BLAUNER, “Racial Oppression in America”, cited in: D. F. HAWKINS, *Ibid*, 106.

<sup>144</sup> D. F. HAWKINS, “Ethnicity: The Forgotten Dimension of American Social Control”, in: G. S. BRIDGES, and M. A. MYERS (eds.), *Inequality, crime, and social control*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1994, 106.



themselves from the dominant group and from its agents of control. This ability varies across ethnic lines, which would explain the different degrees of social control among similarly disadvantaged groups. Thus, “those subordinate racial/ethnic groups that are able to erect barriers between themselves and dominant groups/agents of social control are less likely than other groups to be ‘controlled’.”<sup>145</sup> When a group is less controlled, they will be treated differently, which eventually will result in lower crime rates. HAWKINS suggests three ways in which minorities can create this social distance: 1) by gaining a certain political power, 2) by geographical isolation, or 3) by a lack of competitiveness (for example engagement in activities other than those of the dominant group).

2. Social Distance and Group Differences: The perception that the members of the dominant culture have on the social distance between members of minority groups. The relative “goodness” of Eastern and Southern Europeans is for example less than that of the Western Europeans, but still better than that of non-whites. These perceptions will influence the social control, and the overrepresentation in the criminal justice system.
3. Social Change: Various ethnic groups show a reduction in the rate of reported crime and punishment over time.<sup>146</sup> Does this change have relevance for our understanding of crime patterns currently found among non-white populations? HAWKINS suggests that “an understanding of the change over time in levels and forms of social control may be gained through not only the study of white ethnics but Asian Americans as well.” During the late 1800’s the Chinese immigrants were confined at very high rates. Their crime rates decreased drastically over time. This evolution is similar to that of white ethnics. Most researchers attribute the change to a lessening of economic deprivation and increasing acculturation. This success of Asian and white ethnic groups, leads to questions about other groupings, who have the same length of history as the minority population, but do not show this change.
4. Changing Agents of Social Control: HAWKINS developed the following proposition; “because they are recruited from among economically marginal groups, including those populations characterized by high rates of social control, the police and other lower-level agents of social control play a pivotal role in determining the extent of ethnic/racial differences. As marginal ethnic/racial groups become represented as lower-level agents of social control, the disproportionate representation of members of their group will gradually be reduced.”<sup>147</sup> This proposition would be an addition to the conflict theories; they argue that change in the comparative social status of an ethnic group will lead to a reduction of the level of social control experienced by that group. This addition suggests that one of the earliest manifestations of change in social status is the employment of members of ethnic minority groups as lower-level agents of social control. This change can have several reasons; change in perspective of social distance, increasing political power, or simply the acknowledgement of the dominant group that the minority in question poses a threat to them.<sup>148</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> D. F. HAWKINS, *Ibid*, 110.

<sup>146</sup> D. F. HAWKINS, *Ibid*, 112.

<sup>147</sup> D. F. HAWKINS, *Ibid*, 113.


<sup>148</sup> D. F. HAWKINS, *Ibid*, 107-114.

## 4. Implications of Multiculturalism on Crime

### 4.1. Summarizing the Link between Culture and Crime

In the first three sections of this chapter several links between ethnic and cultural minorities and crime and deviancy have been made. It is a research area that still needs a lot of exploration. The following model makes the two directions in which researchers have sought the link clear:

Figure 3: Model of the link between culture and crime.



The first link is supported by the conflict theories. SELLIN, SUTHERLAND and TURK are the most important authors representing this perspective. SELLIN developed on the basis of SUTHERLAND's writings the Culture Conflict theory, saying that in a heterogeneous society, contact between different cultures will cause conflict because of the different conduct norms they each handle. A culture might consider the conduct norms of another culture abnormal and thus some behaviours will be considered deviant and/or criminal. TURK developed a Authority-Subject Conflict Theory, in which he divides a society in groups with power, and groups without. He understands power not only in economical terms, but as any "institutional authority." Conflicts can occur because of social and cultural differences between the groups. The subjects – those without power – are likely to be criminalized by the law enforcement authorities.

The second direction to explain crime committed by cultural and ethnic minority, is based on *inequality*. This presumes that minorities are subject to economic deprivation and poverty because of discrimination, racism, and prejudices. This leads to frustration, which can lead to property crimes, and to violent crimes. MERTON's Strain Theory explains this very succinct. He argues that society places upon each of its subjects a pressure to achieve certain goals, but society doesn't give equal means to everybody, based on – among other characteristics – ethnicity. This causes a strain for those who do not have the means. They will try to dissolve this strain, and one of the ways to do that is by committing crimes.


The model presented above cannot account for a complete explanation of the existing links between culture and crime. It is a research still in its infancy. HAWKINS gave us some questions and possible answers to guide this future research. He formulated those in four categories: Insularity, Social Distance and Group Differences, Social Change and Changing Agents of Social Control.

### 4.2. A Hypothesis about the Implications of Multiculturalism on Crime

Multiculturalism, in general, and multiculturalism in Canada has been characterized in the two previous chapters. In the first three sections of this chapter, some theories have been given to explain crime committed by members of ethnic and cultural minorities. In this section, the implications that multiculturalism can have on crime will be discussed. Several

aspects of the Canadian multiculturalism policy will be listed, and each component will be situated in the model developed to define the implications that multiculturalism can have on crime (see figure 4). The official Canadian multiculturalism policy will thus serve as an example of multiculturalism, and from that model the possible implications on crime will be derived. Although there are plenty of differing models of multiculturalism, the core of the models are always similar, and therefore the hypothesis developed in this section will very likely also be applicable to other versions of multiculturalism. It also has to be remarked that the analysis is based on the *official* version of multiculturalism, and not on the *ideology*. There are some differences between those two, however, for practical reasons it has a greater value to start from an existing realization of the ideology.

Figure 4: Model of the implications of multiculturalism on crime.



The arrow to the left refers to the influence of multiculturalism on the link between culture and crime, which was described in section 1 of this chapter. The arrow to the right refers to the influence of multiculturalism on the theory of inequality, as it was described in section 2 of this chapter.

With this model, I argue that multiculturalism will have an impact on the two causes of crime committed by members of ethnic and cultural minorities that have been explained in this chapter. Multiculturalism is meant to increase respect for cultures different from your own. It is developed to value diversity, to accept people as they are. This will have an effect on the risk of culture conflicts. When a multiculturalism policy is working to its fullest extent, the differences will not be a reason for conflict, but rather a cause for exchange of experiences and ideas. Conduct norms of ethnic and cultural minorities will not be regarded automatically as deviant anymore. Acceptance of differences will lead to a search for solutions for differing opinions, as opposed to locking them away. The Canadian multiculturalism policy also increases the economic opportunities for members of ethnic and cultural minorities. In its ideal form, multiculturalism will uproot racism and discrimination, which will lead to more opportunities for members of minorities in the labour market. They will be treated as equals. All of these factors influence the need or urge to commit crimes. Crime rates will therefore decrease.

Multiculturalism in Canada is about mutual respect, mutual recognition, sharing, and mutual responsibility. This is so in general, but is also reflected in the three multiculturalism policy goals developed by the Canadian Heritage Department, based on the *Canadian Multiculturalism Act* (see page 22). The first goal has to do with *identity*; “fostering a society that recognizes, respects and reflects a diversity of cultures such that people of all

backgrounds feel a sense of belonging and attachment to Canada.”<sup>149</sup> When analyzing this goal, one can see two tendencies. The first is the expression of the core of any multiculturalism ideology, namely a respect for the diversity of cultures, a respect for all people in the way they are; belonging to a culture, with each their specific characteristics, habits, and values (what SELLIN called conduct norms, *see* page 29). The second is the concern of Canada to remain a coherent country, where everybody does not just do their own thing, but still feels a connection with their fellow citizens. Canada wants to respect diversity, but only in a way that will keep the country together, in a way that Canada will not scatter into islands of different cultures. Both tendencies can be placed on the left side of the model in figure 4. The second goal should be situated on the right side, and is expressed as *social justice*: “building a society that ensures fair and equitable treatment and that respects the dignity of people of all origins.”<sup>150</sup> The understanding of “fair and equitable” in this sentence is not in the strict sense of everything being the same for everybody. “Fair and equitable” here means that different people have to be treated differently. If somebody has less opportunities than somebody else, than this person has to be given *more* so they could come on the same level. This also means respecting the fact that some people need different things to feel happy than others. Since this goal is also about treating everybody with equal respect, it will also influence the left side of the model. The third goal expressed by the Canadian Heritage Department is *civic participation*: “developing, among Canada’s diverse people, active citizens with both the opportunity and the capacity to participate in shaping the future of their communities and their country.”<sup>151</sup> This goal should mainly be situated at the right side of the model again. However, it also speaks of respect for citizens as human beings who have the right to develop themselves in a meaningful activity, which can be of influence on the left side too. Here, as well, two tendencies can be found, the first being the same concern as mentioned in the context of the first goal, namely that of the unity of the country. The second aspect is to give citizens the opportunity and capacity to contribute to the success of their own lives. Canadian Heritage summarizes these three goals as follows: “... are aimed at helping all Canadians to participate fully in the economic, political, social, and cultural life of the country.”<sup>152</sup> This includes both the right and the left side of the model. Through the multiculturalism program, the Canadian government wants to ensure all its citizens respect and equality.

The Multiculturalism Program has been divided in four priority objectives, situated within the policy goals: Fostering cross-cultural understanding, combating racism and discrimination, promoting shared citizenship, and making Canadian institutions more reflective of Canadian diversity.<sup>153</sup> Also these objectives can be placed in the model, exercising influence on both sides. Several local projects are sponsored to bring the policy goals and the objectives into practice. Some projects are even directly aimed at crime prevention. The *Downtown East Side Crime Prevention/Revitalization Project* in Vancouver for example, “helped members of the diverse communities in Vancouver’s downtown east side address safety, crime prevention and community development.”<sup>154</sup> This project relied on focus groups and community meetings to encourage members of ethnic groups to work with local service providers, businesses and residents’ associations to ensure that serious issues were collectively addressed. By inclusion

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<sup>149</sup> DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, *Annual Report on the Operation of The Canadian Multiculturalism Act: 2002-2003*, Ottawa, Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2004, 9.

<sup>150</sup> DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, *Ibid*, 9.

<sup>151</sup> DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, *Ibid*, 9.

<sup>152</sup> DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, *Ibid*, 9.

<sup>153</sup> DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, *Ibid*, 9-10.

<sup>154</sup> DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, *Ibid*, 15.

and empowerment, this project seeks to find ways to prevent crime committed by members of minority groups. The influence of this project on crime will work via both sides of the model, as well as via HAWKINS' first theme (see pages 35-36) of empowerment as a way for minorities to decrease the social distance. Another example of a project is the *Saskatoon Police Service* project, concerning the "Aboriginal and multicultural communities by developing a multi-year project to make major changes internally and in its relationship with them. Cultural sensitivity, inclusive hiring practices and community input are key to delivering police services that respond to the needs of all Saskatoon communities."<sup>155</sup> This project has an influence on both sides of the model. On the one hand, by enhancing cultural sensitivity and inclusion, this project will create a greater sphere of respect. On the other hand, by hiring practices, the minorities will be given more opportunities, which will create a greater equality. In this project one can also see the projection of HAWKINS' fourth theme (see page 35); by hiring members of minority groups, crime is likely to decrease over time.

There are many more examples that could be given, and that could be placed within the model that has just been shown by the two examples. Another way in which the multiculturalism policy will influence the everyday lives of Canadian citizens, is via the instructions that the Canadian government has received from the *Multiculturalism Act*. These are:

- ensure that Canadians of all origins have an equal opportunity to obtain employment and advancement in those institutions;
- promote policies, programs and practices that enhance the ability of individuals and communities of all origins to contribute to the continuing evolution of Canada;
- promote policies, programs and practices that enhance the understanding of and respect for the diversity of the members of Canadian society;
- collect statistical data in order to enable the development of policies, programs and practices that are sensitive and responsive to the multicultural reality of Canada; and
- make use, as appropriate, of the language skills and cultural understanding of individuals of all origins.<sup>156</sup>

In the *Annual Report on the Operation of the Multiculturalism Act: 2002-2003*, pages 20 to 51 are spent on the enhancements the government has made to achieve those goals.<sup>157</sup> It is a long list, and it shows the efforts that the federal government has made, setting an example for the provinces, municipalities, and for all the individual Canadians. And again, all of these efforts can be placed in the model as has been showed in figure 4. They will influence both sides of the model and thereby have an influence on crime committed by members of ethnic and cultural minorities.

#### 4.3. Can we see any Result of the Implications of Multiculturalism on Crime?

It is appropriate to wonder how much of it is true, how these intentions work in practice, if the crime rates have actually changed, and if the members of the minority cultures actually benefit from these policies and programs. This is something that has hardly been researched, mainly because of the lack of available data – despite the government's intention to produce more statistics. In Canada, crime rate statistics are not subdivided into categories of ethnicity or race. There are some statistics about the population in federal and provincial prisons available. In this section an attempt will be made to use these statistics as an indication of how many members of minority groups commit crimes, and whether it is declining over time.

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<sup>155</sup> DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, *Ibid*, 12.

<sup>156</sup> DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, *Ibid*, 19.

<sup>157</sup> DEPARTMENT OF CANADIAN HERITAGE, *Ibid*, 20-51.

However, it is quite impossible to draw substantial conclusions from this data. Incarceration is only the last stage of the whole criminal justice system, and proportions in the earlier stages can differ significantly. As well, these statistics do not give any information about deviancy. Another inconvenience about these statistics is that the focus is more on Aboriginal people than on other ethnic and cultural minorities. No data can be found about whether their presence in prison is decreasing or increasing over time. Also no specification can be found about which crimes are more prevailing among ethnic offenders than others.

In *Corrections and Conditional Release Statistical Overview* some statistics are offered about the composition of the prison population in 2004.<sup>158</sup> In the total population as of April 11, 2004, 70.1 % were Caucasian, 16.1 % Aboriginal, 6.4 % black, 4.1 % Asian, 0.6 % Hispanic, and 2.6 % unknown.<sup>159</sup> These proportions have only changed slightly over the previous 3 years.<sup>160</sup> As of March 31, 2004, the proportion of offenders incarcerated was about 10% greater for Aboriginal offenders (68.1%) than for non-Aboriginal offenders (58.2%). There is no data available about the proportion of the other ethnic groups. Aboriginal offenders represent 18.5% of the incarcerated population and 12.9% of the community population. Aboriginal adults represent 2.7% of the Canadian adult population.<sup>161</sup> From 1996-97 to 2003-04, there has been an increase of 21.7% in the Aboriginal population under federal jurisdiction. Also the number of Aboriginal offenders on community supervision increased from 1996-97 to 2003-04, an increase of 54.3% in the last seven years, from 700 to 1,080.<sup>162</sup> Over the available timeline from 1996 until 2004, the Aboriginal population in prison is thus increasing. One might conclude that the multiculturalism program did not decrease the amount of crime committed. However, there are many factors that have to be taken into account. For example, the multiculturalism program is mainly directed at minority groups *other* than Aboriginals, since they already have specific measures that help them because of their special status in Canada. We would therefore need to have a look at statistics about the other minorities – which are not available – to make the picture complete. Another point of caution is that it is only a period of 7 years, it is possible that there have been other changes from the beginning of the multiculturalism policy until 1996.

It is thus very hard to prove whether the hypothesis about the implications of multiculturalism on crime actually holds water. Some even doubt whether the multiculturalism policy has any effect at all, some think the effects can not yet be seen because of the short timeframe, others argue that the government doesn't spend enough money to support the policy, and that it therefore has very limited and local effects. One consequence of this could be that there is still a lot of discrimination in the criminal justice system against Aboriginals and other ethnic

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<sup>158</sup> PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROTFOLIO CORRECTIONS STATISTICS COMMITTEE, *Corrections and Conditional Release Statistical Overview*, Ottawa, Public Works and Government Services Canada, 2004, 105 p, also available online: [http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/publications/Corrections/pdf/stats04/49569\\_Eng\\_finnal.pdf](http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/publications/Corrections/pdf/stats04/49569_Eng_finnal.pdf).

<sup>159</sup> “Aboriginal” includes offenders who are Inuit, Innu, Métis and North American Indian. “Asian” includes offenders who are Arab, West Indian, Asiatic, Chinese, East Indian, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, South East Asian and South Asian. “Hispanic” includes offenders who are Hispanic and Latin American.

<sup>160</sup> PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROTFOLIO CORRECTIONS STATISTICS COMMITTEE, *Ibid*, 47.

<sup>161</sup> PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROTFOLIO CORRECTIONS STATISTICS COMMITTEE, *Ibid*, 53.

<sup>162</sup> PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROTFOLIO CORRECTIONS STATISTICS COMMITTEE, *Ibid*, 61.

minorities, and that that is the real reason for their overrepresentation.<sup>163</sup> If some of that is the case, than also changes in the crime rates are going to be felt only after the multiculturalism policy has had the chance to fully break through.

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<sup>163</sup> See for example: J. H. HYLTON, *The Justice System and Canada's Aboriginal Peoples: The Persistence of Racial Discrimination*, in: W. CHAN, and K. MIRCHANDANI, (eds.), *Crimes of Colour: Racialization and the Criminal Justice System in Canada*, Peterborough, Broadview Press, 2001, 139-156.

## CONCLUSION

This paper had the goal of creating a hypothesis about the implications of multiculturalism on crime. In the first chapter, multiculturalism has been explained in its different forms throughout the world and over time. The second chapter was directed to multiculturalism in Canada. In Canada, multiculturalism has been adopted as an official policy. This policy has been put into its historical context, and also an analysis has been brought forward, focusing on the “Canadian Diversity Model”. Then, in the last chapter, the first two chapters were used to arrive at a hypothesis. Two main models of explanation of the link between culture and crime have been given; the conflict theories, and an inequality theory. Then the possible implications of multiculturalism – as it has been adopted in Canada – on crime committed by members of cultural and ethnic minorities has been elaborated on. A model has been developed.

Multiculturalism is about respect and tolerance. It is about giving citizens from all kinds of different backgrounds the same opportunities, and about valuing diversity in a positive light. This tolerance should lead to less racism and discrimination. Members of ethnic and cultural minorities will feel accepted. This will lead to less conflicts between members of the majority culture and members of minorities; the latter will more easily integrate into society, without having to give up their conduct norms. All of this will lead to a diminishing tension between the several groups of society, and a decreasing urge for members of minorities to commit crime. Multiculturalism also increases the opportunities that members of minorities have in society. When discrimination in the labour market decreases, more members of minorities will be hired and thereby will have the opportunity to participate in the economy on an equal basis as the members of the majority culture do. When inequality between different groups in society decreases, the members of minority cultures will not feel the strain as much as they would feel it in a society which treats them unequal. Members of minorities will increasingly be able to actually attain the goals that society puts on them. This will also take away this reason to commit crime by the members of minorities.

Unfortunately, this hypothesis is currently very difficult to substantiate with statistical material. There are hardly any relevant statistics available, and thus we stay in the dark about the actual implications of multiculturalism in general, and as it is applied in Canada, on crime.





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