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**MOVING ONWARDS? REFLECTIONS ON MIXED MIGRATION AND SECONDARY MOVEMENT.
DYNAMICS OF MOBILITY AMONG REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS IN KAKUMA REFUGEE CAMP, KENYA**

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Abstract

Objectives of the research: Secondary movement has gained importance within the growing policy field of mixed migration, where it is addressed as a problematic phenomenon. This research builds on previous explorations of refugee camps as nodal points in the Greater Horn of Africa (Jansen 2011, Perouse de Montclos & Kagwanja 2000), and reflects on the increasing blurring of the distinction between forced and voluntary migrants. By looking into the routes and trajectories of secondary movers, and the motivations that accompany them, this thesis seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of secondary movement and the driving forces behind it. A special focus is reserved for camp-camp movements, although references to other refuges and trajectories are made frequently.

Method: This thesis is based on 6 weeks of fieldwork in Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya. Information was gathered through private interviews, focus group discussions and informal conversations with 27 governance actors – staff members from different agencies and the camp manager of Kakuma – and 73 refugees and asylum seekers. The interviews were contextualized within secondary literature.

Results: It was demonstrated that secondary movement connects different refuges within and between host countries. Inquiries further learned that motivations for movement presented features of forced ànd voluntary migrant categories. This creates an ambiguous situation in the field.

Samenvatting

Doel onderzoek: *Secondary movement* kwam op de voorgrond binnen het groeiende beleidsveld van *mixed migration*, waar het wordt beschouwd als een problematisch fenomeen. Deze studie bouwt voort op onderzoek waarbij vluchtelingenkampen worden verkend als knooppunten in de Grote Hoorn van Afrika (Jansen 2011, Perouse de Montclos & Kagwanja 2000). Daarnaast reflecteert het over de toenemende vervaging tussen migranten en vluchtelingen. Door in te zoomen op de routes en trajecten van secundaire migranten en hun motivaties, wil deze thesis bijdragen aan een dieper inzicht in secundaire bewegingen en de drijvende krachten erachter. Kamp-kamp bewegingen worden speciaal belicht, hoewel er vaak verwijzingen zullen gemaakt worden naar andere vluchtoorden.

Methode: Deze thesis is gebaseerd op 6 weken veldwerk in Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenia. De gegevens werden verzameld via interviews, focus groep discussies en informele gesprekken met 27 *governance* actoren – hulpverleners en de kamp manager van Kakuma – en 73 vluchtelingen en asielzoekers. De interviews werden nadien getoetst aan de literatuur.

Resultaten: Er werd aangetoond dat secundaire bewegingen verschillende vluchtoorden binnen en tussen gastlanden verbinden. Verder leerde het onderzoek dat de motivaties die werden gegeven kenmerken bevatten die zowel worden geassocieerd met vluchtelingen als met migranten. Dit creëert een onduidelijke situatie in het veld.

Acknowledgements

This master thesis is the result of many meetings and I would like to thank all the people who were involved in the process and who opened many doors for me.

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[1] The names of refugees that are mentioned in the thesis are fictitious.

Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMADPOC	African Migration and Development Policy Centre
DRA	Department for Refugee Affairs
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GHA	Greater Horn of Africa
GLR	Great Lakes Region
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JRS	Jesuit Refugee Service
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
NCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
RCK	Refugee Consortium Kenya
RSD	Refugee Status Determination
UAM	Unaccompanied Minor
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VLIR-UOS	Flemish Interuniversity Council-University Development Cooperation
WFP	World Food Programme
WTK	Windle Trust Kenya

Contents

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. General introduction

The Greater Horn of Africa[2] is known for its recurrent flows of forced migration (Oucho 2006). Civil wars, genocides and international conflicts have contributed to large population movements, whereby refugees have been termed victims, active participants and enforcing actors in conflict. Moreover, the refugee crisis is characterized by a profound protractedness. It is estimated that almost a million Somali refugees are spread throughout the Horn of Africa, adding to more than a million IDP's; in the US, Europe, Tanzania, the Middle East and beyond (UNHCR 2014b). While refugees of (South) Sudan reside in camps since the early eighties, the Great Lakes Region (GLR) has been exchanging refugees since the seventies. Amidst these two war torn regions, Tanzania and Kenya, and to a certain extent also Uganda, traditionally stand out as havens of peace and shelter for countless displaced people (Veney 2007). Refugee camps that were initially meant to be temporal refuges, have in many cases become permanent settlements and have profoundly impacted the environment (Agier 2002, Hyndman 2000, Jansen 2011, Perouse de Montclos & Kagwanja 2000, Veney 2007). In this vein, Jansen (2011) writes that "the protractedness of a refugee situation does not necessarily imply that all refugees in it are themselves protracted, but the camp as an entity may be, while people pass through continuously. The camp thus gains history that exceeds its contemporary population." (p. 24). Several researchers make mention of such migratory movements. Koser (1993), for example, argues that repatriation can be seen as 'return migration', as it results from a "balanced decision depending on personal aspirations, and information available on wider structural conditions" (p.174). Further, while in exile, people frequently move between different camps, and between camps and other refuges such as cities. During her fieldwork in Tanzania, Malkki (1995) remarked that many refugees had past experiences of other camps and refuges before they arrived in Mishamo Refugee Camp. The same was noted by Jansen (2011) while conducting fieldwork in Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya. However, while many authors occasionally refer to such migratory movements, few have shown a genuine interest in the matter. Consequently, little primary research has yet been done on the subject. The phenomenon is only specifically addressed within *mixed migration*, a growing policy field concerned with "complex population movements including refugees, asylum seekers,

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[2] The GHA consists of 11 countries: Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan, Eritrea and Djibouti.

economic migrants and other migrants" (IOM 2004). Here, these migratory movements are also known as 'secondary' or 'onward' movement, but only when an international border is crossed. When refugees move between refuges *within* a certain host country, the movement falls under national legislation and gets 'lost' to further attention. Secondary movements between host countries on the other hand, are an international concern and have been taken up in various documents of UNHCR and in the successive Dublin Conventions. However, there have been studies on 'domestic' movements. Human Rights Watch (2002), for example, conducted an elaborate research on urban refugees living in Kampala and Nairobi and examined why they had exchanged life in a refugee camp for an uncertain existence in the city. The study learned that deteriorating camp security caused by rebel influences, inadequate education, low income-generating opportunities and various other reasons had pushed them away. However, whether the movement takes place within or between host countries, they are almost exclusively addressed in a negative manner. HRW mentions push factors that drove refugees out of camps, but fails to inquire after motivations that pulled them towards the cities. Research on secondary movement values this information higher. In a study based on extensive fieldwork, Moret and Baglioni (2006) state that access to durable solutions, social networks, employment, education and good living standards among others are decisive factors that contributed to the choice of a third asylum country. Unfortunately, the focus in such studies often lies on people moving from poor to wealthy countries, like African boat refugees arriving in Italy and Greece, or crossing the Gulf of Aden to the Middle East. Moreover, mixed migration addresses secondary movement as a problematic phenomenon, and policies generally aim to prevent or reduce it. Refugees are expected to stay in their first country of asylum until a durable solution is found. Moving onwards, often in an irregular manner, further complicates the blurring of the distinction between forced and voluntary migrants that takes place in mixed flows, where the two travel alongside each other (IOM 2004; UNHCR 2007a, 2007b). And although the mixed character of migration is progressively more recognized, ironically there is also an increasing need to distinguish refugees from other migrants for the evident reason that UNHCR cannot grant all mixed migrants a refugee mandate. While refugees have an elaborate apparatus of rights at their disposal, voluntary migrants have not (Crisp 2008, Karatani 2005, Scalettaris 2007, Van Hear 2009).

Although the growing salience of mixed migration has positively affected research on secondary movements, much remains uncovered. Little is known about the actual dynamics and agents of onward movement at the regional, national and international level. What are

the driving forces behind it and to what personal needs does it respond? While research within mixed migration and ethnographic fieldwork has shown that security and durable solutions are influential factors, it would also be interesting to look at the dynamics at the macro level. Several researchers have argued that political forces exceedingly contribute to the exchange and spread of refugee flows throughout the GHA region (Bariagaber 2006, Van Reybrouck 2010, Veney 2007). Furthermore, the irregular and problematic character that is ascribed to refugee mobility cannot be overlooked (Scalettaris 2009). Secondary movers are often addressed as 'irregular movers' and their claim for asylum has become very much compromised by their movement, and especially their motivations, which are not always protection related (Jansen 2011, Scalettaris 2009, Veney 2007). The combination of various motivations makes of secondary movement a perfect example of the growing salience of the blurring of the distinction between voluntary and forced migrants. Although UNHCR is increasingly attempting to include refugee mobility in policy, there are still many obstacles to be met, like state compliance (Crisp & Long 2010).

This thesis seeks to shed light on secondary movements of refugees and asylum seekers in order to address the above-mentioned knowledge gaps.

In **general**, this thesis will try to contribute to a deeper understanding of onward movement and the driving forces behind it. A special focus is reserved for camp-camp migration. Whereas camp-urban trajectories have been researched before, camp-camp movements have not. However, references to other refuges[3] and trajectories will be made frequently. In **particular**, this study seeks to determine the *routes and trajectories* of secondary movers by building on previous research that has explored camps as nodal points in the wider world (Horst 2006, Jansen 2011, Perouse de Montclos & Kagwanja 2000). Secondly, to achieve an insight in the *motivations and dynamics* that go behind these migratory movements and to what personal needs they respond by examining influential discourses and the different roles played out by the agents of secondary movement: refugees and asylum seekers, and governance actors. Lastly, this thesis seeks to find an answer to the question how secondary movers fit into the present-day pool of *mixed migrants*.

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[3] The term 'refuges' will be understood as all places where refugees and asylum seekers have passed since their flight. These include camps, cities, and other places such as 'the forest'.

1.2. Structure of the thesis

The thesis is built on primary field research carried out in Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya in 2014 during the months September and October. The fieldwork is further contextualized within secondary literature.

The thesis is structured in two main chapters in correspondence with two elements that are recurrent in popular refugee discourse: the element of temporality and the element of forced movement. Regarding the temporal nature of their 'refugee experience', refugees are often conceptualized as vulnerable victims that are pushed from their countries of origin to a nearby refuge where they wait until a durable solution is found. However, secondary movement shows that refugees and asylum seekers have a lot more agency than is ascribed to them and that many refugee situations last longer than expected.

In Chapter One, secondary movement will be explored as connecting different refuges within and between host countries, while reflecting upon the current most preferred durable solution: repatriation. Conceptualizations of refugee camps as protracted entities that have become embedded within their surroundings will be taken into account.

Chapter Two will take a closer look on the motivations that accompany secondary movements, being of much concern to the policy field of mixed migration. It is shown how a rigid distinction between 'forced' and 'voluntary' migrants sometimes creates a complex and ambiguous situation in the field, where different agents struggle to maintain them.

Before going into further detail, I will first elaborate on the methodological aspects of the research and provide the reader with an introduction to Kakuma.

2.   METHODOLOGY

In order to achieve the aforementioned objectives, a qualitative approach was adopted. Not much research has yet been done on migratory movements of refugees and asylum seekers, therefore, the research design and data collection methods needed to be open and flexible, which is characteristic to qualitative research (Burgess 2002). Although the research was set out to be on camp-camp movements only, as the field work progressed, the research design changed and widened to include other secondary movements as well. Qualitative research is also very valuable to reach hidden populations (Decorte & Zaitch 2009: 29). As secondary

movement proved to be a sensitive and controversial issue, a qualitative approach turned out to be very useful.

The research is based on 6 weeks of fieldwork in Kenya, which was further contextualized within secondary literature. The following paragraphs will give an elaborate account on the methodological aspects of this thesis; fieldwork and literature will be discussed in this order.

2.1. Fieldwork

Field research was conducted during the months September and October 2014, of which five weeks took place in Kakuma Refugee Camp and one week in Nairobi. After returning to Belgium, correspondence occasionally took place in order to contextualize certain interviews and to update on the situation in Kakuma and recent developments in Kenya.

2.1.1. Research setting

Kakuma Refugee Camp was founded in 1992 and can be counted among the longest existing camps in the world. The camp has been described a 'transit camp', 'cosmopolitan', and displays urban features while conquering its place within the wider environment. Building further on the aforementioned conceptualizations of refugee camps, Kakuma serves the researcher well. Having said this, it is important to note that the unique character of Kakuma and the information gathered here during fieldwork might not be carelessly generalized to other refugee camps. While Kakuma celebrates its 23th birthday this year, many other camps are much younger, less populated or not so ethnically diverse.

Apart from substantial reasons, Kakuma was also chosen because of its relatively 'safe' environment. While the Dadaab camps in northeastern Kenya are currently prohibited for *muzungu's* (white people) because of precarious security conditions, I was able to walk Kakuma by foot, sometimes even unaccompanied.

I was accommodated by the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) in Compound One where many other agencies had their offices and living quarters. This made it relatively easy to approach other organizations, because visiting other compounds usually required a gate pass or an escort by car. Moreover, LWF is one of the biggest relief agencies in Kakuma and has a long history up to the beginning in 1992, even before UNHCR arrived. Accordingly, LWF is present in many aspects of camp life, which greatly benefited the fieldwork.

2.1.2. Sampling methods

Data collection was supported by LWF and gathered through interviews with refugees, asylum seekers and governance actors. The selection of the interviewees was based on a combination of the so-called purposive and snowball sampling, or chain sampling.

Regarding refugees and asylum seekers, information was collected through five of the seven[4] units of LWF at the time of research in order to target different groups. According to the SAGE Encyclopedia of Qualitative Research Methods (2008), "purposive sampling is virtually synonymous with qualitative research"(p.697). Refugees and asylum seekers were selected when they met the criterion of 'having lived in another camp before Kakuma', although practical difficulties resulted in a more mixed group of respondents: out of a total of 73 respondents, 56 are known to have been in another camp before. Congolese, Burundians and Rwandans matched this criterion well, which reflects their greater number in the sample size (Table 1). For this reason, GLR nationalities were more specifically searched for as the fieldwork progressed. In addition, when three Congolese offered their help to look for respondents, GLR nationals presented themselves more often. This corresponds to what Hennink (2010) writes about the tendency of snowball sampling to follow the pattern of social relations(p. 100).

As for the units: respondents within 'Education'[5] are all nine incentive[6] teachers or head master of primary and secondary schools. 'Community Services' comprises five[7] different units of which 'Reception Centre'[8] was chosen to carry out interviews with seven new arrivals, while one respondent was contacted through 'Gender'. Six interviews were conducted with refugees and asylum seekers in the Protection Area[9], which is administered by the 'Security' unit. Five home visits took place through 'Child Protection' and also one FGD with 17

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[4] Education, Child Protection, Community Services, Security, Livelihoods, Accountability and WASH. The last two were not chosen because WASH is preoccupied with maintenance and Accountability is a relatively new unit with only one busy officer.

[5] Secondary Education has recently passed to Windle Trust Kenya (WTK). Correspondence, LWF staff member (f), May 13, 2015.

[6] 'Incentives' are refugee staff members of aid agencies. They receive a small amount of salary and work under the statute of volunteers, reflecting the fact that refugees are not allowed to work in Kenya (Jansen 2011: 61).

[7] Gender, Youth Protection and Development, Peace and Conflict Resolution, Human Rights and Equity, and Reception Centre. Interview, LWF staff member (m), Kakuma: September 15.

[8] The reception centre is a wired area where new arrivals live until they receive a plot of land in 'the community'.

[9] The protection area is a secured area for people with security issues.

Burundians. Due to practical difficulties, only one interview was conducted with a businesswoman who had received help from 'Livelihoods'.

It would seem reasonable that most of these respondents were receiving assistance from LWF or were paid incentives, as I met many of them through LWF. This was not always the case. Interviews via Child Protection were arranged by LWF staff members who contacted incentives in the field who went to look for respondents. Apart from the fact that information on the given criteria was often lost in between, these respondents usually had nothing to do with Child Protection or LWF; one woman did not even know the translator who had arranged the interview, leaving the question of how we had ended up in her house. Further, respondents in the reception centre were generally not receiving extra assistance either. Out of 73, 20 respondents indicated to be incentives working at LWF, DRC, JRS or the Kenya Red Cross.

Interviews were also conducted with governance actors[10]: employees of humanitarian agencies – LWF, DRC, RCK – and the Department for Refugee Affairs (DRA) Camp Manager of Kakuma (Table 2). Senior officers of the different units and an additional number of LWF staff members who had worked in different countries or refugee situations were approached and interviewed formally. Eight were teachers or head masters in primary and secondary schools, and an additional three were officers within 'Education'. Four LWF staff members were interviewed from Child Protection, one from Security, Accountability, WASH, Community Services, Livelihoods, and an additional three who did not belong to any unit in particular. Informal conversations took place regularly in the evenings or at *wakati wa chai* (tea time).

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[10] UNHCR was approached several times, but did not respond.

Table 1: Interviews with refugees and asylum seekers

Nationality	Private	4 FGD	Informal	Total
Somalis	3	0	1	4
Ethiopians	2	0	0	2
South Sudanese	1	4	2	7
North Sudanese	0	0	1	1
Burundians	10	17	0	27
Rwandans	3	14	0	17
Congolese	11	1	3	15
Total	30	36	7	73

Figures are derived from 4 FGDs. The first in a secondary school with teachers: 2 South Sudanese and a Congolese among nationals. The second in another secondary school with teachers: 1 South Sudanese among nationals. The third in the Burundian community with 17 participants. The fourth in the Rwandan community with 14 participants.

Table 2: Interviews with governance actors

Organization	Private	2 FGD	Informal	Total
LWF	13	5	6	24
DRC	1	0	0	1
RCK	1	0	0	1
DRA	1	0	0	1
Total	16	5	6	27

Figures are derived from 2 FGDs. The first in a secondary school with teachers: 3 nationals among incentive teachers. The second in another secondary school: 2 nationals among another incentive teacher

2.1.3. Methodological tools

Information was gathered through private interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) and informal conversations. As onward movement proved to be a rather sensitive issue to discuss among refugees and asylum seekers, private interviews and informal conversations proved to be very useful. **Private interviews** created a safe environment where anonymity could be granted. The semi-structured interview was preferred above the open-ended or unstructured interview to be able to guide the interview through a list of topics (Decorte & Zaitch 2009) that had emerged from preliminary research (Cfr. Attachment 2). **Informal conversations** created a

relaxed atmosphere where certain topics could be discussed more freely. As onward movement proved to be a controversial issue, **focus group discussions** presented a forum where different opinions could be ventilated. Although these were easy to organize in schools where teachers could be assembled during the break, discussions were more difficult to arrange through other units. One with Burundians was eventually organized through Child Protection and the other through a Congolese informant who had mustered his network to find Rwandans. Regarding governance actors, their time was relatively limited, which made it difficult to arrange a focus group discussion. Private interviews or informal conversations were more suitable here.

2.1.4. Challenges in the field

Although field research has many advantages, it also presented a variety of challenges, many of which were related to my field personality: I was a young female Belgian *muzungu*, and was usually in the company of humanitarian aid workers who were generally wearing a T-shirt from LWF, often with an accessory heat and/or bag. These characteristics certainly had an influence on who I met and what information I was able to obtain. For example, while Congolese often welcomed me warmly, South Sudanese and Somalis were much more cautious during interviews.

My presence was always duly noted. The arrival of *muzungu's* carries expectations for which refugees would literally line up to meet me. Although I repeatedly explained my objectives at the start and at the end of every interview, some still thought I was part of a resettlement mission, or they saw me as a donor who had come to 'inspect the situation', in which case they wanted to uncover some grievances. Therefore, any exaggerations must be taken into account.

Translators caused some dilemmas. Although many respondents were able to converse in English or French (26 interviews), others could not or would not (18 interviews). Opting for a translator from LWF sometimes caused respondents to be cautious. However, I often had to work with what I was given as my network was fairly limited. Some officers insisted on providing a translator from LWF. On the other hand, relying on a friend of the respondent for translation sometimes meant that the translator wanted to make his contribution to the story as well. Four interviews required more than one translator, because of which many words were lost in translation and interpretation. This could be partially

countered by checking a list of Kiswahili words that were mentioned by the respondent in the translation that was given afterwards (most translations required a Kiswahili speaker).

Taking notes during interviews also proved to be a challenge. Respondents were always asked their permission in advance, but while governance actors never minded a notebook accompanying the conversation, refugees and asylum seekers often did. On busy days in which I was only able to write everything down after dinner, it was sometimes a challenge to remember certain details or separate different stories.

2.1.5. Data analysis

The method used to analyze the data is based on the Grounded Theory, which rest on the belief that the researcher should meet the world with an 'open mind'. Theory must 'emerge' from the data and not precede the fieldwork (Decorte & Zaitch 2009). In this vein, all interviews were scanned for recurring themes and discourses, after which these were posited against the preliminary questions asked to respondents. However, because a framework of knowledge was also deemed important, the interviews were substantiated by conceptualizations from the literature.

2.2. Literature

A variety of secondary sources was consulted before and after the fieldwork to situate the data within past research on and related to the subject. Because not much research has yet been done on migratory movements of refugees and asylum seekers, the search for literature was extensive and comprised different fields of research (cfr. infra, p.32). This contributed to a theoretical framework, of which some concepts need additional explanation and interpretation.

Refugees and asylum seekers

The terms refugee and asylum seeker will be used in accordance to their international meaning. All respondents indicated to belong to either group: they were either mandated refugees under international protection of UNHCR, or they sought asylum. The following chapters will always use both terms together in sentence.

Mixed migration

Mixed migration is largely about two concerns. First, the trajectories of people on the move are perceived to be increasingly mixed. Refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants and other migrants take the same irregular routes. Thus, both become subject to human smuggling and other human rights concerns. Second, although they take the same routes, they do not share the same motivations for movement or protective rights. While refugees and asylum seekers are protected by international refugee law, migrants are subjected to national migration policies (Feller 2001, Karatani 2005).

Mixed migration emerged as a concept in the early nineties and was introduced in the policy arena around 2000 (Van Hear 2009). Due to rising numbers of refugees and asylum seekers; rapid expansion of the international migration industry, including human smuggling and trafficking; increasing difficulties of states to cope with 'asylum shopping'; and other related developments, international migration became of increasing concern to UNHCR (Crisp 2008: 1). Western countries had raised concerns over large scale abuses of the asylum system and the increasing flow of asylum seekers from the 'poorer' South to the 'wealthy' North. Van Hear (2009) writes that there was a growing perception that "asylum seekers were really economic migrants in disguise" (p.7). This tension is also referred to as the migration-asylum nexus. As a result, UNHCR became gradually more engaged in the broader migration discourse which traditionally belonged to the field of IOM. While a variety of organizations started to address both migration and refugee issues, researchers and analysts pointed to the blurring of the distinction between 'forced' and 'voluntary' migrants (Crisp 2008, Van Hear 2009).

Until today, UNHCR maintains that it is possible to make a 'meaningful distinction' between voluntary and forced migrant categories. At the same time, IOM and UNHCR recognize that motivations can be mixed and that many people do not belong to either category (Crisp 2008: 5). Scientific research goes further. While several authors have sought to develop new conceptualizations of migration, I adhere to Scalettaris (2007) who writes that researchers "should return to the study of the refugee label"(p.41). This thesis will try to demonstrate how a strict distinction between both categories sometimes creates a complex and ambiguous situation in the field.

Secondary movement

The term 'secondary', or 'onward' movement is mostly used to indicate refugees and asylum seekers who move onwards from their first country of asylum. However, there is much discussion on several parts of this explanation and a clear or universally accepted definition does not exist (Moret & Baglioni et al. 2006).

The term has always been associated with 'irregular movement'. This is demonstrated by an ExCom Conclusion in which secondary movement was addressed as 'a matter of growing concern'. The Executive Committee of UNHCR stated that:

> "Refugees and asylum-seekers, who have found protection in a particular country, should normally not move from that country in an irregular manner in order to find durable solutions elsewhere but should take advantage of durable solutions available in that country through action taken by governments and UNHCR." (UNHCR 1989: paragraph(e))

Apart from irregular, the ExCom Conclusion further describes secondary movement as taking place *between* host countries and as 'moving onwards *after* having found protection'. Both elements were also taken up in Chapter 8 'addressing secondary movements' of the 10-Point Plan of Action (UNHCR 2007a) – the main document to address mixed migration. At the same time, many studies, some ordered by UNHCR, argue that secondary movement often results from a lack of protection in the first country of asylum (Moret & Baglioni et al. 2006, Crisp & Long 2010), thus including the element of insecurity.

This thesis defines secondary movement as taking place from one refuge to another, irrespective of the fact whether a national border is crossed or not. Passages are not included, that is: places that were indicated by respondents to be *en route* to another destination. A broad definition was deemed important for several reasons.

First, apart from taking place between host countries, secondary movements also occur within host countries. Refugees and asylum seekers move from camp to camp, from camp to city, between cities or other refuges (e.g. Horst 2006, HRW 2002, Malkki 1995). Although these movements are usually not included when onward movement is discussed, they are equally interesting – and, as will be discussed, surprisingly similar in nature. Furthermore, if we extend the definition to 'voluntary' migration, IOM (2004) defines 'secondary migration' as movement that takes places *within* a host country (p.59). I will argue

that both types of movement share many features and would do each other short if they are only treated separately.

Second, the element of 'protection' was considered irrelevant for the occurrence of movement, because it is in the first place a *motivation,* given by the refugee or asylum seeker, and open to interpretation by UNHCR or government officials. Moreover, the significance of protection to UNHCR is unclear (cfr. supra).

Third, although the element of 'irregularity' is certainly important, movement also takes places in regular ways – even if this is more common within than between host countries.

Fourth, a fixed time interval for 'onward' movement like Moret and Baglioni et al. (2006) use (a month) was difficult to put into practice, because respondents in Kakuma had very limited recollection of time, and inquiring after too many details generally increased their suspicion on the sensitive subject.

Irregular movement

Researchers who write about secondary movement frequently mention the term 'irregular movers'. While Jansen and Veney use the concept to refer to refugees who attempt to seek asylum in another host country and were subsequently excluded from refugee status and assistance (Jansen 2011: 15; Veney 2007: 183), HRW (2002) posits that "irregular movement is a term used in the policy to describe the concept of 'secondary movement' for reasons not related to protection" (p.164), whereby HRW confirms the traditional association of secondary movement with irregularity.

However, irregular movers are not always secondary movers or vice versa. Although IOM (2008) states that there is no clarity of what irregular movement precisely signifies, in broad terms, irregular migration "takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries" (p.34). Movements are considered irregular when people move to another country without the consent of UNHCR or the host country and without the requisite documentation (2007b). By often resorting to human smugglers and irregular entry-ways, irregular movers become exposed to human rights violations and protection risks. Regular movement takes place through "recognized, legal channels" (IOM 2004: 54), with the consent of UNHCR and or the host government which, in most cases, also facilitate the transfer. I will adhere to the definitions given by IOM and UNHCR.

3.   INTRODUCTION TO KAKUMA

The following section provides an introduction to Kakuma and the research setting in which the fieldwork was carried out.

Kakuma refugee camp is located in the northwestern Rift Valley, which is known for its harsh climate of high temperatures, unfertile land and dusty winds. In the rare occasion of rain, rivers often surpass their banks and flood the camp, sometimes with devastating outcomes. The Turkana district is one of the poorest in the country and is sparsely populated by nomadic pastoralist communities, whose livelihoods have been profoundly influenced by the refugee presence (Jansen 2011). Although tensions often rise between the host and refugee communities, "both were eventually able to engage in mutually beneficial relations as various actors worked to maintain peaceful relations" (Veney 2007: 124). Refugee inhabitants and Turkana regularly engage in trade relations and aid agencies developed 'outreach' programs to involve the host community in education, medical healthcare, employment, child protection programs, water supply, etc.

Although the location of Kakuma is rather isolated within Kenya, the camp is situated quite central in the wider region. Close to the borders of Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia, Kakuma has been a refuge for many nationalities over the years.

During an interview in my first week of fieldwork, the South Sudanese head master of a primary school proudly stated that he had been 'among the founders of Kakuma'[11]. He told me he was one of the Lost Boys whose stories have been famously depicted in the book *What is the What* (Eggers 2007). He had never heard of Valentino Achak Deng, but he recommended me another book that had brought back 'so many memories'. Indeed, the Lost Boys of which he spoke were a large group of children who had fled the civil war in Sudan in the early eighties. They ended up in Ethiopian camps, but were later expelled after Mengistu was overthrown. Approximately 12.000 children moved onwards into Kenya, where they 'founded' Kakuma in 1992 (Bariagaber 2006, Jansen 2011).

Kakuma has grown enormously over the years. Although it was expected that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 and the subsequent independence of South Sudan in 2011 would result in a large exodus from (South) Sudanese, many stayed, and since

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[11] Interview, South Sudanese respondent (m), Kakuma: September 19.

civil war erupted again in South Sudan in December 2013, numbers in Kakuma continue to rise as never before. According to the most recent statistics of April 2014, the camp population stands at 151.114 (UNHCR 2014a). However, at the time of fieldwork, this number was said to have arrived at an unprecedented 176.000. Although most residents are from South Sudan and Somalia, another 17 nationalities including Sudanese, Congolese, Rwandans, Burundians, Ethiopians and Eritreans contribute to an ethnic mix. Already in 2000, Perouse de Montclos and Kagwanja aptly wrote that "Kakuma is the most cosmopolitan camp in Kenya" (p.211).

The camp is also inhabited by many agencies, of which the offices and living quarters are situated at the camp perimeter close to Kakuma town. The compound of LWF houses many different agencies including LWF, RCK, NCCK, JRS, NRC, Filmaid, Kenya Red Cross, DRC, IRC, WTK and Handicap International.

Kakuma has been visited by many researchers, journalists, missionary groups, friends and relatives of refugees and even tourists. "This all added up to a sort of cosmopolitan outlook of Kakuma, where apart from people suffering from traumas as a result of various wars, hazardous flight experiences and poverty, there was also simply life" (Jansen 2011: 14).

4. CHAPTER ONE: ROUTES AND TRAJECTORIES

The 'refugee experience' is generally considered a temporary phenomenon. Refugee camps are built to be temporal refuges, in the hope that refugees will be able to return home soon, or that another solution will be found quickly. However, more often than not, the reality is different. Refugees spend many years in camps and other refuges, while gradually establishing links and interactions with their surroundings.

This chapter will elaborately discuss these connections, respectively by discussing the temporary/ protracted nature of refugee situations; previous research on the embeddedness of refugee camps; and connections established through (secondary) movement.

4.1. Temporality vs. protractedness

Since the inception of an international regime for the protection of refugees in the aftermath of the First World War, the refugee problem has been constructed as a temporary phenomenon (Sytnik 2012: 5). Refugee camps are a clear case in point. 'Built to dissolve', as Jansen (2013) puts it (p.129). The temporality with which refugee camps are governed is criticized by many (Agier 2008, Hyndman 2000, Loescher & Milner et al. 2008, Whitaker 2008). Often built in arid, isolated areas close to the border, almost everything related to the organization and management of a refugee camp has temporary purposes. Refugees are deliberately put in places on the margins of society, outside the 'national order of things' (Malkki 1995). In the same way that Burundians, Rwandans and Congolese fleeing violence and genocide in the nineties were encouraged to go to camps and settlements in the Tanzanian border regions of Kigoma, Kagera and Ngara, encampments in Uganda, Kenya, Congo, Ethiopia and Somalia are all located close to the border. It has been argued that "UNHCR is careful not to make the camps too attractive to potential refugees or other migrants by maintaining minimum education and other facilities, an approach that has been called 'humane deterrence'" (Hyndman 2000: 24). Although the funding structure of the refugee regime can also be seen as a contributive factor. Field operations of UNHCR (as with many other humanitarian organizations) depend entirely on external donations (Whitaker 2008). This makes the refugee regime highly susceptible for state interests, and UNHCR and other organizations frequently face difficulties in raising the appropriate amount of funds. Budget problems occur frequently. In mid-November 2014, food rations in Kakuma and the Dadaab

camps in Kenya were cut half the size for more than a month by WFP, due to insufficient funds, after which the UN had to make an urgent appeal for donors to reconsider[12].

Also illustrative of the temporality, is the preference that is accorded to repatriation as a durable solution. Although Loescher and Milner (2008) note that two-third of the entire refugee population of today finds themselves in a protracted state, local integration is often neglected as a real solution (Crisp 2003), while resettlement only benefits a small percentage. Repeated efforts to promote a developmental and solutions-oriented approach to refugee assistance have met with very limited success: "Host governments were generally eager to retain the visibility of the refugee populations they hosted and to discourage those people from settling permanently on their territory" (Loescher & Milner et al. 2008: 130-131).

However, as a popular Greek saying has it: *there is nothing more permanent than the temporary*. Refugees often spend years far beyond the initial emergency phase living in camps and settlements. While Kakuma and Dadaab respectively celebrate their 23rd and 24th anniversary this year, the Sahrawi camps in Algeria have been in place for almost four decades. Palestinian refugees have been in exile even longer, beyond the outset of UNHCR, making it the world's most prolonged refugee situation (Loescher & Milner et al. 2008). Protracted refugee situations increase every year, of which the majority can be found in Africa (Crisp 2003). UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as one in which 25.000 or more persons have been in exile for at least five years after their initial displacement (UNHCR 2009).

4.2. Embeddedness of refugee camps

4.2.1. Literature

Over the years, researchers have commented on the negative effects of protracted encampments. Refugee camps are often presented as isolated 'nowhere places' where refugees are 'pulped into a faceless mass' (Bauman 2004: 76-80). In line with Bauman, Diken (2004) further developed the conceptualization of refugee camps as permanent 'states of exception', in which "the asylum seeker is held in a condition of immobility" (p.93). Furthermore, some authors argue that prolonged encampment in combination with a continuous reliance on food handouts, forces refugees into a dependent position, leading to

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[12] These events took place shortly after I left Kakuma. Information was gathered through correspondence with 3 Congolese refugees and asylum seekers (m) and one DRC staff member (m) during the months November and December. Also: UN News Centre (30/12/2014).

reduced agency and inactivity (e.g. Harrell-Bond 1986). In this respect, UNHCR is sometimes criticized for its top-down approach, leaving little space for the refugee community to be involved in camp policies (Turner 2010). At the same time, by placing these 'gated communities' literally on the margins of society, refugees are often mobilized by military insurgents and pulled into conflicts from which they initially tried to escape. This often leads to the deterioration of diplomatic relations between home and host countries (Bariagaber 2006, Loescher & Milner et al. 2008, Muggah 2006, Veney 2007). In short, the segregation of refugees from local communities through isolated encampments has been under much critical scrutiny.

However, over the last two decades, many authors have objected to the one-sided representation of refugee camps as isolated 'non-places'. Their central argument is that the actual protracted state of existence has allowed camps to conquer a place – and become embedded – within their regional, national and international surroundings. Thus, instead of focusing on the mechanisms of immobility, camps are explored as nodal points in the wider world. An important step in this direction was taken by researchers who started to explore refugee camps 'through the prism of urban studies' (Bauman 2002: 344). Kenyan camps in particular have been visited by researchers who wrote about Dadaab and Kakuma as places where 'urbanization' was 'in the making' (Perouse De Montclos & Kagwanja 2000: 219; Agier 2002; Jansen 2011). This approach has positively affected refugee studies. Not only has it allowed to recognize camps as places that can also generate activity instead of only idleness, and where refugees have been able to find creative ways to cope with camp life in spite of their trauma and vulnerability, but it has also partially liberated refugee camps from being represented as isolated humanitarian enclaves (Bauman 2002: 344). Perouse De Montclos and Kagwanja (2000) wrote: "Camps are seldom isolated, as new local and international networks expand between them and their surrounding areas" (p. 206). Also Jansen (2011) identifies these wider connections as a "defining element of the camp as an accidental city" (p. 23). Examples of these interconnections can be found in economic trade relations, social networks, remittances and resettlement. And evidently the continuous movement of people seeking access to the camp and people leaving again. Economical linkages have been discussed in a number of studies (Agier 2002, Horst 2006, Hyndman 2000, Veney 2007). Feyissa and Hoehne (2010) wrote on the economic opportunities that the refugee industry of Dadaab brings to the marginalized border regions in Kenya: "The globalization of the borderland economy was reflected in the appearance of new shops, the construction of small airstrips, and the

introduction of a regular bus service between the Northern Frontier District (NFD) and Nairobi." (p. 137). In this light, Dadaab has been placed next to Nairobi and Mombasa as the 'third largest city in Kenya' (Gadeyne 2011). On its facebook page, even UNHCR KENYA advertises for Dadaab's flourishing camp economy.

> "Need some wood, a camel or a chicken? You can find nearly everything in Hagadera's[13] busy market. Refugees and the Kenyan host community do business here and contribute to the dynamic economy. This is one of the biggest markets in the region." (UNHCR KENYA, March 31 2014)

Social interactions have been equally present in studies linking camps to their surroundings. Veney (2007) noted that the communal and cultural links that already existed between Rwandan, Burundian and Tanzanian citizens in the Western Kagera and Kigoma Provinces served to reduce tensions between hosts and refugees in the nineties. Although, when these connections did not exist prior to the arrival of refugees, interactions still developed.

> "Some of them [refugees] married Tanzanian citizens; some of them found employment in the local communities; some of them attended school; some of them raised crops – all of these activities put them in daily contact with Tanzanians enriching social and economic ties" (Veney 2007: 140).

Apart from social linkages between refugees and the host population, Horst (2006) demonstrated how Somalis in Dadaab in Kenya were connected to their kin in Somalia, to their resettled friends and relatives in the US and to their refugee relations in other camps and cities through a radio set called the 'taar', while receiving remittances through the Xawilaad (or Hawalas) money transfer system.

4.2.2. Field notes: embedded through education

A subject that is notably less discussed when refugee camps are presented as nodal points in the wider world, is that of education. There are several reasons why education deserves considerably more attention in this regard.

At first, according to international refugee law, host countries are obligated to provide elementary education to refugees (UNHCR 2010). As an implementing partner of the Convention, UNHCR laid out the options for the curriculum to be taught: camp schools are free

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[13] Hagadera is currently the largest of the five Dadaab camps in Kenya.

to either adopt the curriculum and language of the host country or the country of origin (UNHCR 2003). In Kakuma, the choice was made in 1992 by South Sudanese who opted for Kenya[14], an English curriculum, thus connecting the camp to the wider schooling system of the host country. Neither language, curriculum nor money pose problems for the Turkana to go to the free schools in the camp. The Angelina Jolie boarding school for girls, for instance, attracts many Kenyans[15]. Moreover, in early November 2014, UNHCR launched a four year multi-sector education project that seeks to implement an integrated and holistic approach, whereby the host community is very much involved (UNHCR 2014c), thus embedding camp schools more profoundly in their surroundings.

Secondly, specific for the case of Kakuma, there was a significant perception, both among refugees and governance actors, that the camp was widely known in the region for education. Both refugees and non-refugees from across the national border were said to be attracted to the camp to receive an education, after which they would disappear back to their places of origin. South Sudanese were often specifically mentioned in this regard. The refugee experience in Kakuma was sometimes even connected to their return outside crisis situations.

> "They [South Sudanese] come. Organizations are aware of it and they are happy about it. After South Sudan gained independence, they went back [to South Sudan]. But some come back for education. There are parts in South Sudan that teach the Kenyan curriculum. The South Sudanese system also teaches English, but Kakuma is better. The Kenyan curriculum is being taught in the Nuba Mountains *(South Kordofan, Sudan)* and Eastern Equatoria *(South Sudan)*. South Sudanese also come for education, because it gives them job opportunities in the government in South Sudan."[16]

In my first week of field research, this testimony of a Kenyan teacher touches upon an interesting issue that was confirmed by others throughout my stay. Before the signing of the CPA, the relatively few schools operating in South Sudan were not part of an integrated coordinated educational system (World Bank 2012: 1). Schools differed widely on all sorts of matters, such as the instructed language and curricula. Some states had adopted curricula of Uganda, Kenya or Ethiopia, as the Kenyan teacher above rightfully pointed out. After the CPA and later the independence of South Sudan in 2011, efforts were undertaken to organize an

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[14] Interview, LWF staff member (m), Kakuma: October 11.
[15] Interview, LWF staff member (f), Kakuma: September 16.
[16] FGD, Kenyan participant (m), Kakuma: September 18.

integrated educational system that currently benefits an average 60 percent of the youth population (World Bank 2012: 2). Nevertheless, some schools still teach the curricula of neighboring countries. In Central Equatoria, for example, 19 percent of schools teach the Ugandan curriculum, while 13 percent of schools in Lakes State teach the Kenyan curriculum (World Bank 2012: 78). Kakuma, which has been receiving South Sudanese in an almost uninterrupted flow since the nineties, seems to have become a known safe haven where education standards are sometimes thought to be better than in the home country[17]. An LWF staff member noted that Sudanese even work to finance their journey up to Kakuma[18]. Another Kenyan teacher remarked that, sometimes, she sees the arrival of unaccompanied minors (UAMs) who are sponsored by their relatives in South Sudan to receive a schooling in the camp[19]. It is true that there are a few exceptional educational opportunities for refugees in Kakuma. Well-off students have the possibility to stay in boarding while going to school in Nairobi, although the scholarships granted to excellent students by Windle Trust are most desirable. Thus spoke an incentive teacher enthusiastically of the Windle Trust scholarships that would, once, carry him to Canada[20].

Of course, these stories have to be nuanced at least a little. Arguing that Kakuma has become a educational hub for South Sudanese who are not even in the position to claim refugee status would be somewhat presumptuous. Moreover, employees of relief agencies sometimes tended to exacerbate and generalize stories about people who had no business in the camp, in which respect education proved to be an extra sensitive issue. The period of research was far too short to examine the issue of education more profoundly and make significant conclusions on the issue of education as an element embedding Kakuma within the wider region. However, the above suggests that education should not be overlooked in further research on the embeddedness of refugee camps.

4.3. Embedded through movement

Apart from economical, social and educational linkages, refugee camps are also embedded within their wider surroundings through migratory movements. This section will examine these connections in further detail.

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[17] The World Bank mentions many challenges to reach more than minimum standards.
[18] Interview, LWF staff member (m), Kakuma: October 11.
[19] Interview, LWF staff member (f), Kakuma: September 17.
[20] FGD, South Sudanese respondent (m), Kakuma: September 17.

4.3.1. What is known about these connections?

4.3.1.1 Literature

Not much research has yet been done on secondary movements. Moreover, the existing literature is spread across different fields of research. There are at large three different groups of literature that publish studies on secondary migration in the GHA.

A first group chiefly focuses on the interconnectedness of different (protracted) refugee situations at the macro political level. A case in point is the work of Bariagaber (2006) who draws on the conflict situation in the Horn of Africa to show that refugees can be active enforcing and generating agents in subsequent refugee flows. The Derg led government of Ethiopia thus supported the SPLM/A, who combated the regime in Sudan, to exert pressure on al-Numeiri who sponsored Eritrean and other opposition groups in Ethiopia. The support given by both governments led to a further escalation of the conflict, while merging the two conflicts together. Another example is the refugee formation in the GLR of which the protractedness has reached record heights (Loescher & Milner et al. 2008). Encouraged by political forces, Rwandan, Burundian and Congolese refugees have enforced and generated further conflict in the region (Van Reybrouck 2010, Veney 2007). One of the major consequences in both cases is the diffusion of refugees across the region. After Mengistu was overthrown in 1991, Sudanese refugees were targeted by their forces in retaliation for the support that the SPLM/A had given to the former government. While this caused a massive return flow to Sudan, many of them moved onwards into Kenya, where they 'founded' Kakuma in 1992 (Bariagaber 2006). In Zaïre in 1996, many Rwandan and Burundian refugees crossed the border with Tanzania or Uganda when the RPF and the AFDL invaded the Eastern provinces partly to 'neutralize' Hutu refugees whom had been given sanctuary by Mobutu (Van Reybrouck 2010). Lastly, it is worth mentioning the work of Veney (2007), which describes how acute refugee flows in the nineties have impacted asylum policies in Kenya and Tanzania – and vice versa –, during a time of profound political and socio-economic change. The friendly hospitable climate of free refugee movement and self sustainable settlements changed dramatically to forced encampment and a tendency towards repatriation instead of local integration. Black and Koser (1999) note that "during the 1990s, repatriation has occurred on a scale far more substantial than during previous decades" (p.3).

A second group of literature is located within the field of mixed migration. Research on mixed migration and secondary movements are generally policy oriented for the reason that the

mixedness is seen as a problem and because mixed migration is commonly associated with irregular movements, illegal migrants and human rights violations that people face on the way. In this context, the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies (SFM) conducted a research on irregular secondary movements of Somali refugees in order to tackle the causes underlying onward movement (Moret & Baglioni et al. 2006). However, the size of this group of literature is very modest, mainly policy oriented and exclusively focuses on movements *between* host countries. Moreover, as mixed migration has become closely associated with the migration-asylum nexus, what has followed is a greater focus on (irregular) secondary movements from 'poorer' to 'wealthier' parts of the world, allowing other trajectories to become obscured. Although the study of SFM is an almost unique research on secondary movements in the GHA, 5 of the 8 countries that were visited are on route to the wealthier North and include South Africa.

A third group of literature is produced by anthropological fieldwork in refugee camps and by researchers who approach refugee mobility as part of livelihood strategies. Refugee mobility is also often addressed in the context of protracted refugee situations. Some authors have even advocated for refugee mobility as a fourth durable solution – among the three existing repatriation, local integration and resettlement (Scalettaris 2009, Crisp & Long 2010).

Researchers who have conducted fieldwork in camps in Kenya and Tanzania have shown how refugees can be highly mobile while enhancing their livelihood opportunities (e.g. Horst 2006, Jansen 2011). Horst (2006) elaborates on how Somali refugees in Dadaab strategically migrate to Nairobi while they keep in touch through the *taar*, a radio set, and send remittances to their relatives in the camps. Similar research shows how camps can be profoundly embedded within their surroundings and connect different host countries through movement. Jansen (2011) writes that Kakuma can be seen as a nodal point in the wider world: "(…) people came from camps in Uganda and Tanzania to Kakuma, motivated by the availability of educational facilities and resettlement opportunities, based on stories of their kin" (p.15). Also Malkki (1995) noted sideways how Kigoma town and Mishamo camp in Tanzania are connected through seasonal movements and kin links. Camp refugees would for example migrate to Kigoma at a time of commerce or fishing and return later with the money they had earned (p.199).

However, there are various obstacles to be met before refugee mobility can be turned into a 'fourth solution'. In an article in the Forced Migration Review, Scalettaris (2009) spoke sharply about the outdated static approach of UNHCR, who would present secondary

movement as a problematic phenomenon to be reduced and prevented (p.58). Crisp and Long (2010) responded not long after with an article in the same journal on the progressive policy change UNHCR had made in recent years with respect to refugee movements. Not UNHCR, but nation states impede refugee migration, they stated.

Each of these groups of literature conducts valuable research on secondary migration, although there is little interaction between them. While refugees move between different refuges for a variety of reasons at the meso and micro level, their movements can also be connected on a higher macro level. Government policies play an influencing role in dispersing refugees throughout the region (Veney 2007, Bariagaber 2006, Van Reybrouck 2010). The following sections will show how (forced) repatriation – a powerful instrument of governments – sometimes even serves as a catalyst for further movement. In addition, refugee movements equally come forth out of personal needs, and can be part of livelihood strategies (Horst 2006, Scalettaris 2010, Moret & Baglioni et al. 2006). Furthermore, it is important to be aware of the grey area wherein these movements are often situated. The increasing blurring of 'migrant' and 'refugee' categories is not only progressively more recognized, but equally poses many ambiguities that will be further elaborated upon in the next chapters.

4.3.1.2   Observations of governance actors in the field

The following section will elaborate on what governance actors in the field know about the extent of secondary movements. Respondents at aid agencies (LWF, DRC, RCK) and the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) were asked questions about camp-camp migration, although comments on other refuges and trajectories (camp-city,…) were made frequently.

In general, respondents demonstrated to know more about movements within Kenya than between host countries. Transfers and irregular movements were often mentioned. Legal, 'regular', movements are approved, paid for and mostly organized by camp and government authorities. Respondents referred to these movements as 'transfers'. Transfers between Dadaab and Kakuma regularly take place (mostly from Dadaab to Kakuma), as do transfers between the camps and 'the urban'[21] (mostly from Nairobi to the camps). Relocations can be divided into four groups: resettlement cases, protection related, transfers because of overpopulation and urban refugees deported back to the camps. **Resettlement** cases are always handled in Nairobi or Kakuma, never in Dadaab, because of security issues. Jansen

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[21] Respondents tended to talk about Nairobi as 'the urban'.

(2011) speaks of a public secret when he explained that, in 2006, it was the insecurity affecting the agencies, instead of the refugees, for which a large group of Somali Bantus was transferred to Kakuma for resettlement processing (p.108). At the time of my field research in 2014, this public secret had become an ordinary reality. An LWF staff member who had worked in Dadaab before, said that *muzungu's* are not allowed into the field anymore because Al-Shabaab frequently attacks the vehicles. Even Kenyan aid workers going to the field always need to be accompanied by two vehicles to ensure their safety[22]. Transfers also take place to alleviate the chronic **overcrowding** in Dadaab. In 2009, around 18.000 refugees were relocated to Kakuma (Jansen 2011: 232), after the government denied access to extra land to accommodate a large influx from Somalia[23]. A third reason why refugees are sometimes allowed to live elsewhere is **protection related**. Although each camp has a Protection Area and a Safe Haven to provide extra security for people who suffer from assault, harassment or were followed into exile by their persecutors, relocation to another camp is an option of last resort. While Dadaab-Kakuma transfers mainly concern Somalis processing for resettlement, relocations from Kakuma to Dadaab are almost exclusively protection related and mostly concern GLR nationals[24]. An officer of Refugee Consortium Kenya (RCK) puts the total amount of cases at 'an average of 10 through the year'[25]. Related to protection issues are other security issues such as medical reasons: the need for special medical treatment only available in Nairobi for example. A last group consists of **urban refugees** deported to the camps. In Kenya, irregular movement can almost be equalized to movement outside the camps – unless you have been given permission by authorities. At the time of field research, these movements within Kenya were a hot topic. When starting a conversation on camp-camp migration, one often ended up discussing urban refugees.

> "Since the rise in insecurity, the government wants to take charge of affairs and become more strict in the encampment policy. And it was justified. There is an encampment policy, we do not have urban refugees. Since February 2014, over 10.000 refugees are deported from the urban to Kakuma. And the government paid for the relocation. Almost 40.000 Somalis are brought

[22] Informal conversation, LWF staff member (m), Kakuma: week of 22-26 September.

[23] Interview, LWF staff member (m), Kakuma: October 11.

[24] Interview, RCK staff member (f), Kakuma: October 13.

[25] Interview, RCK staff member (f), Kakuma: October 13; correspondence: December 17.

back to Dadaab. Over 60.000 urban refugees in general are brought back to the camp in the last 1 and a half year. Westgate was planned in Kakuma, not many people know this!"[26]

The 'rise in insecurity' of which the camp manager of DRA is speaking, started in 2011 when Kenya joined the forces of AMISOM to combat Al-Shabaab in Somalia (Rutazibwa 29/02/2012). Al-Shabaab has been carrying out attacks throughout Kenya ever since, reaching its zenith with the massacre of 148 students and teachers on a university campus in Garissa on April 2 2015 (BBC News 23/04/2015). As with other attacks, among which is the notorious attack on Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi in 2013, refugees were used as scapegoats in the aftermath of Garissa. Political exclamations to close all camps pop up after each attack and urban refugees are frequently harassed in the streets. In April 2014, the government launched a 90-days field operation called 'Usalama Watch'. Every week, refugees were expected to arrive from urban areas where they had been rounded up by police.

Although urban refugees have had a hard time in Kenya since the rise of an encampment policy in the early nineties, the implementation always remained a problem because of the refugees' right to freedom of movement. Directives ordering urban refugees to the camps have always been thwarted by the court. At the end of June 2014 however, the High Court ruled in favor of a government directive, issued on 26th of March that year, ordering all refugees to return to the camps immediately (Cabinet Secretary for Interior & Coordination of National Government 26/04/2014). The same judge had previously ruled in favor of urban refugees (Kenya High Court 26/06/2013). The judgement certainly cleared the way for a stronger implementation of the encampment policy.

Although respondents welcomed the inquiry on secondary movements across national borders, many indicated to know very little about it. This seems partly due to the absence of a comprehensive legal framework for movement. According to an LWF staff member who worked in Dadaab and paid a brief visit to Kakuma, transfers between camps or other refuges between host countries rarely take place and mainly concern family reunifications, which are carried out by the Red Cross. Governance actors know very little about movements taking place outside the system of transfers, which is mainly based on reasons that are protection related. It was recurrently stated that refugees who want to move need to have a 'good reason', of which insecurity is the most valid one. However, this makes most other reasons

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[26] Interview, DRA camp manager (m), Kakuma: October 10.

invalid and resulting movements irregular and thus often invisible. And though movements within Kenya are closely monitored, those taking place from across the border are not. Although the DRA camp manager said that few people mention a previous stay in another camp to DRA and at the eligibility interview at Refugee Status Determination (RSD)[27], many respondents believed that there were more arrivals than registrations.

Concerning arrivals from other host countries, it was recurrently stated that refugees and asylum seekers who come from other camps usually concern GLR nationals: Burundians, Rwandans and Congolese. A senior officer of the LWF Child Protection unit said that he had heard of children who come from camps in Uganda, Tanzania, South Sudan and Congo. They are often accompanied by a caretaker, and thus called 'separated children', as opposed to 'unaccompanied minors' who are mostly seen to be coming from South Sudan[28]. The GLR origin of camp-camp migrants coming from across the Kenyan border was an observation other respondents had made as well. Kenyan teachers had noted the presence of students who had been in Uganda and Tanzania before; and several senior officers within LWF said that Kakuma had experienced a rise in numbers when Tanzania had closed its camps for Burundians in 2012. The following explanation was given during an interview with the LWF Sub Program Manager.

> "Refugees fled to Congo from Rwanda and Burundi. They were allowed to have some land, but eventually these groups were claiming the land. Whilst it actually belonged to the government. When land issues and space became pressed in the region, they told the groups to go back to their country and to leave the lands to the citizens. This happened in Tanzania and Uganda as well. When they closed the camps, Kakuma experienced a rise in numbers of refugees."[29]

The political dimension he accords to camp-camp movement corresponds with literature that focuses on the interconnectedness of refugee situations on the macro political level.

It would have been helpful to supplement the opinions and estimations above by statistics of actual movements. However, inquiries after data proved unsuccessful. Staff members of aid agencies often referred to UNHCR for acquiring statistics, but repeated efforts to schedule a meeting ended fruitlessly, and e-mails that were sent after leaving Kakuma through various

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[27] To be eligible for a refugee mandate, asylum seekers must go through 'eligibility', an interview conducted by the UNHCR RSD unit.

[28] Interview, LWF staff member (m), Kakuma: September 13.

[29] Interview, LWF staff member (m), Kakuma: September 30.

channels and key persons remained unanswered. While respondents assured me that numbers of people moving through the system of transfers and of those deported from the urban to the camps certainly existed, unfortunately, we can only speculate on the existence of records that make mention of refugees who have moved on their own, and those who have come from camps or other refuges in other host countries.

4.3.2. Routes and trajectories of refugees and asylum seekers

The following paragraphs will focus on the actual movements of refugees and asylum seekers whose trajectory eventually led them to Kakuma. The first three paragraphs seek to differentiate different trajectories to explore the importance of camp-camp movement. Trajectories that include refuges other than camps are also included because, as the fieldwork progressed, it became clear that movement between different refuges cannot fully separate camps from cities and other places, for they are entangled and interconnected. The last trajectory concerns former repatriates who are now asylum seekers for the second or third time. It covers the life story of many interviewees and was considered important to further understand the protractedness of refugees situations and the interconnectedness of flight trajectories in the GHA.

Before laying out the trajectories, it is important to make two remarks. First, the sample group consists of 73 respondents, 30 of which were interviewed privately, 36 were part of four FGDs and 7 were spoken to informally. Only 3 of them stated to have fled their home country straight to their first and current refuge, Kakuma. Therefore, almost all respondents are secondary migrants. As the subject proved to be quite sensitive and was often received with some suspicion, I avoided asking too many detailed questions about their trajectories. The cost of this approach was evidently the absence of interesting specificities or data. Any data mentioned below is therefore always followed by the entire sample available for that specific subject matter. The second remark has to do with the sincerity with which respondents told their story. The trajectories laid out below are those of which the interviewees felt comfortable enough to share with me and, often, my translator. Certain refuges were said to be looked at by camp authorities with more suspicion that others. For example, an informant entrusted me that if asylum seekers who had previously stayed in camps that are infamous for rebel recruitment disclose this information at RSD, acquiring a refugee status would certainly

be more difficult[30]. It is possible that some respondents chose to hold such information back for this or for other reasons.

4.3.2.1   Camp-camp trajectories

Camp-camp trajectories were said to be the least practiced. 45 respondents indicated to have stayed in a camp before Kakuma, but of all secondary movers with a clear trajectory[31], only a third indicated to have moved from one camp directly to another. A clear distinction between movements within and between host countries could not be made, both were equally represented. With regard to refugees and asylum seekers moving within host countries, Tanzania en Kenya were mentioned. Three Somalis and one Ethiopian stated to have been relocated from Dadaab to Kakuma by camp authorities for resettlement processing or protection issues, a movement well-known to governance actors. Respondents who indicated to have stayed in Tanzanian camps were all GLR nationals. Some had been relocated from transit camps to more permanent camps after a few months, others had been transferred to separate Burundians from Rwandans in different camps. Another situation that had brought about mass relocations was the closure of camps to ease impending repatriation. Partly due to donor fatigue, rising tensions between Tanzania and Rwanda and later with Burundi, rising criticism on the militarization of refugee camps and also due to the protractedness of the refugee situation, Tanzania closed its camps for Rwandans at the end of 1996 and for Burundians at the end of 2012 (Veney 2007, Muggah 2006, Whitaker 2008). The flight trajectory of a Burundian respondent presents an illustrative account of these referrals after camp closures.

> Mbuba, Keza, Kitali, Lumasi, Lukole and Mtabila. In order of appearance, the narrative of Nancy and her six children accounts for an impressive list of camp stays in Tanzania. When she counted the camps, she forgot one or two, and we repeatedly went back to retrieve the camps that had started to blur from her mind. She had to leave all except for Kitali because of closure and repatriated home after Mtabila.[32]

Mtabila camp was also frequently mentioned by others as the last point of gathering to await repatriation. As many as eight Burundian interviewees indicated to have lived there for at least a while. Two of them refused to go back to Burundi and moved onwards after Mtabila closed.

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[30] Informal conversation, Congolese informant (m), Kakuma: October 11.

[31] Clear trajectories only concern private interviews: with whom their trajectory was elaborately discussed.

[32] Interview, Burundian respondent (f), Kakuma: September 23.

With regard to camp-camp movements between host countries, the trajectories Uganda-Kenya, Congo-Tanzania and Tanzania-Kenya were mentioned. Striking from the interviews were some of the stories that respondents had heard from Kakuma or Nairobi in other camps, at the national border or *on the road*. Two respondents had heard from Kakuma in Ugandan camps, and local inhabitants of Tanzania were said to refer refugees more easily to Kakuma than to camps in the area. Both Mwanza and Sirare were often mentioned as passage towns where respondents had sometimes even met other refugees with whom they had traveled along further. Some of these life stories closely follow the historical path of secondary movements in the GHA.

> Alida was only little when her parents fled Burundi to Congo in 1972. For a while, life was good in camp Malinde. Refugees had been given land to cultivate, and "Congo took refugees as their own people. We were living as Congolese. Life as a Congolese and a refugee was more or less the same". This changed in the nineties when refugees fled Burundi and Rwanda by the thousands. Because no new land was issued, the influx coincided with growing hostility from the locals as they increasingly had to split their land with new arrivals. After 'war erupted in 1996', the family moved to 'the forest'. They eventually crossed over to Tanzania, where Alida lived in Mtabila camp until 2012. "This was before Tanzania became hostile. Returning to Burundi was not possible because my parents were killed in Congo by the Banyamulenge. They burned my parents in the house. There is nothing there for me. I heard about a camp in Kenya, so I decided to go."[33]

The trajectory as Alida told it is by no means unique. Two other Burundian Hutu respondents narrated an almost identical flight path that had led them through the 1972 genocide in Burundi, from where they fled to Eastern Congo. Accompanied by displaced Congolese, they moved onwards to Tanzania during the first Congo War, where they were eventually asked to go home in 2012, but ended up in Kenya.

8 out of 13 camp-camp movers indicated that at least one of their movements had been facilitated by camp authorities. This mostly concerns movements *within* Tanzania and Kenya. The 7 secondary movements *between* host countries were never facilitated nor specifically approved. This reflects the irregularity that is commonly associated with refugees who move onward from their first country of asylum. Most people said to have left without even

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[33] Interview, Burundian respondent (f), Kakuma: October 15.

informing camp authorities because they did not think about it, they were chased or because the authorities were part of the problem that made them leave.

4.3.2.2 Combination trajectories

'Combination' trajectories between camps and places and between places were made considerably more. 'Places' include cities, villages or 'the forest'. Two-thirds of all secondary movers with a clear trajectory indicated to have moved between different kinds of refuges. The narrative of a 20-year old Congolese illustrates how refugees can be highly mobile.

> Joseph and his seven siblings ran from their home in North Kivu to Uganda, where they ended up in Camp Rhino. After three years, his eldest sister married a Ugandan from a nearby village to escape the harsh living conditions and the insufficiency of food rations and (school)materials. Somewhat later, her husband invited three siblings to stay in his house, for whom he would pay an education. Joseph was one of them. However, when the husband decided to kick his newlywed wife and her siblings out, the group went to Kampala, where they survived only barely. They moved back to Camp Rhino somewhat later, but discovered that their remaining siblings had also left in the meantime. Consequently, everyone had been cut off from food rations; a request for a new ration card was denied. The group went back to Kampala, where they eventually lost sight of each other. However, as UNHCR had told them that the other siblings had departed to Kakuma, Joseph decided to leave Uganda and look for them in Kenya.

The trajectory of Joseph led him through different places before arriving in Kakuma, where the entire family has recently been reunited. Together with similar flight histories of other respondents, it further shows that regular movement of refugees exist between different refuges such as camps, cities and other places. Hence, camps cannot be fully separated from other hide-outs, because they are connected and interrelated through movement. Of these trajectories, only place-camp movements were said to be often facilitated by UNHCR (15), including many deportations from Nairobi to Kakuma.

In similarity with camp-camp trajectories, it is interesting to note that refugees move relatively easily between host countries – and predominantly under the radar. 10 out of 30 secondary movers with a combination trajectory cited to have moved between host countries, 21 to have moved within. Feyissa and Hoehne (2010) argue that "refugee camps and the status of refugee may be considered frontier areas both in geographical and in metaphorical terms" (p.169). Using borderlands as a metaphor, refugees find themselves in a regime both embedded within and existing outside the 'national order of things'. Would it, then, be plausible to look at camps

and other refuges as being part of a transnational network of metaphorical borderlands? It raises interesting questions. For example, how do refugees and asylum seekers renegotiate national borders when they have moved between host countries for the most part of their lives? And how then, does this process evolve over time? Do they become 'dwellers of the world', as Scalettaris (2013) described Afghan repatriates who returned 'home' to isolated would-be towns for landless returnees that are managed by UNHCR?

4.3.2.3 Trajectory-home-trajectory

Of the three trajectories here discussed, this one does not necessarily include secondary movers. Although most of them have also moved onwards from a first refuge (12 out of 14 with a clear trajectory), this section is primarily about respondents who indicated to be former repatriates. All interviews included (private, informal, FGD), they make up almost half of the sample group, covering at least[34] 30 interviewees. Their large number reflects their greater presence when looking for respondents who had resided in another refugee camp before Kakuma.

Almost all former repatriates in the sample group are Burundians, Rwandans and Congolese. It is known by governance actors in the field that Burundians who previously lived in Tanzanian camps have spread to other host countries after refusing to go home. However, almost all Burundian respondents who were interviewed in Kakuma about this fact said that they had repatriated first before coming to Kakuma during a second or third flight. This section focuses on repatriation as a powerful instrument used by governments to resolve a protracted refugee situation, but which sometimes leads to further dispersion.

Large refugee populations put host countries under a lot of pressure. For instance, refugees exert pressure on land when they arrive in large numbers. The testimony of Alida shows how 'old caseload' refugees and local Congolese increasingly had to split their land with newcomers in the nineties, which in turn heightened tensions with the host community. Because of these and other challenges that arise from sheltering refugees, host countries have to deal with internal stress and anxiety. In addition, diplomatic relations between host and home countries are often put under pressure because of refugee militarization (for instance the SPLM/A presence in Ethiopian camps (Bariagaber 2006)). For Tanzania, Muggah (2006) notes that

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[34] Although the subject was thoroughly debated during two FGDs with Burundians and Rwandans, not all participants disclosed information about their personal past. The actual number might thus be higher.

"Refugee subversion, real or imagined, has led to the deterioration of inter-state relations between Tanzania and Burundi" (p.156). This led to expulsions, refoulement, and it further accelerated repatriation treaties with Rwanda and Burundi (p.140).

When land becomes pressed, internal tensions rise and diplomatic relations with home countries deteriorate, repatriation can be a powerful tool to resolve a (protracted) refugee situation. However, repatriation not always proves to be the easy success-guaranteed solution. The current most preferred durable solution put forward by UNHCR has been criticized by many (Bariagaber 2006, Koser & Black 1999, Loescher & Milner et al. 2008, Veney 2007). Crisp aptly remarks that "the presence of so many protracted refugee situations in Africa can be linked to the fact that countries of asylum, donor states, UNHCR and other actors have given so little attention to the solution of local integration during the past 15 years" (Veney 2007: 153; quotation Crisp 2003: 3). The establishment of peace does not necessarily imply that refugee populations in exile are willing to go back. Although it was expected that refugees would repatriate in masses after Eritrea became independent, Bariagaber (2006) notes that "for some reason, this failed to occur" (preface). Eventually, it happens that the host country resorts to more coercive means. 9 respondents indicated to have been forcibly repatriated before from Tanzania and one from Kenya in 1993 – participants of FGDs not included. During a FGD, Rwandan participants gave the following account of their repatriation experience from Tanzanian camps.

> Repatriation took place in December and it took place by force. Any Tanzanian who kept a refugee hidden could get a fine. There were road blocks all around the camp. Tanzanian military forces had come and were mixed up with Rwandan military forces. The army surrounded the camp. UNHCR gave few assistance. They just watched. They had water tanks to provide people along the way home with water. But people were beaten if they went off track during the repatriation. Thus, many people couldn't reach the water tanks, because the soldiers who accompanied them along the way prevented them. They beat the people whenever they went off road. A man responded he had seen that the mother of a child was beaten to death on the way.[35]

What is more, repatriation does not always have the intended effect. Once 'home', repatriates are often faced with new difficulties. Vorrath (2008) notes that "up to 90% of problems experienced by returnees in Burundi are supposed to be land related" (p.123). In Kakuma,

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[35] FGD, Rwandan participants (m&f), Kakuma: October 13.

three Burundian respondents stated to have fled for the second or third time after conflict had arisen over their former estate[36]. Other people were born in exile or have no land to return to, in which case two Burundian respondents indicated to have ended up in an IDP camp upon their return. When the government removed the camp later on, both migrated back across the border[37]. Reconciliation also poses difficulties to returnees, and often complicates their reintegration. Problems of this kind were especially expressed by Rwandan Hutu who had been forcibly repatriated from Tanzania and Congo in 1996, after which they trickled into Uganda and Kenya not long after.

Congolese respondents voiced other problems upon return. New occurring insecurities as a result of enduring conflict, a new rebel group that had not been present when they had fled the first time, caused three of them to leave Congo again. A last difficulty was not voiced by former repatriates, but by Congolese respondents who had received the returnees. Two locals from Uvira in South Kivu explained how some people experienced difficulties adapting to life outside camps.

> "After repatriation, we went to welcome them. The people stayed in a reception centre. And the people who had relatives or friends were picked up. Others stayed there or went by themselves. It was a strange situation. There was conflict. Land had been taken and was now occupied by other persons. Some experienced difficulties with their new lives and having to start from scratch. The lonely people left again swiftly."[38]

30 interviewees in Kakuma found themselves forced to move again after experiencing the difficulties described above. However, as other respondents who refused to repatriate indicated as well, finding asylum in a second host country can be complicated. In a briefing note, the International Refugee Rights Initiative (ca. 2013) reports of the precarious situation wherein Burundian former repatriates in Nakivale Camp in Uganda currently find themselves: respondents stated to have been refused asylum or have experienced difficulties receiving protection as they were expected to return to Burundi, where peace had been achieved. This closely matches with stories I heard from Burundian respondents in Kakuma.

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[36] Interview, Burundian respondent (m), Kakuma: September 23; Interview, Burundian respondent (m), Kakuma: October 15; Interview, Burundian respondent (f), Kakuma: September 25.

[37] Interview, Burundian respondent (m), Kakuma: October 10; FGD, Burundian participant (f), Kakuma: October 6.

[38] Informal conversation, Congolese informant (m), Kakuma: October 8.

> After Nancy had repatriated from Tanzania to Burundi, her husband was killed. She fled back across the border, but decided to take another route via Uganda, where she arrived in Mbarara Refugee Camp. She tried to register, but was denied a ration card because of her previous stay in Tanzania. After sleeping in the outskirts of the camp for a few months, during which she earned some money by working for the locals, she made way for Kakuma. However, because of her rejection in Mbarara, she decided to send one child ahead to check out the situation, before reuniting with him in the reception centre.

IRRI rightly argues that "although it might look like the protracted refugee situation in Tanzania has ended, in reality it may have only displaced elsewhere in the region" (p.2). Furthermore, in addition to mass repatriations between 1996 and 2012, it seems that the Tanzanian change from an open-door asylum policy to a more restrictive one (Loescher & Milner et al. 2008, Veney 2007), is even maintained for new arrivals. Rwandan, Congolese and Burundian former repatriates and 'first-timers' highlighted increasing hostility from the government, UNHCR and citizens in Tanzania. Three Burundian, one Rwandan and one Congolese former repatriate(s) explicitly stated to have chosen a different route – through Uganda – for their second flight. Seven 'first-timers' stated to have been chased away while looking for refuge in Tanzania.

The stories of above reflect a group of respondents whose trajectory is situated in a grey area. Veney (2007) writes that Rwandan refugees who moved onwards from Tanzania to seek asylum in other host countries were labeled 'irregular movers', and were officially denied further assistance by UNHCR. Refugees who returned to Rwanda but subsequently fled again to Uganda, were told to return to Tanzania, their first country of asylum (Veney 2007: 183). The report of IRRI indicates that the same is happening to Burundians. Although they went 'home', officially lost their refugee status and may not always have moved onwards from a first refuge, the entire *trajectory-'home'-trajectory* of these respondents is very similar to that of secondary migrants. In this way, it is possible that repatriation becomes yet another link in a sequence of secondary movements.

4.4. Towards a new chapter of secondary movement?

In recent years, the issue of repatriation has taken centre stage in Kenya. The growing insecurity and the enduring protractedness of the Somali refugee situation have made the presence of refugees a subject of much concern and debate. Eastleigh, a Nairobian neighborhood predominantly inhabited by Somali refugees, Dadaab – and Kakuma to a lesser extent – are frequently accused of being breeding grounds for refugee militarization (Standard

Digital 2015). It is said that the attacks on Westgate in 2013 and Garissa in 2015 were respectively planned and/or financed in Kakuma and Dadaab[39].

Successive attacks have profoundly increased the resentment towards refugee presence in Kenya. After every attack, urban refugees are harassed by police in the streets of Nairobi and politicians advocate recurrently for the closure of both camps. At the political level, the growing insecurity has had enormous repercussions. In November 2013, not a month after the attack on Westgate, a Tripartite Agreement was signed between UNHCR, the Kenyan and the Somali government to facilitate voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees during a time span of three years (Government of the Republic of Kenya & Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia et al. 10/11/2013). 'Go and see' visits are organized so Somali refugees can visit the places where they would 'return' to, and different actors including the prime minister of Somalia[40] have come to Dadaab to meet with the refugees in an effort to restore or re-establish connections with the 'homeland'. The hurried manner in which the Tripartite Agreement was signed after Westgate reminds of how repatriation treaties between Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda accelerated in reaction to similar concerns and anxieties. The agreement further shows how repatriation can be a powerful instrument used by states in an attempt to resolve a protracted refugee situation and to relieve the stress that hosting refugees can bring to the local community.

However, the voluntary character of the Tripartite Agreement has been the subject of much critical scrutiny. In February 2014, Amnesty International (2014) published a report in which it brings forth testimonies of Somali refugees who find it increasingly difficult to receive the protection they need. Freedom of movement has become strongly restricted; refugees are denied registration outside the camps, and are harassed and arbitrarily arrested by police in the cities; camps are facing cuts in funding resulting in poor living conditions and limited access to services; all which leads to the conclusion that refugees are effectively being "pushed' out of their safe havens"[41]. In addition, a new Security Amendment Bill was passed in Parliament in December 2014, covering several Acts, including the Refugee Act, and is meant to change security structures in order to fight corruption and terrorism. Although the Refugee

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[39] Interview, DRA camp manager (m), Kakuma: October 10.
[40] https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.746585335406493.1073741850.659119560819738&type=3
[41] Sarah Jackson cited in: Somali refugees unlawfully forced out of Kenya. Retrieved from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/02/kenya-somali-refugees-unlawfully-forced-out-country/

Act was initially amended by inserting a clause in which the number of refugees and asylum seekers permitted to stay in Kenya was no longer to exceed 150.000 persons[42] (Kenya Parliament 2014, article 48, 16A), this section has recently been scrapped because ngo's had loudly objected and had taken the matter to court.[43]

Meanwhile, Somalis are increasingly fleeing Nairobi and Dadaab back to Somalia because of the hostilities, although an LWF staff member who works in Dadaab was quickly to add perspective to the repatriation trend.

> "It is in Kambioos (the newest extension of the Dadaab complex) that refugees have begun to repatriate after the signature of the agreement. It is normal. New arrivals still have an affection towards Somalia. They still have relatives there and a life they left behind. Old refugees have set up businesses in the camp, they have built a new life. They don't have any relatives or connections in their homeland anymore. They think: how will we eat? Here, it is free. They have nothing to go back for."[44]

Moreover, a DRC staff member who, until recently, worked with urban refugees in Nairobi, noted that Somalis are not only fleeing back to Somalia, but are also moving onwards to third countries.

> "Another reason for movement is the change in policies in different countries. If countries are hostile to refugees, it's motivating to leave. Between September 2013 and March 2014, the government of Kenya got hostile against refugees. Look at Usalama Watch. There are now Somalis who move to Uganda. These are large flows. Or they go to Asia or Italy, Yemen, South Africa. They are "tarib" *(illegal migrants)*: you just decide to cross. It's a matter of life and death. They feel UNHCR is not fighting for their rights enough. These Somalis especially come from the urban: Eastleigh. And new Somali refugees move directly to Uganda. Or they are denied by DRA for an ID or their resettlement cases are taking too long. Uganda is getting a big receiving refugee country because of the rising hostility in Kenya."[45]

Both statements give rise to many questions. What will happen when the life span of the voluntary repatriation agreement expires at the end of 2016? Will refugees be forced to go back, to a 'home' which many of them have never seen before? Will they end up in would-be-

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[42] The current population of which has now surpassed the number of 650.000: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483a16.html

[43] Correspondence, Linda Oucho, March 24.

[44] Interview, LWF staff member (m), Kakuma: September 29.

[45] Interview, DRC staff member (m), Kakuma: September 14.

towns administered by UNHCR that have become a reality for thousands of landless returnees in Afghanistan? How will the return of a half million of refugees affect local communities in Somalia? What happens when they do not want to go back or when they decide to leave again? Can repatriation, again, become a catalyst and initiate a new chapter of secondary movement?

In aspiration of an enlarged East African Community, John Oucho (2006) wisely wrote that: "the major challenge will be the harmonization of national legislation, policies and practices in an effort to improve the management of migration and refugees in the region" (p.131).

5.   CHAPTER TWO: MIXED MOTIVATIONS

A second element recurrent in refugee discourse, is that of forced movement. Different than migrants, refugees are forced to flee their homes for reasons of insecurity. Their displacement has led to the image of a refugee as a vulnerable victim in waiting. However, the previous chapter has shown that the temporality characteristic for the refugee regime does not always corresponds to reality. Refugees and asylum seekers migrate between different refuges within and between host countries, sometimes for many years. These movements are of much concern to UNHCR and the policy field of mixed migration. They are associated with irregularity and they make it difficult to separate forced from voluntary movers. It was also demonstrated that regular movements often occur within an official system of transfers that seems to be predominantly based on reasons that are protection related, which brings us back to the element of 'forced movement'.

This chapter will therefore examine the link between refugees and forced movement, and try to demonstrate that secondary movement creates an ambiguous situation. Conceptualizations of 'voluntary' and 'forced' migrants in the literature will be applied to the field.

5.1.   Conceptualizations of 'voluntary' and 'forced' migrants

UNHCR's homepage of Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration reads as follows:

> "Migrants are fundamentally different from refugees and, thus, are treated very differently under international law. Migrants, especially economic migrants, choose to move in order to improve their lives. Refugees are forced to flee to save their lives or preserve their freedom."[46]

While the organization observes that "migrants and refugees increasingly make use of the same routes and means of transport"[47], UNHCR (2009) firmly separates each group's motivation for movement. IOM notes that "considerable attention is devoted to asylum seekers and refugees in mixed flows due to the established international legal principles of non-refoulement and refugee protection" (p.1). Although migrants are of particular concern to IOM, there is a "wide gap between the rights and international protection to which migrants and refugees are entitled" (Scalettaris 2007: 42). Refugees are accorded a certain distinctness. Forced to move, refugees are fundamentally different from voluntary migrants. Attempts to

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[46] http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16aac66.html
[47] Ibidem.

grasp its essence have resulted in labels like the 'refugee experience' (e.g. Bariagaber 2006), refugeeness (Malkki 1995) and refugeehood (e.g. Kibreab 2004). However, its distinctness is not uncontested. Debates on how refugees can or must be distinguished from other migrants are as old as the inception of an international refugee protection regime after WOI.

5.1.1. Refugees vs. migrants: a short history

The two World Wars in Europe forced many people to flee their homes and their countries. With the establishment of the League of Nations in 1921 and the United Nations shortly after WOII, a variety of initiatives were undertaken in an attempt to manage the refugee flows in Europe. Several international organizations were established and again dismantled, until the International Refugee Organization was eventually replaced by UNHCR in 1949 (Feller 2001: 584). Although the International Labor Organization suggested to build 'a single comprehensive regime for people on the move', the emerging state powers after WOII were concerned that 'too much international coordination' would interfere with national sovereignty over migration policies (Scalettaris 2007: 42). As a result, facilitating international migration and protecting refugees became separate policy arenas and were translated into conventions and mandates which are respectively administered by IOM and UNHCR today (Scalettaris 2007, Karatani 2005, Feller 2001). But while refugees became entitled to an international apparatus of rights, migrants are generally subjected to national interests and concerns (Karatani 2005). The group of people who are entitled to refugee protection has grown over the years however. In 1969, the African Union broadened the strict definition of a refugee laid out in the 1951 Convention (the essential concept of persecution) to include people on the move due to "external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order" (UNHCR 1969: art. 1 paragraph 2). Through this convention, the European character of the 1951 Convention was expanded to refugee situations in Africa. Later, age and gender dimensions were added to refugee law and IDP's are specially protected by the 2009 Kampala Convention. Moreover, there are still ongoing developments, like the current debate on environmental refugees (Morrissey 2009).

The recent concern over mixed migration and the migration-asylum nexus has accelerated the blurring of the distinction between the two categories and has given rise to "a debate regarding the necessity of keeping a sharp division between refugees and migrants" (Scalettaris 2007: 43, quotation Crisp 2003).

The implications of this legal separation between voluntary and forced migrants for secondary movers can best be explained by pointing at migratory models and the victimization discourse.

5.1.2. Migratory models

The push-pull model is a traditional explanation for migration. Migrants are pushed from depriving conditions in their places of origin and pulled towards a better situation in the place of arrival. The present pull factor gives the migrant a voluntary character. In addition, the migrant is not persecuted but chooses to move. This model is complicated when it comes to refugees. As they do not choose to move, the pull factor is almost absent. For this reason, various researchers have sought to develop explanatory models for forced movements. In this respect, the time-honored kinetic model of Kunz (1973), has recurrently proven to be a valid tool to explain refugee flight (e.g. Bariagaber 2006). Kunz distinguishes between two *kinetics* of flight: anticipatory and acute refugee movements. While the anticipatory refugee leaves his/her home country prior to the deterioration of the situation, which gives him/her time to prepare the flight, acute refugee movements arise from immediate danger and usually take place in large groups. However, it may be relevant to question whether models on primary movements are still applicable on secondary movements. In their extensive report on secondary movements of Somali refugees, Moret and Baglioni (2006) acknowledge that secondary movements contain a higher degree of voluntariness than many first movements. Kunz, on the other hand, "maintains that pull factors play little role, even for persons who take part in anticipatory refugee movements" (Johansson 1990: 266, ft 75). The key element of 'push' in the 'refugee experience', is implicitly further emphasized by Koser (1993), who developed a theoretical model for repatriation. He posited that repatriation can be better understood as 'return migration': "The theory is that repatriates, like return migrants, go home as a result of a balanced decision depending on their personal aspirations, and information available on wider structural conditions" (p.174). While displacement is characterized by the element of 'push', the advent of emplacement happens more voluntary and can thus be understood as migration. However, even before the restoration of this balance, movements can be at least partially voluntary in nature and be the result of a balanced decision. The average duration of a 'refugee experience' has increased from 9 years in 1993 to 17 years in 2003, and is now approaching 20 years (UNHCR 2006: 109). Many refugees do not wait to continue with life or stay in the first refuge in which they have once arrived; studies on secondary movements are a case in point.

The blurring of the distinction between forced and voluntary migrants since the nineties has led several authors to criticize strict interpretations of the division. Turton noted that "there are elements both of compulsion and choice in all migrants' decision-making" (Scalettaris 2007: 39, quotation Turton 2003: 7). Some authors have tried to overcome the division. Richmond, for example, developed a continuum with 'proactive' and 'reactive' migration at the opposite ends, according to the degree of agency exercised by the actors involved (Scalettaris 2007: 39, quotation Richmond 1988: 20).

However, pull factors remain very sensitive and controversial in the case of refugees, and to express them at RSD can have strong implications for the protection of their rights. Although it is generally accepted that onward movements can be the result of insecurity and/or a lack of durable solutions in the country/refuge of departure (UNHCR 2007a), safety issues are often considered far more legitimate than other reasons.

5.1.3. Victimization discourse

The importance accorded to push factors in refugee movements is also reflected in the victimization discourse. "Refugeehood and victimhood are often seen as one and the same" (Korac 2009: 7). The importance of push factors is reflected in the expectation that refugees, as traumatized, vulnerable and passive agents, are predominantly – if not only – looking for safety and security, hence, they are not pulled, but pushed.

'Victimhood' also makes an appearance in the highly debated and contested dependency syndrome theory (Horst 2006). It is argued by some that prolonged encampment in combination with a continuous reliance on food handouts, forces refugees into a dependent position, leading to reduced agency and inactivity (e.g. Harrell-Bond 1986). Bauman (2004) refers to refugees as 'the waste products of globalization'. However, like the dependency syndrome theory, Bauman's great emphasis on structural forces obscures the agency of refugees. Although it may be so – to a certain extent – that the humanitarian system cultivates dependency and 'victimhood' in refugee camps, I adhere to Agier[48] (2002) who stresses that camps can also "create opportunities for encounters, exchanges and reworkings of identity among all who live there" (p.322). Jansen (2011) writes that "people continuously contest and

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[48] Because publications of Agier tend to shift on the degree of agency that is accorded to refugees (in *Aux bords du monde, les réfugiés* (2002), and *Gérer les indésirables* (2008), the agency ascribed is remarkably less), I follow his argumentation in *Between war and city* (2002).

negotiate the labels that are ascribed to them to advance or improve their position or opportunities" (p.20). However, contesting the ascribed 'victim' label also means to contest the power structures that shaped them. Several researchers who have conducted fieldwork in refugee camps have noticed that when a refugee challenges the aforementioned label, s/he can easily come to be seen as a 'cunning crook', as Horst put it (Horst 2006: 2; Kibreab 2004, Turner 2010). The consequences of migrating between different refuges for the perception of secondary movers and refugees in general will be examined in the next section.

5.2. In the field

Conceptualizations of 'voluntary' and 'forced' migrant categories also proved to be important in the field. The migrant-refugee distinction sometimes created an ambiguous situation: during many interviews with governance actors and refugees and asylum seekers, it was noticed that the abovementioned concepts and discourses returned in their perceptions on 'genuine' refugees. At the same time, refugees and asylum seekers also valued other reasons for movement that did not fit this perception. By migrating between different refuges for reasons other than insecurity, refugees and asylum seekers partially lose the innocent vulnerable label of a passive agent that is ascribed to them. For refugees, such an identity is most important. Their experiences, motivations and degree of vulnerability grant them access to the humanitarian system. However, following Jansen (2011), Horst (2006), Scalettaris (2009), and others, this thesis argues that there is more than a safety quest. Interviews with refugees and asylum seekers showed that motivations for movement often presented a mix of different features, which, apart from security motives, contained reasons that are commonly associated with pull factors and voluntary migrants.

The following paragraphs will first discuss perceptions on 'genuine' refugees, and move on to motivations and dynamics of migratory movements.

5.2.1. Perceptions on 'genuine refugees'

5.2.1.1 Governance actors

"You have to report it if you want to move to another camp. And you have to have a reason to move. A strong one. Like insecurity."[49]

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[49] Interview, LWF staff member (m), Kakuma: September 29.

Governance actors recurrently stated that refugees need a 'good reason' to move. Insecurity is thought to be a valid reason and was cited most as push factor. This concerns refugees who are followed by persecutors, ethnic minorities and victims of assaults. Insecurity cases are dealt with by UNHCR who facilitates the transfers. Other reasons such as resettlement, medical grounds (mostly from camp to city) or educational opportunities (mostly from camp to city) are accepted as well, although these are considered to be of a more temporary nature. Students in Nairobi are expected to return to the camps during the holidays and after graduation, resettlement transfers are a only a temporary stopover before actual resettlement. All these movements are considered regular, being approved and facilitated by authorities and accompanied by the requisite documentation. In these cases, governance actors indicate to have no problem with refugees and asylum seekers who have come from other countries or other camps.

Nonetheless, governance actors have several concerns regarding secondary migration. First, onward movement was often associated with irregular movement. Many refugees migrate on their own, without the requisite documentation or approval of the agencies, which is a cause for some irritation. In response to a question on why refugees are not allowed to move on their own, an LWF staff member said:

> "We know better where [refugees] will be safe. Refugees come here as guests and they don't have a say in it."[50]

He further explained the infrequence of transfers *between* host countries by pointing out that, with all the options available for refugee protection in Kenya (protection area, safe haven, transfers within Kenya), refugees who are not safe in either Dadaab or Kakuma, would be insecure in Uganda as well. For these people, resettlement is the only option, he said[51]. His answer can be seen in correspondence to the victimization discourse. Refugees, who are predominantly seeking protection, are ignorant of where they would be safe. Although many governance actors acknowledge that it is possible that some refugees fail to profit from the present options available for refugee protection, they also feel that there are many people who migrate for other reasons than to reach a safety haven. These 'other reasons' were the main concern towards onward movement. In the case of camp-camp movers, motives with

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[50] Ibidem.
[51] Interview, LWF staff member (m), Kakuma: September 29.

regard to aid provision and facilities were particularly frowned upon. These include education and resettlement opportunities, incentive jobs, and other services like the provision of food rations, iron sheets for roofing, medical infrastructure, etc. Two respondents called these movers 'economic refugees'. Such movements were considered inappropriate for refugees, as they were associated with economic reasons and educational opportunities, which are usually categorized as being part of more voluntary movements. The thin line between forced and voluntary migration is emphasized by the term 'economic refugees'. This corresponds to the concept of 'refugee migration', used by Black (1993) "to provide an opportunity to explore insights gained in the wider field of migration studies, applying these to the particular circumstances of refugees" (p.5).

The attractiveness of Kakuma – and Kenya in general – in comparison with other camps in the wide region was put forward by many respondents. A senior officer of WASH proudly stated that Kakuma is often referred to as a five star camp[52]. The representation of Kakuma as an education and resettlement hub was omnipresent during interviews with governance actors and refugees and asylum seekers. In addition, many respondents felt that such aspirations coincided with large-scale abuses of the humanitarian system.

> "Sometimes, I am wondering what we are doing there. 80, no almost 90% of the stories I hear, are fake. People tell everything. You will see people even doing things to themselves to have their way. It's staged. They come here for a purpose. And when they feel it is not going fast enough, they make it go faster. They lie."[53]

However, while most respondents frequently frowned upon refugees and asylum seekers who were more attracted by facilities and opportunities than the promise of protection, teachers and officers within the LWF Education unit were an exception to this rule. Three Kenyan teachers showed themselves proud to be part of it. "Let them come!"[54], an officer said.

Furthermore, secondary movement presents a lot of challenges to host countries and humanitarian agencies who work with small (donor) budgets and who find it increasingly difficult to separate people who deserve and do not deserve a refugee mandate. Moving from one refuge to another without approval or facilitation by authorities is considered 'unthankful'

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[52] Interview, LWF staff member (m), Kakuma: September 15.
[53] Informal conversation, LWF staff member (m), Kakuma: September 27.
[54] Interview, LWF staff member (f), Kakuma: October 16.

towards the host country. Secondary migration costs a lot of resources that could be better spent otherwise. One respondent called such movements 'incidences':

"If people start to compare the services, that is a problem. (…) The migration from camp to camp costs resources since every time the group is received in a new camp, they have to be received and be settled which involved house hold items kit, shelter and time of personnel. The same happens again and again as the refugees migrate meaning multiple use of resources for the same group or individuals."[55]

Next to humanitarian difficulties, the DRA camp manager explained that the attractiveness of Kakuma to people who do not deserve a refugee mandate results in many challenges within the RSD unit.

"It is difficult, because to determinate a status, you sometimes take a whole day to interview a refugee to determine the status. And Kakuma, it is a real attraction magnet for resettlement."[56]

Interesting was the connection made by an LWF officer between camp-camp movers and urban refugees. He said that, when secondary migrants are denied registration because of 'invalid' reasons for movement, they tend to go to the cities. However, recent operations in urban centers, like Usalama Watch and deportations following the enforcement of the encampment policy, bring them back to the camps where they are accepted after all, "because the government thinks it is anyway better to have them in a camp than in the city"[57]. Unfortunately, I did not succeed in finding refugees or asylum seekers with corresponding narratives.

5.2.1.2   Refugees and asylum seekers

Although the concern over refugees who do not always resemble the image of the 'pushed migrant' was more pronounced during interviews with governance actors, some narratives of refugee respondents or incidences during fieldwork show that motivations other than insecurity are sensitive to discuss.

For example, I tended to ask respondents during private interviews what they had expected of Kakuma before they arrived. Where they had heard of Kakuma or what they had heard. Often,

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[55] Interview, LWF staff member (m), Kakuma: October 11; and correspondence, November 19.
[56] Interview, DRA camp manager (m), Kakuma October 10.
[57] Interview, LWF staff member (m), Kakuma: September 30.

these questions would made respondents relatively uneasy. Some would say they had never heard of Kakuma before, but arrived here by chance, others thought the question was by all means inappropriate and said so. One responded: "what do you mean? I fled my country and now I'm here"[58]. Many respondents replied by pointing at their need for protection and considered this the end of it.

Furthermore, it was noticed that educational motives were particularly sensitive. During a FGD in a secondary school with Kenyan and incentive teachers, two South Sudanese and one Congolese became heavily engaged in a dispute about educational motivations for secondary movement.

> Nahor spoke from his own experience when he noted that some students come from camps in Uganda. "The persecutors follow the students. That is why they come to Kenya. I came from Congo, I was in a camp in Uganda and ran to Kenya because of insecurity. Education is not the major factor why people move between camps. It's insecurity. That is the bigger factor!" Aaron disagreed: "I think education can be a factor". The South Sudanese was very much enthused over the opportunities that Kakuma has to offer, especially the Canadian Windle Trust scholarships. Tiras, another South Sudanese intervened: "Education is a good reason for camp-camp movements, but it is not the main reason. We cannot say that all these people have come for education. Insecurity, yes." He further argued that schools face many challenges: classes consisting of 100 students, and students "lingering around to be resettled. They just wait around to be resettled, they are not interested in learning."[59]

Ironically, while Tiras tried to emphasize insecurity by downplaying the education factor, his argument was lost in his last words, giving indications for resettlement motives for movement. However, it is clear from the discussion that Nahor and Tiras felt uncomfortable when Aaron argued that education could be an important factor for secondary movement. Both seemed to value insecurity above education.

It should be mentioned that, with regard to motivations other than insecurity, education and resettlement have a longstanding reputation in Kakuma. Jansen, who has done extensive field research in Kakuma between 2004 and 2006, already noted that "people came from camps in Uganda and Tanzania to Kakuma, motivated by the availability of educational facilities and resettlement opportunities" (2011: 15).

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[58] Interview, Burundian respondent (m), Kakuma: September 23.
[59] FGD, Kakuma: September 17.

Both sections on governance actors and refugees and asylum seekers demonstrate the importance of insecurity for secondary movement and the controversy over and sensitivity of motivations that are not protection related. It further shows that the victimization discourse, and migratory models of push and pull factors that distinguish between migrants and refugees have a clear impact on perceptions on secondary movement. The 'real refugee' adheres to vulnerability and insecurity, not educational opportunities.

5.2.2. Motivations and dynamics of migratory movements

The first section focuses on the reasons through which respondents motivated their flight trajectories. The second section seeks to further understand onward movement by examining underlying and influencing features and dynamics.

5.2.2.1 Motivations for movement

140 motivations for movement were accorded to 8 categories (Table 3). Motivations were categorized as push or pull factors when respondents indicated them as such. Although there are many objections that can be made for such a table to occur in a qualitative research paper, it is primarily intended to provide the reader with a clear overview of which kind of motivations respondents found important to share with the interviewer, and how they broadly relate to each other. For example, it is interesting to notice that respondents indicated more than twice as much push factors than pull factors, even in the 'services' category which governance actors considered inappropriate for refugees because of its voluntary nature. Refugees and asylum seekers often narrated these motivations from the perspective of having been forced to move because of a terrible lack of services. Lastly, it must be mentioned that the demarcation of the categories should not be taken absolute, most movements were made for a combination of reasons

Table 3: Motivations for movement

CATEGORY	PUSH FACTORS	PULL FACTORS	TOTAL
(in)security	38	9	47
Political reasons	28	3	31
Services	14	7	21
Social networks	2	13	15
Third persons	2	10	12
Financial reasons	7	0	7
Distance	0	4	4
Familiarity of a refuge	0	3	3
Total	**100**	**40**	**140**

A third of all motivations that were given for onward movement was at least partially protection related, making the **'(in)security'** category the largest by far. This includes refugees who indicated to have been followed by persecutors through different refuges, ethnic minorities, victims of assaults (rape, robbery, attack), general master narratives like 'war', 'insecurity', one respondent who was falsely accused of being a *génocidaire*, and several others who said to have been chased away from a refuge. The 'push' stands for an insecurity situation which made respondents leave a refuge; the 'pull' signifies the choice for a refuge in order to be safe. The motivation that was found most appropriate for secondary movers by governance actors and refugees and asylum seekers, also appears in the motivations through which respondents narrated their flight history.

 'Political reasons' are linked to a specific host country and governmental policies: urban refugees deported from Nairobi to Kakuma, the closure of camps in Tanzania in the context of repatriation schemes, respondents who moved onward to Kakuma because they found it impossible to register in Nairobi, etc. Oftentimes, political reasons coincided with security motives. Several GLR nationals, for example, perceived Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda to be a political porous region, where government forces cross borders every day and where security cannot be found. One respondent said that she had to flee the host government from whom she sought safety in the first place.

> Sarai was one of the founders of a Congolese refugee organization in Gasorwe Refugee Camp in Burundi. When the Congolese government granted a large sum to its community in the camp, the Burundian government confiscated the money which was subsequently never distributed to the camp residents. The organization went to complain, after which its members were

threatened and attacked. Sarai ran to Bujumbura, where she was raped in front of her children by police. She and her children moved further from town to town to escape the government. Getting tired of playing cat and mouse, she further fled to Tanzania where she found it impossible to register because of what she calls a 'political hostile climate towards refugees'. She finally arrived in Nairobi, where she was transferred to Kakuma.[60]

It has become clear by now that movements accompanied by motivations in the category of '**services**' were found to be the most controversial. This category comprises a variety of different services like education, resettlement, aid provision (food rations, medical infrastructure, water) and incentive jobs.

Education has been elaborately discussed in previous sections and chapters. Kakuma was often presented as an education 'hub' by both governance actors and refugees and asylum seekers. A South Sudanese teacher told me that he had been in Kakuma since 2001 and that he only saw himself leave with prospects for better educational opportunities elsewhere[61]. An Ethiopian teacher told me that he was acquainted with a young unaccompanied boy from Somalia, who had come to Kakuma to 'get educated', while his parents supported him from a refugee camp in Tanzania[62].

Kakuma is also known for its resettlement 'hub'. In Europe, resettlement has become a hot topic in recent years, where it is often considered a practical instrument to grant the most vulnerable and 'genuine' refugees asylum. According to the most recent statistics, 2054 refugees departed Kenya in the first half of 2014 to be resettled throughout the world[63]. In Kakuma, many respondents aspired to be resettled and they had often been waiting for years to be found eligible. 3 Somali interviewees had been transferred or had come to Kakuma on their own to be resettled. Sometimes, RSD and resettlement were not far related. Msafiri, a 23-year old Congolese explained that he had left Nairobi for Kakuma because his *dossier* did not make any progress in the city. When I asked him why he found it so important to be officially recognized as a refugee, he answered that only mandated refugees can be resettled to Europe. Refusing to go back to Congo, where he was sure he would be killed, he found his only future to be lying in Europe[64]. For some, this dream had become so strong that they would do almost anything. Jansen wrote that "insecurity becomes not only a resource but also

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[60] Interview, Congolese respondent (f), Kakuma: October 14.

[61] Informal conversation, South Sudanese respondent (m), Kakuma: September 18.

[62] Interview, Ethiopian respondent (m), Kakuma: September 17.

[63] 'Recent data' Mid-year trends 2014. Retrieved from http://popstats.unhcr.org/

[64] Interview, Congolese respondent (m), Kakuma: October 1.

something that is negotiated to access services and opportunities such as resettlement" (Jansen 2011: 200). In the Protection Area, I met with two Somali women who were each carrying around pockets with pictures of horrible wounds, her dead husband and weapons covered in blood. At certain times during the interviews, they would support their story with these pictures to prove it really happened, after which one asked me to plead to the agencies for resettlement [65]. When I later asked an LWF staff member if he saw such pictures regularly, he answered that it was all staged.

The lack or promise of aid provision and economic opportunities to supplement poor food rations motivated at least partially 9 movements and 5 respondents to leave a camp and move onwards. All but one said they had left Ugandan camps or had directly traveled through to Kenya. The poor quality of aid provision in Ugandan camps was something that was mentioned many times during interviews, even by those who said they had never been there. Two respondents explained that they had not stopped in Uganda, because they had heard 'terrible things' of the camps.

15 movements were motivated by the presence (pull) or absence (push) of **'social networks'**. With regard to movements to the urban, respondents sometimes connected social networks to financial reasons, because family and friends can provide support. A Congolese interviewee even motivated her choice for Kakuma over Nairobi by saying that she did not know anyone in Nairobi, "at least in Kakuma, there are a lot of refugees". Having lived for 7 years in Lugufu camp in Tanzania, she explained she felt more comfortable in the company of fellow refugees[66]. Another Congolese had traveled all the way from Oruchinga Camp in Uganda to Nairobi because he had heard that a fellow refugee had gone to Nairobi to start a church. He explained that other people had made the same journey, because "all the men loved her", and 'Madam Monica' had received them warmly in Nairobi[67].

The category **'third persons'** contains more external motivations. Sometimes, respondents had heard of another camp or place where it was better or they had picked it up on the way. Cab drivers and churches in Mwanza and Sirare bordertowns in Tanzania provided two interviewees with a destination. Two other respondents indicated to have been forced into a

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[65] Interview, Somali respondent (f), Kakuma: September 22; Interview, Somali respondent (f), Kakuma: September 22.
[66] Interview, Congolese respondent (f), Kakuma: October 8.
[67] Interview, Congolese respondent (m), Kakuma: September 16.

lorry which drove to a place where they had been dumped. Their stories remind of human trafficking, a prime concern of mixed migration policies.

The last three categories were only sporadically mentioned by respondents. All 7 movements in the category '**financial reasons'** were motivated by respondents who had lived in the city for a while, but had to leave because their resources had grown thin. 'Life in the urban' was frequently discussed during interviews. Respondents who had lived there wanted to return and others who had only been in camps expressed their wish to leave the dust, the heat and the frequent floods in Kakuma and go to Nairobi or Kitale. When I asked a Congolese who had just arrived from Nairobi about his life there, he cried out: "Ah, Nairobi c'est belle! La vie est belle là!". The category '**distance'** indicates the choice for a refuge because of its proximity. Four movements were motivated as such, although it may be that it was not always mentioned because of its obviousness. **'Familiarity of a refuge'** was motivated three times by respondents who indicated to have returned to a refuge they had lived in before.

However, most movements were made for a combination of motivations. Three narratives of two Congolese and a Somali are illustrative.

René

After fleeing Congo, René lived in a Ugandan camp for a time. With the little amount of food rations available and finding no incentive job, he found it however impossible to maintain his family. Being a former school prefect, he wanted his children to be educated, but found the camp schools to be inadequate. In addition, camp security failed as M23 regularly entered the area. Having heard of Kakuma, the family left for Kenya in search of a better situation.[68]

Waris

When an IDP camp in Mogadishu was attacked by Al-Shabaab, Ethiopian soldiers told Waris to flee to Dadaab. She and her children were safe for a while, but the camp soon turned into 'a second Somalia'. After the community collected money for the bus, the family moved to Nairobi where social relations provided lodging. However, as resources grew thin and police was harassing refugees in the streets, she turned to UNHCR who transported her to Kakuma.[69]

Eliezer

At the age of 6, Eliezer and his parents fled Congo for Bujumbura in Burundi. After his father died, his mother became depressed. Knowing a friend in camp Gasorwe, Eliezer decided to live

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[68] Interview, Congolese respondent (m), Kakuma: October 15.
[69] Interview, Somali respondent (f), Kakuma: September 24.

there for a while. He later returned to the city, where he worked as a cook to pay for an education in informatics. However, after being attacked at home, he and his newlywed wife ran back to the camp, where they were pushed into a lorry that only opened again in Nairobi.[70]

5.2.2.2   Underlying and influencing dynamics

5.2.2.2.1   *Life continues*

"Refugees are free. They're free! They live a normal life. Not like we"[71]

It was in this manner that an LWF staff member explained that the LWF compound in Kakuma was an 'unaccompanied compound', referring to the term 'unaccompanied minor' that is given to children who arrive alone in Kakuma. He further explained that LWF employees are not allowed to bring their family over to Kakuma, because of insecurity issues. Once in seven weeks, they are entitled a week of R&R (rest and rest) to visit their relatives. "We really need it, going to the family", he said. Although it must be said that there was one Congolese who described Kakuma as his 'home', most refugees and asylum seekers pictured a normal life quite differently than what they had in Kakuma. Interviewees often said they were 'between things'. Hereto related is the concept of 'liminality', a transitional state between two phases in which individuals are 'betwixt and between' (Turner 1967). Displacement is often conceptualized within this framework. Refugees find themselves in limbo outside 'the national order of things'(Malkki 1995: 5-8). Bauman (2004) and, in some publications, Agier (2008) ascribe little agency to refugees in this situation. While Agier writes that "these creatures in drift and waiting have nothing but their 'naked life' whose continuation depends on humanitarian assistance" (2002: 55-56, quotation in Bauman 2004: 77), Bauman goes further to describe refugees as 'human waste'. However, Jansen (2011) wrote that "apart from people suffering from traumas as a result of various wars, hazardous flight experiences and poverty, there was also simply life" (p.14). This corresponds to what respondents told me during interviews. Several of them provided their families with an extra income to supplement the rations by making bricks for houses, selling bread or fish or through an incentive job at one of the agencies. In this case, the LWF staff member was not entirely wrong in saying that refugees live a normal life. The continuation of life can also be extended to secondary movements. Most respondents tried to make the best of their situation, and continue with life. If that is thought to be better possible somewhere else, they move onward. Noël traveled with

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[70] Interview, Congolese respondent (m), Kakuma: October 6.
[71] Informal conversation, LWF staff member (m), Kakuma: September 12.

his family almost 1000 kilometers from Oruchinga camp in Uganda to meet a 'Madam Monica' in Nairobi. Although he might have had other reasons which he did not share with me, it was remarkably how he kept returning to the subject of her many virtues, her kindness and everything he loved about her throughout the interview. Moving onwards can also be a livelihood strategy, like Horst (2006) has demonstrated. This corresponds to the stories of Joseph en René who indicated to have left refuges in Uganda because of limited options for survival. Joseph and his seven siblings had been living on poor rations for several years when his eldest sister decided to marry a Ugandan and move in with him. René partially motivated his movement to Kakuma by stating that "The conditions in the camp were below standards. There was no work or possibility for a job". Education was also mentioned a few times. Being a former school prefect, education was very important to René. One of the reasons he left Uganda was the quality of education in the camp and the fact that his children refused to go to school, because it was being taught in the local language. However, apart from enhancing livelihoods, secondary migration had also proved to undermine opportunities for some. The diversity in educational systems and languages was a frustration of which many respondents complained about, especially those from the GLR. 20-year old Joseph said that he had taken a computer course in Congo, but was told in Kakuma that his document was worthless and that he had to return to class 2. He further stated he had experienced the same in camp Rhino in Uganda and that he felt humiliated to join children far below his age. During a FGD, Burundian participants complained that their children had been obliged to return to much lower classes after having moved onwards from camps in Tanzania where the curriculum had been in French. One male participant said that he had been in three camps in the course of his life. He was a child of those who fled Burundi in the seventies, and had received an education in English and Swahili, in accordance with the Tanzanian curriculum. He later went back to Burundi, where the curriculum was taught in French, after which he left for Kenya, where it is being taught in English and Swahili again. He expressed great frustration, saying that it was impossible to 'get on' with his life, to which everyone in the group agreed.[72]

5.2.2.2.2 Durable solutions

A second element that seemed to influence the motivations for many secondary movements is related to durable solutions and the future that respondents pictured for themselves. On its page on 'Durable Solutions', UNHCR writes that "There are three solutions open to refugees

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[72] FGD, Burundian participants (m&f), Kakuma: October 6.

where UNHCR can help: voluntary repatriation; local integration; or resettlement to a third country"[73]. Out of these, (voluntary) repatriation is the current most desirable solution, certainly according to states (Crisp & Long 2010). However, it has been stated above that repatriation does not always proves to be the easy success-guaranteed solution. 30 out of a total of 73 respondents indicated to be former repatriates. Forced repatriation, failed re-integration, new arising difficulties/persecutions drove them out of their home country for the second or third time; not one of them said s/he would ever consider to return again. Especially Burundian and Rwandan former repatriates, and others who stated to have been in exile for a large part of their lives, said that they had nowhere else to go. As local integration is not often presented as an option by host countries for these former repatriates and for others the only way forward is onward. Or to be resettled, although this often means onward movement as well. Msafiri explained it as follows.

> "When you're in Tanzania or in Uganda, you can be there for 6 months. Can you imagine 6 months without [refugee] registration? You are just stuck. You cannot go anywhere. You cannot study, you cannot eat what you want. Employment is difficult to find. I never imagined to be a refugee. I have seen it on the television, but I never imagined I would be one. Kakuma, it is a transit[74] camp. You can go and you can have a future."[75]

Apart from Msafiri, three other respondents, all Congolese, highlighted the significance of a refugee mandate for resettlement. In Kakuma, this appeared to be a problem. Despite of what Msafiri had heard in Nairobi about refugee registrations that are handled at high-speed in Kakuma, an officer of RCK explained that there happened to be a large backlog of RSD case decisions, especially for Congolese asylum seekers: "People have been here since 2009 and still have not passed through eligibility" [76]. Moreover, in reaction to 'numerous complaints' on rejected RSD applications from Congolese asylum seekers, RCK and DRC (2014) conducted a research in order to get a better understanding of the situation. However, apart from Congolese, Burundian and Rwandan respondents also voiced complaints about the RSD process. Regarding Rwandans, UNHCR has invoked the cessation clause for all refugees who

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[73] http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cf8.html
[74] Kakuma was often presented as a resettlement hub, both by governance actors and refugees and asylum seekers.
[75] Interview, Congolese respondent (m), Kakuma: October 1.
[76] Interview, RCK staff member (f), Kakuma: October 13.

fled events occurring between 1959 and 1998 (Harrell-Bond & Cliché-Rivard 10/05/2012). During a FGD with Rwandans, participants showed themselves very tense on the subject.[77]

> "We are discriminated. They don't want Rwandese. They think it's peaceful there now. You don't say you're from Rwanda when you enter Kenya in Nairobi. You say that you are Congolese."

> "They took refugee status away. They [UNHCR] said no, but new people don't get it. Some services have stopped for Rwandese. We used to get scholarships to study outside the camp secondary education. Not anymore. Only the refugees who came after 1998 can still get it. It is very difficult to get a mandate refugee status. We're not planning anything, because of that. We are followed by the Rwandese government in the camp!"

The male participant in the second testimony defended his right to stay in Kakuma by invoking his right for protection, saying that government spies were regularly seen in the camp. Rumors of this kind frequently circulated in Kakuma and could sometimes have far reaching consequences. Implications for onward movement are discussed in the following section.

5.2.2.2.3   Information

Respondents seemed to have very little information on almost everything; camp policies, the situation in the 'home' country. During interviews and informal conversations, this was sometimes made clear when respondents tried to hear me out, in their conviction that I would have more information on certain matters than they had. Information on the state of someone's RSD process[78], the time of arrival or the absence of resettlement missions for a certain nationality[79], a mother who had recently lost aid assistance from the LWF Child Protection Unit but did not know why[80], a woman who wanted to be reunited with her husband in a camp in Djibouti but did not know how[81].

When I had to tell respondents that I was as ignorant as they were on these issues, some started to speculate. Several researchers have emphasized the significance of dynamics of information and disinformation. Turner (2010) writes that "Rumors provide an overwhelming

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[77] FGD, Rwandan participants (f&m), Kakuma: October 13.
[78] FGD, Burundian participants (f&m), Kakuma: October 6.
[79] Informal conversation, Congolese respondent (m), Kakuma: October 6. And informal conversation, Congolese informant (m), Kakuma: October 15.
[80] Interview, Congolese respondent (f), Kakuma: October 8.
[81] Interview, Ethiopian respondent (f), Kakuma: September 22.

source of knowledge about the ways in which people react to dramatic change and how they attempt to interpret the global through the local and vice versa." (p.116). Jansen (2011) writes about Kakuma that "Stories, conspiracies and truths went around that were hard to unravel, but which were nonetheless loaded with meaning" (p.92).

Although there is much more to be said of rumors in Kakuma, there were some interesting stories that can be linked to secondary movement. Rumors about the security situation in the 'homeland' and in the camp would frequently come up. FGDs were especially interesting in this case, because many people of the same nationality came together in a place where rumors were further spread.

> During a FGD with Burundians, a rumor was spread about a group of Burundians who had been forcibly repatriated from the reception centre in Kakuma. "Last week, people were repatriated from Kakuma to Nairobi and then to Burundi. They took their communications away. Now, they're in a place in Ngozi. The women and the men were put in different places. The government of Burundi took refugees and put them in certain places. Because they're in opposition. Men and women were separated." [82]

This information relating to home and host country, resulted in fear of being honest about one's nationality to camp authorities and of being strengthened in one's opinion that Burundi was not yet safe to return to. If forced to move, it would be to another refuge. What is more, the reaffirmation of another insecurity situation for Burundians contributed to legitimize their position as a refugee. Although many respondents indicated that they had repatriated first before coming to Kenya, there were some who had only heard stories in Tanzanian camps about insecurities that returnees were facing in Burundi or they knew someone who had[83].

Imputations and rumors about government spies in the camp also contributed to a continuous feeling of insecurity in Kakuma. A Congolese informant told me that his neighbor had once approached him saying that he was keeping an eye on him. He had been watching and following him, which led him to the conclusion that he must be a government spy. A Burundian respondent told me a similar story. He said it happened all the time.

Sometimes, rumors would create new insecurities and lead directly to further movement.

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[82] FGD, 17 Burundian participants (m & f), Kakuma: October 6.
[83] Interview, Burundian respondent (m), Kakuma: September 23.

In the aftermath of devastating floods in Kakuma at the end of October 2014, a rumor was spread about an 11-year old Nuer girl who had been raped by Dinka, after which Nuer declared an open hunt upon Dinka[84]. An additional incidence involving Nuer children and a Burundian, widened the killings to GLR nationals, as Nuer could not distinguish Burundians from Rwandans or Congolese. Some were killed, many became displaced within the camp and refused to return to their homes. Some fled to other refuges, such as Nairobi and Kakuma town. It was later said that the initial rumor was false. Moreover, subsequent ration cuts by WFP due to insufficient funds were poorly communicated and easily read as deliberate actions to end the chaos.[85]

5.3. Opening an arena for negotiation

The last two sections on motivations and underlying and influencing dynamics show a certain ambiguity with what governance actors and refugees and asylum seekers considered to be 'genuine' refugees. While refugees and asylum seekers motivated many movements at least partially for reasons that are not protection related, such concerns are clearly not part of their ascribed identity. Motivations related to education or livelihoods are thought to be suitable for voluntary migrants, but inappropriate for refugees – regardless of the protracted state of their 'refugee experience', developments in other host countries that had made them leave, or any individual needs or aspirations they have. This makes governance actors suspicious about refugee motives for flight and certainly questions their right for a refugee mandate. Consequently, governance actors find it exceedingly difficult to separate 'genuine' refugees from cheaters. Thus explained the DRA camp manager that the RSD Unit sometimes takes a whole day to recover the true motivations from asylum seekers, because 'Kakuma is a real attraction magnet for resettlement'[86]. It was mentioned by an LWF officer that new arrivals from the GLR will always be asked why they skipped Uganda or Tanzania, which are closer in proximity, before coming to Kenya[87].

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[84] Both Dinka and Nuer are ethnic groups from South Sudan, where a civil war between the two groups caused 50.000 people to flee to Kakuma.

[85] These events took place shortly after I left Kakuma. Information was gathered through correspondence with 3 Congolese refugees (m) and one DRC staff member (m) during the months November and December. Also: UN News Centre (30/12/2014).

[86] Interview, DRA camp manager (m), Kakuma: October 10.

[87] Interview, LWF staff member (m), Kakuma: September 30.

The tensions between the ascribed identity of a refugee on the one hand and the actual concerns that were voiced by respondents combined with suspicion from governance actors on the other hand, open up an arena of negotiation. Returning to Jansen (2011), who writes that "people continuously contest and negotiate the labels that are ascribed to them to advance or improve their position or opportunities" (p.20), personal needs that are not related to protection force refugees and asylum seekers to maneuver within the humanitarian system and, in turn, encourages governance actors to maneuver within the narratives of those who seek access to the camp. Although the period of field research proved to be a little short to intercept many ways in which this negotiation took place, there were two examples on the side of refugees and asylum seekers that were mentioned to be frequently practiced. During an interview with a Rwandan and during two focus group discussions with Rwandans and Burundians, participants said that it was more convenient to tell the camp authorities you were Congolese, instead of Rwandan or Burundian. This was also mentioned by a staff member of the Danish Refugee Council:

> "Some Congolese, Rwandan, Burundian will not say they are of that country. There is a cessation [clause] for Rwanda. Because of the cessation clause, they will say they are Banyamulenge[88]. They ask for asylum as a Congolese, but you can see that they are Rwandese."[89]

Another way to maneuver the authorities was mentioned by a Congolese informant who had seen me in his neighborhood while I was conducting a FGD with Burundians. As we made plans to arrange another focus group with Rwandans, he said to me that many of the Burundian participants and the translators appointed by the group, had held back information on their whereabouts before Kakuma. He assured me that, although most of them told me that they had lived in Tanzanian camps, they had also been in Congo before they crossed over to Tanzania. The reason they had not disclosed that information, was that Congolese camps were notoriously associated with rebel influence and refugee militarization. Revealing this information would jeopardize their claim for asylum, because armed elements are not allowed in the camps.[90] Disclosing and withholding information on motivations and previous

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[88] The status of Banyamulenge as Congolese Tutsi who are originally from Rwanda, presents a grey area.
[89] Interview, DRC staff member (m), Kakuma: September 14.
[90] Informal conversation, Congolese informant (m), Kakuma: October 11.

whereabouts could be one way in which access to camps is negotiated, whereby the motivation of security would be one of the most important.

In turn, governance actors have to maneuver within the narratives of asylum seekers of whose motives they are sometimes suspicious. While Burundian and Rwandan new arrivals receive ration cards and a plot of land to build a house on relatively easily, the percentage of actual approved refugee mandates is very low. Recognition rates for Burundian asylum seekers in Kenya between 2010 and 2013 are respectively 52%, 52%, 21% and 27%. Numbers are even lower in the case of Rwandans: respectively 30%, 15%, 10% and 22%.[91] In addition, the RCK study has shown that there is a large backlog for Congolese for which UNHCR gave the reason of shortage of staff (RCK & DRC 2014) as the RSD Unit makes long hours trying to separate forced from voluntary migrants. In addition, it was proven that the exchange of nationalities, and the popularity of being Congolese, is known to governance actors.

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[91] http://popstats.unhcr.org/PSQ_RSD.aspx

6.   CONCLUSION

This last section will discuss the main empirical findings of the fieldwork in Kakuma Refugee Camp. The fieldwork also created new questions which will be cast into an appeal for further research.

Returning to the introduction chapter, there were three main research questions to which this thesis sought to find an answer in order to contribute to a deeper understanding of secondary movement.

Chapter One largely sought to determine the **routes and trajectories of secondary movers**.

It was demonstrated how refugees can be highly mobile by migrating between different refuges within and between host countries in the GHA. As 'combination trajectories' accounted for two third of the sample group, 'camp-camp trajectories' were said to be the least practiced: many who had previously been in other camps had stayed in other refuges in between. This led to the conclusion that movement between different refuges cannot fully separate camps from cities and other places, for they are entangled and interconnected.

Within host countries, several movements took place within the official, 'regular' transfer system. These are also movements known to governance actors in the field. Movements outside the 'regular' system were considered to happen more frequently, although they were less known to governance actors. While the transfer system seems to be predominantly based on motives that are protection related, respondents of relief agencies and the DRA camp manager believed that most movements are made for different reasons. Indeed, many movements within and all movements between host countries were indicated by refugees and asylum seekers to have occurred in irregular ways. This confirms the traditional association of secondary movement with irregularity.

In the policy field, the term 'secondary movement' is generally used to indicate refugees and asylum seekers who move onwards from their first country of asylum. However, it was interesting to note that movements within and between host countries were equally represented in the narratives of refugees and asylum seekers, which seems to indicate that both types of movement are closely related. This rises interesting questions about the extent of refugee movements, the implications for refugee mobility as a 'fourth solution' and it certainly presents an opportunity to further research the links between the two.

30 respondents, of which many GLR nationals, also indicated to be former repatriates. It was found that the process of repatriation can sometimes become a new link in a sequence

of secondary movements. Host countries frequently use repatriation as an instrument to resolve a protracted refugee situation that causes many anxieties among the host population. However, this does not always have the intended effect. Returnees create tensions by reclaiming their lands, returnees find difficulties adapting to life outside camps, and many find themselves to be forced to move again. In addition, many refugees refuse to repatriate and move onward to other host countries where finding asylum becomes complicated. This led to the conclusion that onward movement can also be the result of regional government policies.

Some interesting starting points were found with regard to the embeddedness of refugee camps in their wider surroundings. While education has not yet received much attention in this particular field of research, it certainly proved to be an intriguing element. The education connection between South Sudan and Kakuma was subject of much concern (and pride) among refugees, asylum seekers and governance actors in the camp. A second starting point relates to secondary movement. Although it was demonstrated that movement exists between different refuges within and between host countries, it takes more to speak of an actual *network* of refuges. The main question arising from the first research question on routes and trajectories is: is there besides linear movement also interaction between people residing in different refuges? An optimistic point of departure is the work of Horst (2006), which revealed Somali linkages between Somalia, Dadaab, Nairobi, and other refuges. Can refugee camps also bring about new social networks that spread within new frames through movement? What interaction can be found between governance agencies in camps and places?

A last remark needs to be made concerning the link that is often made between the protractedness of a refugee situation and the likelihood of secondary movement (Scalettaris 2009, Katy & Long 2010). Although it was confirmed that many respondents found themselves in 'protractedness', others were not. And several indicated to have moved on after only spending weeks, months or a few years in a refuge.

Chapter Two sought to achieve an insight in the **motivations and dynamics of secondary movement**.

It was shown that the victimization discourse and migratory models that represent refugees as being predominantly 'pushed', contribute to the perception of secondary movement as a problematic phenomenon. Both governance actors and refugees and asylum seekers valued push factors and insecurity higher when it comes to refugee movement. Pull factors and reasons that are not protection related are generally associated with 'voluntary'

movements, while refugees are considered to be 'forced' migrants. Moreover, Kakuma was often represented as an education and resettlement hub, which many governance actors found problematic. The importance of insecurity and push factors also returns in the motivations that were given for movement by refugees and asylum seekers: a third of all movements was at least partially motivated by reasons related to protection. However, inquiries learned that they also valued motivations that are not related to insecurity. Services such as aid provision, education, resettlement and incentive jobs proved to be of general importance, in addition to social networks, financial reasons, and other reasons.

Interviews with refugees and asylum seekers also pointed towards three underlying dynamics. Secondary movement challenges the idea of a refugee camp (or any other refuge) as a temporal space where refugees wait to continue with life. However, it is not always clear how long temporality can last. As life continues, building a livelihood, going to school, finding employment, and planning the future become equally important. These require durable conditions such as education infrastructure, job opportunities, social networks, and future prospects which are highly valued by refugees and asylum seekers, but which they also experience difficult to find, and for which moving onwards sometimes provides a strategy. Although secondary movement had also proved to undermine opportunities for some. As for the dynamics of information, the lack thereof gave way to many rumors, conspiracy theories and imputations on which refugees act and decide, give or hide information from authorities. In addition, these rumors sometimes create new insecurities and further movement.

Finally, it was argued that secondary movement presents an arena of negotiation within the blurring of voluntary and forced migrant categories.

The second research question thus led to the conclusion that secondary movement challenges the idea of a refugee as a victim that only seeks protection and safety. Although migratory movements can be the result of governmental policies, they also provide ways to maneuver the protractedness of a refugee situation or the temporality that characterizes the refugee regime.

This further leads to the last research question: **how do secondary movers fit into the present-day pool of mixed migrants**.

While UNHCR maintains that it is possible to make a 'meaningful distinction' between voluntary and forced migrant categories (Crisp 2008: 5), it was demonstrated that motivations for secondary movements of refugees and asylum seekers present features that are associated

with forced ànd voluntary migrants. It was shown that both governance actors and refugees and asylum seekers struggle to uphold both rigid distinctions, creating an ambiguous situation in the field, and opening an arena for negotiation. It is thus argued that secondary movement shows that motivations can be essentially *mixed*, also among people that we categorize as refugees and consider to be preoccupied in seeking protection.

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
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8. ATTACHMENTS

Attachment 1: Kakuma Refugee Camp – Layout Map (October 2014)

KAKUMA REFUGEE CAMP - LAYOUT MAP

Attachment 2: Topic lists of interviews

The following topic lists will respectively elaborate on the structure, and the questions and topics that were discussed during private interviews with refugees and asylum seekers; private interviews with governance actors; focus group discussions in schools (2); and focus group discussions with Burundians and Rwandans. Informal conversations had no fixed topics and are therefore not included.

Topic list 1: private semi-structured interview with refugees and asylum seekers

An interview lasted an average of 1-2 hours.

1. Introduction

    · Introducing myself (and my translator)
    · Explaining the purpose of the research
    · Granting confidentiality and anonymity
    · Requesting permission to take notes during the interview

2. Personal information of the respondent

    · Name
    · Country of origin
    · Family size
    · How long have you been living in Kakuma?
    · Have you been in another camp before Kakuma?

3. Opening question

    · How did you end up in Kakuma?

4. Camp life

    · What do you think of Kakuma?
    · Life in different camps (in different host countries)
        o Assistance provided by the agencies

- o Relationship with host population
- o Relationship with UNHCR and government

5. Urban refugees

- · Have you ever lived outside a refugee camp during your flight?
  - o Yes – How would you compare that to life in a camp?
  - o No – Would you ever consider to move to the city? Why?

6. Movement

- · What made you leave your previous refuge?
- · Route between different refuges
- · Did you experience difficulties /obstacles in your movement from one refuge to another?
  - o New registration
  - o *en route*
  - o Adapting to a new refuge
  - o …
- · Expectations and knowledge about Kakuma before arrival
- · Did you know people in Kakuma /other refuges before you arrived?

7. Some questions were adjusted according to the LWF Units through which I found the respondents (although miscommunication often led to improvisation and categories were often mixed during the interview, e.g. a mother could be asked questions from Child Protection and Education).

- · All Units
  - o How did you come into contact with this particular LWF Unit?
- · Education (primary and secondary schools
  - o Introductory questions about school enrolment, nationalities of students / teachers
  - o How did you become a(n incentive) teacher in Kakuma?
  - o What do you think about education in Kakuma?
  - o Educational opportunities in other camps (in other countries)
  - o Have you noticed students in your classes who have been in other camps before?
  - o For what reasons do you think people move between refuges?
- · Child Protection

- o Children as influential factors in the choice for a refuge
- Community Services
- Security
  - o What would you consider a solution for your situation?
- Livelihoods

8. Concluding questions

- Future prospects
- Is there anything you would like to talk about / you would like to add to what has been said already?
- Granting confidentiality and anonymity once more
- Explaining the objectives of the research once more
- Thanking the respondent for his time

Topic list 2: private semi-structured interview with governance actors

An interview lasted an average of 1 hour.

1. Introduction

- Introducing myself
- Explaining the purpose of the research
- Granting confidentiality and anonymity
- Requesting permission to take notes during the interview

2. Personal information of the respondent

- Name
- How long have you been working in Kakuma?
- Job description

3. In the case of LWF officers, questions were also asked about the workings of the organization or their specific unit. This was also the case for the workings of DRA in Kakuma.

4. Camp-camp movements

   - Have you noticed these movements in your work environment?
     - What kind of movements have you noticed?
   - For what reasons do you think people move from camp to camp?
   - To what extent are refugees allowed to move between refuges?
   - Do you consider camp-camp movement a problem? Why?

5. Camp workings in different countries

   - Knowledge of other camps (in other countries)
   - Have you worked in other camps in /outside Kenya?
     - Differences / similarities between camps
   - Exchange of information between camps in Kenya / in different countries?

6. Repatriation

7. Rising insecurity in Kenya and its influence on camp management and government policies towards refugees

8. Urban refugees and deportations

9. Concluding questions

   - Is there anything you would like to talk about / you would like to add to what has been said already?
   - Granting confidentiality and anonymity once more
   - Explaining the objectives of the research once more
   - Thanking the respondent for his time

Topic list 3: focus group discussions in schools (2)

An interview lasted an average of 40 minutes

1. Introduction

   · Introducing myself
   · Explaining the purpose of the research
   · Granting confidentiality and anonymity
   · Requesting permission to take notes during the interview

2. Personal information of the participants

   · Name
   · In the case of incentive teacher: country of origin
   · How long have you been working as a teacher in Kakuma?
   · What do you teach?

3. Questions about the quality of education in the school / Kakuma

4. Camp-camp movements

   · Have you noticed these movements in your work environment?
       o What kind of movements?
   · For what reasons do you think people move from camp to camp?
   · Do you consider camp-camp movement a problem? Why?

5. Education in other camps in / outside Kenya

   · Educational opportunities in Kenyan cities
   · Exchange of information / programs between camps

6. Concluding questions

   · Is there anything you would like to talk about / you would like to add to what has been said already?
   · Granting confidentiality and anonymity once more

- Explaining the objectives of the research once more
- Thanking the participants for their time

Topic list 4: focus group discussions with Burundians and Rwandans (2)

A focus group discussion lasted an average of 2-3 hours

1. Introduction

   - Introducing myself (and my translators)
   - Explaining the purpose of the research
   - Granting confidentiality and anonymity
   - Requesting permission to take notes during the interview

2. Personal information (only a small number of the actual participants were asked to disclose personal information, because the turn-up was every time larger than expected)

   - Name
   - Nationality
   - Family size
   - How long have you been living in Kakuma?
   - Have you been in another camp before Kakuma?
     - 4 were asked to give a short account of their trajectory

3. Life in Kakuma and other refuges (in other countries)

4. Camp life vs. life in the city

5. Movement between refuges

   - Second flights after return to country of origin
   - Did you experience difficulties / obstacles in your movement from one refuge to another?
     - New registration
     - *en route*
     - Adapting to a new refuge
     - …
   - …

6. Repatriation

7. Concluding questions

    · Future expectations / prospects
    · What information was disclosed at UNHCR, DRA and RSD about migratory movements?
    · Is there anything you would like to talk about / you would like to add to what has been said already?
    · Granting confidentiality and anonymity once more
    · Explaining the objectives of the research once more
    · Thanking the participants for their time