Perceptions on Urban Space

The Case of Hyderabad's River Musi



Perceptions on Urban Space
The Case of Hyderabad's River Musi

by Loïc de Béthune

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Thesaurus

60 Rupee = approx. 1 Euro

Lakh: one hundred thousand
Crore: ten million

Kucha: temporary, crude, unsolid
Pucca: durable, solid, permanent

Nagar: place
Bastee/Bustee: developed slum settlement

Patta: leasehold document
Dhobi: washerman
Kachi: cultivator
Golla: buffalo herder
Dalit: casteless, 'untouchable'
Puja: Hindu worship

GHMC: Greater Hyderabad Metropolitan Corporation

HMDA:Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority
UCDP: Urban Community Development Programme

Contents

A. Discovery 13

B. Reflections 81

Two worlds collide - Photo courtesy of Andy Gijbels

Prologue

This Master Thesis is the result of a two month stay in Hyderabad during September and October of 2010.

However, my personal interest as an urban planner in slums and urban space in the booming cities of India can be traced back to a one month visit to Bangalore in June of 2009. The trigger for this fascination can best be exemplified by the picture on the left. It portrays a slum in Bangalore in front of the high-tech architectural spectacle of a multinational information technology corporation. This image, for me, succinctly summarizes the sometimes cold juxtaposition of two different realities that are simultaneously shaping urban India.

It is in search of this conflict that I contacted Sister Lissy Joseph and

Brother Varghese Teckanath, founders of CHATRI, a Hyderabadi NGO that fights for the tenurial rights of slum dwellers along the Musi River. They were so kind to not only provide Emily Pescod and myself with a subject and a study area along the river, but also to be of constant assistance and great intellectual support throughout our stay in Hyderabad.

This study will try to further expand my observations in Bangalore. Yet, as a Belgian student looking into the situation, I am well aware that I am in no position to criticize developments in a context that is first of all not mine and secondly so deeply complex it cannot always be put into words. Rather, it is the role of the Outsider and the feeling of discovery of this context that I would like to recreate throughout this work. It is exactly this role of Outsider that will allow me to ask some fundamental questions that might too often be avoided in local debates, and investigate options that may traditionally have been foreclosed.

This thesis should be understood as an investigation into the gaps between the perception on urban space different citizens of Hyderabad may hold. As we will see, simple acts of urban planning can become highly polemic interventions, involving many actors and excluding many others

The initial request by CHATRI to Emily Pescod and myself was to study the impact of a number of projects and plans that are being simultaneously being implemented by authorities along the riverbanks of the Musi with respect to a bastee named Moosa Nagar, located at the Chaderghat Junction.

It soon became clear both the isolated settlement as well as the relation of this bastee to the broader context of the river and of informality needed to be studied in depth in order to fully comprehend the complex interactions between urban planning and the citizens of the city. This work is the result of the latter study. For a closer look at Moosa Nagar please refer to Emily Pescod's work on the subject "Moosanagar, a Slum in India. Structural and Design Based Research". The work at hand tries to focus more on the interaction in general between planning and use of space as I perceived it in the city and through literature.

In what follows, I will look into some realities and consequences of infrastructural design on urban space by investigating a relatively small and well defined part of the River Musi. The first section of this work is structured as a walk along this stretch of river, exploring the different places and people on its banks. This walk will bring up a number of appropriations and plans that are transforming the appearance of the river. Although their interconnection is sometimes complex, each of them elucidate the challenges and ambitions of modern-day Indian planning. In the second section, a literature study will further investigate the role of urban space in Indian society and the subsequent forms of use of this space can take. Intermittently, spatial design proposals will be made to formulate critical questions on the role of the urban planner in this context.

A. Discovery

The following chapter is structured as a walk upstream along the riverbanks of Musi. It is an investigation into the places that exist along the river and what entities are shaping them.

The walk has been divided between five major bridges into four stretches.

Each part will discuss the places along the river and conclude with case studies of certain places or phenomena encountered along the way.

But first, the river itself and future plans for it will be briefly discussed.

View upstream from Moosarambagh Bridge

View upstream from Chaderghat Causeway

View upstream from Afzal Ganj Bridge

1. The Musi River

"This is the Musi River … or what is left of it…" – Varghese Teckanath[1]

The site that was chosen for this research runs upstream from Moosarambagh Bridge in the west to Muslim Jung Bridge in the east. This stretch of the river spans about 6 km of central Hyderabad.

Historically and physically, the river is an important element to understanding Hyderabad's development. The city was founded on the southern banks of the river and crossed the river as it grew. Up to this day the river is still the landmark separating the Old City to the south from the New City to the north. The river originates from several smaller streams some 70 km west of Hyderabad in the Anantagiri hills and has always functioned as the drain of the city through an intricate network of small tributaries stemming from the hundreds of lakes and man-made tanks that speckle the surrounding plateaus. After leaving Hyderabad the water flows for another 130 km to join the Krishna River, irrigating fields along the way. The river itself is a shallow slow trickle unfit for transportation purposes. Furthermore, depending on rainfall and inflows, it fluctuates in width and water level.

The river nowadays appears to be no more than a small gentle stream, but it has a dark side that is firmly imprinted in Hyderabad's collective memory. Several violent flash floods have caused the river to break out of its banks causing death and destruction throughout the city. The most memorable one was the tragic Great Musi Flood of Tuesday 28 September 1908 when over 40 centimetres of rainfall led to water levels of up to 3.5 meters, causing the deaths of thousands of people. These events prompted the construction of two dams in the 1920s in order to control the water levels. The two dams, respectively on the Isa (Osman Sagar Dam) and Musa (Himayat Sagar Dam) tributaries significantly reduced water quantities flowing into the city. The dams perform a double function: on the one hand they act as a means to control the water flowing into the river and preventing floods, while on the other hand they serve as reservoirs for Hyderabad's drinking water. The Osman Sagar Lake covers an area of 24.5 km^2 storing up to 110 million m^3 while the somewhat smaller Himayat Sagar Lake has a capacity of 84 million m^3 over an area of 19.5 km^2. The availability of this much drinking water was one of the major factors for comfortable life in the city.[2] As the city is now slowly growing closer to the dams, some fear the purity of the water may become endangered.

The water of the river itself is highly polluted nowadays, as it is a natural drain of the city, the rise of industrial activity and massive population growths have caused the Musi to almost become an open sewer. Although this work focuses on a very concise and highly urbanized part of the stream, it is important not to forget the importance of the river on a bigger scale. This river's exclusive use is to provide irrigation water for villages and farmers in the rural areas. According to Buechler and Devi, productivity of the lands irrigated with the polluted waters has dropped by 50%.[3]

Likewise, these days development around the river is stagnant to say the least. 'Severe mosquito problems', the 'foul smell of the water' and the 'unsightly look' of the area have resulted in a lack of interest in real estate along the river, as can be witnessed by the lower property value of the area compared to the general real estate market.[4] The extreme pollution of the water severely affects the quality of the ground water of the surrounding area.[5]

However, one of the most interesting characteristics of the river is that it is one of the only large open spaces in the city. Although the river itself is a small trickle varying from some 10 to 20 meters in width, the so called 'flood zone' provides for a visual and spatial counterpoint to the density of the surrounding urban fabric. Furthermore, it is an accessible space that thanks to its temporary nature reveals some interesting points on how Hyderabadis use and experience their city.

The area chosen for this study can roughly be divided in two parts. Downstream (east) of Chaderghat Bridge, the river forms a backside of the city. As roads and development diverge from the river, the decrepit area around the Musi is subject to


Direction of Flow
Puranapool
(Old Bridge)
Salar Jung Bridge
Afzal Ganj Bridge
Muslim Jung Bridge
Chaderghat Bridge and
Chaderghat Causeway
Railway Bridge
New Bridge
under construction
Moosarambagh Bridge
Direction of Walk

neglect. For the most part there are no retaining walls to contain water in case of floods and not surprisingly, a number of large slums have popped up along the river.

Upstream of Chaderghat Bridge though the situation is different. As major east-to-west roads come to line the riverbanks, this zone is more prestigious and more developed. The banks of the river are home to some major historical as well as infrastructural landmarks, comprising heritage buildings such as the Andra Pradesh High Court, the Osmania Hospital and the Mahatma Gandhi Bus Station.

Before discovering the riverbanks, two major plans for the river will be discussed and incidentally, each of them coincides with one of the two zones mentioned above. A new Master Plan for the entire Core Area of Hyderabad aims at developing the now underdeveloped area east of Chaderghat, while the Save Musi Project aims at revitalizing the so called 'Heritage Zone' to the west of Chaderghat by attempting to treat Musi's pollution and to beautify its riverbanks.

1 Interview with the author, September 2010

2 M. Vedukumar e.a., *"Natural Resource Management for a Sustainable Hyderabad: A Case Study of the Musi River"*, Humboldt University Berlin, Berlin, 2007; **Hereafter [Vedukumar e.a. 2007]**

3 Mekala Gayathri Devi e.a., *"Valuing a Clean River, A case study of Musi River, Hyderabad, India"*, 2009, p 3

Paper presented at the 53rd Annual Conference of Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Cairns, Australia; **Hereafter [Devi e.a. 2009]**

4 Devi e.a. 2009, p 3

5 Devi e.a. 2009, p 5

2. Plans for the Riverbanks

The Master Plan

In August of 2010, the Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority (HMDA) published a new Master Plan for Hyderabad's Core Area as a long due revision of an older Master Plan from 1975.

The plan designates the land use and required infrastructure for an area of 172 km², influencing the lives of over 3.6 million citizens.[1] As with any Indian city, Greater Hyderabad, presently the fifth largest urban area of the nation, is facing rapid changes as it strives to transform into a 21st century hi-tech cosmopolitan city. The authorities' effort to control and direct this growth through spatial planning is a much needed one, yet revealing of the forces that are shaping urban India.

The Master Plan itself consists of three documents, the most important being the Zoning Maps that define land use and infrastructure for the entire Core Area. They define the physical development of the city. These maps are supplemented with Regulations and a Report explaining the present condition of the city and the goals for the future.

A first read of the Report reveals a highly ambitious planning department in a city that is rapidly expanding. Unprecedented economic growth is making the city explode and densify at alarming rates, revealing challenges to traffic congestion, pollution, governance, ecology, economic and social disparities and housing.

Yet, the Master Plan's mission statement shows surprising determination: this plan aims to "Make Hyderabad the Most Livable City" by 2031.[2] Hyderabad of the future will be Compact, Efficient, Healthy, Safe, Low Carbon, Intelligent, Diverse, Pedestrian Friendly and the Core Area will also be a 'One Hour City', allowing for any place to be reached within one hour.[3] Accordingly, a 'Renewal, Rejuvenation and Redevelopment Strategy' has been proposed.

"The basic premise is the process of city revitalisation by providing and improving access to all areas, proper circulation, efficient mass transportation that should be spread all over the city, efficient location and functioning of activity centres, creation of more facilities for the citizens like parks, parking areas, work centres, vocational training institutes and improvement of infrastructure through Renewal, Rejuvenation and Redevelopment which would be specific to the areas and keeping in view the heritage and environmental and social characteristics of that area."[4]

The Master Plan mainly recognizes the potential of the riverbanks to create a new major east-to-west connection through the city.

"Substantial external-to-external flows across the core area are also being sponsored due to location of certain activity centers. In absence of convenient by pass roads, these flows are being funneled through existing travel corridors of MCH area, thus accentuating the problem. This case be visualized in the east –west flows."[5]

In an effort to promote development along the river and to provide the city with a better east-west connection the Master Plan proposes two 80' (approximately 20 metres) wide roads to be constructed parallel to the river. These roads should help solve the currently problematic east-west connection that is causing massive traffic congestions on a daily basis. Simultaneously, the new roads should incite development along the riverbanks as they would turn the disused areas along the river back into prestigious riverfront property, stimulating construction on vacant plots.

The map on the right has been composed from maps of different zones. The riverbanks in the rectangular area east of Chaderghat have been earmarked for construction of roads. As will become clear though, the ambitions of the Master Plan will conflict with those of a number of other actors that use the riverbanks for their own purposes.

1 Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority, *"Revised Master Plan for Core Area, Draft Report"*, Hyderabad, 2010, p 15; **Hereafter [HMDA 2010]**

2 HMDA 2010, p 2

3 HMDA 2010, p 127

4 HMDA 2010, p 132

5 HMDA 2010, p 103



Composite map compiled from maps in HMDA 2010



The Save Musi Project

The Save Musi Project (SMP) is a rather vague proposal launched in 2006 that aims at restoring the heavily polluted river to its former glory. One major objective of the project is to rationalize traffic flows at a cost of 34.7 crores to improve the east-west corridor through the city, an objective that has clearly been assimilated in the Master Plan. The SMP proposes three different zones along the river, one ecological, one heritage and one metropolitan. The entire stretch is to be transformed in gardens with rock formations, new bridges and pedestrian zones. Also, new sewers would intercept sewage flowing into the river along with four new Sewage Treatment Plants.[1]

It is clear, that within the 'Heritage Zone' that runs from Chaderghat Bridge to Puranapool, the aesthetic facet of the river will play an important role in its further development as the whole concept of creating a heritage zone is particularly aimed at creating a new tourist hotspot in the city. A new esplanade is under construction along the river between the Muslim Jung and Salar Jung bridges in an attempt to beautify the riverbanks. The aesthetics of the balustrades and lampposts that make up the scenic walk clearly refer to an emulated westernized idea of a picturesque riverbank.

As information about the whole operation is scarcely shared, it is unclear what the extents of the plan are and what its relation to the Master Plan is. Clearly though the goal to create a smooth east-west corridor permeates both proposals.

1 Vedukumar e.a. 2007

3. The Walk

1. Moosarambagh
to New Bridge

2. New Bridge
to Chaderghat Bridge

3. Chaderghat Bridge
to Afzal Gunj Bridge

4. Afzal Gunj Bridge
to Puranapool

North Bank

Ambedkar Nagar

Annapurna Nagar

Fields along the river

Moosarambagh Bridge to New Bridge

The first part of the walk along the river runs from Moosarambagh Bridge to a New Bridge that is under construction as proposed in the Master Plan. The distance between the two bridges is approximately 1.3 kilometers.

The first 500 metres of the North Bank is part of a neighbourhood called Annapurna Nagar. Right next to Moosarambagh Bridge there is a small slum neighbourhood called Ambedkar Nagar. For the most part of the stretch, fields that spread out into the riverbed are separated from the mixed income neighbourhood by a small channel. The neighbourhood itself is comprised of self made huts alongside

South Bank

Abdel Nagar

multistory concrete housing. The channel is severly polluted with plastic bags and other refuse.

Halfway between the two bridges a dense apartment complex is under construction in a neighbourhood called Lal Bagh. As a large sign explains, the GHMC is building this group of eight pink social housing apartment buildings to house low income families. Adjacent to the apartments a paved square has been constructed with a shrine in the middle.

After Lal Bagh lies Tulsiram Nagar, another mixed income neighbourhood.

The South Bank of this part of the river is comprised of two parts. The first part is a squatter settlement called Abdel Nagar that lies between a dirtroad and the riverbanks. All houses are self-built with found materials. As Abdel Nagar is an exemplary case of a squatter settlement, it will be further discussed at the end of this segment. On the same dirtroad, a row of mechanic shops repairs busses, cars and autorickshaws.

Past Abdel Nagar a number of recycling shops have been set up alongside a camel farm.

A couple of meter beyond that, a 20 metre wide road has been constructed as a first step in the completion of the east-to-west corridor along the river. As this road is as of yet not connected to any other major roads it is not in use.

Lining this road are a lot of vacant plots and some construction sites.





Lal Bagh Apartments





Tulsiram Nagar













Recycling Centre



Camel Farm






Tulsiram Nagar





Durga Temple

New Bridge









New Road





A construction site

New Bridge





Abdel Nagar

Abdel Nagar is a typical squatter settlement. It is a manifestation of people who are so poor that they have no other option than to build their own house on a vacant spot somewhere in the city. As they have no means of paying rent in other places this close to the city centre, they decided to cut away some bushes and build on open unused land. This particular slum is a collection of around 150 huts haphazardly scattered between a mud road and the retaining wall of the river forming a 600 meter long slum.

In between the makeshift homes tour busses are parked, car wrecks have been dumped and street dogs are running freely. Waste is everywhere, either on the ground or collected in textile bags.

In the two days I spent interviewing the residents of Abdel Nagar I mostly met women and children working from home during the day.

The majority of the neighbourhood's residents are Hindu, though there is a small Christian community who built their own brickwork church and I also noticed a few Muslim families. About halfway into the slum a small Hindu shrine has been set up under a tree creating a gathering space. Next to this shrine a small school was built by a local NGO.

There didn't seem to be much more than a sporadic sense of community or friendship between the neighbours. Signs of hierarchy between the squatters were evident as several people implied the existence of different 'community leaders' (most of whom lived outside the slum) and one woman told me she had no contact with her neighbours as they were of lower caste.

The place shows no signs of installed sewers, water or electrical connection. The existing electrical connections all seem tapped from nearby poles. Between the houses and the river small wash-rooms have been built: person-sized enclosures where one can wash in relative privacy. The river's flood zone is used for defecating as can be seen from the little paths that lead down to the riverbed. Houses, usually tent-like structures with a rectangular plan, appear to be built by hand with crude bricks, plastic sheets, wooden beams, corrugated sheets and found materials.

The use of second-rate materials and the image of temporality reflected in the huts as well as the road is what is referred to as 'kutcha', a word meaning crude, unfinished or ramshackle.

Each house is about 2 meters high at most. The average surface area of 15 square meters needs to hold a typical family of 5 members. Covered with plastic and badly ventilated, the dimly lit houses are hard to keep cool during the day. Inside, the houses are packed with belongings. These typically include an array of cooking pots, clothes, a TV-set for which electricity is tapped from nearby electrical poles, a (ceiling) fan, some bags of rice and food, some calendars or posters of religious as well as popular idols, a water barrel or several smaller pots for water and some suitcases that can be locked with other valuables inside. Hindu

houses also typically allocate a small space for puja (worship). Most activity happens in the centre of the room on mats on the ground. Consequently, furniture is often reduced to a couple of stackable plastic chairs and some low tables and cupboards lined against the walls to keep belongings from touching the ground. Some families own a bed which provides place for sleeping under as well as on it. Most homes have stone floors, but occasionally it is just the bare ground, so the house is constantly swept to keep it clean and dust-free. Shoes are taken off before entering. As it is impossible to securely close the hut, it needs constant supervision to prevent theft.

While women typically do domestic work in nearby middle class houses, most men work as 'coolies', doing manual day labour and petty jobs. Another major source of income is ragpicking: collecting waste and selling it to recycling centres. In fact, evidence of ragpicking is everywhere. Several little 'recycling centres' have been set up within the slum to sort large amounts of paper, plastic, glass and metal and collect them in large textile bags. The result is that people are literally living amidst waste.

As I perceived it, some of these

The local church

Inside a hut

A ragpicker

squatters are literally one misfortune away from famine. When asked about how they perceive the state of their surroundings, most answer they have bigger problems to deal with than improving their homes like paying dowries for their daughters' weddings. Although people are poor and some barely make enough money to feed themselves and their families, the reason for Abdel Nagar's squalid state did not seem to be poverty per se. Perhaps surprisingly, the majority of these squatters has been living in these conditions in this very place for 15 to 30 years. Yet there has been a reluctance to invest in developing the place because of the threat of eviction. The people of Abdel Nagar are held in a stranglehold of fear of eviction by authorities because of their illegality. For years they have been warned that the site they live on has been earmarked for the road works implied in the Save Musi Project and the Master Plan, reducing any urge to physically improve their situation.












Vodafone













Picking Waste

Hyderabadis seem to have the habit of just throwing away their garbage in the streets or in the river. Urban open space appears to literally be the trash can of its citizens as there seems to be no awareness on the repercussions of littering.

One of the worst victims of this behaviour is the river itself.

Yet, some people make a living off of this waste. Collecting waste, perhaps just one step up from tanning leather and begging on the occupational ladder, is an occupation open even for the worst off. Scavengers, also referred to as ragpickers or sweepers, are mostly women and children who pass through specific areas of the city to collect waste. Apart from the typical paper, plastic, glass and metal, it is also customary to collect cinders and coconut shells to use as cheap fuel. The collected materials are sold by the kilogram to middlemen and small recycling centres.[1] Very dirty or wet materials are unsellable as such and are taken home to be washed and dried first. Ragpickers often live in the midst of the waste they collected themselves. A study that analysed the composition of waste at disposal sites seems to suggest that intensity of ragpicking is quite low in Hyderabad as high percentages (up to 10% of the waste were plastics) of recyclable materials were still found at the end of the waste chain.[2]

1 1 kilogram of paper or glass fetches 1 rupee, metal is worth 3 and plastics up to 12. Frederic C. Thomas, *"Calcutta Poor, Elegies on a City above Pretense"*, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk (NY), 1997, p 97; Hereafter [Thomas 1997]

2 HMDA 2010, p 95












North Bank




Shanti Nagar

A school near Krishna Nagar





New Bridge to Chaderghat Bridge

The second part of the walk spans the 1.7 kms between the New Bridge and Chaderghat Bridge.

Along the northern bank of this part of the river bastees (or slums) are alternated by crematories and graveyards. For some Hindus it is important to be cremated near flowing water bodies, therefore a number of cremation grounds have been built on the riverbanks.

Just west of the new bridge are two bastees. The smaller Shanti Nagar is separated from the larger Krishna Nagar by a channel.

New houses are under construction on a patch of land that appears to be reclaimed from the flood

South Bank

zone.

Southwest of Krishna Nagar lies the GHMC Electrical Crematorium. Behind this a number of graveyards line the river up to Chaderghat. In the interstices of these graveyards lie two bastees named Sanjay Gandhi Nagar and Kadja Garib Nagar.

Right before the Chaderghat crossroads lies Kamgar Nagar, a dilapidated social housing complex that will be discussed in further detail.

The Southern bank of this stretch of river continues on the newly constructed road. Where the road ends, signs of its future expanse are allready visible. Wahed Nagar used to be a bastee but was destroyed some years ago in prospect of the new road. Beyond the rubble of Wahed Nagar, the path along the river is overgrown and clearly there is a lot of vacant land. The path continues into Shankar Nagar, a large bastee with wide roads. Shankar Nagar is the first in a sequence of bastees that line the river. Next is Padma Nagar, separated from Shankar Nagar by a channel running into the river. After Padma Nagar lie Vinayaka Vedi (or Rasoolpura as it is also referred to) and Moosa Nagar.

Krishna Nagar

New construction in the flood zone





The ruins of Wahed Nagar





An overgrown area

Shankar Nagar


Construction of a new sewer

Shankar Nagar’s main road

Gambling near the river




Cattle at Sanjay Gandhi Nagar

A railroad bridge





Kamgar Nagar

Pottery shop at Chaderghat Causeway








Padma Nagar

Vinayaka Vedi





Moosa Nagar

Chaderghat Bridge





Kamgar Nagar

Kamgar Nagar is a social housing complex built in 1966 at the Chaderghat crossroads to rehouse people living in a slum. The complex initially provided 72 apartments in 4 separate buildings, with ample space between and around the buildings. Apartments consist of one room, a kitchen, a small restroom and a small shower, both accessible from a balcony.

The majority of residents of Kamgar Nagar work as contractors at the GHMC malaria department. Their work consists of anti-larva operations by treating water sources around the city.

As time passed and families grew, space needed to be provided for extended families or married sons with their families. Consequently, the residents themselves started building new housing around their own buildings. By now, all ground-floor houses have been expanded in at least one direction by adding a room in the front, the back or the side. Additional rooms have been constructed on top of these to expand homes on the first floor. It seems the social housing complex has ironically become a new slum of its own. All apartments have been painted in bright colours and some have also internally undergone transformations.

In recent years, the municipality has declared the buildings 'past its expiration date' and has forsaken them, resulting in their semi-ruinous state today. On top of this, the entire complex was recently labelled illegal by authorities and the residents were termed encroachers on public land.

In effect, the new HMDA Master Plan designates the area as part of the flood zone, condemning the buildings to demolition.

Moosa Nagar

Moosa Nagar is a prime example of a developed slum or, in Hyderabadi terminology, a 'bastee'. The bastee's present form is bound by the river's flood zone to the north, the higher Chaderghat Bridge to the west and the lower Chaderghat causeway to the east and a Muslim graveyard to the south.

I came to Moosa Nagar intermittently over the course of two months, usually during the day when men were out working.

Houses are brightly coloured and built with plastered brick and cement. Clearly, a lot of attention has gone into decoration of the homes. Typically, homes have one or two rectangular rooms with small windows. Most roofs are covered with corrugated sheets, while some have concrete roofs that can be used as terraces. An average house spans about 20 m^2 and is home to around 5 people. Some houses have built additional stories reaching up to three stories high. Homes tend to cluster around open or closed courtyards where communal water taps are installed and people can gather.

The bastee has been notified by authorities which means cemented roads, electricity, sewers, water connections and communal garbage bins have been provided by the municipality. Most of the homes have some form of tap water and relatively private toilet facilities.

The bastee comprises a number of public buildings and services. A mosque, a Hindu temple, some smaller shrines, a community centre, a day-care centre, several shops, and an elementary school have been built throughout the years through efforts of its residents and interaction with authorities and NGOs.

Evidence of government intervention is not only visible in the infrastructure, but also in a number of open places within the slums where houses were demolished by authorities during a conflict. Furthermore, a number

of houses have been built by the government to rehouse families it had to evict for the construction of Chaderghat Causeway.

The flood zone of the river forms an extension of the slum and is used as a meeting place, an open air toilet and for cattle. Several herds of goats roam around the area. The flood zone is also used for gambling and brewing of illegal liquor. The slum has developed a special relation with the river as evidenced from the precise placing of the houses as close as possible to the flood zone without running the risk of inundation. The result is that, in times of higher than average floods some houses are inundated.

There is a slight Muslim majority making up 55% of the total residents, the rest being Hindus. Most Muslims belong to the Sunni denomination while most Hindus belong to the Madiga caste, a Dalit caste. The place emanates a strong sense of community as the streets are always full of women and children and neighbours seem to know each other well. Houses are poorly insulated though and due to high densities privacy appears to be a problem. There seems to be some relationship between the bastee and the nearby police station as police officers use

Houses around a courtyard

Street view

the slum as a parking lot for their motorbikes.

Storage is one of the most visible function of the homes. Inside, the houses are usually arranged as large walk-in closets. The walls are lined with belongings on built-in shelves or on tables and in suitcases. As space is scarce, linen is dried along the facades of the houses. Most households own a TV and a ceiling fan, some own a scooter and most people have a cell-phone. Average income is around Rs. 5000 a month, which leaves little room for a 5 person family to save.

Moosa Nagar started out in the mid 1950s as just five illegal squatter huts. Much like Abdel Nagar, early residents of Moosa Nagar had no security of tenure nor infrastructure. Although they had bought land from several landowners that owned the different patches of land the slum is built on, official recognition and thus security came only in 1982 when Moosa Nagar was notified by the authorities under a project called the Urban Community Development Project. Notification meant the slum was entitled to water, electricity, sewer,... connections and the squatters were entitled to legal acknowledgement of their occupance of the land. They were given ‘pattas’, documents

granting them some rights over the land they occupy.

Apart from notification, the residents of the bastee had a big hand in developing the entire area to habitable conditions themselves over 50 years time. This development was not in the least due to the strong unity the slum could present towards authorities. Several other bastees that started out in the vicinity have grown in a similar fashion, resulting in the formation of one large slum along the river running from Shankar Nagar in the east to Chaderghat Darwaza in the west. Although this large slum might seem homogenous, the communities within it are clearly delineated.

Within Moosa Nagar segmentation exists, the most notable example being the people living under Chaderghat Bridge. The Bridge forms the border between Moosa Nagar and the neighbouring bastee Kamal Nagar. Under the bridge is where the most unfortunate elements of Moosa Nagar have set up their shacks. Many of these houses use the vaults of the bridge as a structural element and as a roof. Conditions under the bridge are difficult as the bridge leaks into the houses and smoke from cooking fires is badly ventilated. As people under the bridge could not possibly be granted pattas, seeing as that land was deemed inhabitable, they remained propertyless and were consequently marginalized by some of their neighbours.


Garland making


Under Chaderghat Bridge *


*

Income sources within the slum vary greatly. Garland making is a major business in Moosa Nagar for women. The bastee used to be known for its flower business but due to pollution levels of the Musi, the growing of flowers became impossible. Therefore, the industry shifted to production of leaf garlands which are used as decorations for festivities. Leaves for the garlands are collected from trees around the city by the men of the slum and the finished garlands are sold by the roadsides. Apart from garland making, typical occupations are autorickshaw drivers, cooks, butchers, wall painters and domestic workers. Some work in the GHMC malaria department or as GHMC pavement sweepers, these 'government workers' clearly have better incomes than their neighbours and some of them even draw pensions. Also, several shops have been set up within the slum. These seem to sell mostly sweets to the neighbourhood children.

* Picture courtesy of Emily Pescod















*







*


North Bank

Major roads run adjacent to the river

Sai Baba Temple

Basket Weaver Slum



Chaderghat Bridge to Afzal Ganj Bridge

The third part of the walk runs from Chaderghat Bridge to Afzal Ganj Bridge or Nayapool as it also called (meaning New Bridge) . This part of the river comprises the Mahatma Gandhi Bus Station (MGBS), built on a dry spot in the middle of the river. In this part of the river, the main east-to west roads run adjacent to the river.

The northern walk is for the most part fenced off from the river. 300 metres past Chaderghat lies a small squatter settlement of around fifty huts that sell hand woven baskets to passersby.

At MGBS, or Imlibun Bus Stand as it is locally known, a multitude of street vendors are selling clothes, luggage

South Bank

Chaderghat Bridge and Kamal Nagar

Chaderghat Darwaza

Mahatma Gandhi Bus Station

Mechanics around MGBS

and food to commuters. This phenomenon will be discussed in further detail in what follows.

Further down the road, lies the Afzalganj State Library, an important heritage building. Right across from it, lies the Afzalganj Bus Stand that doubles as a marketplace.

The southern walk starts just next to Chaderghat Bridge at Kamal Nagar, a notified bastee that has been supplemented by authorities with a number of three story apartment buildings. Next is Chaderghat Darwaza. This is a dhobi ghat, a place where washermen wash linnen next to the river. On this side of the river MGBS has attracted a lot of mechanic shops rather than street vendors. Because this side only serves as an exit for long distance busses, opportunities for street vendors are scarcer.

Beyond the mechanic shops, a number of opticians have started their businesses next to an eye hospital.

From the Salar Jung Bridge one can enter the Imlibun Park adjacent to the MGBS on the island or continue crossing the river to the northern bank. Looking down from the bridge one sees a lot of dhobi ghats and ragpickers.

From Salar Jung bridge westward the Save Musi Project esplanade with scenic lampposts and balustrades is under construction along the riverbank. Facing the river stands the large Muslim Jung museum. Finally, at Afzal Ganj, on the bridge itself, a number of people sell toys and fruit .

* Picture courtesy of Emily Pescod

**Picture courtesy of Wikipedia





Street Vendors at MGBS













Abid Ali Khan Eye Hospital




Salar Jung Bridge







Roadside pottery shop

Afzal Ganj State Library







Entrance to Imlibun Park

A ragpickers' recycling centre

Shivaji statue on Salar Jung Bridge

A roadside door sale

Salar Jung Museum

Scenic riverside esplanade under construction

Afzal Ganj Bridge

Imlibun Street Vendors

The Mahatma Gandhi Bus Stand (MGBS), or Imlibun Bus Stand as it is casually known, is a gigantic bus terminal that was constructed in 1985 around an island in the middle of the river. The terminal is supposedly one of Asia's largest and is comprised of two parts. The one located on the island serves as a terminal for national busses, while a smaller hangar on the northern bank is used by local busses. Though the national terminal contains a shopping mall, the high number of commuters passing through MGBS on a daily basis has encouraged a number of street vendors to set up shop along the road leading to the entrance of the bus stop.

They have placed themselves on the narrow pavement between the road an the retaining wall of the river. Their stalls literally touch the side of the road, forcing passersby to walk on the road and in turn forcing cars and busses to avoid these passersby, causing serious traffic issues.

The goods on sale are tailored to the needs of bus passengers. The hawkers predominantly sell clothes and luggage from long bamboo stalls that were constructed in the narrow space between the street and the retaining wall of the river. Winter clothes are especially popular, as bus rides to northern states can get cold. Apart from clothes stalls, there are shoemakers, chaiwallas (tea sellers), fruit and vegetable sellers, snack vendors, et cetera. They all sell their wares from a variety of carts, floor mats, bamboo stalls or timber constructions.

Although all vendors claim to be independent from each other, it is clear the winter clothes vendors are all selling clothes from the same manufacturer. Vendors assured me they got their clothes from faraway places such as Nepal, Ludhiana and Delhi, and some had even personally travelled there to collect the clothes themselves. Whether this was some selling strategy to ensure

buyers that the goods were actually manufactured in areas where people would know how to make warm clothes is not entirely clear to me. Furthermore, as it turned out, most of the clothes vendors were actually from Orissa and Bangalore and only came to Hyderabad for a couple of months to sell their wares.

What is interesting is that, inside the bus terminal, registered shops are selling the same types of goods. The roadside shops outisde are actually stealing a share of the customers of the formal shops inside the bus terminal. As prices inside the bus stand are higher, the shops inside tend to cater more to the richer sections of society.

The street vending is of course prohibited, so vendors are forced to pay daily fines and bribes. A police officer sitting nearby explained to me; *"yes, these people are illegal, but it is the only way for them to make a living, so what can we do?"* In effect, vendors actually 'rent' their space from several authorities in the form of fines. Police fine the vendors because they are not formally registered businesses, while traffic police and GHMC issue fines because they obstruct traffic. Fines and bills seem to vary greatly from one vendor to another, although they all sell the same goods in the same area. In my opinion this suggests informal relationships between vendors and officers issuing the fines. On average ,fines total up to between Rs. 400-600 a month. Furthermore there seems to be an informal rent arrangement that allows some to stand in more favourable spots than others.

The national terminal **

Official shop inside the national terminal

A storage box

All along the road big bright yellow boxes have been built. The boxes were built so vendors could safely store their goods at night and were later painted yellow to advertise a cell phone company. These boxes, and the area in front of them are rented through some informal mechanism to the street vendors for a number of months. Rent for the boxes is on average Rs. 100 a day but can run up to Rs. 200 .

**Picture courtesy of Wikipedia









MARA






Idea









Idea

Labour in the River

A number of professions seem to be related to the river and show interesting uses of its riverbanks.

Dhobis, the city's washermen and –women, work near water streams and lakes, doing manual laundry for hotels, restaurants and upper class residents. The Dhobi's are one of the lower castes of the caste system and are (perhaps ironically) considered an 'impure' caste. Dhobi's do their washing in concrete washbasins they call "houses". Concentrations of these washbasins are called dhobi ghats. In recent years, the authorities are slowly concentrating the different self-built ghats in certain places like Chaderghat Darwaza, where government-built washbasins and clean water taps are provided for them. As pollution levels of the river rise, the practice of washing with river water has almost died out.

Dhobis tend to favour setting up in the vicinity of bridges for reasons of accessibility and though their washbasins are quite compact the drying of the linen demands a lot of space. Spread out linen is a usual sight along the river.

The Kachis (para-grass cultivators) and Gollas (buffalo herders) perform agricultural activities in the centre of the city. These professions are also increasingly endangered because of the rising pollution of the water and pressures from the ever growing city. Large parts of the flood zones of the riverbanks have been leased by the government to the cultivators. Some of these farmers, in turn, have subdivided the lands and sold the lots to squatters and other encroacher, as happened in Moosa Nagar. Most of the cultivation consists of para-grass, a type of grass used as fodder for cattle alongside with banana and coconut plantations which are cultivated for their leaves (respectively used as plates and as decoration for festivities).


Dhobis


Kachis


Gollas

North Bank




Road alongside Osmania Hospital





Afzal Ganj Bridge to Puranapool

The last part of the walk spans the 2 kilometres between Afzal Ganj Bridge and Puranapool (Old Bridge).

The first part of the walk up to Salar Jung Bridge will cover an important historical part of the city sporting views of the majestic domed buldings of the Andhra Pradesh High Court on the southern bank and the Osmania General Hospital on the northern bank.

The northern walk starts with a small ragpicker slum next to Afzal Ganj Bridge, followed by a straight stretch lined by the river on one side and the Osmania Hospital on the other.

Beyond Osmania Hospital, some men are sleeping in

South Bank

View towards Osmania Hospital

No Horn Zone

AP High Court

the streets next to a small enclosed municipal park.

At Salar Jung Bridge, the road once again diverges from the river, once more resulting in the formation of slums between the main road and the river. The space right under Salar Jung Bridge is used as an informal workshop for the production of festival statues. Along the road, vendors of different kinds of services and goods stand in groups along the pavement. First there are scrap metal sellers, next horse drawn carriages that can be rented for weddings, followed by carpenters and shops selling plates made out of leaves.

At Puranapool, a large dhobi ghat has been built by GHMC.

On the south bank of the river, the scenic esplanade continues up to Salar Jung Bridge. The road in front of the High Court Building is empty of activity and a large sign indicates the street is a 'No Horn Zone' in an attempt to reduce the noise of the passing traffic. Some dhobis are continuing their business near Salar Jung Bridge, regardless of the newly built esplanade (yet further enquiry reveals they will have to move to Puranapool as soon as construction is completed). Past Salar Jung Bridge, the road diverges once more from the river. Yet here, the interstice between road and river has been filled with government buildings. The Government Maternity Hospital and the Police Transport Organisation are faced by a Police Headquarter. The rather empty street is lined on both sides with high walls.

At Puranapool, the oldest part of the bridge has been closed to traffic and has been converted to a market.



Osmania Hospital


View towards Andhra Pradesh High Court


Homeless sleeping on the street



Municipal park



Durga statue workshop under Salar Jung Bridge



Wedding carriages for rent



Dhobis next to the new esplanade



Hyderabad City College


Quli Qutb Shah Stadium



Medical facilities opposite the Government Maternity Hospital


Police Headquarters





A small Hindu temple next to the water



A small Hanuman shrine next to the water






Furniture shop


Leaf plates shop

Dhobi ghat at Puranapool





Gravestone shop next to a small graveyard

Shiva Temple

Police Transport Organisation



Tanning Leather

Puranapool Market on the bridge

Pavement Dwellers

Lining the street next to the Osmania Hospital is a large group of men sleeping on the pavement in the shade. This is an informal labour ‘adda’, a place where these homeless day labourers can be picked up by contractors for one off jobs.

This kind of pavement dwellers are mostly rejects from other neighbourhoods. Because of their drug and alcohol abuse or violent nature they are not welcome in most slum communities. Some of them lost their jobs or their wives and ended up alone. Some got addicted to drugs and subsequently ended up on the streets. Some were originally from far away places as Tamil Nadu, Karnataka or Pakistan and wander around India from one city to the next.

They literally live on the streets and roam about the city between a certain number of spots they know are good for sleeping, begging, getting food, or getting work. This specific place offers shade to sleep, charity from the worshippers at the nearby temple and visibility to passing employers. Usually they can get work as lightholders during weddings or as dishwashers or vegetable cutters in nearby restaurants. Interestingly, the old fence of the adjacent park is used as a bench to sleep and sit on.

Although most of them know each other, their mistrust of each other prevents them from forming an organized community. As most of them have a drug habit and can be unpredictable and violent the formation of friendships between them is difficult.












Shrines

The construction of shrines in vacant spaces is ubiquitous. Hindus as well as Muslims have a habit of building shrines and even graves in open spaces. These shrines may be built in interstices or under bridges but also in the middle of the road or on footpaths where they obstruct passersby.

Apparently, this behaviour is tolerated because of the taboo on freedom of religion. Criticizing a religious action is highly polemic as tensions between religious groups can quickly escalate. This laissez-faire attitude has led some groups to abuse of the sanctity of these encroachments to gain foothold over certain places.

Influence of Institutions

As can be seen from a number of examples, official institutions or companies affect the use of space around them. Just like the MGBS attracts street vendors, the Government Maternity Hospital attracts small medical facilities. Copycats act as a cheaper alternative to the service provided by the official insitiution. On the other hand, some institutions try to ban these kinds of activities and control the space around themselves. The areas around the AP High Court and police stations are very controlled (emphasized by No Horn signs) and consequently (forcefully) kept free of illegal encroachments. The pictures on the right show three institutions and the subsequent use of space around them


Government Maternity Hospital


Police Headquarter


Andhra Pradesh High Court

4. Musi River Atlas of Appropriation

The above research has detected a multitude of uses for the open spaces along the riverside. These phenomena will be mapped out on the following pages in order to identify the patterns that regulate these appropriations of urban space.


Formal Institutes
Slums
Buildings
Approx. 500 metres
Kachiguda
Amberpet
Chaderghat
Old Malakpet
Malakpet
Afzalganj
Puranapool
Darulshifa

Musi River



Influence of Institutions

1 Government Dispensary
2 Police Transport Organisation
3 City Police C.A.R. Headquarters
4 Government Maternity Hospital
5 Quli Qutb Shah Stadium
6 Government City College
7 Andhra Pradesh High Court
8 Osmania General Hospital
9 Nayapul Maternity Hospital
10 Andhra Pradesh State Central Library
11 Salar Jung Museum
12 Imlibun Park
13 Mahatma Gandhi Bus Station



Slums

1 Unknown
2 Unknown
3 Jumerath Bazaar Slum - Age 45
4 Unknown
5 Unknown
6 Unknown
7 Unknown
8 Unknown
9 Unknown
10 Unknown
11 Sri Krishna Nagar
12 Chaderghat Darwaza - Age 60
13 Unknown
14 Kamal Nagar - Age 60
15 Unknown - Age 60
16 Moosa Nagar - Age 60
17 Kamgar Nagar - Age 45
18 Vinayaka Vedi - Age 40
19 Kadja Garib Nagar - Age 50
20 Padma Nagar - Age 40
21 Sanjay Gandhi Nagar - Age 50
22 Shankar Nagar - Age 40
23 Krishna Nagar - Age 50
24 Shanti Nagar
25 Lal Bagh Appartments
26 Abdel Nagar - Age 25
27 Ambedkar Nagar - Age 35



Street Vending

1 Food Market - Puranapool
2 Paper Plates
3 Tombstones - Graveyard
4 Horse Carriages and Scrap Metal
5 Medical Services - Hospital
6 Meals and Fruit - Hospital
7 Fruit and Trinkets - Bridge
8 Vegetables - Bus Stand
9 Pottery and Snacks
10 Doors
11 Winter Clothes & Food - Bus Stand
12 Baskets - Slum
13 Clothes - Crossroads
14 Pottery
15 Telephone Shop
16 Pottery and Snacks - Bridge
17 Snacks - Bridge



River Labour



Religion and Shrines

1 Shiva Temple
2 Afzal Ganj Masjid
3 Aza Khana Zehra
4 Masjid Haji Kamal
5 Hanuman Temple
6 Sai Baba Temple
7 Government Cremation Ground
8 Pentecoastal Mission
9 Durga Temple

5. A Divide in Perceptions

"An architecture or urbanism of equality in an increasingly inequitable economic condition requires looking deeper to find a wide range of places to mark and commemorate the cultures of those excluded from the spaces of global flows." – Rahul Mehrotra [1]

As evidenced by the situation at hand along the Musi, there is a clear juxtaposition of planned and unplanned developments that are conflicting with each other. On the one hand there are large scale infrastructural works like the new bridge and the new esplanade that try to develop the river according to modern ideals of connectivity, rational planning and architectural spectacle; on the other hand large groups of people appear to intervene on the physical aspect of the city out of primary need for space to live, work, worship,... Especially the poorer segments of society appropriate underused space and claim the interstices of the built environment to develop them according to their needs. Their concerns seem to be towards creating a quality of life for themselves. Although this may be considered a selfish way to interact with urban space, it seems most of these people have been placed in a situation where they have no other choice than to resort to appropriating space that isn't theirs. The shear mass of their piecemeal actions is making them a huge passive, irrational force that is constantly in search of weak spots in the city fabric and seemingly undermines the aforementioned ideals of rationality, order and hygiene imbued in the Master Plan and the Save Musi Project.

Both those plans have to be placed within the context of a city that is rapidly developing and becoming increasingly technological. On the one hand the Master Plan is proposing new roads to stimulate development and construction along the largely underused banks of the river, while simultaneously trying to improve the east-west connection

of the city. On the other hand, the Save Musi Project is aestheticizing the riverfront as an architectural entity, providing it with an image that reflects a westernized romantic ideal of picturesque landscaping and city parks. The Master Plan and Save Musi Project both see the river as a face of the city and attempt to maximize its potential as a scenic element, leaving little place for the more practical appropriations of the poor.

What is important though is that the interaction between both the planned and unplanned urban development appears to be so uni-dimensional it can be summed up in one word: Battle. This statement might seem quite loaded, yet a deeper study of the two plans, and especially the Save Musi Plan, will further elucidate the depth of the conflict at hand.

Forsaking Participation

The history of the Save Musi Project is a rather interesting one. Not surprisingly, the SMP is not the first project to launch a beautification proposal for the river. Yet, previous projects have turned out to have the hidden agenda of doing away with the poor along the river while providing high value real estate to corporate developers.

In order to understand the context of the SMP we must first look back to 1997 at the Nandanavanam Project. This project was an ambitious plan to develop the stretch of the Musi between Chaderghat and Puranapool. The project proposed redesign and widening of existing roads, construction of new sewage treatment plants, rationalization of the cremation grounds, the public lands and heritage zones. It included recreation parks, shopping malls, water sports[2], gardens, government offices, premium clubs, commercial complexes etc…[3] The plan was conceived as a public-private partnership that would be self-financing.[4] It involved building a small channel in the middle of the river to canalize the flow in order to free up space for construction and create 'interesting' water bodies. Furthermore, the Rs. 408 crore plan gave some attention to history and heritage through the extension of an original 'Musi River Front Development' project and the creation of a historical theme park depicting the past of the city in order to turn the river front into the central node of a tourism network that would span throughout the city.[5]

The project started as a participatory initiative involving several NGO's and representatives of the urban poor living in the slums along the river. Soon enough, it became clear that 'participation' was a hollow phrasing and that massive evictions of slums would be necessary in order to complete the plan. According to activist Varghese Teckanath, the whole plan grew out of two faulty assumptions. The first one was that the people living and working around the river could easily be moved. The squatters and poor living on the banks of the river were termed 'encroachers' stealing the public space away from society. This statement seemed to forget the considerable efforts and investments both the people and the authorities themselves had put into developing the riverbanks and moulding them into valuable places. Yet, because these places did not conform to aesthetics upheld by middle class authorities they were seen as a nuisance. The poor along the river consequently put up a fight for their rights to stay in their homes. The second assumption was that the river was a dead stream, an assumption that would spell the demise of the entire project.

The discussion about the Nandanavanam Project coincided with a heavy flood. Even after the construction of the two great dams, floods had remained a threat to most people living near water bodies. Since the 1920s, the usual reason for floods has been high water levels of the Osman Sagar and Himayat Sagar lakes after heavy or irregular rainfall. In such cases authorities open some floodgates and release some of the water into the city. Though this is a fairly controlled operation inundating only the river's flood-zone, the events of the flood of the 24th of august 2000 are a good indicator of the insecurities associated with living near Musi (which, according to 2005 statistics was 9,4% of Hyderabadis[6]).

It is important in this case to realize the extent in which this disaster was not merely a natural hiccup[7] but also largely a man-made calamity that had been in the making for some time. The disaster was due to 24.1 cm of rainfall in 24 hours, a combination of slow reaction by authorities in opening the floodgates and encroachment by different urban actors in the flood zones (people squatting on the land as well as Government buildings constructed on lands earmarked as flood-zone and making transformations within the river itself) amplified the devastation of the flash floods, affecting the lives of more than 80 000 people along with 21 deaths.[8] The politics of this

event didn't take long to kick in. CHATRI, the people's organization protesting the Nandanavanam project, put the responsibilities for the disaster *"squarely on Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, District collectorates of Hyderabad and Rangareddy, and the State Government."*[9] Simultaneously, authorities used the disaster as an argument to displace more people living near the river. During a round table conference in the aftermath of the floods, the CHATRI activists accused HUDA (now HMDA) of being a 'real-estate broker' selling off public lands along the river to private contractors through projects such as Nandanavanam.

Finally, in the year 2000, the authorities had to abandon the Nandanavanam project, as the floods had made clear that narrowing down the river was a utopian idea.

In 2006, six years after the failure of the Nandanavanam Project, the Save Musi Project[10] was proposed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh as part of the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), a gigantic national programme that funds regenerative projects in several Indian cities.

Many critics point out that the SMP project is nothing more than a rehashed version of the failed Nandanavanam project. *"Represented as a diffuse idea for urban development – historical conservation, ecological upgradation, improved infrastructure, sanitation and real estate development – the project resonated positively with the IT and service sector professionals who had become increasingly vocal in demanding a better quality of life from the city"*[11] scholar Anant Maringanti writes on the project.

The lesson urban planners seem to have learned from their failure with the Nandanavanam Project is that participation is to be avoided. As authorities are sternly keeping details of the project secret, the suspicion that history might be repeating itself is not unfounded, as certainly slum settlements will be evicted to make way for the prestigious plan.

Infrastructure and Exclusion

Likewise, proposals of the Master Plan show little acknowledgement of the poor. As some authors state, the word 'infrastructure' is often used as an excuse to displace slums and poor people. In the words of Jeremy Seabrook *"the word infrastructure is the new code word for the unceremonious clearance of the fragile shelters of the poor."*[12] Network infrastructures, as Pieterse notes, are the main tools for cities to *"reinvent themselves as magnets for investment in a globalizing world"*[13], a process certainly imbued in the new Master Plan, yet *"network infrastructure pressures tend to further skew public resource allocations and reinforce the marginalization of the urban poor at different scales."*[14]

The construction of new roads right across the neighbourhoods of the poorest elements of society implies urban planners have little attention for the poor. It seems the urge for development that is embedded in the Master Plan is inherently exclusive of the poor as it does not provide spaces for them.

Everyday Rebellion

Simultaneously, the poor are waging war against a state that does not seem to want them, precisely by entrenching themselves into the cracks of the city of the rich. Asef Bayat explains *"... what makes street activity political is the active or participative (as opposed to passive) use of public space; thus the use of street pavements, crossroads, urban land, the space for assembly and public expressions of culture all become sites of contestation. These sites increasingly become the domain of the state power which regulates their usage, making them 'orderly'. The state expects users to operate passively according to rules it has set. Any active and participative use challenges the control of the Authority and those social groups which benefit from such order."*[15] The poor are thus constantly challenging authorities by illegally setting up businesses, forming organizations, encroaching on lands,...

A Return to Inclusive Planning?

To conclude, it seems a lot of the proposals made in the two plans are purely technically or aesthetical and lack a kind of authenticity or grounding into the local situation. In turn, the slums and street vendors seem able to provide such a notion of identity as their use of space is an authentic reaction to their surroundings driven by need. Urban planning itself is of course governed by a plethora of different factors and it has to satisfy a number of ideals that drive it. Forces as traffic flows and real estate prices interact with urban planning yet can sometimes surpass it as they become increasingly controlled by global forces. Therefore, critical urban

planning should be able to nuance and (ab)use these forces in order to fulfil a local agenda.

When HMDA was created back in 1975 under the moniker Hyderabad Urban Development Agency (HUDA) it had the specific goal of preparing a *"rational urban land and housing policy… (to) provide for optimum utilization of land for various needs of the community… [it] should particularly take into account the requirements of weaker sections of the society."*[16]

Unfortunately, the explicit emphasis on *"the weaker sections of society"* in the mission statement of the erstwhile HUDA seems to have gone lost in recent planning proposals.

The second part of this work will try to investigate possibilities for inclusive urban planning that takes a step towards the poor and makes them part of the city through physical planning, whilst trying to avoid the mistake of overly romanticizing the self made architecture of the poor as well as utopian ideals of democratic modern urban planning. Yet, this investigation may imply the need to rethink the position of the urban planner from a purely top down technician to an investigative mediator that takes a holistic approach to design issues. It is my belief extensive research is needed into the motives, habits and needs of the poor as well as into previous solutions and their measure of succes.

1 Rahul Mehrotra, *"Kinetic City: Issues for Urban Design in South Asia"*, in: Kelly Shannon and Janina Gosseye (eds.), *"Reclaiming (the urbanism of) Mumbai"*, SUN Academia, Amsterdam, 2009, p 144; **Hereafter [Mehrotra 2009]**

2 Interestingly, in a recent study on the perception of people on the Musi, very few respondents actually seemed to recognize any recreational potential of the river. According to the authors *"this might be due to the fact that, Musi River has been polluted for more 20 years now and people cannot even think of boating or swimming or any other recreational value of this river. However, once the river is cleaned and the flow in the river increases, probably its recreational value will increase."* Devi e.a. 2009, pp 5-6

3 Anthoniraj Thumma (ed.), *"In Deep Waters, Housing Rights and Floods in Hi-Tech Hyderabad. Proceedings of the Round Table Conference organized by CHATRI on 1 October 2000"*, CHATRI, Hyderabad, 2000, p 15; **Hereafter [CHATRI 2000]**

4 Vedukumar e.a. 2007, p 62

5 Varghese Teckanath, *"Housing for the Urban Poor, Changing Paradigm in Hyderabad"*, Hyderabad, 2002, p 26; **Hereafter [Teckanath 2002]**

6 M. Deepthi, *"Planning for reclamation of River Musi"*, Jawaharlal Nehru Technical University, Hyderabad, 2005, p 26

7 Average rainfall for August is around 60 cm, so 24cm in 24 hours is certainly exceptional.

8 CHATRI 2000, p 7

9 CHATRI 2000, p 7

10 Incidentally, this name resembles the name of the 'Musi Bachao Andolan' organization, or translated the 'Save Musi Campaign' that initially fought the Nandanavanam project.

11 Anant Maringanti, *"Neoliberal Inscriptions and Contestations in Hyderabad",* UMI, Ann Arbor (MI), 2007, p 33; **Hereafter [Maringanti 2007]**

12 Jeremy Seabrook as quoted in Mike Davis, *"Planet of Slums"*, Verso, London, 2006, p100; **Hereafter [Davis 2006]**

13 Edgar Pieterse, *"City futures : Confronting the Crisis of Urban Development"*, UCT Press, Cape Town, 2008, p 9; **Hereafter [Pieterse 2008]**

14 Pieterse, p 9

15 Asef Bayat, *"Un-Civil Society: The Politics of the Informal People"* in Third World Quarterly Vol. 18, No1, 1997, p 63

16 As quoted by V.K. Bawa in CHATRI 2000, p 38

B. Reflections

The second part of this work will try to conceptualise a number of the discoveries discussed during the walk.

In order to better understand the different perceptions on urban space and reasons for the appropriations perceived earlier, this section will study phenomena of appropriation of open space from small to big. Starting with simple uses of space such as littering and festival constructions, to more complex manifestations such as informal labour and street vending and finally to squatter settlements and bastees. Although these last subjects are the most spatially present and arguably of the most interest to urban planners, it is important to frame them as by-products of other factors that are key to understanding the poor and their motives to 'encroach' 'public' space.

As the following chapters will explain, housing is a priority for urban planners, but not always for the poor. Any architect that has witnessed the heartbreaking conditions in kucha squatter settlements will feel the inherent urge to act on this situation, yet it is often through misunderstandings and biased conclusions that bad policies are implemented. A number of sometimes non-spatial concepts will be brought to the fore that will elucidate the spatial priorities of the poor and make it possible to construct a framework to understand where traditional urban planning and the needs of the poor diverge and where they collide.

Yet firstly, it is important to contextualise the rapid urban growth Hyderabad is facing. It is this growth that is putting enormous pressures on urban space and is driving the need for oversight in the form of urban planning.

1. The Urban Overload: A City of Migrants

Hyderabad Aerial View



Hyderabad Growth Pattern

This chapter will provide for a historical oversight of Hyderabad's growth and the forces propelling it.

Pre-Independence Centralities

Before Independence, the city to become Hyderabad formed around a number of urban cores that gradually merged to form the sprawling metropolis we know today.

Hyderabad started out as a fort settlement at Golconda under the Muslim Quli Qutb Shah dynasty. In order to relieve water shortages at the fort, Sultan Mohammed Quli Qutb Shah decided to move the city to the south bank of river Musi in 1591. An orthogonal grid was installed that could house up to five lakh population. In the centre of this grid the Charminar monument was erected to commemorate the plague epidemic that had swept the new-born city as it was being built. This part of the city is today still referred to as the 'Old City'. Hyderabad remained the seat of rule of the Quli Qutb Shah dynasty until 1687, when it was annexed by the Moghul Empire. The subsequent lull in growth due to a gradual disintegration of the Moghul Empire, was overcome after Ali Khan, ruler of the Deccan seized control of the city in 1724. He proclaimed himself the first Nizam of the Asab Jah dynasty and declared Hyderabad State an independent Muslim nation. In 1798 the Nizam Sikander Jah signed a subsidiary alliance for military and political cooperation with the British East India Company, allowing them to set up a cantonment named 'Secunderabad' north of the city's man made Hussain Sagar Lake. There was a clear divide between the two cities and as British soldiers had no permission to enter Hyderabad city, Secunderabad became a fully autonomous twin city to Hyderabad.[1] The presence of the British would turn out pernicious to the Indian quarters, as the cantonment's exception from custom duty attracted merchants away from the Old City. The construction of a railway brought a phase of industrialization to the area around Hyderabad, laying the foundations for the decay of the Old City's feudal economical system. After a huge flood ravaged the city in 1908, aristocrats and authorities decided to leave the historical city and shift from the south banks of the river to the north banks, influencing city growth in that direction.[2] The area north of the river and south of the Hussain Sagar Lake is today still known as the 'New City'.

Post-Independence Sprawl

Due to deepening divides in Indian societies, Independence from the British colonial rulers in 1947 resulted in the Partition of British India. In short, Partition was the division of British India in autonomous states based on religion. This has over the years led to the formation of the modern day Hindu-based 'Republic of India', the 'Islamic Republic of Pakistan' and the Muslim 'People's Republic of



Hyderabad Roads and Water Bodies

Hyderabad Zoning

Bangladesh'. Partition displaced up to 15 million people who were forced to move across the newly formed borders based on their religion and has left the subcontinent with traumas that are still deeply rooted today (e.g. the dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir).[3] By the time of Independence the state of Hyderabad had become an affluent nation with its own railways, post system and radio service. Since Hyderabad was a Muslim-ruled state in the middle of the 'Hindu' Indian Union, its claims to stay independent (backed by other Muslim nations) were quickly done away with and it was annexed with astonishing ease by the Indian Army in 1948.[4] In the aftermath of the annexation, Muslim aristocrats fled the city due to police actions[5], leaving large estates behind.[6] By 1951 Hyderabad joined Calcutta in obtaining the metropolitan status along with Delhi and Chennai and by 1971 it was part of the top five Indian cities with regards to population. In 1956 Hyderabad became state capital of the newly formed state of Andra Pradesh.[7]

Over the course of the last few decades, the gradual densification of the central 'New City' and constant expansion of the city has led Hyderabad and Secunderabad to merge into one city centre referred to as the Twin Cities, or simply Hyderabad.

Loosely encircling the Core Area comprising the Old City, New City and Secunderabad is the Inner Ring Road, beyond which the city has sprawled out radially in all directions. Indeed, contemporary Greater Hyderabad is a megacity covering an urbanised area of approximately 800 km².[8] Due to its central location within India, the city is intersected by three national highways and five highways that literally cut through the city.

In order to relieve the traffic congestion caused by this situation, a plan has been made to build an Outer Ring Road around the city, spanning a length of over 100 kilometres. Several important developments are taking place in this urban belt; to the west an IT centre is forming known as Cyberabad, to the south the new Rajiv Gandhi International Airport is stimulating development, while to the north Knowledge Park and Genome Valley are important hubs of research and biotechnology.

Constant overflow of municipal boundaries has led to a step by step reassembling and merging of different municipal corporations which eventually resulted in the formation of the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC) in 2007. While the GHMC primarily handles municipal duties such as waste managment, road works and city maintenance, several planning agencies shape the city. Apart from the Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority (HMDA) which just finished the Master Plan for the Core Area, Cyberabad is planned by the Cyberabad Development Authority (CDA) and the new International Airport falls under the scope of the Hyderabad Airport Development Authority.

Hyderabad's Population Growth

The pattern of urbanization can be clearly read from Hyderabad's population data. Rise and fall of Hyderabad's population growth has traditionally been linked to political stability.[9] The first authentic population records of Hyderabad

appeared in 1680 when population was approximately 80 thousand. The initial orthogonal layout of the Old City could hold a population of five lakh and it took up to the start of the twentieth century to reach this number. Growth from 1891 onwards was mostly due to immigration and despite the Great Musi Flood of 1908 population kept rising. Expansion of the city ranked Hyderabad between the top five Indian cities area-wise. By 1920 a plague and influenza epidemic had sunk the numbers back to four lakhs. Ever since, the population has been growing exponentially, reaching decadal growths up to 61 %.[10] Until 1941 most migrants found jobs in the city's administration and education. In the sixties population increase was mostly driven by the installation of Hyderabad as the state capital, natural increase and rapid industrialization.

From 1991 onwards, the population growth of the Core Area started shrinking, chiefly because the surrounding municipalities have begun to absorb the majority of the newcomers, while the Core Area further densifies due to natural growth.[11] In recent years, the growth of the IT-sector has opened up a lot of opportunities for migrants. Projections for future population growth vary between 40-45 lakhs for



2011[12] and 43-52 lakhs for 2021. [13] By 2031 population in the core area should reach 60 lakh.[14]

Not surprisingly, lack of housing is a major issue in booming cities. Real estate prices in city centres are soaring as land is getting scarce and most new migrants simply don't have assets to purchase or rent a home. Consequently, housing problems in these massively overrun city centres have been solved for the most part by extralegal and informal land markets referring arriving low-income migrants to slums, squatting or the sidewalk. The fact that Indian slums are growing 2.5 times faster than overall population reflects the enormity of this problem.[15] Likewise, in the sixties Hyderabad witnessed annual growth rates of up to 3.5%, while the slums had to endure growths of 9.6%.[16] Clearly, large amounts of arriving immigrants were sucked right into the slums.

High Speed Urbanization

In order to understand where these people come from and what is driving millions of them all over India (and in fact, worldwide) into decrepit neighbourhoods like Abdel Nagar, we need to broaden our scope. As Indian engineer and philosopher Anant Maringanti states, *"transformation of the slum on a day to day basis is always already underwritten by transnational processes."*[17]

In his book Planet of Slums, American scholar Mike Davis explains that the world is currently undergoing a second wave of urbanization in developing countries, propelled by the phenomenon of globalization.[18] How come rural peasants make the choice for the city, a move termed so utterly desperate some go almost as far as comparing it to suicide?[19]

Incremental implementation of neoliberal policies under pressure of globalization and increasing population growth in rural areas have caused India's neglected agrarian sector to collapse. The effects of agricultural deregulation which started after independence but was radicalized in the 1990s have created a surplus of labour that is being pushed out of the countryside in an accelerating exodus towards the cities. [20] The Indian urban population grew from 108 million in 1901 to 278 million by 2001.[21]

Hyderabad's recent developments are linked to India's radical neoliberal restructuring from 1991 onwards. The main result of this restructuring was a high-tech and IT boom in several Indian cities such as Bangalore, Chennai, Pune and, of course Hyderabad. The adjustments weren't without result seeing as India's GDP grew at 6% during the 90's and produced 1 million new millionaires. The flipside of the medal, as Jeremy Seabrook counters, are the 56 million poor India also gained during the economic boom.[22]

For many traditional farmers competition from the low food prices and mechanization free-market capitalism has poured into

the Indian countryside is ruthless. As smaller holdings are steadily being merged into larger ones, an economic landscape of industrial-scale agribusiness is taking shape, desiccating small scale family businesses at a steady pace. [23]

Furthermore, due to population growth, family farm estates have been subdivided into ever smaller parts from generation to generation, leaving a majority of farmers with barely enough land to produce food for their own families, let alone make investments to improve their livelihoods. Consequently, a constant state of life on the edge of destitution has made the countryside more vulnerable than ever to exogenous shocks such as droughts, rising interest rates, illness… [24]

In the opinion of Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, a few other factors also influence the migration patterns. The most visible is the amelioration of roads and communication (especially radio) providing the rural population the possibility of 'travel'. Secondly, the promise of the city, viz. better education and health facilities in urban centres, is a major attraction for destitute families.[25]

So it is a combination of famine, debt and a flickering of hope that drive the poor to claim their 'right to the city'.[26] Yet, surprisingly, it has come to the point that 'de-peasantization'[27] seems completely oblivious to what little opportunities city life has even left to offer. Davis argues that city growth, whilst in western countries traditionally linked to rising industrialization and development, seems independent of this relationship in countries of the developing world. People unrelentlessly migrate to cities like Mumbai in periods of industrialization as well as during periods of deindustrialization when opportunities in the city are possibly even scarcer than in the countryside. On the same note, the Third World is inverting the classic (western) rural-urban relationship by producing the unexpected combination of capital-intensive countrysides and labour-intensive city centres. *"The size of a city's economy, (…), often bears surprisingly little relationship to its population size, and vice versa."*[28] The rural areas generate migration at a break-neck pace, irrespective of economic push or pull factors of the cities. To quote scholar Frederic C. Thomas, *"the push of rural misery, it seems, has been more of a factor in migration than the pull of urban opportunity."*[29] This 'overurbanization' is thus *"driven by the reproduction of poverty, not by the supply of jobs."*[30] In other words still, *"third world urbanization is primarily an urbanization of poverty."*[31]

Contextualizing the Migrant

As more and more migrants are forced into the cities, they are increasingly transforming its development. At this point, it is important to stress that migrants come in many hues and colours and certainly do not form a homogenous demographic. Not all migrants make a definite move, some may only stay seasonally, flocking to the cities in the low seasons of harvesting in hopes of scoring some temporary job at a construction site or driving an auto-rickshaw. Vendors at Imlibun Bus Stand and the basket weavers near Chaderghat are seasonal migrants, staying in Hyderabad to sell their goods and returning to their fields for harvest. Consequently, in-migration should be understood within this mentality of temporality. Most first generation migrants intend to return to their villages after some time, be it retirement after 40 years or a seasonal to and fro movement between village hut and city slum. This mental state, comparable to that of a visitor, implies that some migrants will rarely accept or treat the urban environment as theirs, rendering it difficult to make them accountable for it. It often takes at least one generation to dissolve the close ties between metropolis and countryside.[32]

A city like Hyderabad also attracts a relatively large number of highly educated professionals from other cities in the country as it is slowly becoming a magnet for computer scientists and bio-engineers.[33] The rate at which highly-educated migrants enter the city is of course not comparable to the huge number of poor streaming in from the countryside. However, it is important to recognize the growing polarization between high-end professionals and the hundreds of lower-end workers needed to sustain them.

On a side note, it is not always an economic motive that drives people to the cities. The Partition of the subcontinent in 1947 for example, caused waves of ethno-religious refugees to flee into the slums of big cities like Mumbai, Delhi and Karachi up until the 1970s.[34]

Moreover, some nuance is necessary to understand the possibilities for migration. Banerjee and Mitra argue that it is often hard for low-income farmers to make the move to the

city. It is usually the rural middle class that can migrate as they hold enough assets to afford the transportation costs. The move of the rural poor is usually a several step process, from rural agrarian labour through rural non-farming work to, finally, obtaining employment security in the city, a procedure which can take several years and may be an iterative process.[35] An important point Banerjee's research has shown is that about one half of the migrants only moved to the city after fixing a job with an employer or through a relative.[36] This brings us to the importance of networks for the poor.

The Importance of Networks

The passage from the village to the metropolis is often a rough and stressful one. Migrants tend to rely heavily on a network of contacts to consolidate a position in the city. Understandably, new migrants seek comfort from the anonymity of their new environment by physically and economically anchoring themselves near others from the same caste, village, religion.

"In India, the multilingual and multiethnic identities of its citizens make such adaptations even more important. Thus, the more culturally and ethnically heterogeneous an area/country is, the more likely it is that migrants would seek to settle in and around the areas already claimed by their brethren."[37]

Family, religion, occupation, caste and origin constitute a 'widening circle of networks' the new urbanite can draw on for economic support. [38] It is this same principle that the urban poor continue to rely on once they settled, the Network functions as an age-old social security system. The kinds of networking the urban poor rely on are manifold though a study by Arup Mitra shows that not only are the types of network important to the jobs that can be accessed, *"on the whole, occupation and network are all in relationship governed by factors such as caste, gender, migration status, and education; these factors determine the nature of contact and the access to information pertaining to the job market."*[39] Mitra also further distinguishes a spatial distribution of activities stating that some areas of the city encourage certain employment more than others. As evidenced along the Musi, certain streets are associated with certain products or services. Many neighbourhoods are associated with certain trades, as formation of professional niches provides security in an economy of scarcity.[40]

Therefore, it is important to understand that within the city, these networks are anchored to physical places which define the movement patterns of the poor. These networks are both a blessing and a curse to the mobility of the poor. I would go as far as to say that people are more familiar with certain places because they access them through a network of relations than because of proximity or distance. This is because, for the poor, it is often harder to make new contacts based on proximity than on relation. To give a simple example, it will probably be easier for a person to find work through their network of relatives even if that job is far away than to obtain a job from strangers in the vicinity of their home.

To conclude, the overpopulation of cities and the resulting pressures on urban land are results of a steady collapse of India's traditional countryside. As migrants stream into the cities in hopes of some new source of income they most of them remain mentally anchored to their villages Their physical movements in the city are mostly regulated through a network of relatives rather than rational mobility patterns.

1 Narendra Luther, *"Bridging Two Cultures"*, Seminar, 585, May 2008

2 HMDA 2010, p 7

3 *"The Partition of India"* on http://english.emory.edu/Bahri/Part.html, last visited on 22/05/2011

4 Mohan Guruswamy, *"There Once was a Hyderabad"* ,Seminar, 585, May 2008

5 Uma Adusumilli, *"Regulatory Guidelines for Urban Upgrading: Hyderabad Experience, India"*, 2001, p 2

6 Teckanath 2002, p 21

7 The Republic of India is a federation, comprising 28 'States' and 7 'Union Territories'. To avoid confusion, I will refer to Andhra Pradesh as the State and India as the Nation.

8 HMDA 2010, p 21

9 HMDA 2010, p 26

10 Figures according to official sources, Varghese Teckanath speaks of decadal growth up to 67.04% during the 1990's , Teckanath 2002 p22

11 HMDA 2010, p 36

12 Results of the 2011 census were not yet available at the time of this writing.

13 These estimates are for the Core Area. Estimates for the entire Metropolitan Area for 2011 vary up to 126,76 lakhs , Teckanath 2002 p 22

14 HMDA 2010, p 131

15 Davis 2006, p 18

16 HMDA 2010, p 59

17 Anant Maringanti, *"Between the City and the Slum"*, 2008, p 3 Paper presented at The Making of Global Cities: A Symposium and Research Agenda, University of Minnesota; **[Hereafter Maringanti 2008]**

18 The 'first' wave refers to early 20th century urbanization in the western countries under influence of the industrial revolution.

19 Sarat Chandra as quoted in Thomas 1997, p 43

20 This deregulation was instigated under pressure of the World Bank schemes. In order to apply for loans developing countries were coaxed towards adopting the principles of the 'Washington Consensus' i.e. moving away from welfarism and interventionist states in order to let free market forces structure the economy and society.

21 HMDA 2010, p 24

22 As quoted in Davis 2006, pp 170-171

23 Davis 2006, pp 16-17

24 Davis 2006, p 15

25 Hernando de Soto, *"The Mystery of Capital: Why Capital Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else"*, Black Swan, London, 2000, pp 81-82

26 A phrasing coined by Henri Lefebvre in 1968

27 Deborah Bryceson as quoted in Davis 2006, p 15

28 Davis 2006, p 13

29 Thomas 1997, p 37

30 Davis 2006, p 16

31 Pieterse 2008, p 35

32 Thomas 1997, pp 155-158

33 Vedukumar e.a. 2007

34 Davis 2006, p 55

35 Arup Mitra, *"Occupational choices, networks, and transfers : an exegesis on micro data from Delhi slums"*, Manohar Publishers & Distributors, New Delhi, 2003, pp 18-19; **Hereafter [Mitra 2003]**

36 Mitra 2003, p 38

37 Mitra 2003, p 25

38 Thomas 1997, p 91

39 Mitra 2003, p 63

40 Thomas 1997, p 108

Hyderabad and site of the Walk

Waste opposite the AP High Court

2. Neglect of the 'Outside'

In order to obtain a framework for discussing public space, this chapter will try to retrace the historical emergence of the current divide in perceptions of 'public' space between urban middle classes and urban poor. On the one hand there is a partly aesthetic pursuit of order, hygiene and standardised, 'universalised' behaviour. In other words, a quest for a civic society. On the other hand there is a tendency towards chaos, defilement of the public space and using (privatizing?) it according to one's needs. A majority of literature on the subject approaches the topic in terms of binary conflicts as middle class vs. poor; static vs. kinetic; modern vs. traditional; conform vs. insubordinate; public vs. pablik.[1] As will become clear, the search for the roots of this conflict simultaneously unearths a foundation of the problem of waste in the city.

Redreaming Dreams

"And when we look in through the windows, all we see are shadows. And when we try and listen, all we hear is a whispering. And we cannot understand the whispering, because our minds have been invaded by a war. A war that we have both won and lost. The very worst sort of war. A war that captures dreams and re-dreams them. A war that has made us adore our conquerors and despise ourselves." - Arundhati Roy [2]

In order to better understand this duality I would like to interrelate three essays with observations made during the walk along the river, namely *"Filth and the Public Sphere: Concepts and Practices about Space from Calcutta"* by subaltern studies professor Sudipta Kaviraj, *"Politics of the Urban Poor in Early Twentieth-Century India"* by communal politics professor Nandini Gooptu and *"Kinetic City, Issues for Urban Design in South Asia"* by architect Rahul Mehrotra.[3] Although these authors write for the contexts of Calcutta, Uttar Pradesh and Mumbai, I perceive the generalities of their work to apply to Hyderabad as well.

Not surprisingly, the concept of controlling and monitoring the public space in cities is part of a long heritage. Order and control over public spaces were part of a traditional city planning system based on notions of hierarchical spaces that was further reinforced under British colonialism. Especially under colonial rule the different social, economical and cultural groups living in the city were carefully arranged in different spaces in an attempt to minimize conflict between them and maximize control.[4] Some areas were no-go zones for natives and this was expressed in the physical appearance of the city fabric. Typically, a hierarchical three-tier structure took shape with colonial authorities in the city centres, 'civilised'[5] Indian middle-classes in a concentric circle around them and finally, at the urban fringes and in the interstices of the middle class city the poor, living in their squalid homes. Hyderabad is an extreme example of this as the British installed their cantonment away from the Old City, leaving the open space in between to clearly mark a divide between the two cultures as an extended 'zone neutre'. Although both parties were politically on equal terms, the economical dominance of the British quickly instated a de facto hierarchy between the two cities.

Nandini Gooptu argues that the introduction of town planning ideals into Indian middle class values can be traced back to the First World War and more precisely to a visit by Patrick Geddes, one of the leading British town planners at the time, to a number of Indian cities. The town planning expositions Geddes organized in these cities gave the town planning movement a *"determined following well beyond official circles and seized the imagination of Indian urban notables and the propertied, who would soon be at the helm of local affairs."*[6] Geddes' perception on slums was exemplary of the movement, *"he deeply abhorred, and declared war against, the `noxious squalor', chaos and confusion of these slums."*[7] He saw town planning as a tool to reform society as a whole and provide for a hygienic, orderly and moral environment. Although Geddes was British himself, he strongly resented 'imperialist' town planning *"which he denounced as disruptive of indigenous ways of life and as an imposition of western imperial cultural ideas, not to mention being uncoordinated and interventionist."*[8] He drew his model for Indian town planning from the traditional Indian 'temple-towns'. The indigenous touch Geddes added to the ideal of civilization made his ideas all the more resonate with middle class Indians.

"The social group that was most strongly attracted to the European model of the public sphere was the middle-class educated elite. (…) They admired the great Enlightenment narrative of improvement and had the right combination of a sense of inferiority to the British and cultural self-confidence to embark on a course of systematic emulation, which was indeed the essential and unmissable point of that story"[10] Kaviraj explains. Gradually, Indian middle classes started defining themselves as a separate group of respectable citizens, with their own set of morals, standards and taste. In doing so they distanced themselves from the poor by consciously abstaining from practices and acts they considered typical of the inferior lower classes. The poor became a stigmatized group that had to be moralized by benign elites.[9] As Gooptu argues: *"Geddes' town planning reports were, implicitly or explicitly, celebrations and expositions of civic virtue and social responsibility. This appealed to the Indian middle classes in their endeavour to define a superior role and identity for themselves through local government, both in opposition to colonial rule and in contrast to the seemingly undisciplined mass of the poor."*[11]

The British further introduced a number of related concepts that were subsequently adopted by the urban middle classes.[12] The standardised lettering of the municipal sign, Kaviraj argues, had the purpose of imposing standardised behaviour on the users of the urban spaces. *"From signs promoting hygiene, to traffic regulations, to directions in huge disorderly railway stations, all were painted in the same standard colour and letter, a livery of municipal sovereignty. Until the 1960s most of these signs were in English, which marked the state's irresistible power and distance by delivering orders in language ordinary subjects could not entirely understand."*[13] The British also brought with them the notions of the public park and the maidan, a large open space accessible only to the wealthy. [14] These efficiently managed and highly aestheticized spaces produced a safe, hygienic, standardized, universalised modern city that stood in stark contrast to the unsafe neighbourhoods of their colonial subjects, which were characterized by irregular buildings, dirt, dust, foul diseases, lack of sanitation and unhygienic conditions.

Before independence, the juxtaposition of these different perspectives had become fully absorbed in Indian urban society. Political scientist Leela Fernandes notes *"the assumption that urbanization represents the highest objective for a nation's development has had a long history, one that was incorporated into Nehru's vision of national development."*[15] Especially nationalist elites seemed to deeply regret the lack of sense of civic duty in their poorer peers. Gandhi himself stated *"Everybody is selfish, but we seem to be more selfish than others: We do not hesitate to throw refuse out of our courtyard; standing on the balcony, we throw out refuse or spit, without pausing to consider whether we are not inconveniencing the passer-by."*[16]

Common Space in Indian Tradition

Gandhi's observation was not unfounded. Indians would eat, sleep and bathe in the same streets they soiled with garbage and defecated on, showing an absolute lack of commitment to this communal space.[17] In order to understand this behaviour, Kaviraj carefully unfolds traditional forms of 'public', or better, 'common' space in Indian society. He describes how, instead of the imported concept of public/private space, traditional Indian society had developed a culture of distinguishing inside from outside, in particular with regards to a binary conception of purity/filth. The following paragraphs will explain how in pre-colonial Indian society the people were divided in clearly defined large groups, or 'spheres of inclusivity', which were conceptualised as pure and safe entities, whilst what was perceived as 'outside' of these entities was distinguished as dangerous and disorderly.

The main uses of common space in traditional Indian societies were puja and group activities. Since collective decisions lacked the notion of officiality, the arbitrary boundaries of these spaces were never clearly marked, nor legally recognized.[18] Nevertheless, this lack of documentation or 'contractual' obligation did not impede the formation of a system that governed common spaces through tacit rules and 'social contracts'. This system made people aware of their responsibilities and agency towards the common space.[19] So the concept of "Indian common space" diverges from that of "Western public space" through its lack of connotations of officiality, authorization, impersonality and individualism.

But the two notions diverge also on another ground. While Western society takes the individual as its entity, Kaviraj argues Indian (Hindu) society is built on 'spheres of inclusivity'. The individual is always part of a larger entity, be it a family, a caste or a religion (to name a few of these 'spheres'). An important point is that these 'spheres' are not universally accessible, one cannot freely move from one entity to another and each entity has its own well defined spaces. This system ensures that everyone in the society knows their place within the greater whole and does not move from it. Consequently, the traditional Indian world view is constructed according to an apan/par (own/others) binary. What is 'inside' of the entity is safe, pure and good, what is 'outside' is unclean, potentially dangerous and unpredictable. Kaviraj argues that this duality is apparent in a spatial sense as the conceptual boundary between the 'inside' and the 'outside' of the home. He explains it by studying the way waste is handled. By describing the way the home, the inside, is purified[20] before puja, Kaviraj explains that *"when the garbage is dumped, it is not placed at a point where it cannot casually affect the realm of the household and its hygienic well-being. It is thrown over a conceptual boundary."*[21] So, the outside, the street is seen as 'not one's own', as free of obligations or responsibilities, because it does not express any values and is utterly devoid of the 'civic'. *"The exterior is abandoned to an intrinsic disorderliness. No order, rules, restraints can be expected there."*[22]

On the other hand, Kaviraj argues that the western concept of public space produces a universality and equality of access through individualization.[23] As it is a representational space for civic life, parameters as hygiene, control and aesthetics come into play.

Not surprisingly, the unpredictability of the newly imported public space of the modern city is often terrifying to people raised in the caste-system, which obviated the need for meeting strangers.

To summarize, Kaviraj defines two conflicting notions of space in colonial Indian society, on one side a duality of private/public, on the other a juxtaposition of inside/outside. Though these two binaries seem closely related because they tend to refer to the same kinds of spaces, they are in fact conceptually

antithetical. From my reading of them, a better way to rephrase Kaviraj's concepts would be to call them the Western mine/everyone's vs. the Indian ours/no-one's. It is important to understand that educated elites were more inclined to assimilate the Western notions of space than the uneducated poor, creating a divide within the Indian community that would further develop after independence.


Car wrecks dumped near Osmania Hospital

Design: Clean Musi

"Why should not industrials and multinationals be involved in the planning and construction of housing for the urban poor?" – Dr. Vasant K. Bawa, ex vice-president of HUDA[24]

Experience from Musi's riverbanks seems to suggest that the perception of waste is still highly problematic with regards to public space. The conceptual notion of the public space as a no man's land beyond personal responsibility (apan/par) still appears to deeply permeate behaviour of urbanites. According to the Master Plan, the Hyderabad Urban Agglomeration produces 3379 tonnes of garbage on a daily basis. Although the Master Plan claims collection by the municipalities shows between 91 and 95% efficiency, a five minute walk through the streets of Hyderabad should convince anyone that the 'remaining 5%' of uncollected trash is omnipresent.[25] These massive amounts are even more worrying considered that most of it is not recycled and that no city landfills are available to dispose of the refuse. The response of authorities has been to privatize garbage disposal. The municipal corporation does the collection and transportation of the refuse, while entrepreneurs handle the disposal in incinerators built around the city.

The massive expansion of the city has also meant that the river has had to cope with increasingly disturbing amounts of pollution. The focus on growth, development and industrialization, coupled to a lack of anti-pollution policies and quality measures have led to the massive dumping of waste in the riverbed. Industries all over the metropolis were able to discharge effluents and wastage without restrictions into different streams which eventually flowed into Hussain Sagar Lake and River Musi.

The city's sewage system has been laid out in 1931 with two intercepting sewers along the river. On the north and south riverbanks sewerage pipes run parallel to the water and collect waste from pipes coming from all over the city. This system was remodelled in 1985 by adding five more major sewers. As of 2010 the ever growing metropolis generated 589 million litres of sewage daily, of which only a fraction was successfully treated before release in the river.[26] The city's main Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) was built in 1938 at Amberpet and later extended[27] in 2008, enabling it to treat 339 million litres of sewage water every day, after which the treated water is released back into the river in different stages.[28] The 2010 Master Plan for Hyderabad states only 23% of the city's waste water is treated and a mere 3% is reused.[29] There is some variation on the different estimates for the actual amount of sewage water the city generates and how much is actually treated. Whatever be the exact figures, it seems that the last 5 decades little effort has been done to manage the crisis of surplus sewage water with very few plans or policies thought up and even less implemented. This has resulted in the ecological disaster that is the Musi's pollution level.

As stated before, the river's main role is irrigation of fields beyond the city, a function endangered by the high pollution levels. Consequently, the need for conservation of the river is apparent.

This design will propose some radical solutions to some of the Musi's, and for that matter Hyderabad's problems. It is an alternative to the east-west corridor proposed in the Save Musi Project and the HMDA Master Plan. While the Save Musi Project seems to be serious about saving the river



from pollution, it seems to want to do this more for aesthetic reasons than ecological concern. This proposal takes a more radical approach to “saving” the river.

In this design, the river is vaulted to protect it from the massive amounts of waste that are dumped into it on a daily basis. As some Hyderabadis have the habit of just throwing their refuse in the river, this radical measure should prevent them from doing so. Parallel to the covered river two new sewer lines will be constructed in order to manage Hyderabad’s rising sewage quantities. The new open space created on top of these three tunnels can be used for construction. On top of the river, a road is constructed, forming the important and much needed east to west connection for the city. As the city is in dire need of more effective mass public transport systems to halt the growth in private vehicles, a monorail line is provided along the east-west connection, which connects to other planned monorail lines that run across the city. The area adjacent to the road will become centrally located, well connected, high value real estate and will allow for sizeable construction (marked in grey on the right). The zone right above the new sewer line will be unfit for heavy or large structures because it is impossible to dig foundations, leaving space for the temporary light-weight constructions of squatter settlements (marked in red). As the whole project stays within the contemporary flood zone of the river, none of the existing constructions along the river are endangered. To compensate for the open space and historical significance that is lost by hiding the river from sight, large open public spaces will be provided at key points. Whenever the dams are opened to release water surpluses, these open spaces are flooded, reviving the presence of the river in the city. In other words, the flood zone is shifted from a wasteland that runs parallel to the river to a number of central open spaces. These open spaces will be key to managing the urban actors we have discussed earlier and will remain free from permanent encroachments as regular floods will keep the areas vacant. Some will be implemented as gardens or public squares, some as drive-in markets, others are maidans or sports fields, while others still can be used as dhobi ghats or fields for cattle or plantations.

In an ideal scenario, through the creation of high value real estate, the project may even be self-remunerative. Instead of a


1 Monumental Square
2 Park
3 Market Square
4 Dhobi Ghat
5 Kachi Fields
6 Market Squares
7 Kachi Fields
8 Sports Fields
Approx. 500 metres
Above Ground Level
Below Ground Level

traditional Public-Private partnership developmental project, this project proposes a Public-Private-Partnership, where the poor get space for housing, the private sector receives central real estate and the public sector reduces pollution and facilitates traffic. While space has been allocated for the poor, they have also been assured of tenancy since the sewage pipes consolidate the land as unbuildable.

Although this proposal does bring up some interesting questions of what the value is of this river for its city and why it is worth preserving, a utopian megalomaniac proposal such as this also question, I believe, the role of the centralised urban planner. The initial goal of reducing waste in the river can impossibly be tackled by one centralised intervention such as this one, since waste enters the river from all sides of the city, and consequently, all possible water streams would have to be hermetically closed as not to expose the water to harmful pollution. Rather, the decentralised nature of much informal behaviour perhaps asks for a more decentralised approach to planning spac=ùùes, a topic that will be further developed in following designs.

1 Although I am personally inclined to nuance these binary oppositions between the poor and the middle classes, I follow this line of thought in the following section on grounds of the researchers' expertise over mine. E.g. Kaviraj literally refers to an opposition of a 'culture of poverty' against a westernized culture, a highly polemic statement in my opinion, regarding the connotations of 'culture of poverty' as unproductive, asocial and socially immobile.

2 Arundhati Roy, *"The God of Small Things"*, Random House, 1997, p 53

3 Respectively:

Sudipta Kaviraj, *"Filth and the Public Sphere: Concepts and Practices about Space in Calcutta"*, Public Culture, 10(1), 1997; Hereafter [Kaviraj 1997]

Nandini Gooptu, *"The Politics of the Urban Poor in Twentieth-Century India"*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001; Hereafter [Gooptu 2001]

Rahul Mehrotra, *"Kinetic City: Issues for Urban Design in South Asia"*, in: Kelly Shannon and Janina Gosseye (eds.), *"Reclaiming (the urbanism of) Mumbai"*, SUN Academia, Amsterdam, 2009; **Hereafter [Mehrotra 2009]**

4 Mehrotra 2009, p 142

5 Or rather, in the eyes of the British, 'not quite yet civilised'

6 Gooptu 2001, p 77

7 Gooptu 2001, p 78

8 Gooptu 2001, p 80

9 Gooptu 2001, pp 420-421

10 Kaviraj 1997, p 92

11 Gooptu 2001, p 79

12 It seems both extremities of the societal hierarchy had more resistance towards this emulation of British standards. The upper-class elites refused to assimilate western culture and the poor were plainly excluded from civic life and education.

13 Kaviraj 1997, p 85

14 Maidan means 'open space' in Hindu. Although these wide open spaces were originally only accessible to the elites, the role of the maidan in contemporary cities is much more one of a democratic sports field open to the masses.

15 Jawaharlal Nehru was India's first prime minister. Paraphrasing Gyan Prakash in Leela Fernandes," India's new middle class : democratic politics in an era of economic reform", University of Minnesota press, Minnesota, 2006, p 138

16 Mahatma Gandhi as quoted in Dipesh Chakrabarty, *"Of Garbage, Modernity and the Citizen's Gaze"*, in: Dipesh Chakrabarty, *"Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies"*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2002, p 67; **Hereafter [Chakrabarty 2002]**

17 Chakrabarty 2002, p 66

18 Kaviraj describes 'officiality' as the irreversibility and canonization of a decision backed by a state with power to distribute sanctions in case of violations.

19 Kaviraj 1997, p 88

20 Purity in this context is quite a different concept than the Western concept of 'hygiene'.

21 Kaviraj 1997, p 98

22 Kaviraj 1997, p 99

23 Although these enlightened ideals of individualism and equality were in fact imported to India by the British, they were very scarcely and strategically implemented by the colonizers. E.g. the highly racist hierarchical town planning.

24 V.K. Bawa in CHATRI 2000, p 40

25 HMDA 2010, p 95

26 Figure according to the 2010 HMDA Master Plan. Another account, the Musi River Study Team, speaks of at least 850 MLD. Vedukumar e.a. 2007, p 60

27 *"NCCL Sewage Treatment Plant"* on http://www.nlsenlaw.org/copy_of_news/nccl-sewage-treatment-plant; last visited 27/02/2011

28 Another STP has been built at Hussain Sagar treating 20MLD. Around several smaller lakes STPs have been built in 2006 treating 25MLD. Plans were made to build several new STPs along Musi though it is unclear if these plans have been implemented. Estimates are between 384 and 592 MLD of treated water based on different sources.

"Sewage treatment plants: trial runs next month" by M.L. Melly Maitreyi http://www.hindu.com/2006/08/23/stories/2006082320400300.htm last visited 27/02/2011;

M. Vedukumar e.a. 2007;

HMDA 2010

29 HMDA 2010, p 88

3. Perceptions on Public Space

Since independence, postcolonial elites have in many ways gladly reproduced the existing spatial and infrastructural patterns they inherited from the British. Nandini Gooptu writes on the national post-independence politics of the Congress Party: *"Implicitly or explicitly, the poor were denied a place in civic life and urban culture, and were seen as an impediment to progress and betterment of society."*[1] The fact that the Congress Party received its electoral victory by profiling itself as the socialist movement for the 'garib janata' (the common poor people), makes her observation all the harder to swallow. On the same note, Gooptu points out that the ideals of a new democratic urbanism were quickly distorted by the elites.

"Ultimately, the grand conception of urban transformation was whittled down and domesticated to meet the immediate interests of the propertied classes. Instead of unfolding as idealistic projects of social regeneration, the town planning schemes evolved as avenues to further the interests and aspirations of the propertied and the instrument of the growing marginalisation of the poor. The war against slums came dangerously close to being a battle to control the settlement and habitation of the poor, and indeed an offensive against the poor themselves."[2]

Defining Pablik Space

In recent years, gradual globalisation has caused some shifts in the historically juxtaposed perceptions between urban elites and urban poor. In the contemporary post-colonial divide, middle classes aspire to Modern ideals of development, consumerism and spectacular high-tech cities, while the poor read urban spaces more in terms of survival. The following chapter will discuss the evolution of this divide in perceptions, especially with regards to developmental ideals and city beautification.

"Cities in India have become critical sites for negotiation between elite

and subaltern cultures. The new relationships between social classes in a post-industrial economy are quite different from those that existed in state-controlled economies", Mehrotra notes.[4]

Sociologist Leela Fernandes explains how middle classes have further embraced western lifestyles. *"The lifestyle of the new middle class is in many ways the most visible symbolic representation of the benefits of India's embrace of globalization. (…) this middle class is not simply a new socioeconomic group; it embodies a changing set of sociocultural norms for the Indian nation."*[5] These changes in lifestyle are shaped by socioeconomic shifts that have appeared through liberalization and globalisation like the expansion of the service sector, rise of leisure and entertainment industries, the introduction of shopping malls, private vehicles, nightlife, et cetera. Consequently, a new "middle class" is being produced by these changing consumption patterns, and it is giving form to new expectations of urban space generated by desires for development and consumerism. On top of the inherited notions of civic society and orderly spaces, ideals of development and technological spectacle have been added to the middle class wishlist. These desires are expressed through the modelling of Indian cities after the architectural spectacle of cities like Singapore, Shanghai, Paris and London.[6] The new middle class continues forming its own political, social, economic and aesthetic identities and while doing so is increasingly distancing itself socially as well as spatially from the urban poor.


The poor appreciate the public space more in terms of its physicality than in terms of its aesthetics

Meanwhile, the immigrating poor have started eyeing the open urban space through their own needs. Kaviraj argues that today, *"the public is a matter not of collective pride but of desperate uses that can range from free riding to vandalising."*[7] The poor's preconceived notion of 'the outside' as a no-man's land has led them to appropriate open urban space for their own domestic and economical purposes. Mehrotra explains how, oblivious to the ambitions of elites, the needy do not perceive the city *"in terms of its architecture, but in terms of its spaces."*[8] In other words, they appreciate the elements that make up space more because of their physicality than because of their symbolism or aesthetics.

Kaviraj defines this practical perception of space as 'pablik space'. *"Ironically, the English term public would be used in the discourse of this crucial detournement of space. If asked, the people would reply that they settled there precisely because this space was pablik, not owned by individual property owners, and as poor people they had a quasi-claim to settle in such state or municipal property."*[9] Experience from the Musi seems to suggest that the notion of 'property' does not play much of a role to the poor when choosing a spot for their activities. As we will see later on, the majority of slums in Hyderabad are built on private land. Therefore I would like to expand Kaviraj's conception of the 'pablik' space, not only as municipal land, but rather as any open, accessible space in the city, regardless of ownership.

This new concept of use of 'pablik' space, appropriation of vacant space out of necessity, is closely related to what Mehrotra perceives as the 'Kinetic City'. He presents a concept of the contemporary city as juxtaposition of a 'Static City', a permanent entity representing the formal modernity of the state, and a Kinetic City, a city-in-motion representing a pirate modernity of survival.[10] As the Static City disapproves of the manifestation of the poor these poor can only resort to living outside 'the plan'. This 'unintended city' has been likewise defined as *"the city that was never part of the formal 'master plan' but always implicit in it"* by Ashis Nandy.[11] Historian Gyan Prakash reads the occurrence of this 'unintended city' as *"a general problem intrinsic to the nation-state's historicist discourse of modernisation – the inability of its linear narrative to accommodate the spatiality of historical processes,*

the uncomfortable coexistence of the modern and the 'obsolete', the intrusion of the rural in the urban, the combined emergence of official and unintended cities. The city's historical geography of power, culture, and society resists its representation as evolution and development."[12]

To Mehrotra, it is important to understand the resulting 'pirate modernity' not as a conscious attempt of producing a counterculture, but as a survival strategy of the needy. This perception runs parallel to Asef Bayat's theory of a *"quiet encroachment of the ordinary"*.[13] Enacted by the poor from an individualistic viewpoint, this massive encroachment of open urban space is shaped by individuals or groups acting parallel to each other in order to safeguard their own gains. It is only when these gains are threatened that they become a collective political entity.

Interestingly though, jumping to the conclusion that the Kinetic City is by definition a city of the poor is too simplistic. Mehrotra explains that the Kinetic City isn't necessarily a product of the subaltern, but rather that it is an *"indigenous urbanism that has its particular 'local' logic."*[14]

Because I will be using the terms Static, Kinetic and Public, Pablik throughout the rest of this work it is important to define them well. To summarize, the Indian city of today is imbued with a dual conception of space. One is towards a formal Static City; its reading of open space as "public space", that is to say as representational of society, is charged with developmental aesthetic and architectural ideals along with a sense for order and civic behaviour. The other is an 'unintended' Kinetic City in the form of economies, squatter settlements, spontaneous organizations, abandoned cars... that pop up in the interstices of the Static City.[15] This Kinetic City reads open space as 'pablik', that is to say 'useable' according to one's needs. While the Static City is an organized, active force, the Kinetic City is the result of independent actions throughout the city. While the Static City tries to infuse symbolic meaning into spaces, the Kinetic City tries to extract the practical potential of these same spaces. As Mehrotra emphasizes, the Kinetic City and Static City are equally important when reading the city as the Kinetic City can be read as a critique on the Static City. *"The Kinetic City forces the Static City to re-engage itself in present conditions by dissolving its utopian project to fabricate multiple dialogues with its context."*[16]

Although middle classes tend to read the city more as Static and the poor are for the most part the actors behind the Kinetic City, there are complex relations between the two groups and their perceptions.

In order to further explain these conceptions, two examples will be studied: religious festivals as an example of kinetic use of space, and beautification as a tool of the Static City.

Religious Encroachments

One aspect of city life that exemplifies a lot of the concepts discussed above is religion. As evidenced from the walk along the river, shrines and signs of religion are ubiquitous. Yet specifically the Hindu festival is a good example of kinetic use of open space.

Ganesh Chaturthi is a ten day festival honouring Ganesha, the elephant headed god of wisdom, good fortune and prosperity. During this ten day festival communities erect tent-like structures on the streets, squares and pavements to hold statues of the deity. Constant worship and loud religiously themed music pervade the street scene in attempts to appease the God. Important is that this manifestation of Mehrotra's Kinetic City is not only driven by the poor but by all layers of society. On the last day, large processions carry the idols to a water body and immerse them.[17] Although most statues are made out of clay and disintegrate once immersed, idols are often painted in bright colours with toxic paint. Sadly, the immense popularity of the Ganesh festival consequently results in massive pollution of urban water bodies.

To Mehrotra it is important to read the spectacle of Hindu festivals as the reuse of the Static City by the Kinetic City to create a new spectacle. *"Thus architecture is not the 'spectacle' of the city nor does it even comprise the single dominant image of the city."*[18]

The Hindu festival is a also a good example of how the claim to the pablik space is more than just an appropriation of open space out of a need, as it can sometimes take the form of (subtle) subordination. *"It is a characteristic feature of political life that subaltern groups would, by some ingenious move, turn these uninvigilated segments of their life activities into low levels of protest. … It is the site of the everyday, out of the surveillance of disciplines, that is usually turned into the place of small*

rebellions of the poor."[19]

Different social groups tend to worship different deities. Mostly middle class families worship Durga, the Brahmin goddess of all power while lower classes tend to worship the gods of the uneducated like Manasa, the goddess of the snakes.[20] This 'class variation of worship' has led the urban poor to mischievously abuse of the potential of party to disturb their middle class neighbours. Celebrations are often stretched for days on end and taken deep into the night with *"blaring music… directed precisely at the middle-class houses."* [21] By studying the festivals of the poor, Kaviraj shows the potential of turning use of public space into acts of insubordination, friction and resistance. The open space becomes a stage for the rivalry between two ideologies trying to best each other. Although the poor don't have the financial or the organizational means to fight the hegemony of the middle classes, insubordination can come as a relief from the injustice that is inflicted upon them on a daily basis

Beautification

"The production of the identity of the new middle class is linked to a politics of spatial purification, which centres on middle class claims over public spaces and a corresponding movement to cleanse such spaces of the poor and working class"[22], Leela Fernandes states. One of the ways this happens is through making assertive and aesthetic claims on urban space. The ultimate medium for middle classes to let their fantasies of development and civic society run free is Beautification.

As Fernandes explains *"in these projects, the state and new middle class engage in a shared conception of the city as a central sociospatial site that can manifest an idealized vision of an India that has been transformed by globalization; the global city in effect, represents the new city-nation."*[23] Beautification ideals are of slum free cities, wide unencumbered sidewalks, clean parks and spectacular buildings. The idea of 'cleaning up' the city is constructed around class-based discourses that have to be framed in a wider pattern of state-led restructuring of public space in order to cater to the wealthier segments of society.[24] As Kalpana Sharma remarks on Mumbai, *"Investment is always available to beautify the already well-endowed parts of the city. But there is no money to provide even basic services to the poorer areas."*[25]

The Nandanavanam and Save Musi Projects can serve as perfect examples for these observations. Both programmes try to purify the riverbanks and recreate a vision of a developped Hyderabad. The poor already living on the riverbanks are regarded as eyesores that taint this ideal image. The conservation of these newly created 'clean' and 'pleasant' spaces usually has to depend on a constant surveillance and maintenance to expel any unwanted 'elements' (much rhetoric treats beggars and squatters on the same par as debris and dirt).[26] Likewise I would like to argue that in many cases the 'No Horn Zone' is a manifestation of this urge to control the space around certain institutions. In the case of the riverbanks, signs No Horn Zones were always empty of informal activity and thus highly policed by authorities. Increasingly though, the state is collaborating with the private sector on these projects in its urge to create developed, aesthetic, poor-free cities. Either through funding or by hiring private surveillance, the public space is monitored and purified. In fact the emergence of gated communities is completely in accordance with this trend of top down privatization of the public space.[27] What is important here is how *"there is a growing intersection of interests between the state, the private sector, and [the rising middle class]"*[28] and how they collectively turn against other agents making conflicting claims on the public space.

The Bias of the State

As is obvious from the above examples, the role of authorities is ambiguous in the debate between middle and lower classes. Although it is the role of government to provide for all its citizens, the struggle imbedded in urban society often implies picking sides and generating anger and resentment with one or both of these groups.

Although authorities have often provided for the poor, more often than not, authorities and middle classes tend to share the same aspirations for their cities. As Leela Fernandes explains *"The politics of urban development reflect the ways in which the state shapes middle class identity and consequently helps consolidate a base of support for economic restructuring."*[29] As we will see later on, the 2010 Master Plan can be very biased when it comes to planning for the poor. This partiality of the government has serious consequences for the poor. Several authors indignantly expose the biased

practices of authorities. *"Those cities and towns that aspire to be 'globally competitive' are compelled to accept that economic success requires major sacrifices and interminable inequality"*[30] Edgar Pieterse states. *"The legal institutions of Third World countries had been developed over the years to serve the needs and interests of certain urban groups … As long as the peasants stayed put, the implicit legal discrimination was not apparent"*[31], Hernando de Soto chimes in.

Free market capitalism has of course had its say among the governing elites. *"When it comes to the reclamation of high-value land, ideological symbols and promises made to the poor mean very little to the bureaucrats in power."*[32] Davis states governments *"criminally undertax"* their urban rich and have *"betrayed their original promises to the poor."*[33]

Neglect is not the only problem standing in the way of governmental aid to the urban poor. *"The government systems have become behemoth and independent and isolated in the case of some issues and, therefore, leading to a lack of integrated policy formulation, implementation and monitoring systems."*[34] As governments are faced

with unbelievable waves of poverty, the governability of cities becomes extremely complex. Furthermore, *"the failure to provide basic amenities to many slums – electricity, water, minimum sanitation and medical dispensaries - are substantially explained by the tendency of politicians at the state and centre to distrust and therefore underfund municipal governments to such a degree that the latter are effectively crippled."*[35]

In conclusion, I believe Frederic Thomas says it best by explaining how by lack of a middle ground, authorities forfeit their responsibilities to the greater good. *"The prevailing climate has been one of indifference to poverty, even when the most elementary essentials for human dignity are lacking. Decision makers can neither alienate landowning groups nor throw squatters out without generating public wrath. The best course of action becomes no action at all or ameliorative half measures in deference to the city's fastest-growing constituency."*[36]

Design: Sewer Lids

As we have seen, both the notions of Static and Kinetic City are related to certain sections of society and are constantly strategically used by them to criticize each other. The poor abuse of their right to religion to badger middle class neighbours while authorities side with middle class ideals in defining use of space and aesthetics and in doing so stigmatize constructions and habits of the poor.

This design tries to interpret the sense of place of the Musi in a different way than proposed in beautification designs that see the river as a picturesque element of the city within the heritage zone. Instead, I define the sewers running alongside the river as elements that are almost as recognizable as the river itself. As the sewer lids have to stay above flood level so as not to flush the sewers each time the river floods the lids have been elevated in the form of concrete cones. My proposal is to turn these monofunctional sewer totems into defining elements along the river by lighting them at night and using them to bade the riverbanks in an eerie glow after dark. Lamps are built on top of the cones that shine down at night and illuminate the concrete structure. This intervention marks the riverbanks as a heterogeneous link between different zones of the city and makes them accessible. The strong point of this proposal is that it redefines the river banks as a space instead of an accidental element in the landscape by emphasizing its length while avoiding the use of foreign symbolism or 'creation of a new meaning'. The originally present elements are used to form a democratic sense of place along the river by providing an aesthetic that works for the structuredheritage zones as well as for more improvised zones. By consequentially making an investment all along the river, it is not only the architecture of the Static City but also the Kinetic City interacting with it that is valued as the flood zone of the river is in many ways a pablik space.

1 Gooptu 2001, p 421

2 Gooptu 2001, p 84

3 The word 'pablik' is a bastard form of the English word public, since Hindi and other Indian languages did not have a word for "public", they inserted the English word into their Hindi vocabulary, gradually changing its pronunciation and its meaning into a new interlingual term.

4 Mehrotra 2009, p 142

5 Leela Fernandes, *"India's New Middle Class : Democratic Politics in an Era of Economic Reform"*, University of Minnesota press, Minnesota, 2006, p 141; Hereafter [Fernandes 2006]

6 After Singapore, Shanghai is now the model Mumbai is being developed towards. Mehrotra 2009, p 148

7 Kaviraj 1997, p 105

8 Mehrotra 2009, p 144

9 Kaviraj 1997, p 107

10 Mehrotra 2009, pp 142-143

11 Gyan Prakash, *"The Urban Turn"*, Saraï Reader: The Cities of Everyday Life, 2002, p5

12 Prakash 2002, p5

13 Bayat 1997, p 57

14 Mehrotra 2009, p 144

15 Please note that the word 'City' has to be read not only as the physical city, but also the actors, economies and cultures that make up the city.

16 Mehrotra 2009, p 149

17 Usually a stream or the sea. In Hyderabad, the most popular immersion spot is the Hussain Sagar Lake. For some reason, the Musi does not seem to be used for immersion during the festival.

18 Mehrotra 2009, p 144

19 Kaviraj 1997, p 110

20 Kaviraj 1997, p 111

21 Kaviraj 1997, p 111

22 Fernandes 2006, p 139

23 Fernandes 2006, p 146

24 Fernandes 2006, p 147

25 Kalpana Sharma as quoted in Davis 2006, p 97

26 Fernandes 2006, p 148

27 Fernandes 2006, p 156

28 Fernandes 2006, p 156

29 Fernandes 2006, p 156

30 Pieterse 2008, p 24

31 de Soto 2000, p 83-84

32 Davis 2006, p 101

33 Davis 2006, p 63

34 Vedukumar 2007

35 Manor as quoted in Maringanti 2007, p 40

36 Thomas 1997, p 162

Garland production in Moosa Nagar

4. Desperate Labour

"The crucial issue for the people living in slums is the employment factor. The nature of employment and the place of their work are the factors that determine and justify their place of stay." - Dr. Vasant K. Bawa, ex vice-president of HUDA[1]

Now that a framework has been established to understand how the urban poor perceive urban spaces, it is time to investigate into what needs are pushing them to exploit the pablik space. As we have seen, religious as well as behavioural patterns influence the use of space, yet it is in the economical and domestic use of the pablik space that its true potentials and true struggles emerge.

As the major attraction of the city for poor migrants is the potential of employment, this chapter will introduce the informal economy that results out of this mass immigration, while the next chapter will discuss it's manifestation in the pablik space by studying street vending.

Urban Occupations

Urban occupations diverge significantly from rural ones and provide the poor with a variety of opportunities. The traditional occupational structure of Indian society was based on caste; a trade was passed on through generations of the same caste. This system was hierarchically ordered, with the most impure and undesirable professions ranked at the bottom for the lower castes. In the city, instead of occupation depending on caste, the labour market is segmented in 'caste-like' occupations. *"Unlike caste in the traditional sense, the castelike occupations that urban residents take up are not actually ranked into high and low, although some may be regarded as more respectable than others. (...) New urban occupations help groups dissociate themselves from their parent castes of lower rank and bring them money and influence"*[2] Thomas observes, *"in some cases, caste is important, notably in occupations considered unclean, such*

as the tanning of leather, and these have consequently been adopted by migrants belonging to inferior castes. By and large, however, occupational groups are more meaningful than caste per se in understanding relationships in the urban society. (…) Also, new occupational groups have emerged, such as car cleaners and the istriwalla, or ironing men, (…), who do not have specific caste antecedents."[3]

In other words, the urban context provides a liberating atmosphere for people to shed the mark of their caste by generating anonymity and loosening occupational definitions. Although Muslims are traditionally not divided in a caste system, their societal village structure is of course hierarchical and divisive too and they too can be rid of former stigmas by urban anonymity. The poorer elements of urban society are often employed in semi-traditional occupations like ragpicking, buffalo herding or tailoring, in service activities for the middle classes like domestic work or chauffeuring, in production like the garland makers of Moosa Nagar or workers in sweatshop-like industries; or in shops of different kinds.

Most of these occupations described above fall under what is commonly referred to as the informal sector, that is to say unlicensed and unregistered (and thus illegal) work.

An Informal Economy

The concept of the informality was first coined by Keith Hart, based on his anthropological research in Accra in 1973.[4] In his studies of migrants moving from small towns to big cities he encountered new forms of employment and termed these unlicensed urban services 'the informal economy'.

Frederic Thomas traces the jumpstart of the phenomenon in Calcutta back to the closure of jute mills. *"Skill requirements were minimal and literacy irrelevant. Any required proficiency could be acquired very quickly, so workers remained highly replaceable. Poorly housed and never fully "urbanized", this casual labor force would be replenished as needed from the bottomless manpower pool that was to be found in the overpopulated states of north India."*[5] One of the main reasons for closure of jute mills, especially in cities like Mumbai, was the rising real estate prices; it gradually became more lucrative to sell off the mill lands than to actually keep the mills running.[6] All over India, the closure of jute mills from the 1980s onwards has left tremendous amounts of unskilled and illiterate people on the streets to fend for themselves.[7] Most of these people had no other option than to accept any job they could get joining the ranks of the growing informal economy.

Important for the context of urban planning is that the effects of this revolution on the spatiality of the city have been severe. The collapse of a centralized state industrial sector has scattered service and production centres across the city, leading to what Mehrotra terms *"a new bazaar-like urbanism"*. *"With the retreat of the state through the 1980s and '90s (...) the space of the 'everyday' is where economic and cultural struggles are articulated"* he explains.[8] The interstitial spaces claimed by these scattered activities can range from very small in the form of domestic workers living with the middle class family they work for to huge marketplaces. Not surprisingly, the hotbeds for most of these decentralised industrial activities are the ubiquitous slums that dot the cityscape.

Nowadays the informal sector seems to be represented in just about every part of the formal economy, providing 'low-end' services for 'higher end' professionals from domestic work to street vending over sweat shop work to construction over driving to mechanic works. However, incomes in the informal sector are significantly lower than those in the formal sector.

So although 'informal' simply refers to the fact that these businesses are not licensed, do not pay taxes and do not adhere to standards and regulations, the reality of informality is far more complex. Because the informal sector is founded on the desperation of people to take whatever jobs they can find in order to make a living, the reality of it is a massive coercion of needy people into unskilled and underpaid work. As work in the unorganized sector is by definition not regulated by formal employer-employee contracts, labour is unprotected and therefore highly exploitable. Furthermore, informal activities are characterized by low productivity, lack of capital, oversupply of products, fluctuating production and small profits.

Increasing competition in the informal sector puts a lot of pressure on the social capital of communities, critically draining essential resources for solidarity from the poor's social networks.[9] Altruism between people in the same community has to be seen

in this context as a survival strategy that in turn can also be perverted into exploitation mechanisms.[10]

Parallel to the Indian situation, informality worldwide has been on the rise since the 1980's. There is a consensus among researchers that the economical crises of the 1980s form a tipping point that established (formerly 'marginal') informal strategies as primary source of livelihood over formal activities. The 2003 United Nations report *"The Challenge of Slums"* interprets the recent rise of the informal sector as *"...a direct result of liberalization."*[11]

Informalism is increasingly the only way for the poor to survive and has become anything but 'marginal'. Research estimates that at least two fifths of workers are informal workers in the developing world[12] with some cities reaching numbers up to 75%. In India, accounts go as far as designating 92 % of the workforce as employed in the unorganized sector (including the highly unformal rural areas).

Cheap Labour

It is, though, quite misleading to see the urban markets simply as a

Temporary Durga statue workshop under a bridge

formal-informal dichotomy since both sectors are intertwined in complex and dynamic ways. For most citizens, there is no abrupt divide between formal and informal city life. A policeman may live in a slum, a businessman may buy his lunch from a roadside stall, and a government official might wear counterfeited fashion designer clothes. Moreover, both markets respond to each other in layered ways. E.g. the spontaneous establishment of unauthorized bus and taxi services shows the informal sector is quick to fill any gaps it perceives in the formal sector.[13] Moreover, as Mike Davis points out, part of the informal labour force is a hidden workforce for the formal economy through subcontracting and sweat-shop-like pyramid structures.[14] Saskia Sassen acknowledges this *"many of the differentiated components of the economy – whether firms, sectors, or workers – are actually interconnected, but with often extreme social, economic, racial and organizational segmentation. The result is fragmented topographies that obscure the underlying connections."*[15] Sassen is referring to the many economic activities that are engendered by multinational corporations yet are performed outside of them, like for instance First World textile production that is subcontracted to Third World sweat shops. She continues, *"even the most sophisticated professional sectors need access to a broad range of industrial services located with easy access in central areas. When these industrial service firms lack the bidding power to locate in central areas they often operate partly of fully in the informal economy."*[16] Newly emerging highly skilled professions are heavily dependent on cheap mass labour typically provided by the informal sector for their own productivity. So, the informal economy is mostly driven by the poorer elements of society, yet it does provide services for all its segments.[17] This implies a deepening of social financial disparities as cities start attracting more and more high skilled and low skilled labour. A study on the household income patterns conducted in Hyderabad in 1994 indicates the differentiation of incomes. The average monthly income per household was Rs. 4219 (equalling an average of 630 Rs. per capita). What is striking is that while 33% of the population was found to be living under or marginally above the poverty line, the rich were noted to be getting richer, the income of the highest 17 % of the population increased by 82%.[18] Clearly, the informal sector works not separate from but subordinate to the formal sector.[19] This observation reveals an underlying hypocrisy in the middle class view of the poor: on the one hand, they tend to associate squatters and urban poor with unhygienic conditions, crime, parental neglect, illiteracy, and disease. On the other

hand, it is these same people who they happily hire to drive them around, clean their houses and do their cooking at extremely low wages. As Frederic Thomas points out once more, the two are interrelated. *"Mainstream society cannot have the convenience of cheap labor without slums intruding visibly into the interstices of urban space."*[20]

Patterns of Exploitation

Moreover, Alejandro Portes and Kelly House's research further reinforced the evidence of distinctions within the informal sector itself between the informal petty bourgeoisie and the informal petty proletariat.[21] They found the correlation between the rise of entrepreneurship and expansion in the informal sector to the shrinkage of formal entrepreneurship and the formal proletariat. In stronger words, laid off public sector workers or other professionals with specialist skills are increasingly unable to find proper employment in the formal sector and are often forced into informal entrepreneurship, where laid off manual workers tend to serve as their employees.[22]

In search of explanations for the phenomenon of informality, a number of theories have been proposed. The Todaro model, based on the idea that the informal sector was just a stepping stone for rural immigrants towards achieving skills needed in formal-sector jobs, was very popular in the 1960's with modernization theorists.[23] This theory of upward mobility has been proven wrong, as argued above. Most statistics indicate the inverse evolution, that of formal sector workers losing their jobs and ending up in informal work.[24] Although migrants initially rely heavily on pre-existing networks to obtain some foothold in the cities, improvements to this condition rely on scarce possibilities for self-help and wealth accumulation. As veteran sociologist Jan Breman boldly puts it, *"The failure of the newcomers' efforts to find stable and reasonably paid work was due mainly to a development strategy that, in the face of excess supply, sought to keep the price of labour as low as possible, allowed no room for collective action to reduce these people's vulnerability, and refused to provide this footloose workforce with government assistance."*[25] In short, upward mobility in the informal sector has proven *"a myth inspired by wishful thinking."*[26]

Informality as Solution?

World Bank Studies and other followers of the 'Washington Consensus' have therefore focused on presenting informality as *"the urban Third World's deus ex machina"*[27] focussing on the 'vibrancy' and 'vitality' of Third World self-employed entrepreneurship.

In fact, the World Bank *"has been one of the leading proponents of the process of informalization, as we might refer to the erosion of the rights of formal sector workers"*[28], Breman argues about its 1995 World Development Report[29], *"the Bank's report is authored by a team of economists who are much more sympathetic to the interest of capital than to those of labour."*[30] Prime examples of this are radical land titling policies inspired by Hernando De Soto's publication *'The Mystery of Capital'*.

De Soto's publication was hugely popular because of its simple idea: reducing the role of government, granting of property rights to stimulate individual initiative and letting the 'heroic' urban entrepreneurs build their own future by free market principles. Granting the poor property rights to the land they were encroaching upon (be it in the form of housing, workplaces or shops) was supposed to enhance their abilities to acquire loans from formal banks and make transactions by using their legal assets as mortgages thus finally releasing their formerly restricted inner capitalists.

If anything, de Soto does provide an intriguing analysis of the phenomenon. In a study on the legalization of extralegal businesses or housing, he reveals the bureaucratic state apparatuses of different Third World and former communist nations to be extremely resistant to formalization. According to his research the procedure to formalize property in the Philippines consists of 168 distinct steps to be completed, taking up to 25 years to finalize.[31] Further finds lead him to believe it is almost as difficult to stay legal as it is to become it. He concludes by stating that *"Inevitably, migrants do not so much break the law as the law breaks them – and they opt out of the system."*[32]

Studying the different critiques on de Soto's work are revealing of the complexity of the informal sector.

A principal critique on de Soto is that his theories are highly reductionist and one-dimensional. As Elmar Altvater rebukes, *"Men are not entrepreneurs by birth. Moreover, it is socially impossible for everyone to become a capitalist, since some must remain*

workers to be hired by capitalists."[33] It seems de Soto confuses the necessity of entrepreneurship as a condition for survival with an inherent capitalist talent.

Moreover, de Soto seems to have underestimated the exploitative aspect of the informal sector by making a number of false assumptions about these 'self-employed entrepreneurs' he glorifies. First of all, employees of the informal sector have traditionally remained invisible in Third World market studies. The reason for this is that the appearance of self-employment can hide more complex employer-employee dependency relationships in the form of wage payment based on piecework rather than time-rate basis. Own-account workers are often hired labour.[34] This common mistake of linking informality to self-employment can be traced all the way back to Hart's original definition. Yet, the fact is that most people in the informal economy work for someone else, which severely contests de Soto's stereotype of the heroic self-employed.

One very important point about the informal economy de Soto hammers on is its contribution to economic growth. *"Entrepreneurial ingenuity of the poor has created wealth on a vast scale"* de Soto revels, *"... the total value of the real estate held but not legally owned by the poor of the third world and former communist nations is at least $9.3 trillion."*[35] The typical example in this case is that of Mumbai's Dharavi, famous as a prime example of informal productivity. Presumably Asia's largest slum, this neighbourhood reaches a population density of an estimated 1 million people living on a mere 223 ha.[36] It is estimated to house over 10,000 small scale industries, which depend on the slum's illegality to survive on their small profit margins, and reach a total turnover of up to Rs. 450 crore a day.[37] Government estimates pinpoint the annual turnover of Dharavi's economy around the Rs.3000 crore mark.[38]

Urban involution: oversupply of labour, scarcity of space

However, the view of the informal sector as the generator of employment has to be placed in the light of division of existing labour rather than creation of new labour.[39] Due to the massive surplus of desperate labour, the constant growth of the informal sector means a steady drop of incomes within it, in an effort to provide as many people as possible with some source of income. Although the informal sector generates a massive turnover, it is by far outpaced by the need of the ever growing mass of urban poor.

What is of interest to us in particular is that this 'urban involution', as Davis calls it, is also spatially apparent in the form of a constant subdivision of prime urban spaces between economic actors.[40] This be evidenced by some streets along the river that are lined by groups of people offering the same service or product.

In the context of informal sector competition under virtually infinite labour supply de Sotan strategies of making labour even more flexible are a recipe for disaster. It is once more Breman who succinctly puts his finger on the sore spot of the World Bank's reasoning. "*'Exploitive labour practices' is not an expression that belongs to the [World] Bank jargon."*[41] Inequality is an essential part of the informal sector. As, consequently, is exploitation. *"... when all is said and done, there is no escaping the unpalatable fact that the vitality of the informal sector depends in large measure upon ruthless exploitation of labor."*[42] This constant state of conflict is an intricate part of how those who pull the strings of the informal sector run their business, using coercion and sometimes even chronic violence to keep people oppressed. *"Politically, the informal sector, in the absence of enforced labor rights, is a semifeudal realm of kickbacks, bribes, tribal loyalties, and ethnic exclusion. Urban space is never free."*[43] Receiving patronage or achieving membership to certain networks is essential when making even simple transactions such as occupying a place on the pavement, buying wholesale goods,

finding a job…

To summarize, the main dialogue I have focused on here is the one between de Soto's bias on capital and Breman's insistence on labour as a major factor in production. In short, Breman dismisses de Soto's arguments by stating that the West has achieved high living standards through the valorisation of labour and through curbing capitalism by instating welfarist measures to ensure a social order based on equality. While De Soto argues that the main problem for urban poor is that they cannot capitalize their assets because they have no access to property titles, Breman (seconded by Davis) argues that the biggest issue in the informal sector is the lack of valorisation and protection of labour.

1 V.K. Bawa in CHATRI 2000, p 33

2 Thomas 1997, p 92-93

3 Thomas 1997, p 95

4 Keith Hart, *"Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana"*, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, March 1973, pp. 61-89

5 Thomas 1997, pp 43-44

6 Neera Adarkar and Padma Achwal Desai, *"Destruction of a Legacy: Mumbai's Mill Lands in a Globalizing Context"* in: Kelly Shannon and Janina Gosseye (eds.), *"Reclaiming (the urbanism of) Mumbai"*, SUN Academia, Amsterdam, 2009, pp72-74

7 Breman speaks of 250 lakh workers being laid off in Mumbai and around 85 lakh in Ahmadabad. Jan Breman, *"The Labouring Poor in India: Patterns of Exploitation, Subordination, and Exclusion"*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2003, p 222; **Hereafter [Breman 2003]**

8 Mehrotra 2009, p 142

9 Davis 2006, p 184

10 Depending on the degree of interdependence between the donating and receiving parties, the drawbacks of donation will always be weighed against the benefits of expected future counter-donations in time of need. Mitra 2003, p 14

11 UN-HABITAT, *"The Challenge of Slums: Global Report on Human Settlements 2003"*, London 2003, pp 40-46; Hereafter [UN-HABITAT 2003];

Davis 2006, p 175

12 UN-HABITAT 2003, pp 40,46

13 De Soto 2000, p25

14 Davis 2006, p178

15 Saskia Sassen, *"Fragmented Urban Topographies and their Underlying Interconnections"*, in: Alfredo Brillembourg, Kristin Feireiss, Hubert Klumpner (eds.), "*Informal city Caracas Case*", Prestel, New York, 2005, p 85; **Hereafter [Sassen 2005]**

16 Sassen 2005, p 86

17 Which in India more often than not coincides with the lower castes. It is important to stress though that people from all castes and classes are represented in the whole of the informal sector.

18 HMDA 2010, pp 44-45

19 Breman 2003, p 214

20 Thomas 1997, p 164

21 Davis 2006, p 180

22 Davis 2006, p 180

23 Mitra 2003, p 38

24 Mitra 2003, p 78

25 Breman 2003, p 198

26 Breman 2003, p 174

27 Davis 2006, p 179

28 Breman 2003, p 201

29 Breman refers to the 1995 World Development Report "Workers in an Integrating World" which implies that informal employers usually treat their workers with a 'socially acceptable' benevolent paternalism.

30 Breman 2003, p185

31 De Soto 2000, p 21

32 De Soto 2000, p 23

33 Elmar Altvater, *"Globalization and the Informalization of the Urban Space"* in: Alfredo Brillembourg, Kristin Feireiss, Hubert Klumpner (eds.), *"Informal City Caracas Case"*, Prestel, New York, 2005, p 54

34 Breman 2003, p 216

35 Anno 1997, De Soto 2000, p 32-33

36 223ha = 2,23 km²; Kalpana Sharma, *"Dharavi: an Uncertain Future"* in: Kelly Shannon and Janina Gosseye (eds.), *"Reclaiming (the urbanism of) Mumbai"*, SUN Academia, Amsterdam, 2009, p 84; **Hereafter [Sharma 2009]**

37 Neuwirth 2005, pp 122-128

38 Sharma 2009, p84

39 See Thomas 1997

40 Davis 2006, p 182

41 The report seems to imply that informal employers usually treat their workers with a 'socially acceptable' benevolent paternalism. Breman 2003, p 174

42 Thomas 1997, p 161

43 Davis 2006, p 185

A roadside barber

5. Profiting from the Streets

One of the informal sector's most visible and most debated manifestations is hawking, or street vending, because of its presentation and dynamism in the street scene. Because of this, hawking has become a highly politicized and mediatised topic and an exemplary case for studying the complex relations within and between the formal and informal systems. Street vendors represent one of the most direct linkages between lower, middle and upper-classes. *"Perhaps as no other citizen, the street vendor becomes the focus of interaction of almost all city pressure groups – the municipality, police, politician, consumer, real estate agent, shop owners, vehicle owners"*[1], SEWA coordinator Renana Jhablava writes. [2] The following chapter will discuss the views and policy measures surrounding this kind of appropriation of the pablik space.

Hawking

In comparison to other, more invisible forms of the informal economy, the street vendor, or hawker, is by definition an extremely visually, audibly and spatially present entity in the street.

Vending is a very inviting profession thanks to the low number of skills and the fairly low initial capital required. Street vendors themselves have also stated the profession was considered more respectable than other jobs.[3] Due to this low threshold, hawkers comprise around fifteen percent of the national informal workforce.[4] Likewise, Hyderabad is home to around 40 to 50 thousand street vendors.[5]

Logically this group of people is very heterogeneous, and can take a very diverse range of forms. They may be little children selling water bags at street corners, self proclaimed businessmen selling counterfeited electronics, an old couple selling tea at a bus stand or temporary tribal migrants living two weeks on the city pavements to sell off their produce.

Earnings in the sector vary greatly,

ranging from 50rs to 1000rs daily.[6] Bartering is customary making earnings fluctuate. On average, mobile vendors earn less than stationary ones, those selling perishables earn less than those selling hardware and more money is to be made in big cities than in smaller towns.[7] Women, who tend to be mobile and sell perishables, traditionally earn less than men. Since street vendors work out in the open, they seem to be very susceptible to weather changes, which makes it hard for them to have a steady work cycle.[8] Yet, recent changes in Indian lifestyle have proven beneficial for street vending. Strict traditional rules that some higher castes cannot eat outside the home are loosening. Furthermore, the emancipation of middle class women in the job market has increased the dependence of lower middle class families on cheap warm meals.[9] Finally, as cars are becoming available to more and more people, the potential for street vending to reach a greater audience also increases.

The system of street vending is one of natural markets, that is to say, product and location are interlinked. The product that is being sold is often a direct reaction to surrounding activity, and vice versa, the place


Market stall

where one sells is linked to the product one wants to sell. Due to their temporary nature, shops, stalls and carts can easily react to the activity around them, moving about the city where their services are needed. In residential districts, groceries will be sold, while in business districts chances are high perpared meals will be sold. Likewise, around schools book shops and paperstores pop up and around train stations just about anything can be found.

Likewise, certain official retail or service centres will attract informal copy-cats selling the same (usually counterfeited) product on the streets at cheaper rates. As evidenced from institutions along Musi, the area around official buildings is often the battleground for disputes over space. Some institutions will completely ban any activity around them in order to keep the appearance of order and authority. Yet, in most places with high numbers of vendors, authorities seem to tolerate hawking as long as daily fines are paid. The system seems to have evolved into an 'official recognition of an unofficial activity'[10] that actually just rents out parts of the public space in the form of fines. To echo Davis once more, 'urban space is never free'[11]; bribes can run up to 20% of the daily income

The cause of conflict between urban players on the subject of street vending is more often than not the contradiction between the right to earn a living and the obstruction of public space. Usually, street vending happens in places with high traffic flows, be it pedestrian or motorized traffic, exactly because of the high number of potential customers.

Proponents of hawking make some interesting points when trying to explain why street vendors are a positive influence on the urban society.

Renana Jhablava strongly propagates that street vending is part of a public culture, a 'collective psyche'.[12] It has evolved out of an essential part of traditional India and remains a deeply rooted part of contemporary urban Indian life. As opposed to the recent integration of centralized supermarkets and shopping malls into the city, street vending has been around for ages and is part of a bazaar market culture. It is for a big part a manifestation of a roadside buying culture: customers have the habit of buying their groceries 'on the go'.

In Hyderabad, this very habit is undercutting the authorities' goal of creating decentralized activity nodes. *"The commercial development has happened all along major roads leading to one of the longest continuous strip commercial areas in India. Major arterial roads and through roads have become shopping streets."*[13] The habit of buying on the go is the source of major congestion, and not surprisingly street vendors and traffic police regularly clash.

Bus Stations are natural markets

Street vendors, Jhablava continues, employ themselves where the government cannot, helping to bridge a gap in a constantly rising demand for new traders. They provide an important service while keeping prices conveniently low. Furthermore, they would reduce poverty because of the (semi-) security offered by a remunerated job enables them to invest in their secondary needs. At this point though, Jhablava may be over-romanticizing the informal economy, as we saw earlier, experience has proven that incomes in the informal sector are subdivided in a constant urban involution. It is clear from observing large groups of street vendors selling the exact same wares in the same spot that vending is not exempted from exploitative subdivision of labour and space. Similarly, these 'conveniently low' prices are of course an indicator of a drastic oversupply of labour.

Thirdly, Jhablava emphasizes that the presence of hawkers prevents social unrest. Hawkers exist because customers want them to. The low-cost service they provide is of the utmost importance to the other poor to alleviate their plight. If street vendors are a problem for government, they are also a solution for the majority of the poorer sections.

"A ban on hawking will only aggravate the problems of the urban poor. It will not only deprive a section of the urban population from gainful employment but will increase the cost of living for the poor." [14]

Lastly and most importantly, street vending is a big cog in the machine of the general urban economy. Jhablava succeeds in making a point by estimating the annual turnover of Mumbai street vendors over Rs. 6000 crore, thus underlining the importance of this economy on a big scale.[15]

Arguments like these are often denied or ignored by authorities and the legalization of street vending is a contested subject. Most municipalities see vendors as encroachers of public spaces and obstructers of traffic flows. . Violence is part of the uncertainties that vendors face by engaging the public space every day. Fights between vendors and police or local goondas are part of an everyday reality of the street.

Keeping the Streets Free

Strangely, street vending is actually not prohibited, though in practice it is often suppressed.

A number of policies have been

proposed throughout the years, ranging from forced evictions to installing special vending zones or distributing identity cards. Most policies fail though, because of course the places where street vendors generally cause traffic congestion are the places where they want to be most.

In 2004 the National Policy on Urban Street Vendors came into effect, acknowledging the role street vendors play in the economy. Moreover, those in favour of street vending claim the Indian Constitution offers legitimation for street vending in articles 39 (a) and (b):

"(a) the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood; (b) the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good." [16]

However, mainstream acceptance is still far away as Jhablava remarks *"the public authority has discretion to allow or disallow vending. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has ruled that street vending is a fundamental right and decreed that it is the duty of the authorities to provide means for the hawkers to sell. This is where perceptions distort reality. Most public authorities, although empowered to do so, refuse to permit street vending. They grant permission only to a small percentage of actual street vendors, leaving the vast majority as 'illegal'."* [17]



Perhaps the harshest attack on street vending in India must have been in 1996 under the outrageous moniker *'Operation Sunshine'*, when Calcutta authorities violently evicted over one lakh street vendors confiscating crores rupees worth of goods in the process. [18]

Municipal authorities in most cities have in the past tried to start several actions to regulate street vending though always reaching very small proportions of the target audience because of bad implementation or unrealistic demands.

Hyderabad's GHMC has implemented some policies on street vending. The greatest concerns are about street congestion, order, hygiene of the foods sold and security. The authorities decided to issue ID-cards for mobile vendors using pushcarts and other transportation devices to sell their wares from. This should improve communication between the vendors and the police, making it possible to identify certain vendors. Yet, vendors selling on the ground or in permanent structures are excluded from the policy. Furthermore, the policy marks three different kinds of zones. 'Green' zones are areas where vending is allowed without restrictions, while in 'orange' zones vending is restricted to particular times or days. In 'red' zones no vending is allowed. Of course, most of the restricted and no-go zones are precisely where vendors want to sell. [19] Natural markets provide goods where the customers need them most, e.g. as mentioned above, people selling travel items will sell near train stations (and vice versa, people selling near train stations will sell travel items). In practice, zoning often has no regard for where vendors want to sell and therefore fails.

Design: Market Junction

The following design focuses on a multifunctional role for roads that sees them not as mere transport-networks also as shopping places. The site for this design is the intersection of the new bridge across the river with the new road as presented in the Master Plan. It proposes a space that combines high traffic flows with opportunities to stop and shop. The suggestion is to construct crossroads not as roundabouts but as square 'arenas' as can be seen on the illustration above.

Traffic flows in India are anarchist to say the least. Although lane discipline, right of way, traffic lights and speed limits are often neglected, Indian traffic has its own regulating dynamics that manages the complex dance of speeding cars. Although

travel certainly does not run any smoother because of this quasi-anarchy, the addition of roadside vending is a recipe for a deadlock on traffic flows.

This design proposes the demarcation of a walled square that allows for the interweaving of the two contrasting dynamics. The corners of the square provide for areas of low traffic densities, making it possible to stop near stalls while passing traffic regulates itself in the centre of the square.

New construction should incorporate these facilities for street vending for two important reasons. Firstly, crossroads are natural markets for street vendors and they are going to gather around these hotspots for as long as no other large scale employment is created. Accommodation of street vending is thus not only necessary to prevent additional chaos at intersections; it is also an acknowledgement of the services provided by street vendors. As Breman states, rather than a lack of property rights, it is the serious lack of valorisation of labour that is problematic for informal activities in contemporary Indian cities. Therefore, as long as governments cannot provide employment themselves, they should value and support spontaneous initiatives and entrepreneurship from their citizens. The explicit construction of public space for vending (like market spaces) seems a logical yet crucial step in this process. Secondly, and more importantly, the question arises why governments should invest in accommodating infrastructure for activities that do not contribute to society by avoiding taxes. In order to contextualize this controversial proposal, I would like to present the policy of Special Economic Zones (SEZ), special areas that are developed to cater to multinational industries. As Kelly Shannon explains *"SEZ policy enables the creation of duty-free enclaves, designated as foreign territory for the purposes of trade operations, duties and tariffs; they have state-of-the-art infrastructure and support services and can exist autonomously."*[20] The website of the Indian Ministry of Commerce further explains what kinds of benefits are granted to entities within these zones as well as developers who want to set up the zones. Hyderabad has six SEZs[21], most of them located in the city's periphery. Among the facilities and incentives offered to units in the SEZs are duty free import, exemption from a number of taxes including the

ones on export income in the first five years, central sales taxes and services taxes.[22] Governments are seemingly caving in to the radical neo-liberal demands of multinational companies for a minimum of taxation and regulations and a maximum of facilities and infrastructure in hopes that SEZs will pay off by creating additional foreign investment, employment and economic activities in the cities.

The argument I would like to bring to the fore is that middle class parties protesting the facilitation of street vending are most probably the same that would hail SEZs as facilitators of development. While both phenomena require the state to invest in facilities to enable economic growth, the first is based on 'survival' while the second is based on 'development'. Yet, the hypocrisy of ruling elites goes even further. Let's not forget, it is exactly those kinds of policies of deregulation and free market capitalism engendering SEZs and 'development' that are producing the desperate labour that makes up the informal sector. Providing SEZs with physical space and support while marginalizing survival strategies of the disenfranchised means robbing them twice: by putting them in insecurity and consequently, by allowing them no means to change their situation. Moreover, street vendors are not out to avoid paying taxes since they pay them indirectly in the form of daily fines.

1 Renana Jhablava, *"Roles and Perceptions"*, Seminar, 491, July 2000; **Hereafter [Jhablava 2000]**

2 Self-Employed Women's Association is an Indian trade union registered since 1972 that organizes women working in the informal sector. http://www.sewa.org/

3 Results of a NASVI study. Sharit K. Bhowmik, *"A Raw Deal"* ,Seminar, 491, July 2000

4 National figure for 2000. Jhablava 2000

5 Marlis Wipper and Christoph Dittrich, "*Street Food Vendors in the Food Provisioning System of Hyderabad"*, Humboldt University Berlin, Berlin, 2007, p 17; **Hereafter [Wipper, Dittrich 2007]**

6 Results of a NASVI study. Bhowmik 2000

7 The median income in Mumbai is around 100 Rs. daily, in Lucknow this is 50 Rs. Jhablava 2000

8 Breman 2003, p 228

9 "Instead of cooking, they buy food packed in little plastic bags from the vendors on their way home from work. These women are the so-called 'plastic bag housewives'" Wipper and Dittrich 2007, p 9

10 Jonathan Shapiro Anjaria, *"Street Hawkers and Public Space in Mumbai"*, Economic and Political Weekly, May 27 2006, p2141

11 Davis 2006, p 185

12 Jhablava 2000

13 HMDA 2010, p 123

14 Bhowmik 2000

15 Jhablava 2000

16 Constitution of India 2007 p 22

17 Jhablava 2000

18 Shaktiman Ghowh, "A Question of Survival", Seminar 491, July 2000

19 Wipper, Dittrich 2007, p 14

20 Kelly Shannon, *"Reclaiming Mumbai"*, in: Kelly Shannon and Janina Gosseye (eds.), *"Reclaiming (the urbanism of) Mumbai"*, SUN Academia, Amsterdam, 2009, p 21

21 Including the newly constructed International Airport.

22 "Special Economic Zones in India" http://www.sezindia.nic.in/about-fi.asp Last visited 20/05/ 2011

Domesticating the Pablik Space

6. Domesticating Pablik Space

"Empty land sitting useless – if homeless people can live there, what's wrong?" – Rohinton Mistry [1]

While it is most often the opportunities for work that attract the poor to the cities, the impact they have on shaping the city is primarily manifested in the form of slums. Not surprisingly, the actual privatization of 'public' space is an extremely controversial subject for middle classes and authorities. The following three chapters will study the manifestation of slums. The chapter at hand will study the prevalence of the phenomenon and the basic parameters that define it. The next chapter will discuss how slums themselves improve their situation and consolidate their existence in the city. The chapter after that will look at the ways authorities have interacted with slums and how their perceptions of urban space may have evolved throughout the years.

The Prevalence of Slums

Counting slums is a complex process for it requires defining slums, a process that can be exclusive or biased.

Data on slums varies greatly because every institution has different definitions of what a slum is.[2] Moreover, accuracy may be low because slum populations are sometimes deliberately undercounted by authorities in attempts to minimize the problem.

The eminent authority on slums is considered to be UN-Habitat. They recognize four physical indicators: lack of water, lack of sanitation, over-crowding and non-durable housing structures. A fifth, legal, indicator is included: insecurity of tenure. This last indicator is very hard to evaluate as slum dwellers have often achieved de facto or de jure security of tenure, rather than conventional legal tenure. The UN categorizes Mumbai as the world capital of slum-dwelling, housing an estimate of 1 to 1.2 crore squatters (on top of an estimated 10 lakh pavement dwellers), followed

closely by Mexico City and Dhaka.[3]

In the case of India, slums are counted every decade as part of the Census of India. The Census considers a slum "a compact area of at least 300 population or about 60-70 households of poorly built congested tenements, in unhygienic environment usually with inadequate infrastructure and lacking in proper sanitary and drinking water facilities" along with all areas notified or recognized as 'slum' by the local governments.[4] The 2001 Census did a wide survey in the slums of 26 states (see following page).[5]

In Hyderabad, counting has been done by different agencies throughout the years. The Master Plan offers an insight into the evolution of slums in the Core Area of Hyderabad (see illustration above). The statistics in this Master Plan are an excellent example of the bias authorities can deliberately exert when it comes to acknowledging slums. As policy is shaped based on these statistics it is important to be able to read them for what they are and not how they are presented. There are three notes to be made on the above data. Firstly, the represented figures only indicate the notified settlements, i.e. the slums officially recognized



by the authorities, not the totality of slums in the Core Area. This implies that the scores of slums that are not represented are not only considered illegal, but apparently inexistent. Subsequently, these are not taken into account in policy making. Secondly, the rise in prevalence of slums in the above graph does not reflect the factual growth of slums, but only the rate at which slums were being notified. Thirdly, notification of slums ended in 1994, yet it is still this data that is used today, ignoring any possible growth in slums over the last 15 years.

On a side note, the same data notes that 95% of the slums are over 10 years old. The Master Plan's dry conclusion that *"this indicates in a fair degree of Tenure Security in MCH area slums"*[6] is of course void of meaning as notification has not taken place since 1994 and consequently no rise and fall of new slums could possibly have been taken into account. This observation of a 'fair degree of tenure' is by the way severely contested. Other accounts[7] tell different tales, of scarcity of land, high insecurity of tenure and increasing crackdowns on slums in attempts to evict them. These two examples go to show why official data on slums has to be studied with care.

Recently, a new effort to count Hyderabad's squatter settlements has been undertaken by MEPMA AP (short for Mission for Elimination of Poverty in Municipal Areas, Andhra Pradesh). According to their accounts, within Andhra Pradesh, Greater Hyderabad provides for nearly 20 % of all slums and all slum population. The agency counted 1456 slums in Greater Hyderabad, housing 19.8 lakh population.[8] Still, there are other accounts speaking of at least 2000 slums.[9]

Records by the CIB (City Improvement Board) show the origination of slums in Hyderabad around the 1920s.[11] The first slums were attributed to a need for cheap servants of plantation-owners around the city, followed by industrialization in the 1930s that attracted labourers. Annexation to India in 1948 led to the out-migration of Muslim aristocrats towards the UK, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The large estates they left behind were taken over by charitable trusts and influential people, who in turn rented them out to squatters.[12] Due to the enormous in-streams of migrants, these settlements are now invading the city, popping up on vacant lands and in between the cracks of the built environment without regard if the places are fit for habitation or not. The resulting reality of the Twin Cities is comparable to Frederic Thomas' description of Kolkata: *"crumbling elegance stands cheek by jowl with improvised huts of the meanest sort, (...) There is no concealing the*

conditions of the poor, no blotting out their wretchedness. They are not isolated in ghettos or hidden away behind high walls or on the others side of railroad tracks."[13]

The Ambivalence of Property

A major, yet seemingly little discussed factor that influences the growth of slums is the western concept of legal property that puts the actual label of illegality on many squatters.

This system of property has brought comfort and wealth to many while simultaneously being tremendously divisive. As journalist Robert Neuwirth states in his book "Shadow Cities", property has been an age old bearer of conflict within societies because it defines a clear boundary between "haves" and "have-nots".[14]

Urban real estate is becoming one of the safest investments and most profitable assets in the Third World today. Urban land is not only scarce and thus valuable because of overpopulation of the city, but also because it has become subject to international market forces. The most evident example for this are the NRI's, Non-Resident Indians living in Europe and America, who are regularly coaxed by Indian developers to invest



Sources: censusindia.gov.in. ; apmepma.gov.in

in real estate back home, making prime real estate in Mumbai no longer just comparable to Delhi or Bangalore but to Manhattan and Paris.[15] The result is that big money is taken away from banks and production and is invested in real estate. It is estimated that in India 75% of urban lands is in fact owned by a mere 6% of urban households.[16] Mumbai's statistics are of course even more extreme: the rich hold 90% of the land while the city's poorest half is pushed together on the remaining 10 %.[17] This problem of property has been best explained by Ambrose Bierce.

"The theory that land is property subject to private ownership and control is the foundation of modern society (...) Carried to its logical conclusion, it means that some have the right to prevent others from living; for the right to own implies the right exclusively to occupy; and in fact laws of trespass are enacted wherever property in land is recognized. It follows that if the whole area of terra firma is owned by A, B and C, there will be no place for D, E, F and G to be born, or, born as trespassers, to exist."[18]

A statement many of the squatters of Abdel Nagar should be able to relate to. The fact that entirety of the city is zoned and defined by the propertied, makes it impossible for the poor to find a place to reside near their workplaces, making them trespassers by definition. It is at that moment that open space turns pablik. In a Static City that does not provide for the poor, the emergence of a Kinetic City seems unavoidable. The implication of this is that almost every large property owner is confronted with squatter settlements on their lands. Since it is impossible for landlords to monitor all their lands, the high degree of absentee landlordism is one of the causes for slums to develop easily.

Similarly, in the case of Hyderabad, confusion over ownership of lands has led to the proliferation of slums. The Master Plan shows that about two thirds of (notified) slums are on land that is in 'private' hands.[19] In this case, 'private' means most of the land is under dispute between several parties, including government agencies.[20] The origin of these disputes is historical, Maringanti explains. Under the Nizams, the erstwhile rulers of Hyderabad, there were three main types of land. There were 'jagirs' (estates belonging to jagirdars, aristocratic families), the Nizam's private lands named 'serf e khas' and diwani (revenue lands). When Hyderabad was annexed by the Indian Union, all serf e khas came under control of the state, while other lands were claimed by a number of different people and agencies, giving rise to disputes. The jagirs were initially abolished, yet this land still remained largely under de facto control of the 'jagirdars'. As of 1953 attempts were made to settle

disputes, usually privileging the rights of the tiller of the land. As there was no central system for updating land records, conversion of land and subdivision of plots went largely unpunished. Gradually, *"the only way to establish tenancy became de facto occupancy by force or by extra legal influence."*[21]

In the 1980s the Government of India introduced the New Industrial Policy, one of the first attempts to open up borders in order to facilitate movement of investments and technologies. Accordingly, the Government of Andhra Pradesh started allocating a lot of the peripheral serf e khan lands[22] it had inherited from the Nizams to industry. In the same period, an influx of families from the rich coastal districts started migrating to Hyderabad to invest in industry and commerce, all of which built up the pressure on real estate with the resulting repercussions on the living conditions of the poor.

Perhaps ironically, the paradox of the market is that while none of the urban poor can afford the land they want to live on; they are behaving in an economically rational way by wanting to reside close to job opportunities.

On the other hand, it is barely surprising to find out that elite

A seasonal slum of basket weavers

landowners have in fact several times used squatters to develop certain areas in order to raise the value of their land, expelling the squatters right before the sale is made.[23]

The pre-colonial Hindu property system was based on a more communal ownership; according to the notion of spheres of inclusivity certain groups of people would own and live on communal lands.[24] As Neuwirth shows, communal ownership systems have proven to work in Mumbai slums, as internal cooperation helps develop the slum to higher living standards. *"So here, cooperative ownership has kept people in their homes as the neighborhood has improved around them."*[25]

In Search of the Zero-Value Land

The existence of a slum depends on a fragile balance between several parameters.

First, and most obvious, is the physical aspect of the location. Sociologist Erhard Berner defines the basic requirements that influence the location of slums: *"a parcel of land has to fulfil two minimal conditions to be suitable: accessibility (some public transport) and a source of water."* He continues by stating that *"if such land does exist, it is as a rule hazardous."*[26] As land in city centres becomes increasingly scarce *"squatting has become a wager against inevitable disaster"*[27], Davis chimes in. Although 'disaster' might be a bit exaggerated for the general Hyderabad context, it does ring true for the slums along the Musi as their houses are always in close negotiation with the river's flood zone. What is crucial though, is that slums seeking permanence will often have to find land no-one else values for housing and develop it themselves to habitable conditions. More often than not, old squatter settlements have achieved a certain level of comfort through painstaking transformations of what were once marshes, waste lands, flood zones, landfills, rock beds or hillsides. Interestingly enough, field work along Musi has revealed that superstition is equally an important factor influencing the desirability of an area. Areas around graveyards tend to offer space to squatters because it is believed these areas may harbour harmful ghosts or demons.

Furthermore, there are a couple of social requirements for rooting the slum as an entity that can interact with its context and make claims towards physical improvements and tenurial security. The slum community is always in a constant process of entrenching its position which requires it to interact with other, more powerful actors. Through corruption, networking, intimidation and the like, they can strike deals with more powerful agents in

order to obtain status. According to Maringanti, security for the slum depends on *"the poor finding a piece of land whose ownership is either contested or unclear, politicians securing electoral commitments from the poor, land ownership claimants needing someone to establish de facto tenure, and government agencies receiving funds to spend."*[28]

An Atomized Urge for Growth

The process of squatting is a daily one in developing cities as edges and open or interstitial spaces are constantly being tested for their lack of surveillance and are subsequently encroached upon. Building the slum is an iterative process, a constant activity sociologist Asef Bayat refers to as *"the 'quiet encroachment of the ordinary' - a silent, patient, protracted, and pervasive advancement of ordinary people on the propertied and powerful in order to survive hardships and better their lives."*[29] According to Bayat, this quiet encroachment is enacted by atomized communities of poor working in isolation to improve their situation. As there is no coordination between them, they act as a passive force against the injustices bestowed upon them, instead of being united in their struggle. Consequently, the terrible conditions in some slums are a result of this lack of unity and organization as everyone is left fending for themselves.


A slum under Salar Jung Bridge

Slums express an inherent strife for improvement. Though squatting may be a very efficient short term solution to an immediate need for a place to live, in the long term it does not necessarily turn out cheaper or easier than actually buying a plot. Rather, squatting provides poor people with the opportunity to spread the costs of building a house over the long run. Squatters make incremental changes to their environment in search of a more comfortable life. Depending on the perceptions squatters have on their hold over the place they reside, this growth may be curbed in cases where eviction is imminent or living conditions are becoming too challenging, while other communities in more favourable conditions may be tirelessly working at improving a place for the generations to come. Investments in the upgradation of the environment will always be weighed against the chances of these investment paying off. Construction of housing and infrastructure is a step by step process starting with temporary materials such as found plastics, tarps, corrugated sheets, grass, leaves, reeds, bamboo, mud and un-burnt mud. As the slum ages and the squatters have a relative sense of faith in the future, they might invest in infrastructure and housing, building pucca houses in burnt bricks, cement and concrete roofs.[30]

The following chapter will further elucidate how this urge for improvement can help slum communities develop the pablik space they claimed and raise their living standards.

1 As quoted in Robert Neuwirth, *"Shadow cities : a Billion Squatters, a New Urban World"*, Routledge, New York, 2005, p101; **Hereafter [Neuwirth 2005]**

2 To take an extreme example, accounts suggest the entire Old City of Hyderabad was seen as one huge slum by officials during the fifties. Maringanti 2008, p 6

3 Davis 2006, pp 22-23

4 Census of India http://censusindia.gov.in/Tables_Published/Admin_Units/Admin_links/slumnote.html, last accessed 07/05/2011

5 http://www.censusindia.net/, last accessed 07/05/2011

6 HMDA 2010, p 63

7 See Natraj Kranthi and Kavitha Daryani Rao, *"Security of Tenure and Protection Against Evictions of Slums Dwellers: A Case of Hyderabad"*, Institute of Town Planners India Journal, 7-2, April 2010; **Hereafter [Kranthi, Rao 2010]**;

CHATRI 2000;

Maringanti 2007;

8 http://www.apmepma.gov.in/SlumProfile/secI2A_rep_dist.php last accessed 07/05/2011

9 Maringanti speaks of at least 1200 notified and 800 unnotified slums in 2005, not counting "squatter settlements". Maringanti 2007, p 45

11 Maringanti 2007, p 47

12 Maringanti 2008, p 6

13 Thomas 1997, p 50

14 Neuwirth 2005, p 282

15 Fernandes 2006, p 153

16 Davis 2006, p 84

17 Stats from Davis 2006, p 96

18 *"Many Great Thinkers and Economists Have Realized that Landed Property is Different."* http://www.henrygeorge.org/land.html last visited 22/05/2011; Neuwirth 2005, p 290

19 HMDA 2010, p 62

20 Maringanti 2008, p 6

21 Maringanti 2008, p 7

22 AP Government created the Ranga Reddy district encircling Hyderabad in order to accommodate industrial growth.

23 Maringanti 2008, p 7

24 Raj Kumar (ed.), *"Essays on Legal Systems in India"*, Discovery Publishing House, New Delhi, 2003, p 93

25 Neuwirth 2005, pp 298-299

26 Erhard Berner, *"Learning from Informal Markets"*, in David Westendorff and Deborah Eade (eds.), Development and Cities: Essays from Development Practice, Oxford, 2002, p 233; Hereafter [Berner 2002]

27 Davis 2006, p 40

28 Maringanti 2008, p 10

29 The term "Quiet encroachment of the ordinary" has been widely quoted by different authors throughout the Third World, though Bayat initially used it mainly in the context of undemocratic governments where winning votes is not a priority of leaders, leaving the poor to devise their own politics to get their ways. Bayat 1997, p 68

30 Teckanath 2002, p 24

Laying a new sewerline in Shankar Nagar

7. Developing Pablik Space

Certain slums develop to a point where the borders between Static and Kinetic City can become diffuse. Bastees with sewage, electrical connections, concrete multi-story housing and paved roads are sometimes hard to distinguish as manifestations of the pablik space. The 'urge for growth' discussed above engenders an evolution of the slum that slowly absorbs it into the tissue of the Static City. Some squatter communities achieve a relatively high standard of life, enjoying many of the comforts of the 'legal world', while staying in the slum out of emotional, social, economical or practical reasons. It is thus important to start reading slums not necessarily as spaces of the poor, since not all bastee residents are necessarily 'poor'. Rather, developed bastees are neighbourhoods with their own growth logic that are connected to a certain way of life rather than a certain income. It is important though to keep in mind that although squatter settlements can develop into relatively congenial bastees, this evolution inevitably requires interaction with entities outside the slum and is more often than not an extremely long and difficult one, that can take several decades and sometimes several generations.

Clearly, from examples along the Musi, social mobility is possible when slums succeed in using a number of urban forces to their benefit. A major factor is the stance of authorities towards slums. Although this will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, I perceive notification to be one of the most favourable policy choices towards slums. As we have seen, a notified bastee such as Moosa Nagar has achieved relatively high living standards because of environmental upgradation by the state, while a squatter settlement such as Abdel Nagar has remained stagnant because the squatters feel the threat of eviction.

Before further discussing the forms and values of the developed slum,

I would like to discuss two more of these urban forces that act in a more informal manner. Firstly, corrupt politicians can ensure investment in the physical infrastructure of the slum and secondly, informal real estate market can serve as a major wealth strategy for the squatters. However, both these processes may turn out divisive within the slum itself.

Community Politics

"Slums are highly unstable artefacts of governmental procedure, local politics, international developmental policy, and local urban markets. The objective existence of the slum is meaningful and strategically and tactically useful for different groups of people in different ways." – Anant Maringanti [1]

It is the formation of a community that is key to the development of the slum. The social and physical delineation and identification of the slum as an entity is of great importance for it to be able interact in the cityscape. It makes it possible for politicians to access the voters of the area, for residents to establish their own internal social order as for the slum to network with other entities such as production centres, other slums, urban markets, and so on...[2] Communities that search to

Billboards as a wealth strategy

enhance their environment often tie themselves to outside powers, such as local politicians and NGO's that can help them develop infrastructure and get connected to municipal services.

The majority of the older slums are related to political parties, either through their own neighbourhood committees or through local mafia-like middlemen who act as intermediaries between politicians, slum communities and police.[3] In return for 'proper political behaviour' i.e. votes and attendance at political rallies, they can get water taps, ration cards and the like, which politicians can easily arrange.[4] Mike Davis points out the perversities of this system. *"In both India and Pakistan ... slum development became famously synchronized to election cycles ... in India, elections provide squatters with leverage to seek legalization or improvement of their bustees."*[5]

Although slums have to appear united to face the challenges urban life throws at them, they are hardly ever homogenous. As with any community, individuals within it interact in dynamic and layered ways. Conflicts within the community are inevitable, yet can be resolved under the pressing need for unity.

It is important to understand social mobility within the slum as part of internal politics. Powerful entities within the slum will tend to attract benefits their way, at the cost of other less powerful parties. The unity of a community should be a good gauge for its democratic development. With this in mind, the importance of keeping divisive forces out of the slum seems of the utmost importance to ensure developmental programmes reach the right beneficiaries.[6]

Real Estate Economics

Informal housing, though outside the formal market systems, is of course not alien to market mechanisms or to property rules. The informal real estate market is extremely powerful in most cities as well as within the slums themselves. "*Slum dwellings are often worth more per square foot than other types of real estate investment"*, Davis explains.[7] This informal land market is the principal way for the urban poor to turn their assets into cash, but it often manifests itself in exploitative, sometimes almost feudal practices. To study this aspect of slums I would like to return to the example of Moosa Nagar. Residents of the bastee have taken advantage of their high visibility to passing traffic on the surrounding bridges and have started to construct billboards facing the traffic around their houses. Each family adjacent to a billboard can earn up to Rs. 5000 a year through advertisements.

Another, more typical case is that of Munna Begum. Munappa, as she is also called, is a landlady within Moosa Nagar itself. Apart from owning the largest residence in Moosa Nagar,

a three story house with a ground floor garage from which she runs an autorickshaw business, Munappa owns several other houses in the bastee which she rents out. In the centre of the bastee she owns an entire courtyard block which she rents out to 7 families and two shop owners, amongst several other structures for which she holds pattas throughout the bastee.

This phenomenon of landlordism, or rather slumlordism, can be one of the most divisive elements within slum communities. Diana Lee-Smith concludes a study of Nairobi's Korogocho slum by emphasizing *"that petty landlordship and subletting are major wealth strategies of the poor, and that homeowners quickly become exploiters of even more impoverished people."*[8] The introduction of ownership processes within a slum is often the generator of social shifts with upward mobility for owners but a further downward sinking for the poorer strata of the neighbourhood. Not surprisingly, the economically weakest elements in slums are the renters. Renters are easily exploited by slumlords and due to their temporary nature; they are often regarded as outsiders by the permanent community. Indeed, according to Maringanti, Munappa has been known to be 'brutal in her dealings'[9] with tenants who defaulted on rent payments. Furthermore, rents can be exorbitantly high, and houses in poor condition. As visibility of tenants towards governments is low, they are often forgotten in policies, making them ineligible for compensation or resettlement in case of eviction or redevelopment. Moreover, renters are difficult to organize and unite against their oppressors. Properties of one slumlord are often scattered across different slums and there are almost as many types of rental 'contracts' as there are renters, since these informal arrangements are based on kinship, tenant relationships, bargaining power and the like.


The Maqta Bastee

Yet, renting is far more common than most literature and typical perceptions of squatters suggest. Thomas explains how in Kolkata, renting is completely embedded into the informal housing sector, since most of the city's 'thika bustees' are built on private land of landowning elites rather than government land. The three tier rental structure that evolved out of this is quite intricate, weaving a relation between the often absent landlord on one side, who owns the land; the thika renter, who builds the shacks and rents them out, and, finally, the 'squatter' who rents his house from the thika renter. This situation has formed an absolute deadlock on improvement of bustees. Landlords prefer their future real estate untouched by permanent construction, thika renters feel little for improving the slum as the land isn't theirs and authorities are reluctant because the land is private property.[10]

The Developed Bastee

A number of factors seem to imply a bastee has reached a certain level of development and its residents have likewise reached a certain quality of life. A very obvious one in my eyes is investment in decoration of the houses by painting them in bright colors. It is a simple sign that implies households have the means to invest in secundary needs and aesthetics. Another manifestation of development within slums is verticalization. This happens partly through densification of the slum, but also because social mobility allows squatters to expand their homes. Although usually little long term thinking goes into the initial composition of the slum in its original form as a tent settlement, the initial haphazard arrangement of the slum results in an irrational and complex urban tissue as the slum develops. When horizontal expansion boundaries are reached, the only way left for the squatters to expand is up, leading them to construct multi-story buildings on very small footprints.

A good example of this is the Maqta bastee situated right next to the prestigious Hussain Sagar Lake, on

what is arguably some of the most valuable land the Twin Cities have to offer. As authorities found it difficult to evict the squatters, the neighbourhood has been thoroughly shielded from the scenic lake view by a 3 meter high concrete wall. The squatters abused of their prime location by selling advertisement space on billboards. This strategy brought the squatters the financial means to develop their surroundings, slowly carving their own legitimacy into the city map. Nowadays, the formerly squalid slum holds several densely packed high-rise structures and has become a fully functional neighbourhood.

An even more extreme example of what slum growth on prime land can lead to is once again Mumbai's Dharavi. Originally a fisher village in the worthless marshlands outside of Bombay, Dharavi offers an insight into the tremendous determination of squatters to develop worthless land into habitable conditions. The slum also offers an intriguingly complete view into the diversity, vitality and misery of squatting. The most squalid ramshackle huts can be found within a couple of hundred metres of jewellery stores. Understandably, Dharavi's land value has steadily risen during the years; it is now one of the most prized areas of real estate of Mumbai, especially since the construction of the Bandra-Kurla Complex, a major luxury office and housing complex, at a stone's throw of the megaslum. Accordingly, developers have eyed Dharavi for some time now, and plans are being made to rehouse its slum dwellers in apartment complexes and make way for a mixed-income neighbourhood.

Slums like Dharavi, Maqta, or Moosa Nagar for that matter, evolved from squalid manifestations of the Kinetic City into full-fledged neighbourhoods that have become a sort of hybrid between the Kinetic and Static Cities. Many people in bastees like Moosa Nagar enjoy comforts typically not associated with slums. Most of the inhabitants of Moosa Nagar for instance have tap water, electricity, sewage, TV reception. Some have scooters or even cars. Many have escaped the daily struggle for survival inherent to extreme poverty. Furthermore, the neighbourhood developed communal facilities, answering to secondary needs of its residents and enhancing its value for the surrounding area. Bastees may contain paved roads, shrines and temples, schools, medical practices, shops, markets, community centres,

Verticalization and social mobility

etc... transcending the initial "selfish" need for housing inherent to squatter settlements and creating valuable places from zero-value land.

Design: Roadside Bastee

"The conventional sequence of planning– servicing– building– occupation turns raw land into a scarce and expensive commodity, especially if cumbersome administrative procedures and transaction costs are considered. The lesson to be learned from illegal subdividers is to reverse this sequence: start with absolutely minimal infrastructure and services and allow for incremental development of individual houses and settlements. This strategy implies the need for a thorough revision of regulated standards, and an annulment of most of them."

– Erhard Berner[11]

The new road designed by the Master Plan in order to achieve an east to west corridor through the city is an essential link in Hyderabad's transportation network. Inevitably, the construction of the corridor implies that several slums will have to be removed to make way for the four lane road. Residents of notified bastees are entitled to rehousing as they have pattas and several of these bastees are suitable for densification, but what with the 'illegal' squatters living in Abdel Nagar? As these people are illegal and thus not entitled to relocation, they have no other place to go than the streets or another vacant spot where they have to start rebuilding their community ties and employment network. This design is an attempt to create an 'equilibrium' state between accessibility and desirability for a squatter slum that would rehouse the evictees from Abdel Nagar.

The proposal is a pablik space for these squatters that can hopefully infuse their community with the same growth logic found in Moosa Nagar, Maqta, and Dharavi.

As stated earlier, it is not poverty in itself that is keeping these squatters in shacks but the certainty of eviction. They have been told years ago that eventually, a road would be built over their community and that all their constructions would be removed. What these people need, to grow out of poverty, is a sense of security that they can safely invest in their physical environment without having to fear eviction.

The design identifies 2 core needs for these squatters: zero value land and proximity of their existing community/



employment network. Thirdly, the solution should be cheap and simple for authorities to actually implement it. In the process, controversial issues will be discussed that the choices made in the design bring up.

Assuming these people have no money to sustain more valuable assets than they hold at the moment, the need for zero-value housing is evident as land or housing received via the government may be sold off again at the first signs of financial trouble. Likewise, 'beneficiaries' of the design may be bullied out by more powerful agents who want the valuable land for themselves. In other words, forcing upward social mobility by providing the squatters with assets that transcend their means will only result in eventually putting them back in their original position, that is to say, in an illegal, threatened, kutcha slum. Consequently, zero-value land will provide squatters with the tenurial security they need to make incremental changes to their physical conditions over long periods of time as they do not have to worry about competition from the real estate market. Actual legal titling of lands in this situation is avoided as it may further individualize the struggles of the squatters while they need to be united in order to tackle challenges in an efficient way.

Secondly, the importance of the social network should never be underestimated when designing for the poor. This network acts as their only social security and only source of employment. Time has painstakingly spun ties between neighbours, employers and employees, landlords and squatters, and all these relations are anchored to physical places in the city. Removing the poor from these places and dropping them in new ones puts severe stress on these ties. Without the network supporting them, there is no growth for the poor. Residents of Abdel Nagar should be resettled as close as possible to their current location and all of them should be given the chance to stay in that place.

The design concept is to take advantage of the interstice that will appear between the newly laid road and the retaining wall of the river. By defining the proportions of this zone, the land is made unfit for traditional buildings, making it an interstitial 'waste space' with no function. This limit should be around 7 to 8 meters, too small for an average house, but suitable for a one-room hut and adjacent space to pass it. Next, the earth that is dug up to lay the road is formed into a rammed earth wall, secluding the slum from the street. In this manner the economically valuable land along the street is separated from the 'residual space' near the river. In this fashion, a line slum can be created along the new road, shielded from the latter's economical potentials by a rammed earth wall. Two walls are proposed making the slum accessible next to the bridges, but also halfway, creating a hierarchy in desirability of land within the slum itself. The open space in the middle can serve as a communal space that can accomodate communal facilities.

It is important that the wall be more than a segregation, but actually serves the road as well as the bastee behind it and the interactions they may have with each other and the river. A first, obvious point is that the wall can function as a structural element for the houses. As houses outgrow the wall, it becomes a facade. Facing the road, the wall can be used as a billboard to earn revenues for the slum dwellers. Lowering the wall in some parts offers opportunities for roadside vending.

As time passes, the squatters will themselves find answers to problems such as the floods of the river, piped water, electrical connections and sewage. Through collective efforts, they should be able to develop the place to higher standards, something that is impossible for them in the place they live at the moment.

Why this proposal might be considered controversial is because it institutionalizes the slum as a model. It approves of common people making their own choices based on their own judgements, budgets and visions in their own time, questioning the traditional role of the urban planner. As atomized individuals build their own houses, irrespective of each

other, they ignore the standards and regulations of formal construction meant to protect them. Although Frederic Thomas himself would acknowledge such a model[12] he argues that *"knowing on which side their bread is buttered, planners would reject the notion that slum dwellers are more qualified than trained specialists to work out the answers to their problems or that a composite of their localized plans would be better than any "rationalized" bureaucratic solution. It would violate conventional adherence to quality standards and institutions and the inevitability of progress. It would refute the premise that poverty can be eradicated. Planning cities for the poor would be considered tantamount to an admission of failure."*[13] Urban planner Gita Verma makes a great argument against this type of planning. Her book *"Slumming India"* [14] attacks the notion of institutionalizing the slum. In short, she argues that making the slum part of the 'Plan' for city development is a gross violation of the initial ideals of equality and regularization that were at the basis of rational city planning. These ideals have been corrupted not by the slumming poor but by 'Those In Charge' (TIC) who *"saw their roles not in terms of responsibility but in terms of power"*, and distributed wealth and space unequally amongst the different layers of society. As the disenfranchised started protesting these injustices, she argues, TICs started blaming het original 'Plan'. *"They demanded the Plan be changed so that even the subhuman conditions the 'others' were living and working in be considered as 'planned'. They argued that old-fashioned planning itself must go to make way for 'progressive' planning that allowed people to remain unsettled. They demanded that such progressive planning be considered the 'right' of the 'others' (...) [the poor] lost the right to be settled and instead gained the dubious 'right' to remain unsettled with minimal services till they were resettled. And TICs gained the 'right' to do whatever gave them greater choice and greater control over resources."* In other words, by institutionalizing the slum, the urban poor have lost their rights to the standardized housing, infrastructure and resources implied by democratic urban planning.

Although Verma certainly makes a striking point by revealing the social and ethical complexities faced by planning for this context, her discourse seems deeply rooted in a reverence for rational Master Planning as a solution to inequality. I would like to argue here that the institute of planning Verma upholds is in itself inescapably 'unequal' as it is a top down model instated by educated elites that imposes so called objective modernist ideals for the 'Greater Good' on the 'uneducated' masses. Minimum floor areas, fire safety regulations, water purity standards and the like are all requirements of the Static City the poor cannot afford and cannot relate to. While the state upholds these standards as universal, it cannot provide them. In my opinion, as long as the poor have no say in shaping the city, planning can hardly be called democratic or egalitarian. I would at this point like to underline my design choices with urban planner Edgar Pieterse's idiom of 'radical incrementalism'. According to him contemporary urban planning, is left with *"bringing change into the world through ... discrete avenues: surreptitious, sometimes overt, and multiple small revolutions that at unanticipated and unexpected moments galvanize into deeper ruptures that accelerate tectonic shifts of the underlying logics of domination and what is considered possible."*[15] In that spirit, this design proposal is by no means an ethically easy choice to make, as it implies putting people behind 500 metre long walls with no water or electrical connections and letting them develop it themselves, a process that may take several decades. Yet it is a radical reaction to a critical understanding of the forces that drive squatters to create a Kinetic City: their inability to partake in the real estate market, their primary concerns for economical and social stability over improved housing standards and their incrementalism as a passive force that develops the interstices they occupy. This design offers the poor an acknowledgement of their resistance towards the unequal rules of the Static City and learns from them to exploit the loopholes in its system.

1 Maringanti 2008, p 3

2 Maringanti 2008, p 11

3 Thomas 1997, p 57

4 Thomas 1997, p 55

5 Davis 2006, p 56

6 Padma Achwal Desai, “Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion: Evidence from Mumbai’s Slum Redevelopment Scheme”, in: Kelly Shannon and Janina Gosseye (eds.), “Reclaiming (the urbanism of) Mumbai”, SUN Academia, Amsterdam, 2009, p 101; Hereafter [Desai 2009]

7 Davis 2006, p 86

8 Davis 2006, p 44

9 Maringanti 2007, p 66

10 Thomas 1997, pp 79-80

11 Berner 2002, p 242

12 He himself proposes a similar ‘Austerity Model’ for dealing with the urban poor. Thomas 1997, p 165

13 Thomas 1997, p 166

14 Unfortunately I have not had the chance to access a copy of *“Slumming India”* (2002) but base my discussion of it on accounts from Davis 2006 and a book review by Karthik Rao-Cavale at http://vishwakarman.wordpress.com/2010/07/20/book-review-summing-india-a-chronicle-of-slums-and-their-saviours/

15 Pieterse 2008, p 6

8. Dealing with Slums: A Policy Review

"To date, states have been far more effective in the destruction of mass housing than in its construction."

– Erhard Berner[1]

"For urban planners and architects it is hard to understand that it is not the house itself that is most important to the poor, it is their source of income."

– Varghese Teckanath[2]

To come full circle again, this chapter will discuss the different perceptions authorities have had on the claim to the public space of squatters. As has become clear by now the need for careful planning in this context is of the utmost importance.As discussed above, the stance of authorities on the subject of slums has a major effect in determining their evolution. Yet, just like the poor, authorities are not homogenous, or for that matter, rational actors, and their actions depend on a multitude of factors ranging from political climate over availability of funds to corruption and attitude of specific officials. As stated earlier, authorities often tend to lean towards middle class perceptions of urban space. Although in some cases, they have acknowledged the Kinetic City and have sided with the poor and helped them develop their environment and their homes. If and when authorities are benevolent towards slums and help them move out of their squalidity by installing infrastructure and providing them with services, the slum may reach certain qualities of life. On the other hand, if authorities condemn squatters as encroachers or harmful actors, they may stay in the same decrepit state for decades. This last chapter will discuss the relationship between authorities and slums by explaining how they have reacted to the encroachments of the poor and what alternatives they have tried to offer to the misery related to squatting and illegality.

A Right to Shelter

Responses to the phenomenon of slums by authorities have been

manifold. British colonialism was very efficient at keeping native populations out of the cities through their trademark 'divide and rule' tactics. The most extreme example of this being of course the installation of the apartheid regime in South Africa, but also the deliberate deepening of caste barriers in India. Nandini Gooptu's work on the urban poor under colonial rule reveals how colonial officials and new native elites strived to rid the cities of the poor through a series of fervently implemented Town Improvement Trusts and encroachment laws. Davis argues though that *"the British were arguably the greatest slum builders of all time (…) their refusal to improve sanitation or provide even the most minimal infrastructure to native neighborhoods ensured huge death tolls (…) and created immense problems of urban squalor that were inherited by national elites after independence."*[3]

Post-Independence governments have had a significantly harder time dealing with the problem of housing the urban poor as they actually had to provide solutions.

The Right To Shelter is a basic right accepted in international declarations like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Declaration on the Right to Development as affirmed by the Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development. The Constitution of India defines the 'right to life' which includes the Right to Shelter.[4] Accordingly, sheltering the homeless has become a highly scrutinized practice with the worldwide media as arbitrator of the cat and mouse game between private developers, government authorities and squatters. The reaction of authorities to slums can be broadly categorized in two main types: conservative (eviction and resettlement) and progressive (upgradation and legalization).[5] While the more conservative measures try to enforce the ideals of the Static City on the poor, the progressive approaches acknowledge certain parts of the Kinetic City as valid and sees their growth potential. Of course, all kinds of forms of these views have intermittently been implemented, and as a result, housing types of Hyderabad's poor take equally different forms. I will give an overview of policies in order to sketch the evolution of perceptions on informal settlements over time and how the issue of slums is presented in current policy.

One general characteristic of governmental proposals is the need for quick results. While slums tend to steadily grow towards certain standards of living over long periods of time, authorities often present different types of highly ambitious 'instant solutions' that usually tend to fail because they want to achieve too much in too little time. Furthermore, all along the chain of implementation corruption is rampant. Nepotism, exploitation and fraud appear to be ubiquitous, from the politician who launches a programme, over the construction worker at the site to the actual beneficiaries of the scheme; any of these people may corrupt the good intentions of a scheme for their own benefit.

Erasing the Slum

"Forced evictions are a gross violation of human rights" - UNCHR Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Resolution 1993/41

Forced evictions have a considerable history in India. According to architectural scholars Natraj Kranthi and Kavitha Rao, since the 1950s an astonishing 5 crore people were evicted all over India to make way for dams. Similarly in Hyderabad, the late 1990's saw the destruction of over 10,000 homes for the project of the new IT-hub named Cyberabad.[6]

Involuntary rehousing is a fundamentally traumatizing event in people's lives. The economic, moral or scientific arguments that underlie the choice of resettlement are rarely weighed against the undoing of the economic and social ties that have been carefully weaved during years and often throughout generations by the people of a community. Studies have shown that *"wherever people have been displaced they have become poorer."*[7] Kranthi and Rao explain that nowadays, as land disputes are settled by the courts, court rulings are among the main reasons for evictions. *"What is unfortunate is that slum evictions are mostly dominated by court rulings. Evictions and relocations still form a major part of the slum policies in Hyderabad. Court orders favour the land owners resulting in evictions."*[8] Accordingly, court rulings would have become part of the cat and mouse game between illegal slums and evicting authorities. *"There is a Clause that no demolition should take place without public hearing. After the public hearing, 15 days notice should be served. But the notice is never served. They start the demolition on Friday night or early*

morning of Saturday, so that people have no way to go to the courts."[9]

In one of its year reports CHATRI, clearly shows how violent forced evictions can be. *"96 families have been illegally evicted out in the middle of night at 03:00h on 27-12-2008 after surrounding them with hundreds of policemen. People have been shunted out like wild animals and forced to move out to a new location against their will. Their homes were bulldozed in front of their eyes before the sun rose. It is not just a case of physical demolition of their homes but a demolition of their dreams, memories and dignity."*[10]

Residents of that particular slum were promised rehabilitation, though that is not always the case. In his book on squatters Robert Neuwirth tells the tale of how slums in Mumbai were evicted in the eighties. *"... the residents of Sanjay Gandhi Nagar received the notices they all dreaded: their community was considered an encroachment and was subject to demolition. On March 12, 1986, with no replacement housing on the horizon, the police moved in. Using lathis (thin wooden staffs) on the residents and hammers and crowbars on the buildings, the police crushed the ... neighborhood."*[11]

Pure eviction, that is without offering alternative rehabilitation, is widely considered an inhuman practice, and has certainly proved not to be a solution to the slum problem.

Correcting the Slum

Resettlement is of course not always forced as governments have set up several social housing schemes to cater to the housing needs of the poor. Yet, the concept of social housing has been a problematic one in the Third World. Primarily, the lack of serieux by governments to tackle housing issues through welfarist measures is induced by Structural Adjustment Plans (SAPs) imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The stringent requirements of the Bank's SAPs often entail a shrinkage of government and a privatization of public services (such as social housing) in order to boost the country's economy and make it competitive on a global scale. Therefore, 'social' housing has been a rather dwindling practice with very few success stories.

However, some exceptions appear to exist and have served as a model for many Third World authorities. The two cities that do shout out 'success' through social housing are two self proclaimed 'slum free' city-states: Hong Kong and Singapore. However, Erhard Berner and Mike Davis point out though that these success-stories appear quite relative once their practices are scrutinized.[12] While Hong Kong produced mass housing at an inhumanely dense scale (around one million squatters were rehoused into buildings providing an average of 2.2 square metres per adult in early projects), Singapore added up to 30% of the island's land area to its inherited 40% in a 'draconian expropriation'.[13] Furthermore, Singapore managed to actually keep most of the undesired poor (literally) at bay through tight immigration policies. These kinds of radical measures can only be taken within the context of extremely manoeuvrable governability offered by a city state. As it turns out, Hong Kong has produced nothing less than the human equivalent of an industrial chicken coop while most of Singapore's slum problems have been simply exported to Johor Bahru, its neighbour across the water. Regrettably, both these city-states are still heralded as model-cities by governments around the world.[14]

The new Master Plan offers an insight into the situation of the housing stock at hand. The problem appears to be double: firstly, there is a lack of housing and secondly, large amounts of existing houses are in kutcha condition (around 10% of the current housing stock) and need to be replaced. As estimates show, 80% of this housing need originates from the poor.[15] We learn that "the housing need can be met only if at an average 21800 housing units are added annually during 2001-2021 and 19700 units during 2021-2031."[16] The authors of the Master Plan seem to imply this construction has been going on for the last ten years at least. In contrast, the actual number of houses provided by the state is rather disappointing: 18839 houses were built between 1997 and 2006, or in other words, less than a tenth of the required number.[17]

Before independence, the agency in charge of housing for Hyderabad was the CIB (City Improvement Board).[18] Between 1912 and 1956 it completed 19 slum clearances and built a total 40,000 new houses for middle and low income groups in 8 locations. CIB's counterpart, TIT (Town Improvement Trust) in the then still separate Secunderabad built 12,000 new houses between 1931 and 1950.[19] After the formation of Andhra Pradesh in 1956, the two separate agencies were merged into the Andhra Pradesh Housing Board (APHB), which according to V.K. Bawa, lacked

the social component the CIB had so well upheld.[20] This agency nowadays works in conjunction with the Andhra Pradesh State Housing Corporation Limited (APSHCL), established in 1979[21]. The APSHCL is in charge of supplying houses to 'Economically Weaker Sections' (EWS).[22] Its main activities are in the rural areas of the State, were it provides an average of 140,000 dwelling units each year.[23]

Social housing in Hyderabad has been financed by a plethora of different schemes named after prominent political figures: The Indira Awas Yojana and the Rajiv Gruha Kalpa programs, Valmiki Ambedkar Awas Yojana (VAMBAY) schemes[24] and currently the Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY) scheme, amongst others. Most schemes work according to the same structure. Beneficiaries applying for a house receive a small subsidy and a long term mortgage, provided they pay a part of the cost up front and fall under a certain income limit.

Each scheme yields its own conditions and housing types. Consequently, each new housing programme puts new pressure on slums to relocate. *"The pressure to relocate often came from the middle level government officials under direction from their superiors to meet targets in the new housing programs."*[25]

	Income Limit	Unit Cost	Beneficiary's Contribution	Loan	Subsidy
EWS	Rs. 18,000	Rs. 30,000	Rs. 2,000	Rs. 25,000	Rs. 3,000
Township Houses	Rs. 30,000	Rs. 100,000	Rs. 2,000	Rs. 95,000	Rs. 3,000

The APSHCL provides two types of housing: EWS (Economically Weaker Section) housing and township houses. The requirements and costs are listed in the table above.[26] In practice, it appears governments have a lot of trouble recovering these loans and mortgages due to flawed administration or political pressure.[27] Moreover, scholar Uma Adusumilli notes that due to escalating land prices, the cost ceiling inherent in the schemes *"enables only the grant of land tenure and the building of the RCC frame structure for the multi-level tenements. The beneficiaries are then expected to build the walls/ envelope on their own. In such cases, the experience shows that the beneficiaries, for various reasons do not complete the dwellings and therefore, they remain unoccupied."*[28] The poor are understandably reluctant to evacuate except if they don't have permanent residence or if they are confident they will eventually never have to repay the loans. As Maringanti succinctly remarks, slum residents are only willing to take *"the new housing in addition to the existing slums and not in lieu of it."*[29]

In order to densify housing and reduce land costs, a lot of these rehousing schemes would resort to the building of apartment buildings. Exemplified by most of these so called 'government apartments', a major recurring issue of social housing would be the inadequacy of planners and architects to incorporate actual livelihood strategies of the poor into the new buildings. High rise apartment buildings are incompatible with social and occupational structures of their residents. Slums offer much more than shelter, they are the physical expression of community. Houses are never mere homes, but also workshops, schools, shops, meeting places, pens for live stock, etc… The mono-functionality of most apartments is a constraint on the lives the poor are used to live.

The inflexibility of social housing is considered another pitfall, as in the original slum none of the inhabitants have the same size of house, the whole community will look at rehousing projects through a multitude of eyes. Some will get bigger houses than they have, others will get smaller ones and reactions will consequently be divided. Furthermore, houses have to be flexible so they can be subdivided in case a son gets married and needs a home of his own but cannot afford to buy or build a new one in another plot. As apartments offer little to no choices for expansion, the size of the new houses is a decisive element in getting people's approval and support for the project. The outcome of many a rehousing project has been that the residents actually prefer their old residence or cannot sustain the value of their new ones. Social housing apartments are often very attractive to the middle class who happily buy them from the original beneficiaries and refer them back to their huts.[30] Perhaps the most famous Indian example in this case is Navi Mumbai, Mumbai's modern mainland counterpart planned by architect Charles Correa, which was built in the 1970's with the promise

of housing and jobs for the poorest. Now, 40 years later, the majority of the housing has gone to upper and middle classes.

In recent years, social housing has been increasingly taken up through public private partnerships. To take another example from Mumbai, which boasts of a progressive approach towards informal settlements, any squatter that can prove his occupancy of a house prior to 1995 is promised a new home at no cost if their neighbourhood is targeted for government aided projects through public private partnerships. Developers can apply for a bonus in case they build replacement housing for the poor. For every 225 square feet house they build for the poor, they are allowed to build 225 square feet for the mainstream market. It is exactly this zoning bonus that developers eyeing large slums are counting on. Yet the policy is said to fail on a number of grounds. As we have seen before, the size of the new housing is a major deal-breaker for most squatters as the maximum surface of any new house is 225 square feet with little chances for expansion, about half the surface of a well-to-do squatter shack. Also, this policy does nothing for renters who are simply put out on the streets.[31]

Improving the Slum

"The value of my house – 26 years of struggle." – A Brazilian Squatter[32]

"The fact that governments and international financial institutions help squatter settlements put in public services … in defiance of property law is an implicit recognition of extralegal property arrangements." – Hernando de Soto [33]

As stated earlier, although most slums may more often than not be perceived in terms of marginality, illegality and crime, Indian cities have come to recognize some of their slums and helped them in their development. This progressive approach focuses on the concept of slums as 'solutions' to urban poverty rather than 'problems'. Upgradation can take two major approaches: self-help schemes that fund people to build their own housing and environmental improvements undertaken on the totality of the slum by municipal agencies. Although in India slum upgradation has been undertaken since the sixties[34], worldwide streamlining of policies towards improving existing slums ensued in the early 70's. Under the auspices of the World Bank programs founded on the radical ideals of John Turner were widely implemented.[35] This anarchist architect promoted the ideas of self help (*"the only architecture that works"*[36]) in order to grant the poor more control over their own housing. His ideas were subsequently implemented through systems of micro-credits and self-help loans. Acceptance of these schemes came piecemeal.

In Hyderabad one of the most effective schemes set up to improve the slums, according to Adusumilli, was the Urban Community Development Programme (UCDP) launched by the Municipal Corporation in 1967.[37] The heavily funded UCDP started out as a holistic approach to slum improvement, leaning heavily on self-help ideals along with environmental improvement, public participation and help between communities.[38] Apart from physical improvement it included employment generation, health and education initiatives, et cetera.

In general, Turner's utopian ideals of self-help were quickly found deficient by several critics. Most pinpoint the fact that squatters are inefficient and tend to think in short term logics, thus making unsustainable choices that have to be solved again in later stages. Likewise, squatters are considered by some to face problems way too big for them that require centralized decision making and oversight. Letting squatters govern themselves is consequently considered dangerous as they are socially divided and exploitative.[39] The lack of economy of scale makes the programs financially inefficient and the lack of expertise of the people would make the hiring of skilled labour necessary to complete construction. Most importantly, these schemes have had the habit of ending up benefiting the middle and upper classes while failing to act on the urban poor because prerequisites to apply for loans are often too exacting.[40]

Environmental improvement on the other side seems to have had more success. Arthur T. Row notes how the choice for environmental improvement in 1960s Calcutta was a controversial one. *"It took courage, particularly on the part of the Indian staff, to propose a program of simple environmental improvement, acknowledging that for most of the bustee dwellers the bustees would be their homes for years and decades to come. (…) political attitudes in India were governed by middle-class norms, and gaining acceptance of [this] point of view in the face of both bureaucratic and political opposition was no mean feat."*[41]

In the Twin Cities, slum improvement was established through a process called Notification, which was enacted in 1962 and was cancelled in 1994.

Notification was instated under the Andhra Pradesh Slum Improvement (Acquisition of Land) Act which came in effect in 1962.[42]

"Under section 3(1) of this Act the government may by notification in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette declare an area to be a slum area if it is satisfied that such area is or may be a source of danger to public health, safety or convenience of its neighbourhood by reason of it being low lying, unsanitary, squalid or otherwise. Under section 3 (2) of the Act the government may acquire the land in such 'notified slums by publishing in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette a notice to the effect that they have decided to acquire it in pursuance of this section."[43]

The UCDP played an important role in notifying slum and according to Anant Maringanti, the growth of notification in the 1980s was mainly prompted by funding to the UCDP by the UK Overseas Development Agency (ODA).[44]

Slums that received notification were either considered objectionable or unobjectionable, depending on their location in dangerous areas or on land earmarked for roads or other construction.[45] Unobjectionable slums were eligible for infrastructural improvements and gained certain legal status.

Notification provided for the gradual installation of infrastructure like roads, water supply, drainage, street lighting, latrines etc. This would happen in several stages over time. On the whole, almost 400 km of roads have been built in slums along with 220 km of sewer lines and over 4500 street lights.[46] Slums that do have piped water receive water supply every alternate day for 1-2 hours.[47]

From my personal experience providing communal facilities to slums has a major impact on the well-being of its residents. In literature though, this kind of environmental improvement has been criticized mainly on the point that the residents are unable to manage these communal facilities themselves. *"The problem boils down to expanding the extent of private space so that residents assume a collective responsibility instead of depending upon the municipality to correct whatever goes wrong. Poor maintenance is also a function of migrant attitudes and lack of commitment to urban living."*[48]

Regrettably, during the 1990s funding slowly shrunk and the responsibility of dealing with slum communities shifted more towards NGO's. In the same period the power to notify slums shifted from the Municipal Corporation (that contained the UCDP) to the Revenue Department as a result of decreased activity on the former's part. In a suspiciously curious twist of events this shift was not communicated to the greater public who kept addressing the Municipal Corporation regarding notification. Maringanti argues that, after the official in charge of notification at the Revenue Department left this department, these powers remained there but were neglected due to lack of day to day contact with the slums. *"Thus even though there was no official announcement that no more slums would be notified, in effect, the practice of slum notification came to an end."*[49] It seems some shift in attitude towards slums had occured with authorities because, as of 2001, although the UCDP had upgraded 12,000 houses and granted 20,000 pattas[50], funding and interest had tapered off. The initially ambitious programme had by then been reduced to implementing environmental improvements only.

Legalizing the Slum

Closely related to notification is the practice of granting pattas. By way of the 1984 Patta Act, notification was supplemented with the granting of 'D-Form pattas'. The patta is a legal document that was adopted to give the poor the right to occupy a part of allocated land granting them relative security of tenure and acknowledging their claim to the public space. A patta gives a slum resident the right to occupy their plot in the slum, granting them some power over the land they live on. Technically, a patta can neither be sold nor transferred within the first ten years and can only be withdrawn in public interest.[51] The Patta Act entitled all residents of notified slums to D-form pattas.

This conditional form of granting tenurial rights can be framed within a broader global consensus towards legalizing slums which culminated in the adoption of the radical theories of Hernando de Soto by the World Bank in the 1990's. Certainly the black sheep of slum policy, de Soto was subsequently widely criticized by scholars worldwide, not in the least for the arrogance with which he presented his solutions.[52] This Peruvian economist proposes


FORM - D

97

G/716/88 PATTA CERTIFICATE

D-Form Patta, affected by rats. Photo courtesy of Emily Pescod

nothing less than the ultimate solution to poverty. The starting point for his reasoning is that the poor already possess all the wealth they need, they just can't access it. de Soto refers to the land that squatters hold but don't have legal titles to, using the metaphor "acres of diamonds". Illegality, or extralegality as he calls it, prevents squatters to use property as an asset in acquiring loans, making transactions, setting up legal businesses, et cetera. His seemingly communist proposal of just handing the urban poor title deeds is actually deeply rooted in free market capitalism and is all about entrepreneurship, investment and capital. Recent literature has pointed out that de Soto's quite one-dimensional model would have some serious holes in it. For instance, what the Peruvian economist doesn't hold into account is that titling of lands would not only individualize the struggles of slum residents[53], it would actively reinforce existing real estate mechanisms of the slums.[54] Eventually, it increases social differentiation by pushing the poorest people who are overwhelmed by the monetary value of their lands, out of the housing market and back into new, more inaccessible squatter settlements. In effect, experience has shown that when people are given more assets than they can sustain, they sell their parcel of land to the highest bidder as soon as they experience financial difficulties. Furthermore, renters are completely left out of the picture though they make up a sizeable portion of the slum population.[55] It is Neuwirth who best points out the gravest danger of land titling by letting squatters themselves speak up to the proposal. *"We are four of us in this house and we will all want it. It will never work."*[56] Kenyan squatters told him. According to them, titling of lands can tear entire communities apart. Governments on the other hands are big fans of the theory because it offers them a simple tool to appease the angry masses.

The practice of granting pattas as it was instated in Hyderabad can be compared to formalization of property rights, yet because the D-form patta is conditional the strategy seems to be less divisive than in other cases presented in literature.

The distribution of pattas in slums across Hyderabad has had big effects on the empowerment of slum residents, lifting them out of semi-feudal dependence on the goodwill or (more likely) corruption of landlords, informal patrons, police officers

and politicians. More importantly, by lifting the stigma of illegality off of squatters' heads, they are given a chance to step out of marginality and regain their dignity and self-respect as members of society. While notification ended in 1994, pattas are still granted, the primary condition being that the beneficiary should have been living in a house on government land for at least five years.[57]

Yet, as the majority of slums is located on private land, granting pattas has often proven difficult or expensive. For this reason a land sharing concept was developed during the 1980's by the UCDP. The proposal is for the private land to be shared between the landlord and the squatters, splitting it in two. The landlord is returned a piece of his formerly encroached and litigated land while the squatters are provided with ownership, the security to build permanent structures and improved social status.[58]

Recent Developments

On a local level, forced displacement has again become increasingly practiced in the last decades. Ever since the quiet evaporation of notification as a practice, authorities and private developers slowly began putting pressure on the slums again. By 2000, Teckanath spoke of *"evictions en masse"*[59], referring to the Nandanavanam Project, and by 2005 Maringanti claimed most of the 2000 slums in Hyderabad faced the threat of eviction.[60] Architecture scholars Kavitha Rao and Natraj Kranthi point out that the value of the patta has also been proven quite relative. Although the patta can only be revoked in name of the public good, in practice, evictions of patta-holders has taken place in interests of non-public agencies, such as political parties. The case Rao and Kranthi make is that *"powerful groups will not let possession of patta documents stand in their way when it comes to overpowering underprivileged groups for their purpose."*[61]

While on the local level policy choices seem to lean predominantly towards doing away with the Kinetic City, on the national level, pro-slum policies are once again getting the upper hand. A National Slum Policy that has been in the making explicitly disapproves of slum clearances.[62] The 2001 Draft for this Policy seems to be all in favour of granting tenure to squatters. *"Tenure shall be granted to all residents on tenable sites owned or acquired by government. Full property rights shall be granted on resettlement and/or rehabilitation sites."*[63] As the document has been in draft stage for over almost a decade, it is not sure when and if this policy will ever be implemented.

Another simultaneous development that highlights how antipodal national and local perspectives on urban space are resolved is the project of the Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY) Slum Free Cities Plan. This five year plan is being implemented in all cities falling under the mammoth governmental funding of the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), the same instance that funds the Save Musi Project.[64] Although the JNNURM funds and proposes the scheme, it is left to Urban Local Bodies (ULB) to implement the plan in their own cities. The preparation of implementation of the plan relies on hi-tech satellite imagery to identify all the slums in the city. The resulting mappings will subsequently be enriched with socio-economic data from the slums themselves, covering basic infrastructure, basic services, plot sizes and personal data of the residents. In the case of Hyderabad the RAY is currently being prepared by the Mission for Elimination of Poverty in Metropolitan Areas, Andhra Pradesh (MEPMA AP).

The plan is all in favour of granting tenure and upgrading slums to liveable conditions. It proposes doing away with slums on three levels: *"Bringing existing slums within the formal system and enabling them to avail of the same level of basic amenities as the rest of the town; redressing the failures of the formal system that lie behind the creation of slums; and tackling the shortages of urban land and housing that keep shelter out of reach of the urban poor and force them to resort to extra-legal solutions in a bid to retain their sources of livelihood and employment."*[65]

The plan shows some striking commitment to the poor. First of all, it is serious about a *"'whole city' approach, so that an integrated and holistic plan is prepared for upgradation of all existing slums, notified or non-notified, in each identified city."*[66] Hyderabad's authorities were forced to look past the traditional 811 notified slums and subject their city to a thorough survey. The gigantic amount of 1470 slums that came up for Greater Hyderabad alone seriously questions the feasibility of the plan's ambition to complete the plan within just five years.

Next, the RAY criticizes the approach of classical Master-planning with

regards to land zoning. *"Cost of land is a very significant component of the cost of housing. Not only the master plans but also state, development authority and urban local body policies in the past have made no provision for ensuring adequate supply of serviced land towards housing the EWS and LIG segments."*[67] Indeed, the Hyderabad Master Plan marks notified slums as regular residential zones, holding up bastee land prices to the price level of the surrounding urban land.

Furthermore, the plan couples a drive to legalization with a response to the need for new housing by proposing a public-private partnership to construct new housing.

"Given the massive needs for affordable housing and the capacity constraints faced by public agencies like housing boards, urban development authorities and municipalities to take up group housing on a large scale, it is necessary to involve private sector entities in the creation of affordable housing stock on ownership, rental or rental-cum-ownership basis and in scaling up the programme to the desired scale."[68] Although intentions of the plan seem genuine and well thought out, the key point is implementation. As the same guidelines will be interpreted and applied by a multitude of people with different political agendas, with the ever-present threat of corruption hanging over the process, nationwide results will inevitably vary in success. As Hyderabad's current political climate seems more favourable towards evicting bastees, it shall be interesting to see how the RAY-proposal is dealt with on a local level.

1 Berner 2002 p230

2 Interview with the author, October 2010

3 Davis 2006, p 52

4 CHATRI 2000, p 4

5 Two notes on this: first, the discussion at hand is only limited to schemes engaging in the physicality of the slum. Of course there have been scores of schemes to improve education, health, feminism, etc... Throughout the years, these fall outside of the scope of this work.

Second, although some authors like Davis seem to suggest these concepts are chronological, evidence from Hyderabad shows conservative as well as progressive policies have intermittently been used up to this date.

6 Kranthi, Rao, 2010, pp 41-42

7 D. Narsimha Reddy in CHATRI 2000, p 20

8 Kranthi, Rao, 2010, p 46

9 K.G. Kannabiran in CHATRI 2000, p 46

10 CHATRI, *"Report of Press Conference in Aghapura Resettlement Colony, 31-12-2008"*

11 Neuwirth 2005, p 105

12 Davis 2006, pp 62-63

13 Berner 2002, p244

14 E.g. Both Mumbai and Bangalore have set Singapore as their model for urban development.

15 HMDA 2010, p 57

16 HMDA 2010, p 58

17 HMDA 2010, p 57

18 Maringanti 2007, p 46

19 Maringanti 2007, p 46

20 Bawa in CHATRI 2000, p 38

21 http://housing.cgg.gov.in/histroy.html

22 The APSHCL is a different agency from the APHB mentioned above; both agencies work in conjunction with each other. Adusumilli 2001, p 3

23 Adusumilli 2001, p 4

24 Nandanavanam colony was paid through VAMBAY

25 Neoliberal Inscriptions p 46

26 Adusumilli 2001, p 5

27 Maringanti 2007, p 46

28 RCC = Reinforced Cement Concrete

Adusumilli 2001, p 5

29 Maringanti 2008, p 5

30 Berner 2002, p240

31 Neuwirth 2005, p 115

32 Jorge E. Hardoy and David Satterthwaite as quoted in Berner 2002 p 236

33 de Soto 2000, p 185

34 E.g. Notification of slums started in the sixties, likewise in Calcutta: Thomas 1997 p 81

35 Davis 2006, p 71, pp 79-80

36 Turner as quoted in Berner 2002, p 227

37 There have been scores of government schemes. "The major schemes were Slum Clearance Scheme, Slum Improvement Programme, Environmental Improvement Scheme, Housing Scheme for urban poor, Integrated Urban Development Programme, Hyderabad Slum Improvement Project and the Urban Community Development Programme."

Adusumilli 2001, p 6

38 Adusumilli 2001, p 6

39 Peter Marcuse as paraphrased in Neuwirth 2005, p 295

40 Davis 2006, pp 72-73

41 Arthur T. Row as quoted in Thomas 1997, p 81

42 Adusumilli 2001, p 7

43 Adusumilli 2001, p 7

44 Maringanti 2008, p 9

45 Objectionable slums were to be rehabilitated to another site. Adusumilli 2001, p 3

46 HMDA 2010, p 61

47 HMDA 2010, p 85

48 Thomas 1997, p 155

49 Maringanti 2008, p 10

50 Adusumilli 2001, p 6

51 Maringanti 2008, p 11

52 For a scathing critique of de Soto's theories, please refer to Breman 2003, pp 203-219

53 Davis 2006, p81

54 As Jan Breman points out, de Soto seems to ig-

nore that property is not necessarily owned by those who use it. Breman 2003, p 217

55 Davis 2006, pp 42-45

56 Neuwirth 2005, p 281

57 Kranthi Rao 2010, p 42

58 Adusumilli 2001, p 6

59 Teckanath in CHATRI 2000, p 16

60 Maringanti 2008, p 5

61 Kranthi, Rao 2010, p 48

62 Government of India, **"Draft National Slum Policy"**, 2001; **Hereafter [Government of India 2001]**

63 Government of India 2001

64 The JNNURM would have a budget of Rs 1,20,000 crore to fund developmental projects in cities. Manu Kaushik , *"JNNURM: Urban India's best hope"*, 2010, at: http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/jnnurm-urban-indias-best-hope%20/1/5569.html Last visited 22/05/2011

65 Government of India Ministry of Housing, *"Rajiv Awas Yojana: Guidelines for Slum Free City Planning"*, 2009, p 1; **Hereafter [Government of India 2009]**

66 Government of India 2009, p 11

67 Govern=ment of India 2009, p 8

68 Government of India 2009, p 9

Epilogue: The Impact of the Planner













A place that is closely related yet physically segregated from the slums along Musi River is the Nandanavanam Colony. [1] It is a good example of the responsibilities planners and policy makers have towards the citizens they plan for. The Nandanavanam Colony is a prime case of where planners and policy makers had little ear for the needs and desires of their target group and consequently created a failure that had a deep impact on the lives of the so called 'beneficiaries' of the project.

Authorities developed the site to provide housing for people it was evicting from the banks of river Musi. The targeted bastees were an inconvenience to the prestigious Nandanavanam Project, the predecessor of the Save Musi Project, which aimed at beautifying the river.

The first evictions took place in the year 2001, displacing just under 530 families from several bastees. The area has remained a relocation site to this day, receiving evictees from Moosa Nagar, Kamal Nagar, Chaderghat Darwaza, Salar Jung Bridge...[2]

The squatters were initially rehoused in small one-room houses or apartment buildings under the VAMBAY programme. The houses were well designed, providing a basic one-room construction with space for expansion in the front, the back as well as on the roof of the house. As can be seen from the pictures on the right hand side. The apartments on the other hand were quite static and inflexible.

Although the actual housing was certainly an improvement for the residents of these bastees, what is striking is the distance from the city centre at which this housing was provided. The relocation of people has had shattering effects on their daily lives as their entire existence is based on their social network and community which all stayed near the river. Presumably, the choice of location was related to the affordability of the land, though the conclusion that authorities deliberately dumped their poor out of the city's bounds is also easily contrived. Whatever be the reason, the choice of location has proven to be an anti-poor measure. The site is located approximately 9 kilometres by road from the river, where the 'beneficiaries' were initially settled. Likewise, the place was initially far away from schools, medical facilities and markets. Moreover, the area was seriously under connected by public services. Water connection, electricity

and public transport were poorly provided. The remoteness of the new housing made daily commutes painstakingly long and expensive, leading to a raise of almost 50% in household transport expenditures.[3] Ten years after the first evictees were rehoused in Nandanavanam Colony, some residents still make the daily commute to the city centre because it has proven too difficult for them to find work closer to their new homes, either because they don't know anyone in the area that could help them to a job, or because the risk of seeking a new job is too high as it might cost them their current one. Because these former squatters are isolated and concentrated together, there is little opportunity for them to create work in the area as they are used to catering to the upper classes.

The allocation of housing in Nandanavanam Colony in 2001 turned out to be quite problematic. Especially the identification of 'beneficiaries' proved a problem. In the slum certain people had signed the agreement to relocate, but refused to make the move after they had received new houses, thus retaining both houses. Many people who weren't slum residents to begin with were assigned houses and many moved to the relocation site but were never allotted homes, forcing them to build a squatter settlement next to the brand new empty buildings. Others still, moved back into their old plots in the slum after the relocation because they couldn't afford the commute. Ironically, as people had initially signed contracts to relocate, the slums were considered demolished and taken out the records.[4] As of 2006, the failure of the Nandanavanam Colony had become clear as a mere 30 % of the houses were in use. Ever since, as services improved and the city expanded towards the Colony, people have slowly started to trickle in.[5] In 2010, a survey in Nandanavanam showed 30 % of the houses were rented out, 15% were sold and only 55% of the houses were still occupied by the original allottees.[6] Over the course of the last ten years, life in Nandanavanam Colony does seem to have gotten better, but primarily thanks to adaptations by the poor themselves. A raging critique of the project by Mahadevia and Gogoi states the VAMBAY programme that provided the site and the housing produced *"a situation of creating new set of problems to address old set of problems. In fact, these case studies indicate that new sets of problems have been created while not solving*






the old sets of problems. The selection of resettlement sites showed complete lack of understanding of the livelihood and lifestyle requirements of the communities to be shifted into those houses."[7]

The present day situation at the Colony shows a number of conflicting phenomena. Firstly, there are the initial apartments and houses that were constructed in 2001 under the VAMBAY programme. Recently though, a great number of apartment buildings have been added, but have not been allotted and are vacant as of yet. Bright pink as they may be, the new housing blocks certainly enhance the ghetto aura of the area. Next to the new constructions is a squatter settlement of people waiting to be allotted a new home in the vacant buildings.

Interestingly, the case of new construction at Nandanavanam Colony can exemplify the current divided policy choices that are affecting Hyderabad's urban poor today and the thin line between pro- and anti-poor measures. The large amounts of empty newly built apartments suggest massive evictions are still common policy.

It is perhaps surprising to find out that all new construction is being funded by the JNNURM Slum Free Cities Plan mentioned in the previous chapter. Although the plan clearly states "a citywide plan would be made *to shift untenable slums to the nearest possible available vacant land or notified slum which has the space to receive them."*[8], it seems authorities are once more making the mistake of displacing evictees from slums all over the city to the periphery.[9]

1 The word 'Nandanavana(m)' refers to a heavenly garden in Buddhist cosmology. http://wisdomlib.org/definition/nandanavana/index.html

2 Kranthi, Rao, 2010, p 46

3 Darshini Mahadevia and Trishna Gogoi, *"Assessment of Shelter Programmes in Andhra Pradesh"*, Government of India, 2010, p 20; **Hereafter [Mahadevia, Gogoi]**

4 Maringanti 2007, p 27

5 Mahadevia, Gogoi, p 17

6 Mahadevia, Gogoi, p 16

7 Mahadevia, Gogoi, p 36

8 Mahadevia, Gogoi, p 36

9 *"Singareni Colony Residents, Police Clash"*, 2011, at: http://www.hindu.com/2011/02/15/stories/2011021561000300.htm Last visited on 22/05/2011

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