

“MARTIAL BRAVERY” AND JAPAN’S MODERN DEITIES

Commander Hirose and the “Three Brave Bombing Heroes” in Japan’s early 1930s

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“Krijgshaftige Dapperheid” en de Japanse Moderne Goden

Fregatkaptein Hirose en de “Drie Dappere Torpedisten” tijdens de Vroege Jaren Dertig in Japan

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In deze scriptie wordt er gefocust op twee instanties van zogenaamde “Vergodelijkte Japanse Krijgshelden” (*gunshin* 軍神) en hun weergave in verschillende media-vormen. Deze paper heeft als doel de culturele significantie van deze Japanse moderne godheden te onderzoeken en haar rol binnen de militarisering van de Japanse maatschappij gedurende de jaren dertig te verduidelijken. Er wordt gezocht naar wat deze godheden collectief verbindt en wat hen onderscheidt van andere nationale helden.

Om dit te doen wordt er gekeken naar Hirose Takeo en de zogenaamde “Drie Dappere Torpedisten” aan de hand van relevant geachte kranten- en magazine-artikels alsook andere instanties van massa-media binnen een ruw tijdskader van 1930-37. Hirose Takeo was een fregatkapitein die zijn leven verloor gedurende de Tweede Poging tot Blockade bij Port Arthur tijdens de Russo-Japanse Oorlog van 1904-5. Hij werd na zijn dood in massamedia “vergodelijkt” omdat hij “dapper” naar zijn ondergeschikte, Sugino Magoshichi 杉野孫七, op het zinkende schip de *Fukui-maru* 福井丸zocht. De legende van Hirose Takeo vond weerklang in de vorm van weergaves binnen de Japanse populaire cultuur, officiële narratieven en leerstof, maar verloor haar significantie na de initiële opflakkering van interesse. Rond de jaren dertig keerde hij opnieuw terug in officiële narratieven en werd gehercontextualiseerd als een “oord van herinneringen” (*lieu de mémoire*). Voorts moet er nog vermeld worden dat voor Hirose Takeo een breder tijdskader moet genomen worden omwille van zijn onstaan dertig jaar voor de periode die onderzocht wordt.

De tweede instantie waar dit onderzoek naar kijkt zijn de zogenaamde “Drie Dappere Torpedisten” (*Bakudan San’yūshi* 爆弾三勇士 of *Nikudan San’yūshi* 肉弾三勇士). Dit waren drie jonge genie-soldaten die, naar verluidt, vol met vastbe-radenheid hun levens hebben geofferd om de impasse die het Japanse leger met het Chinese 19de leger had tijdens het Eerste Shanghai Incident van 1932 op te lossen. De drie mannen droegen een torpedo naar de prikkeldraadomheining die de Chinese soldaten hadden opgericht. Ze bliezen zichzelf samen met het hindernis op.

Ondanks dat deze twee instanties geen substantiële band met elkaar hebben, zijn de sociale mechanismes die hebben geleid tot hun vergodelijking soortgelijk. Aan de hand van de bovenvermelde instanties van heldendom poogt dit onder-zoek deze mechanismes te verduidelijken en een geschiedenis van de twee instanties neer te schrijven. Verder is het doel van deze paper de gemediatiseerde vergod-elijking te duiden, haar cruciale elementen te ontleden en de commerciële en plastische dimensie van deze legendes te onderzoeken.

Deze paper stelt dat de vergodelijking van deze helden op een areligieuze manier gebeurde door middel van de mediatisering van cruciale delen van evenementen die relateren aan de held zijn dood en de verering erond (zogenaamde *media events*), dat deze helden een exclusief pantheon vormden van nationale helden die op hun beurt deel zijn van een overkoepelende areligieuze gevallenen cult (in Duits: *Totenkult*) welk een complementair deel is van de religieuze gevallenen cult zoals die zich manifesteert in instituties zoals het Yasukuni schrijn en de andere schrijnen waar de doden worden geëerd (*gokoku jinja* 護国神社). Als deel van deze overkoepelende gevallenen cult dragen deze “godheden” bij tot het onderhouden en versterken van bestaande naratieven zoals de “Japanse geest” (*yamatodamashii* 大和魂) of de “samoerai ridder code” (*bushidō* 武士道). Voorts verschijnen deze helden in de loop van enkele decennia en dragen oudere helden vaak bij tot het contextualiseren van nieuwe heldendaden tot deze zich vestigen als zelfstandige verhalen.

Ondanks dat dit onderzoek zich niet in detail heeft kunnen bezighouden met het volledige pantheon van *gunshin*, hebben de bovenstaande instanties zich als een waardevolle steekproef ontpopt om de aard van de *gunshin* te onderzoeken. Dit onderzoek besluit dat ondanks haar exclusieve aard *gunshin* als phenomeen uiterst vaag gedefinieerd is maar daarvoor niet bestaat uit arbitrair gekozen personen. Ze reflecteren de staat van de maatschappij die hen heeft voortgebracht en funct-ioneren als: manifestaties van een areligieuze vorm van de gevallenen cultus, werktuigen voor het legitimiseren van gewapende conflicten, het bevestigen van de indentiteit van de groep en soms als een stimulatie voor culturele en economische groei. Onderzoek omtrent specifieke instanties van oorlogshelden is uiterst schaars in westerse talen, niet enkel Japanse oorlogshelden. Daardoor was het niet mogelijk om een comparatief onderzoek uit te voeren die de kenmerken van Japanse oorlogshelden met die van andere landen vergeleek. Voorts was het materiaal dat kon verzameld worden in het kader van dit onderzoek voornamelijk uit de omstreken van Tōkyō. Ondanks dat materiaal uit andere gebieden gebruikt werd, was het wellicht onvoldoende om de locale dimensie die deze oorlogshelden hadden in hun geboortestreken te onderzoeken.

武勇と近代日本の新たな神様－

“古”広瀬中佐及び“新”肉弾三勇士を中心に―

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本稿の目的は、1930-37年の期間に焦点を置き、近代日本が生んだ「軍神」と称される英雄たちの社会的・文化的な意義を明らかにすることである。その目的を達成するために、二つの代表的な軍神を中心に軍神の生誕、鎮座の方法、武勇のメディア化などを検討する。さらに、軍神は靖国神社・護国神社で執り行われた招魂祭などによって祀られている戦死者とどのような関係を持っているか、軍神はそもそも宗教的な現象であるのかを明らかにすることを課題とする。

　本研究の最初の研究対象は、日露戦争で戦死した広瀬武夫海軍中佐である。広瀬中佐は日露戦争で行われた第二次旅順口閉塞作戦の際、部下である杉野孫七兵曹長の命を守るために敵の弾雨が激しく飛ぶ中で沈み行く福井丸を三度も捜索した。しかし、その姿が見つからないため救命ボートに乗ろうとした際に敵弾の直撃を受け戦死した。最初のメディア化・英雄化以降、広瀬中佐が日本社会の状況により数回再文脈化されたと考えられる。特に1920年代の後半から、日露戦争に関する公共記憶が薄れ、広瀬中佐は日露戦争の重要な記憶として帝国の栄光的な歴史を思い出す「記憶の場」（フランス語：*Lieu de Mémoire*)になった。その「場」としての意義を正確に理解するために、以上で述べた期間を検討する前に、当初の状況についても考察する必要がある。

　第二の研究対象は上海事変の際に、廟行鎮で中国の十九路軍の鉄条網を破壊するために爆死した肉弾三勇士（爆弾三勇士とも称される)である。この三人は大衆社会化の進展した日本社会で出現し、軍神の新たな世代を代表すると考えられる。大衆社会化と共に日本のメディア状況も大きく変化した。したがって、肉弾三勇士の軍神化は当時のマス・メディア状況に先導されたと考えられる。

　日本の近代化に伴い、他の近代国家と同じように国家を正当化する「英雄」が生み出され始めた。最初に楠木正成、西郷隆盛などの人物が銅像などにより国家の英雄になり、靖国・護国神社ではより一般市民を含むような宗教的な「戦死崇拝カルト」（ドイツ語: *Totenkult*）が形成され、その「カルト」によってさまざまな英雄が現れたと考えられる。宗教的な「カルト」のみならず、前述した楠木正成のような人物で代表する「無宗教的な戦死崇拝カルト」も存在し、合成的な「カルト」を形成すると考えられる。そして、軍神はその無宗教的なカルトの一つであると言える。

　公的な機関によって祀られていない、すなわち、機関の制度に由来していないため、軍神自体が定義しがたい現象である。しかしながら、軍神は恣意的な現象でもなく、①部下を思いやりながら戦場で戦死した中年の指揮官、➁大決戦の勝利に導いた将軍や提督、➂決死隊として任務を遂行して戦死した若い将兵という三つに分類することが出来る。宗教的な現象ではない軍神は、近代の神として、そして近代の方法により、国家の英雄として国民全体が参加できるようなイベントによって祀られた。要するに、軍神はマス・メディアに報道される「キー・イベント」と呼べる軍神の美談に重要なイベントによって鎮座されたと考えられる。広瀬中佐にとって、「キー・イベント」は、旅順での戦死、佐世保に上陸し東京へ輸送された亡骸と東京で執り行われた葬儀、大分県竹田市、岐阜県高山市と東京都須田町万世橋駅前での銅像建設である。1930年代に入ると、広瀬中佐を記念することの一つとして、邪魔者扱いされていた万世橋の銅像が改めて重視されるようになった。軍国主義的な儀式が開催され、帝国の栄光を表す場所となったである。同様に、広瀬中佐の出身地である大分県直入郡竹田町には、正式な神として「広瀬神社」に祀られ、その場所も同様な機能を担い、完成した際には一週間の間にもわたり非常に見事なイベントが執り行われた。

　三勇士の場合、マス・メディアの状況の変化に伴い、新たな英雄たちを生もうとするマス・メディアの競争の中で生まれた。「キー・イベント」として挙げられるのは、マス・メディアによって報道された日本国民など当時の他の戦死への認識より高い熱心、三勇士の母に代表される遺族が新聞社により東京へ招待されたこと、そして東京の青松寺と福岡県の久留米市で建設された銅像を巡るメディアアテンションである。もし日本が敗戦しなかった場合、三勇士も「記憶の場」になりえたかどうかは明言できないが、青松寺に建設された銅像の記念式がすぐに執り行われるところになり、当初の熱狂と共に「場」になることは可能であったであろう。しかし、「十五年戦争」の説を認めれば、太平洋戦争は満州・上海事変により勃発し、敗戦によって終戦して、決まった時代になった。要するに、満州・上海事変を巡る記憶は十五戦争を通じて薄れることはなかった。戦後検閲と共に前の時代になった上公共記憶からも消されたため、結局「場」になりえなかったと言えよう。

　このメディアに放送された「キー・イベント」は、「メディア・イベント」として軍神の鎮座祭の役割を果たしたであろう。軍神を国家の英雄として鎮座するよう影響を与えた「キー・イベント」は、マス・メディアによって時間性・空間性を超え、ある意味で国民全体に中継され、「イベント」の意義を伝える。それによって日本の新たな英雄は国民に「軍神」として認識され、生まれたと考えられる。因みに、「戦死崇拝カルト」は戦争を正当化する役割のみならず、グループのアイデンティティ、この場合日本国民のアイデンティティを確認する役割も果たす。すなわち、国民全体がメディアによって出席する軍神の鎮座によって、国民は軍神とそもそもどのような関係を持っているかは確認されている。

　広瀬中佐と爆弾三勇士の間に直接的な関係はないが、軍神としてテーマ的・制度的な関係がある。まずは、双方とも登場した際に以前にあった武勇によって文脈化された。広瀬中佐の場合、葬儀で演じられた弔辞では楠木正成の権化として提示され、新聞記事にはコスモポリタン的にホレーショネルソンイギリス海軍提督と比較されたこともある。三勇士が出現した際、国家の英雄は既に多数存在したため、当初広瀬中佐、旅順口閉塞隊、橘周太などと比較され、また一週間以内に新たな戦死者が出た際の武勇伝は三勇士の戦死状況と比較されるようになった。その比較を行うことによって新たな英雄たちは読者層に提示され、英雄の業績は強調・文脈化されたであろう。そして、その比較は「大和魂」「武士道」「日本精神」などの神話の証として提示され、その神話の不断さを表すこととなったであろう。

　今後の課題としては、本稿の結論から他の軍神の状況も同様であるかを明らかにすることである、またそれによりこの研究を拡大させ、「武勇に関する総合的ネットワーク」の存在を証明することも今後の課題としたい。

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# 1 Introduction

Although militarist trends during the 1930s have been the subject of a vast body of academic writing, a topic that has been rather neglected in English literature is the matter concerning to so-called “Japanese deified war heroes” (*gunshin* 軍神).[[1]](#footnote-2)\* *Gunshin*[[2]](#footnote-3)refer to members of a pantheon of modern Japanese soldiers that died a heroic death and were valorized in so-called “tales of martial bravery” (*sensō bidan* 戦争美談 or *gunkoku bidan* 軍国美談).[[3]](#footnote-4) These *bidan*[[4]](#footnote-5)were a form of moral storytelling based on personal, (semi-)fictional experiences of war featuring male soldiers dying on the battlefield, – equaly discoursively constructed – humble women sacrificing themselves for the nation or children who were raised to die for their country. While not limited to *gunshin*, a common theme in *bidan* were the lives and deaths of such high standing war heroes as General Nogi Maresuke 乃木希典, Lieutenant Colonel Tachibana Shūta 橘周太 and Captain Nishizumi Kojirō 西住小次郎.[[5]](#footnote-6) The lives of these men became prominent features of the Japanese media landscape, finding themselves as the protagonists of a long list of movies, radio plays, theater performances, biographies, children story books and text books. *Gunshin*, as a phenomenon, were present and virtually ubiquitous in the above-mentioned forms within Japanese society from the Russo-Japanese War (*Nichiro sensō* 日露戦争) of 1904-5 up until the end of the Second World War in 1945, and with that have left their mark on Japanese society.

Even though there is need for research on the whole pantheon of *gunshin*, due to limitations in the scope that this research can devote itself to these heroes, this paper limits itself, to only two *bidan* which it analyzes during the first half of the 1930s up until the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War on 7 July 1937. Currently, only little research specifically on *gunshin* is available in English. A few coherent examinations of the phenomenon can be found in Japanese in Yamamuro Kentoku’s *Gunshin* and Nakauchi Toshio’s *Gunkoku bidan to kyōkasho*.[[6]](#footnote-7) Whereas the first completely devotes itself to an examination of the phenomenon in question, Nakauchi puts his emphasis on textbooks where the tales of said heroes were prevalent features. Furthermore, Ueno Hidenobu’s *Tennō heika banzai* explores the *Bakudan San’yūshi* 爆弾三勇士 both during their period of relevance and the postwar period.[[7]](#footnote-8)In the English literature, Naoko Shimazu devotes one chapter of her monograph, titled *Japanese Society at War*, to Hirose Takeo where she analyzes his ascension to godhood in-depth.[[8]](#footnote-9) Aside from that, while *gunshin* are not ignored by Western scholars, they tend to analyze them as part of an overarching story. Even research that deals with wartime media more directly such as Peter High’s *The Imperial Screen* or Louise Young’s *Japan's Total Empire* which give insightful analyzes on *bidan* in a variety of media forms, still go rather broad talking about a variety of militarist tropes, not only *gunshin*.[[9]](#footnote-10)

The first instance of “martial bravery” this paper discusses is the tale of Hirose Takeo 広瀬武夫, a lieutenant commander (*shōsa* 少佐)[[10]](#footnote-11) of the Japanese Imperial Navy, who died during the second attempted naval blockade at Port Arthur (*Dai-niji ryojun-kō heisoku sakusen* 第二次旅順口閉塞作戦) in march 1904 who was posthumously promoted to the rank of commander (*chūsa* 中佐), then became a member of the order of the golden kite (*Kinshi kunshō* 金鵄勲章) and who became known as the first *gunshin*.[[11]](#footnote-12) After his death and his elevation to *gunshin* in mass media, he promptly became an iconic figure and a national hero strongly associated with the Russo-Japanese war, earning fame and honor both in- and recognition outside Japan. The second bidan concerns the so-called *Nikudan San’yūshi* 肉弾三勇士 or “Three Brave Bullet Heroes”,[[12]](#footnote-13) three sappers (*kōhei* 工兵) who died during a mission trying to destroy barbed wire defenses of the Chinese military during the First Shanghai Incident in 1932.[[13]](#footnote-14) Similar to Hirose Takeo, even though they were worlds apart regarding military ranking, their deaths received abundant media attention, they were posthumously promoted to the rank of corporal (*gochō* 伍長) and became one of the iconic images of the First Shanghai Incident and of early 1930s military campaigns in general.

This paper chose to focus on the abovementioned instances of martial bra-very and argues that these two are representative of two general trends regarding nationalist and militarist tendencies during the 1930s. These tendencies are connected and one of the aims of this thesis is to shed light on the character of this connection, something which previous scholarship has neglected. One being the emergence of new war heroes in the context of the contemporary military ventures, the other being the return of previous military exploits within collective conscious-ness. In other words, commemorating previous wars while new soldiers lost their lives. It focuses on these two *bidan* during the period stated above from the perspective of a media event, meaning their sensational promotion in outlets of mass media during the periods in which these *bidan* were deemed to be topically relevant. It also looks at the emergence and development of these media events in the light of military activity and media related developments and aims to get insight into how war heroes in Japan were valorized and if the fame of these military heroes contributed to a popular perception and social standing of the Japanese Imperial Military within Japanese society, and what influence these heroes had on the self-perception of Japanese audiences. Furthermore, with regards to Hirose Takeo’s reappearance during that period as part of commemorative events, as stated before, it aims at understanding the recontextualization of past events, in this case armed conflicts with other nations which were won and likely seen as past “glorious” victories, in the light of new political and military developments. For this purpose, he needs to be analyzed in the context of a larger temporal framework.

The media dimension of the above instances is examined by means of excerpts taken from Tōkyō based newspapers complemented with articles in newspapers from Fukuoka 福岡, Kyūshū 九州 and Ōita 大分 due to their geographical connection with the objects of interest. In addition to newspapers, magazine articles covering a variety of topics and niches such as women magazines, reviews, scientific magazines, et cetera, are used to further diversify the material used and to get a better insight in the discussions surrounding the objects of interest. However, due to the vastness of material which could be incorporated into this paper, it derives quite some information from, for instance, biographical accounts, as it could be argued that such works provide a condensation of the overall discussion of the bravery of the objects of interest. Lastly, photo albums have been a prime source for visual material.

Aside from dealing with topics of martial bravery and valorous death in mass media, this paper aims at providing a cohesive summary of ideas concerning the nature of *gunshin* and tries to place this phenomenon within the deification of humans in Japan in general. It also aims at understanding how *gunshin* differ from ordinary “heroes” in addition to the origin and development of the concept itself. For reasons that are explained in further chapters, it will become clear that the term *gunshin* is a vague one. One can describe some characteristics of *gunshin* and categorize them, but when trying to formulate a concise explanation what makes a certain group of these military figures stand out from, for instance, the thousands of soldiers enshrined in the Yasukuni Shrine (*Yasukuni jinja* 靖国神社) in Tōkyō, it is seemingly hard to justify the distinction.[[14]](#footnote-15)

# 2 Historical Context

This paper mainly concerns itself with the period of 1930-37, yet in order to talk about this paper’s main topic, one needs to look back to the inception of the concept. *Gunshin*, for the 1930s, were already, what Pierre Nora might have referred to as, a “Realm of Memory” (*Lieu de Mémoire*). They were fragments of Japan’s history, and crucial parts of the Meiji legacy as their emergence is intrinsically tied up in the Russo-Japanese War.[[15]](#footnote-16) *Gunshin* are a token of Japan’s early imperial ambitions, reflect the status of its army and are a phenomenon that is arguably guided by Japan’s media landscape. It was this imperial history that worked as the background of the 1930s.[[16]](#footnote-17)

As *gunshin* can be considered representations of the Army and Navy’s military prowess and embodiments of their moral values, they did not only serve as prestigious elements within the military’s oeuvres but are reciprocally subject to the social position of Japan’s Imperial Forces. Leaving aside the First Sino-Japanese War (*Nisshin sensō* 日清戦争) of 1894-95, Japan’s position on the international stage really took off with its victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. However, Japan’s victory over Russia marked a turning point for the military’s internal structure.[[17]](#footnote-18) From its establishment in the 1870s, the top of the military mostly consisted of members of the old *bushi* class (*bushi-sō* 武士層).[[18]](#footnote-19) Yet, the identity of individuals such as Nogi Maresuke and Yamagata Aritomo 山県有朋 (1838-1922) was not confined to only being military personnel, as, due to their heritage, they also belonged to the political and cultural elites.[[19]](#footnote-20) Incidentally, individuals playing political roles too came from the same background as high ranking military personnel and, as a result, were able to value military matters.[[20]](#footnote-21) Moreover, high ranking military personnel not only shared personal connections, with high ranking politicians, as most of them were from the Chōshū 長州 and Satsuma 薩摩 clique (*Satchō hanbatsu* 薩長藩閥), they also shared the same goal: to make the country rich and the military strong (*fukoku kyōhei* 富国強兵).[[21]](#footnote-22) As Japan found itself threatened by imperialist superpowers, the Japanese army, which on paper directly responded to the Japanese Emperor, worked together with politicians in order to ensure Japan’s future.[[22]](#footnote-23)

“Political dominance” (*seiji no yū’i* 政治の優位) was a prevalent feature during the Sino- and Russo-Japanese War and shows the rather homogeneous nature of the political and military elite.[[23]](#footnote-24) Afterwards, however, this dominance slowly faded away, as new personnel and recruits worked themselves up the political and military ranks, and specialization took place.[[24]](#footnote-25) As new personnel took the places of former personnel allied with the Chōshū and Satsuma cliques, close connections between military and politics too slowly faded, and the two factions became estranged. Furthermore, with the end of the first modern wars, the military found itself confronted with, what they saw as, “the moral degradation of Japanese society”. The military needed to find a way to keep itself running ensuring enough recruits and maintaining the spirit and training of recruits that had finished active duty in a period of peace and in trying to maintain its social relevance, the idea arose that the military should concern itself with the education of Japan’s population.[[25]](#footnote-26)

The military found itself also at odds with the new wave of democracy. Although some military personnel saw democracy as compatible with the idea of *kokutai* 国体, others were cautious as they saw it was one of the causes of the rise of socialism and the political unrest in Europe.[[26]](#footnote-27) At the same time, ideas such as demilitarization and the abolition of mandatory conscription understandably made some military personnel uneasy.[[27]](#footnote-28) This uneasiness might not have been completely unwarranted as Japan faced criticism by the international community for militarist tendencies due to it having soldiers being stationed in Vladivostok, and politicians tried to answer to calls for demilitarization.[[28]](#footnote-29) In October of 1920 Takahashi Korekiyo 高橋是清 (1854-1936), then the finance minister, voiced his opinion to prime minister Hara Takashi 原敬 (1856-1921) to abolish the General Staff Headquarters (*Sanbō honbu* 参謀本部).[[29]](#footnote-30) While nothing came from this, it shows that the idea to abolish a key institution of the military to conform to international opinion floated around in the political sphere.[[30]](#footnote-31)

Although the Japanese military was little involved in the First World War, this rapidly became a problem as it lost its momentum. Whilst it had fought during the Russo-Japanese War with a superpower on the same eye level, the First World War had led to many innovations in European armies which the Japanese army missed out on.[[31]](#footnote-32) While the army must have been eager to catch up, there was little political support for a modernization of the army, as there was no incentive for such a tremendous cost.[[32]](#footnote-33) Over the course of the 1920s, the military would instead be confronted with cuts in personnel, the Washington Naval Treaty (*washinton kaigun gunshuku jōyaku* ワシントン海軍軍縮条約) of 1922 and the London Naval Treaty of 1930.[[33]](#footnote-34)

In the long run, popular, financial and political support for the military began to dwindle, even after officers had been able to restore their image a little by helping with relief efforts during the Greater Kantō Earthquake (*Kantō dai-shinsai* 関東大震災) of 1923.[[34]](#footnote-35) Recruitment numbers shrunk and the salaries and pensions for soldiers dwindled.[[35]](#footnote-36) In the end, some officers and soldiers began to hate wearing their uniforms in public.[[36]](#footnote-37) Eventually, pent up frustration would be vented in magazines such as the *Kaikōsha kiji* 偕行社記事, blaming society’s ignorance of military matters on the fact that there had not been any wars recently, and that the amount of arms reductions was preposterous.[[37]](#footnote-38) This frustration continued up until the 1930s when frustration made place for disobedience. Whether or not the frustration was directly responsible for the disobedience and political terrorism at home is unclear, but if it is true that the military felt unappreciated, then it is easy to see why there was little internal backlash to these delinquents.[[38]](#footnote-39)

The economic, political and social context also began to see some changes from the middle of the 1920s. Economically, Japan experienced for the first time a deflationary trend because of the global economy after the First World War and the post-war depression.[[39]](#footnote-40) In 1929, the Wall Street Crash had far-reaching consequences as Japan too fell into a severe recession which political parties were unable to properly respond to.[[40]](#footnote-41) Meanwhile, the government’s financial policy led to economic inequalities while farmers struggled with a severe agricultural crisis. By the 1930s, the disdain for the military had slowly turned in a renewed approval of military exploits, as now political parties faced criticism. Politically, the early 1930s were marked by the advent of the so-called “Manchuria-Mongolian Lifeline Argument” (*Manmō seimeisen-ron* 満蒙生命線論) and Japan’s military ventures to the Chinese mainland, seen in the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident (*Manshū jihen* 満州事変) on 18 September 1931 and the First Shanghai Incident shortly after on 28 January 1932.[[41]](#footnote-42) This eventually led to the Lytton Committee being sent to investigate the matter, the establishment of Manchukuo (*Manshūkoku* 満州国) as a Japanese puppet state, Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933 and international isolation.

As with *gunshin* themselves, the planes of Manchuria are a more literal representation of a *Lieu de Mémoire*. After decades of virtual neglect, it resurfaced and brought with it the memories of past military exploits. While it took until the 1930s for Manchuria and Mongolia to be infamously dubbed the “lifeline” of Japan, the significance of the Manchurian Incident is rooted much deeper in Japan's past modern military exploits. With Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War Japan solidified its position internationally, even though being considered an equal to the West was still a fantasy and gained a sphere of influence over the southern parts of Manchuria. Direct colonial influence was established in parts like the Liaodong Peninsula (*Liaodong Bandao* 遼東半島, in Japanese: *Ryōtō hantō*) and the grounds on which Japan’s Southern Manchurian Railway Company (*Minami manshū tetsudō kabushiki gaisha* 南満州鉄道株式会社 or *Mantetsu* 満鉄) and informal control through maintaining relations with local Chinese leaders.[[42]](#footnote-43) While at first treaties signed by involved parties, such as the “Sino-Japanese Treaty Concerning Manchuria” (*Manshū ni kan suru nisshin jōyaku* 満州に関する日清条約) signed with the Chinese government and the Treaty of Portsmouth at the end of the Russo-Japanese war, guaranteed Japan’s claims over the above and more, these governments eventually changed and what was defined in these treaties became subject of discussion.[[43]](#footnote-44) For instance, China’s right to build adjacent or crossing lines to the *mantetsu* became an issue, as well as Japan’s right to place troops for defense purposes.[[44]](#footnote-45) The placement of troops around the *mantetsu* was a crucial point for the Japanese side, especially for the Kwantung Army (*Kantō-gun* 関東軍), however, China raised objections to the legitimacy concerning troops ever since the conclusion of the war citing that while Russia had given these rights to Japan, China had never given those rights to Russia.[[45]](#footnote-46) Japan, however, insisted that this was a matter discussed between Russia and Japan.

Even though Sandra Wilson tends to downplay the importance of Manchuria for the “ordinary Japanese person”, the historical link with the Russo-Japanese War means that the “ordinary person” may have felt more involved than some would admit.[[46]](#footnote-47) The extent to which the Russo-Japanese war shaped self-perception and involvement in nation building cannot be denied.[[47]](#footnote-48) The image of the war, whether actively consumed or not, was virtually everywhere. *Seirogan* 正露丸, the famous “Conquer Russia Pill” (*Seirogan* 征露丸), was branded during the war to capitalize on patriotic feelings and kept its original name until in 1926 the embassy of the Soviet Union voiced complaints after seeing one of the many adds in a newspaper.[[48]](#footnote-49) Victories achieved by Japan in these conflicts filled the schoolbooks, and the topic of the Russo-Japanese war was rendered various forms in topics such as history, language, and morals. School songs (*shōka* 唱歌), which were a particularly prominent feature in patriotic education, saw a variety of war songs (*gunka* 軍歌) added to its roster.[[49]](#footnote-50) With regard to educational material, it needs to be further specified that these materials were rather significant, given that they did not disappear from Japanese textbooks until the end of the Second World War.[[50]](#footnote-51) Even though there was a dip in interest in Russo-Japanese War in media, after the initial burst of commemoration up until 1912, the war came back to the forefront of collective consciousness in the 1920s, as it shifted from being a “recent” event to that of a bygone era.[[51]](#footnote-52)

The number of casualties in one of Japan’s first modern wars also implied a kind of blood debt as part of imperial history, meaning a moral obligation to not let those deaths of those who fought for the empire be in vain.[[52]](#footnote-53) While not every family had someone sent to Manchuria, chances are that they had a family member that fought in the Russo-Japanese War or during the Siberian Intervention of 1918-22. With more than a million soldiers sent and half of that number injured or killed within the first war, and, granted, a less bitter war with only a quarter of the soldiers involved, the territory of Manchuria was associated with bloodshed, grief and loss.[[53]](#footnote-54) This blood debt, however, likely only became active after 1931 when Manchuria suddenly became a key territory within Japan’s empire as memories were distorted over what these wars were initially fought over.[[54]](#footnote-55) Aside from the loss of human lives and the return of wounded veterans, it was the financial cost which created an immense war debt that together with an unsatisfactory peace treaty that stung. As Louise Young points out it was both glory and bitterness that was a source of early 1930s war fever.[[55]](#footnote-56)

At the same time, while the Kwantung Army was busy securing Japan’s lifeline, and the Shanghai Siege was in full going, acts of domestic political terrorism were prevalent with the unsuccessful coup d’états by the Cherry Blossom Society (*Sakura-kai* 桜会) known as the March Incident (*Sangatsu jiken* 三月事件) of 20 March and October Incident (*Jūgatsu jiken* 十月事件) of 21 October 1931, in which the Society attempted to bring about a “Shōwa Restoration” (*Shōwa ishin* 昭和維新), restoring the Emperor’s power and shifting Japanese society from the liberal Taisho Democracy (*Taishō demokurashī* 大正デモクラシー) to a military dictatorship. From February to March 1932, the Blood League Incident (*Ketsumei-dan jiken* 血盟団事件) occurred in which wealthy businessmen and high-ranking politicians were assassination targets. A few months later, the May 15 Incident (*Go, ichi-go jiken* 五・一五事件) occurred in which prime minister Inukai Tsuyoshi 犬養毅 (1855-1932) was assassinated by young army officers. This political terrorism would continue even up until February 1936 when a massive military insurgency led to the killing of Japanese leaders.[[56]](#footnote-57) The offenders often enjoyed popular support and went off scot-free, even if, as with the case of the *Sakura-kai*, the judges were the original targets.[[57]](#footnote-58) In fact, the trials often were counterproductive as these solidified the “pureness” of their crimes.[[58]](#footnote-59) It is likely that this popular support emerged from a feeling of injustice committed by the victims of the attacks.[[59]](#footnote-60)

In the meantime, the Japanese military organized grand commemorative events. While the Russo-Japanese War had been neglected immediately after the facts, and despite its 20th anniversary already being used by Army officials to push their own ideas, it would take until its 25th anniversary in 1930 for commemoration to hit a peak.[[60]](#footnote-61) Japan’s Navy Day (*Kaigun kinen-bi* 海軍記念日) and Army Day (*Rikugun kinen-bi* 陸軍記念日) which had been reduced to a strict internal celebration by the 1920s had taken up full course again.[[61]](#footnote-62) Mass media began devoting considerable parts of their program to the events on their respective days, 10 March for the Army and 27 May for the Navy.[[62]](#footnote-63) Another part of Imperial legacy also found its way back into public consciousness as 4 January 1932 marked the “Fifty Year Anniversary of the ‘Imperial Rescript for Soldiers and Sailors’” (*Gunjin chokuyu go-jū shūnen kinen-bi* 軍人勅諭五十周年記念日), a document which symbolically given by the Meiji Emperor himself to the military, and which held the ethical framework for soldiers of all ranks.[[63]](#footnote-64) The event was deemed such a success that the military decided, after the initial event to organize another celebration on 24 April the same year.[[64]](#footnote-65) Amidst these acts of pageantry, the nation’s heroes were put in the spotlight. Nogi’s handwriting was printed in newspapers, and Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō 東郷平八郎 had his voice recorded for a radio broadcast of the Imperial Rescript.[[65]](#footnote-66) The mediatization of such events brought military pageantry to the forefront of so-called “current events”.

“Current events” are occasions, ceremonies, developments, crisis et cetera that happen within a time frame that a society considers them “current”.[[66]](#footnote-67) This characteristic of being “current” is defined by a society’s media landscape and how fast information can be delivered to its audience. Before radio entered the Japanese landscape in 1925 and up until radio became widespread enough for it to be considered ubiquitous within Japan, “current events” were events that transpired at most within a period of a week or two from when it was reported.[[67]](#footnote-68) Radio accelerated information, making it reach its destination almost immediately, igniting what High calls “a critical mass” for mass media further cranking up competition between media outlets. With the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, Japanese audiences could follow the exploits of the Japanese military on a daily basis. Newspaper outlets often printed newspaper extras (*gōgai* 号外) using photographs of the battlefield as an edge within its competition with radio broadcasts. Soon the military craze manifested itself in other media forms as movie studios too started to scramble to pump out one military feature after the other.[[68]](#footnote-69) Soon, militarist media became virtually unavoidable, and it was consumed to the fullest as it would take until 1933 for the war fever to die down.[[69]](#footnote-70) This turned the Manchurian Crisis of 1931-33 into a commercially fueled war fever.

While militarist media has the tendency to evoke images of an authoritarian state threatening innocent journalists into publishing stories that the state or military dictated, media outlets had a high degree of agency in what was published. Censorship often limited itself to keeping military information a secret, which in time of conflict is often seen as an imperative. It was only after the February 26 Incident (*Ni, ni roku jiken* 二・二六事件) in 1936 and the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 that censorship tightened. That did not mean that there was no censorship of ideas. Publishing of Communist or other works of left-leaning political thought or articles were reason for bans.[[70]](#footnote-71) Anti-war sentiments could have been published, however, there was not a societal large basis for pacifism. While it had seen the destruction that the First World War had caused in Europe, often in the form of newsreels, these were no first-hand experiences.[[71]](#footnote-72) War was still directly linked to fortune and glory.

However, the question remains whether or not “the ordinary Japanese person” saw his or her life “return to normal” after the Manchurian Crisis.[[72]](#footnote-73) Granted, party politics made a small return in the aftermath of the Manchurian Crisis, and war fever might have dropped from 1933, but as discussed above, the military had suddenly become an important figure in Japanese society, political terrorism had been normalized and would return in the latter half of the 1930s, internationally Japan had successfully isolated itself and withdrawn itself from commitments to disarm. Direct and immediate impacts to an individual’s life might not have been so drastic, but Japanese society unmistakably had undergone a serious transformation, regardless of an individual’s perception. Furthermore, while Wilson contends the engagement of Japanese audiences during the Manchurian Crisis, as, for instance, studies on mass media remains a study on “messages that were disseminated, not messages that were received”, it needs to also be acknowledged that despite the inability to perfectly gauge the reaction of Japanese audiences, it can be reasoned that the media boom around the Manchurian Crisis occurred because outlets of mass media and instances of culture industries knew that printing what was printed and broadcasting what was broadcasted was profitable.[[73]](#footnote-74)

# 3 Japan’s War Heroes from the Russo-Japanese War Onwards

Before beginning with the analysis on the main two case studies, the concept of *gunshin* needs to be fully understood.[[74]](#footnote-75) As mentioned in the introduction, however, the precise nature of *gunshin* is unclear as it is based on vague criteria that furthermore changed and developed over time. There is no institution or authority that imposed standards on who could or could not become a *gunshin*,yet that does not diminish the exclusive nature of the phenomenon.[[75]](#footnote-76) The ascension to *gunshin* does follow social trends, its own deification logic and reflects the society they emerged from and persisted in. The term was initially a popular term that was constructed by fellows of the first *gunshin* and embraced but not officially acknowledged by the Japanese Military. Some might argue that it was this recognition from above that in the end, guaranteed the success of the phenomenon.[[76]](#footnote-77) This recognition from above might also, in the end, have contributed to its exclusive nature. Despite that the masses and media outlets could dub someone a *gunshin*, it might have needed the military’s or the state’s implicit approval of the individual. Examples of military personnel or state officials speaking about *gunshin* in the open are plentiful, but even that does not necessarily imply official endorsement as officers or officials often acted as private individuals.

Despite its vagueness, however, there are ways to categorize *gunshin*, more specifically there are arguably three types of *gunshin*.[[77]](#footnote-78) Firstly, the middle-aged commanders (*shiki-kan* 指揮官) who put their lives in danger out of consideration for the safety of their inferiors. This relationship between superiors and inferiors in which the superior feels responsibility towards his inferiors marks a clear cut and reversion with the past model of servitude between lord and retainer, in which the retainer devotes himself completely to his lord that persisted most of Japanese history, and the beginning of a modernized logic in the structure of armed forces.[[78]](#footnote-79) This type emerged first with the first two *gunshin* Commander Hirose Takeo, who is discussed in-depth below, and Lieutenant colonel Tachibana Shūta.[[79]](#footnote-80) The second type refers to a general (*shōgun* 将軍) or admiral (*teitoku* 提督) who led his troops to victory in a decisive fight. This group is represented by General Nogi Maresuke and Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō.[[80]](#footnote-81) Lastly, the third type is the youngest category, and refers to, usually a group of, young officers and men (*shōhei* 将兵) that accomplished an operation or a mission but were unable to return alive. The third group can be represented by the *Bakudan San’yūshi* and the “special attack force” (*Tokubetsu kōgeki-tai* 特別攻撃隊), sometimes referred to as the “Nine Deified War Heroes” (*Kyūgunshin* 九軍神). That this category consists of groups rather than referring to a single individual distinguished this category from the first two, as often the indentity of the individual, while often known, merges as a part of the whole.[[81]](#footnote-82)

The *San’yūshi* are the prime example of the vagueness of *gunshin*, and perhaps a clue regarding whether recognition from above was an implicit requirement. While there are plenty of examples of material referring to the *San’yūshi* as *gunshin*, such as newspaper articles, magazines and movies, there are also examples of the opposite. Ueno, for instance, cites one of his encounters with such material, a biographical work that was titled “An Authentic Biography of the Deified War Hero Eshita Takeji” (*Gunshin Eshita Takeji seiden* 軍神江下武二正伝) which allegedly had the characters for “*gunshin*”marked with a red pencil and with a comment saying “the two characters for deified war hero are unnecessary” (*gunshin no futaji wa iranai* 軍神の二字は要らない) written next to it.[[82]](#footnote-83) While he initially took the correction for Post-war censorship, he later acknowledged the possibility of post-production alterations.[[83]](#footnote-84)

Yet, despite this ambiguity, for all intents and purposes the *San’yūshi* might as well be, and for this paper are, considered *gunshin*. Because, as with other *gunshin*, they reflect the state of the society they emerged from. As Yamamuro puts it, they were “*gunshin* that did not become *gunshin*”.[[84]](#footnote-85) From the 1920s onwards, Japan underwent a transformation following the First World War, as the boundaries of the state and society became blurrier.[[85]](#footnote-86) By the 1930s Japanese society had undergone a metamorphosis to a mass society (*taishū shakai-ka* 大衆社会化).[[86]](#footnote-87) Whereas during the Russo-Japanese War, the strict hierarchy might have given rise to “great men” (*ijin* 偉人), these were considered elites. For the common people, the noble death of an elite might have been tragic and moved them to tears yet was perhaps unrelatable. Seeing “one of their own” engage in heroic acts of selfless dedication to the country might have been more stimulating than the most recent case of a brave major or commander meeting a tragic end. Then the reason for them not officially being embraced as *gunshin* might be perhaps due to persisting social rigidness and official channels being hesitant adding them to the pantheon of elites. There was still a difference between being a model soldier and receiving the honor of being added to an exclusive pantheon. The following chapters aim at providing insights into the possible origin of the phenomenon and the process of deification.

## 3.1 On Deification and Deified Japanese War Heroes

There is a long standing tradition of deification in Japan stretching back to before the Nara period (710-794 CE) in which the connection between humans and deities was rendered in a variety of ways.[[87]](#footnote-88) Collectively this refers to *Hitogami* 人神, a distinct category in which the soul (*tama* 霊) which becomes a god (*kami* 神) originates from or is connected to the soul of a human (*jinrei* 人霊 or *reikon* 霊魂).[[88]](#footnote-89) Animism led to the deification of natural phenomena, parts of the natural world such as roads, rivers and geographic areas (so-called “spirits of the ground” *dochigami* 土地神) or the sky (so-called “heavenly gods” *amatsukami* 天つ神). The idea was that both living and non-living things harbor souls, and as a result, human souls became part of the equation and were incorporated into this larger frame of animism. This meant that the soul of a human could be elevated and become a divine spirit (*shinrei* 神霊) and turn into the soul of a natural phenomenon such as a river, a forest or a mountain.[[89]](#footnote-90) In the larger framework of *Hitogami* this group can be referred to as the “personification-style deities” (*gijin-kei* 擬人系).

The second kind of *Hitogami* are so-called “visiting gods” (*raihō-kei* 来訪系) and refers to individuals that are possessed by souls (*kami no hito e no hyōi* カミの人への憑依). These are souls or deities that use a human that is suitable as a medium and includes tropes such as the “mysterious visitor” (*marebito* 希人).[[90]](#footnote-91) The third type of *Hitogami* refers to a group of humans that directly turned into deities (*hito no kami-ka* 人のカミ化) either while they were alive or after their death, and is referred to as “Human Gods Group”(*hitogami-kei* 人神系).[[91]](#footnote-92) The most well-known example of this is likely the Japanese Emperor (*tennō* 天皇) who as descendant of the sun goddess Amaterasu (*Amaterasu ōmikami* 天照大御神) is considered to be a “living god” (*arahitogami* 現人神). This category is more exclusive than it might appear at first glance as it does not encompass private worship of ancestors within a private family shrine (*shibyō* 私廟).[[92]](#footnote-93) It refers to publicly worshipped humans that turned god, and even then, people that died of old age are not included within this category.[[93]](#footnote-94) In the case of deceased persons, these were humans that were able to show strong emotions of joy or anger that were worshiped as new deities. While often these deceased humans were worshiped to pacify vengeful spirits, sometimes emotions from the worshippers, such as admiration for a loyal death (*chūshi* 忠死), were prevalent in this deification logic which was likely the case with Kusunoki Masashige 楠木正成 (1294-1336) and Ōishi Yoshio 大石良雄 (1659-1703).

Within this cultural phenomenon of deification, Japan’s warrior class (*bushi* 武士), which exerted its influence over Japan’s society from the 12th century during the latter part of the Heian Period (794-1185), naturally became subject to deification. Deification, however, was no fixed concept. Over time, new concepts entered deification and shifted the perception of the divine from an ancient (*kodai* 古代) unitary system in which it was believed that humans and spirits inhabited the same plane of existence, to a medieval (*chūsei* 中世) dual perception in which there was a notion of two worlds, one being the material world (*shigan* 此岸) and nirvana (*higan* 彼岸), to eventually an early modern-modern (*kinsei, kindai* 近世・近代) notion in which the material world became the field of existence important for *hitogami*.[[94]](#footnote-95)

When thinking about the nature of *gunshin*,as soldiers that were deified, the third category of *Hitogami*, especially considering the deification of warriors,seems to offer a possible cultural origin to the phenomenon. As the concept of publicly worshipped humans was not something out of the ordinary. Despite the *bushi* class falling out of power after the Meiji Restoration (*Meiji ishin* 明治維新) the image of war gods sometimes became popular objects of worship (*hayarigami* 流行神) as was case from the Russo-Japanese War onwards where soldiers began worshiping Katō Kiyomasa 加藤清正 as a “war god” (*ikusagami* 軍神) to further “continued luck in the fortunes of war” (*bun’un chōkyū* 武運長久).[[95]](#footnote-96) Only few *bushi* were able to become a unifying force throughout Japan. The term *ikusagami* is written with the same characters used to write *gunshin*, and as a result, this, together with the observation of the character *kami* in the term, raises the question whether *gunshin* are a religious phenomenon or a modern fabrication. One of the first articles pertaining to the death of Hirose was a transcribed telegram sent via official channels by some of his fellows. The telegram is likely the first document that refers to Hirose as an *ikusagami,* with the article unable to show the reading in *furigana* as the space was occupied with emphasis signs.[[96]](#footnote-97) Why the reading shifted from *ikusagami* to *gunshin* is unclear, but it might perhaps be linked to a separation between the two concepts.[[97]](#footnote-98) The original transcribed telegram used clearly *ikusagami.*[[98]](#footnote-99)This either indicates archaic use of language, or an intent by the sender to draw on the imagination of other “war gods” to establish Hirose’s prestige. Furthermore, the telegram was sent via official channels, despite it being Hirose’s fellows discussing private thoughts on Hirose.[[99]](#footnote-100) This hints at the possible motive to put Hirose in a position where he could serve a similar function to future soldiers as a *hayarigami*, as the official telegram was transcribed in newspapers shortly after, something which likely would have been more difficult if it had been sent via private channels.[[100]](#footnote-101)

On a national scale, as part of Japan’s modernization, the need for public worship of its national heroes and recognition for its armed forces arose. The development of a cult of the fallen in Japan, while being a process that developed in the context of Japan turning into a modern nation-state and the concurrent political and socio-economic transformations, finds its origin also in the history of religion, and more specifically the history of Shintō in Japan.[[101]](#footnote-102) Noteworthy is the national hero’s or fallen soldier’s potential to legitimize armed conflict towards the people and the bereaved families, and functions to increase morale of citizens.[[102]](#footnote-103) Since the Meiji period, as part of modern nation building the practice of honoring the dead, in this case the war dead, as part of a cult of the fallen manifested itself most famously in the construction of the Yasukuni Shrine and the development of so called “invocation of the dead ceremonies” (*shōkon-sai* 招魂祭) in which the war dead were added to a pantheon of deities that were asked or commanded to protect the country. Whereas in Western countries usually a nonreligious cult of the fallen manifested, in Japan a predominantly religious cult of the fallen took hold. While *gunshin* too constituted part of this religious cult of the fallen, their *gunshin* identity needs to be seen as separate. As is discussed in detail in the chapters concerning Hirose and the *San’yūshi*,non-religious deification of these cases occurs usually in outlets of mass media through coverage of their deaths and the popular response to it. This has no direct basis in religion but is part of popular approval of the individual in question. The practice of honoring the dead shifted from a top-down project orchestrated by the state and the military during the early Meiji period, to a reciprocal interaction in which many actors worked together around the time of the First Sino- and Russo-Japanese Wars.[[103]](#footnote-104) This includes military personnel who often contributed to magazines, wrote books or functioned as organizer in events, who not necessarily represented the military or the state.

Subjects of enshrinement at the Yasukuni Shrine or so-called “Protect the Country Shrines” (*Gokoku-jinja* 護国神社), on the other hand are strict religious phenomena, completely in line with the notion of a religious cult of the fallen. *Gunshin,* however, must be seen as a composite case in which the religious dimension is present but not dominant and where their *gunshin* identity is separate from their enshrined identity. They do fulfill the roles of protector gods, but that identity stands apart from their identity that is rendered in school books, statues, songs, illustrations, et cetera. In other words, when considering *gunshin*, their apotheosis, identity and entry in popular imagination, a war hero logic is rifer than is a religious logic.

## 3.2 Mechanisms of Deification – Events that Transcend Locality

Until now this chapter has concerned itself with the intricacies of *gunshin*, what they represent and possible origins, even if certain aspects such as transnational factors are still subject for future research.[[104]](#footnote-105) Before advancing into the topic of war dead and engagement by the public, there is still the need to discuss the social mechanisms from which *gunshin* emerge. While this paper cannot concern itself with premodern mechanisms of deification much further, it does not need to as modern deification utilizes mainly modern utensils which are the focus of this paper. The need for shrines or commemorative plaque, for instance, which will be discussed in the chapter concerning Hirose Takeo, is something that in the initial stages were not even considered.[[105]](#footnote-106) Instead, the idea of *gunshin* emerged from outlets of mass media, and was likely guided by interest groups.[[106]](#footnote-107) As these national heroes transcend local boundaries, their legacy had to reach all members of the nation, as all these members were needed to witness the birth of this new hero and his ascendance to modern godhood.

Mass media was the ideal tool to connect and transcend spatial and temporal boundaries of events. Fittingly referred to as “media events”, this phenomenon refers to any kind of event that is “broadcasted” via the means of mass media to a large public.[[107]](#footnote-108) While the radio did not find widespread success until the 1930s, only being introduced to Japan in 1925, newspapers were in their own way able to “broadcast” events.[[108]](#footnote-109) Until instant transmission was available, this dispersing information took more time but dispersed information was still considered to be “current”.[[109]](#footnote-110) While the idea of a “media event” seems straightforward, considering it simply refers to an “event” that is disseminated to a larger audience by means of mass media, it carries some deep going implications. Firstly, an event constitutes a broad range of occurrences and can refer to a festive occasion, a disaster, an incident, et cetera.[[110]](#footnote-111) It can be planned and occur in regular intervals, it can happen temporarily without a warning or by chance, or anything in between. In any case, an event requires participants, active or passive, and carries its meaning mostly to them.[[111]](#footnote-112) Events are usually limited in terms of time and space, and only individuals fulfilling the requirements of sharing the right period and area with an event have the possibility to connect and participate with it on a deeper level than people who fall outside this category.[[112]](#footnote-113)

For this research, this paper focusses on “planned events”, which can refer to two types of events: “Public events” and “corporate events” and implies an organizer.[[113]](#footnote-114) The first refers to a, financially speaking, non-profit event in which the organizing group draws upon private funds, while the latter refers to events which are designed to generate profit in a direct or indirect way.[[114]](#footnote-115) While public events bring with them economic, social and cultural prospects for their venue, corporate events are mostly concerned with their own image, identity, networking and sales.[[115]](#footnote-116) However, these two types do not constitute a clean-cut duality but can form composite-style events.[[116]](#footnote-117) As events grow larger, multiple interest groups, each with their own agenda and goal for the event, get involved with the planning of an event. This brings with it that, for instance, an event which superficially seems to be organized as a public event can serve as a marketing stunt for one or more of the involved organizing parties.[[117]](#footnote-118) Events bring a variety of effects with them, they can stimulate the economy of a place, serve to confirm the identity of a group and polish up their image, it can strengthen or revitalize a doctrine, et cetera.[[118]](#footnote-119)

When media comes into the mix, these boundaries extend beyond its immediate temporal limits and surroundings. Furthermore, it opens the door to more players to get involved in the planning and creation of events. These players can get involved from the top of the event or be small independent players who indirectly get involved by capitalizing on the success of an event. Mass media holds the power to create, organize and/or relay events, and it is within this versatility that one of the characteristics of media events truly shine.[[119]](#footnote-120) Due to its potential of being organized on a national scale, the massiveness that media events can achieve bring with them a whole array of smaller events organized in different planes of locality. In other words, media events can be considered to consist of a layered mosaic with smaller and larger pieces spread out over its range guided by local relevancy.[[120]](#footnote-121)

Another thing to note are the mechanics how media can elapse the boundaries of time and space. For space it is straightforward, as media can broadcast an event to places too far away from the initial epicenter for the event to reach. Media does this by utilizing text, images and sound, giving the details of the event, contextualizing them and bringing the information to more people than would physically be able to attend. In doing so it provides all the necessary tools to feel involved in the event, virtually bringing the event home. Timewise, media cannot only bring an event faster to its audience, it can also extend the duration of an event by keeping the discussion surrounding an event going even after the event proper has finished.

One of the fundamental characteristics of an event is its extraordinary nature and its capability to form a contrast with the ordinary daily routine of life.[[121]](#footnote-122) However, there are some problems with this notion when one considers the difference in scale some events can have or the composite nature of certain events. For instance, small events might not have the same power as larger events to contrast with the ordinary, which, when taken on its own, might not even be that much of a problem for categorization purposes. However, gradation is certainly a necessity when discussing extraordinariness. Consider annual events, these, while forming some opposition to mundanity, eventually turn into expected festivities. These cannot, by nature, be equally out of the ordinary as a sudden event. In other words, not every event has the same potential to separate the mundane from the extraordinary. This means that extraordinariness is not a binary system but forms a spectrum. Consider, however, a composite-style, nationwide media event in which a certain topic becomes so pervasive that smaller relating events occur, then these events will likely not provide the same contrast as the core event, but add to the overall event nonetheless. Regarding the returning extraordinariness, while it may be true that the contrast with the mundane diminishes over time, this is not necessarily permanent as the mundane can become again exceptional within a new context. In fact, there is a whole industry powered by this concept of, which Shimazu dubs, “commemorative industry” (*kinen sangyō* 記念産業).[[122]](#footnote-123)

When considering what an event might refer to in the case of deification one might think of an act of enshrinement. In other words, people coming together to witness the birth of a new deity. In a way this enshrinement or festival in honor of a “deity” is the very mechanism that defines, ensures and strengthens the tie between the “believers”, delineating the identity of the group. Furthermore, as this event occurs it strengthens the ties within a group, as it serves to define and underline the boundaries of that group.[[123]](#footnote-124) Yet, what constitutes enshrinement in the case of a *gunshin* is ironically not literal enshrinement. The first shrine built for a *gunshin* was the Toshigi Prefecture’s Nogi Shrine (*Nogi jinja* 乃木神社) in 1916 to honor of Nogi Maresuke, the general who committed suicide together with his wife when the Meiji Emperor had died.[[124]](#footnote-125) Even before Hirose, the first *gunshin*, was enshrined, General Kodama Gentarō 児玉源太郎, another general, had already become an enshrined deity at his own shrine, without even being a *gunshin*.[[125]](#footnote-126)

As stated above, modern deities emerge by means of modern tools, yet the material which gets mediatized does not originate internally. Hirose’s death occurred at Port Arthur, his body touched the shore at Sasebo 佐世保, his statues were built in three different locations, et cetera. It is, however, through mass media that virtually the entire population could partake in a lengthy process of deification. Audiences are virtually transported to the location where the event occurs and witness directly the birth of new heroes. In further chapters, the key events that constitute the deification relating to this paper’s case studies are further discussed.

## 3.3 Timing, Casualties and War Fever

As established in previous chapters, the apotheoses of *gunshin* were basically a nonreligious process. Thus, it is important to understand popular appeal when creating national heroes. The cult of the fallen, which has been discussed in previous chapters, functions essentially to confirm the identity of the population and the survivors, to justify the casualties of war and to increase moral.[[126]](#footnote-127) Yet, the devotion to this cult is not a constant and as casualties increase and society changes, popular support for war cannot always be sustained. Moreover, in the case of the exclusive group of *gunshin*, who gets accepted becomes more and more vague. For this, one could consider the case of Tachibana Shūta and Kuga Noboru 空閑昇 (1887-1932).

Tachibana famously became the second *gunshin* but was never truly as loved as Hirose. This, considering that he virtually embodied the same or a similar set of virtues as Hirose.[[127]](#footnote-128) He was even promoted to the same rank as Hirose, from Major (*shōsa* 少佐) to Lieutenant Colonel (*chūsa* 中佐), forming an adequate Army counterpart to the Navy’s War God. Yet, his emergence five months after Hirose meant that, for one, Hirose’s death had already saturated the media landscape, furthermore, his death at Liaoyang also meant that he was only one death among approximately 23,000 deaths, whereas Hirose was one among circa eighty. The war had also been going on for six months, having started in February of the same year. From February to the end of August, many battles had been fought, amongst which also Nogi’s disastrous campaign at Port Arthur in which at least 59,000 men had lost their lives. In other words, Tachibana emerged from a bloody war where many men were lost, and bodies were, quite frankly, piling up. At a certain point, there must have been a point where empathy and morale of society, which incidentally lost the same number of husbands, fathers and sons, would run low, and it must have been this stained emergence that led to Tachibana’s essentially secondary position as a *gunshin*. Nogi, on the other hand, who had caused more bloodshed than Tachibana could have prevented with his death, was able to reconcile with the families whose sons he had sent to their death, and alongside his ritual suicide (*seppuku* 切腹) functioned likely as a fresh formula for becoming honored as a *gunshin*.

Thirty years later during the Manchurian and First Shanghai Incidents, a new war had brought the opportunity for new martial valor. As discussed below, newspapers were filled with stories of new martial valor. This was made possible by the relatively low number of casualties the incidents saw. Along the *San’yūshi* other instances of martial valor included the tale of Kuga Noboru, a Major during the First Shanghai Incident that was captured by the enemy during a mission, was released and later committed suicide out of shame on the same battlefield where his mission took place.[[128]](#footnote-129) Kuga’s tale expressed deep tragic and moral lessons, and it even received official recognition by Army Minister Araki who remarked after Kuga’s suicide that because of his martial spirit he would be honored like he was a casualty of war. The story found quite some coverage and some renditions in popular culture, it was, like many other stories, even featured alongside the initial *San’yūshi* coverage, yet it, and many other tales, simply paled in comparison to the attention that the three sappers received.[[129]](#footnote-130) This situation where newspaper pages were saturated with tales of martial valor was enabled by the state of the mass media at the time as well as the low number of casualties. Although the low casualty rate might have been the product of propaganda efforts, its low mortality rate meant that morale of Japanese audiences was still high, and as the market had grown in size, on the side of both producers and consumers, outlets of the culture industries and mass media had creative freedom with the production of sensational content.[[130]](#footnote-131)

The propagation of these new heroes during the Shanghai Incident was not necessarily disseminated in an effort to incite war fever, as the war had already been popularized with phrases such as the “Manchurian Lifeline” or the anger towards Chinese boycotts of Japanese business in Shanghai. In contrast, the new heroes were likely the result of an acknowledged conflict and served further to confirm the identity of the group during the conflict. However, regardless the function of these heroes, none of the other heroes, despite finding some renditions in outlets of the culture industries, found the same level of recognition and culture status as the *San’yūshi* did. With the ideas surrounding *gunshin* established and discussed, the following chapters attempt to apply these ideas onto the media events surrounding this paper’s two case studies.

# 4 Commander Hirose

## 4.1 Introduction to Hirose Takeo

Hirose Takeo was born in Taketa竹田 in Ōita prefecture on 27 May 1868 (or 16 July according to the Gregorian calendar) as the second son of Hirose Shigetake 広瀬重武 (1836-1901) and his mother Tokuko 登久子 and was one of six children.[[131]](#footnote-132) In May of 1877, his hometown got involved in the Boshin War (*Boshin sensō* 戊辰戦争) during which his house was burned to the ground. Five months later, his father became the head of a courthouse in Takayama 高山, in what is now the northern part of the Gifu Prefecture, Hirose too consequently changed to a school in the area. A few years later in 1883, his entire household moved there too. He was mostly raised by his grandmother Chimako 智満子 as his mother died when he was only eight years old. Chimako encouraged Takeo and his brother, Katsuhiko, to study hard. Furthermore, she would allegedly not allow the two to become arrogant and let them work in the house when they had nothing else to do.[[132]](#footnote-133)




Figure 1. A portrait of Commander Hirose.

On 1 December 1885 he enrolled in the Japanese Imperial Navy School (*Kaigun heigakkō* 海軍兵学校) in Tukiji 築地, where he quickly gained the reputation of being a “bad boy” (*akutarō* 悪太郎). Four months after he graduated, he first joined an ocean navigation missions to Hawaii Guam on 13 August 1889 and two years later another one on 20 July 1891. He joined various crews over his life, including the ship *Kaimon* 海門, *Hiei* 比叡 and *Tsukuba* 築波. On 12 May 1897, Hirose became a staff member of the intelligence division of Naval General Staff (*Kaigun gunrei-bu chōhō-ka ka-in* 海軍軍令部諜報課課員) and a month later, on 26 June, he was ordered to go abroad to Russia together with Takarabe Takeshi 財部彪 (1867-1949) who was ordered to go abroad to England.[[133]](#footnote-134) He promptly became fond of Russia, and even moved in into the house of a Russian family in order to learn Russian faster. After his study abroad ended, he was ordered to stay in Russia as an attaché in 1899.[[134]](#footnote-135) He would stay in Russia until 20 October 1901, when he was ordered to return home. On 22 April 1902 he became the “Head of Sea mines and torpedos” (*suirai-chō* 水雷長) and Divisional Leader (*buntai-chō* 分隊長) of the Battleship Asahi (*Asahi-maru* 朝日丸).[[135]](#footnote-136)

When the Russo-Japanese War broke out in 1904, Hirose led the Battleship Hōkoku (*Hōkoku-maru* 報国丸) in the First Attempted Naval Blockade of Port Arthur (*Dai-ichiji ryojun-kō heisoku sakusen* 第一次旅順口閉塞作戦) of 20 February. The members of the operation risked their lives for the mission and were referred to as a “suicide squad” (*kesshitai* 決死隊). Although the blockade was not successful, Hirose did return. A month later, he boarded the Battleship Fukui (*Fukui-maru* 福井丸) in the Second Attempt, being one of few sailors that went consecutively on a suicide mission. It was during this mission that he famously lost his life when trying to find Chief Warrant-Officer Sugino. When he blew of the search after having sought the ship three times, he was hit by a Russian bullet when attempting to board the life vessel. His death became an instrument for Navy public relations as Hirose became known as Japan’s first deified war hero. While his deeds at Port Arthur were the catalyst for Hirose’s legacy, it was not necessarily the focal point for his legacy as is discussed in the following chapters.[[136]](#footnote-137)

## 4.2 The Initial Event

Before this paper can discuss commemorative efforts concerning Hirose Takeo, the initial media event, meaning the initial media attention that the death of Hirose received during the first few weeks following his death, must be properly understood as this was a crucial period for his establishment as *gunshin* and arguably the construction of *gunshin* as a phenomenon itself. While the response to Hirose’s death could be seen as a spontaneous fervor brought by the death of an admirable person and fueled by a competitive mass media industry trying to capture its audience by means of glorified accounts of Hirose’s death, this view would ignore the possible intentions of another group of interests.[[137]](#footnote-138) Although it is true that newspapers competed to gain as much money of off patriotic sentiment, the Japanese Imperial Navy itself was still fighting for its own independence from the Japanese Imperial Army.[[138]](#footnote-139) Hirose’s emergence must, therefore, be seen within the light of the Navy’s ambitions for recognition.[[139]](#footnote-140) Hirose’s initial media event primarily consisted of his death at Port Arthur, his funeral and the initial efforts to commemorate his death. The construction of Hirose’s statues was a long and drawn-out process, hence, that part of the event is discussed in later chapters.

While Hirose died on 27 March 1904, it took some time for that information to be disseminated to the public. News of the Naval Blockade reached the public quite early, with various reports being published in various newspapers, the most detailed being one published in the *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* 東京日日新聞 on March 28th written by Tōgō.[[140]](#footnote-141) When the news eventually met its destination, it first was picked up by Ogasawara Naganari 小笠原長生, the official naval historian of the Japanese Navy.[[141]](#footnote-142) News of Hirose’s death came at exactly the right time, since the war had only just begun, the number of casualties was still low, and therefore morale of Japan’s population high. At the same time, there was a drought of valorous tales, which meant that the tale of Hirose did not have to share its spotlight. Combined with Ogasawara’s interest in utilizing martial valor and heroic tales and insight into the importance of public relations practically guaranteed the success of Japan’s new modern hero.[[142]](#footnote-143)

Ogasawara played a crucial role in promoting the image of Hirose as it was known until the end of the Second World War. While Admiral Tōgō arguably solidified Hirose’s potential to become an iconic figure by referring to him as a “model soldier” (*gunjin no kikan* 軍人の亀鑑), Ogasawara drew on his own relationship with Hirose, as well as the eagerness of Hirose’s friends to share anecdotes to compile material on him which he could use to carefully construct the image of Hirose. This was necessary as the first impression that Hirose’s image would make on Japanese audiences had to be perfect, anything less than that and the legend of Hirose would have failed.[[143]](#footnote-144)



Figure 2. The aftermath of the second attempted blockade at Port Arthur. The crew of the Fukui-maru together with the casualties of the mission.

The above image shows the crew of the *Fukui-maru* after the Attempted Blockade, while left and right large coffins can be seen, the remains of Hirose, a piece of his flesh preserved in a bottle of alcohol, and Sugino are actually held by the sailor on the right side in the front in small boxes. [[144]](#footnote-145) These remains touched the Japanese shore on 2 April 1904, after which it would be subject to massive media attention. It would travel from Sasebo 佐世保, where it arrived in Japan, to Shimonoseki, over Kōbe 神戸, to Shinjuku 新宿 in Tōkyō, and Japanese audiences could follow his remains during that period.[[145]](#footnote-146) Similarly to their issue where they had shown Hirose’s face floating above a sinking *Fukui-maru* as an illustration, the *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞 featured another illustration depicting the scenery of the moment when Hirose’s remains arrived in Shinjuku on 5 May. The image showed a group of, presumably, Navy officers along with some civilian spectators all looking intently at the station where a train had arrived. The image was then adorned with cherry blossoms, similarly to the above-mentioned illustration, along with some chains and an anchor. After the coffin had arrived Shinjuku, it would be transported to Katsuhiko’s house before which, however, it had been put on display in the women’s waiting room of the station. It provided a chance for bystanders and participants to pay their respects to Japan’s new hero. It had even foreign journalists attending.[[146]](#footnote-147) Hirose’s funeral took place two weeks after his remains arrived in Japan, on 13 April and was preceded by a massive procession which went over large parts of Tōkyō.[[147]](#footnote-148) As it fell the middle of spring, cherry blossoms adorned the streets. This period, starting with the remains arriving in Sasebo up until his funeral was adorned by newspapers disseminating a steady supply of anecdotes as well as some smaller complementary events such as Hirose being turned into a topic in an imperial poetry contest, became a motive on postcards and even had his image slightly commercialized.[[148]](#footnote-149)



Figure 3. Hirose's funeral procession outside the gate of Akasaka.

*Figure 3* is a photograph of Hirose Takeo’s funeral procession.[[149]](#footnote-150) The procession was led by Superior Warrant Officer Taniguchi Naomi 谷口尚真, followed by the naval band playing a solem melody, 220 guards of honor with one half at the front and another half in the back of the procession, and adorned by offerings in the form of a species of evergreen named *sakaki* 榊 which is sacred in Shintō beliefs from prince Higashifushimi (*Higashifushimi no miya* 東伏見宮, 1867-1922), prince Kitashirakawa (*Kitashirakawa no miya* 北白川宮, 1887-1923) and other families, in addition to two-toned red and white flags, as can be seen in the back of the procession in *Figure 3*, which were imperial offerings brought by the chamberlain of the Imperial Household.[[150]](#footnote-151) The procession was further joined by high-standing individuals such as Navy Minister Yamamoto Gonnohyōe 山本権兵衛, Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō, the Chief of the Naval General Staff Itō Sukeyuki 伊東祐亨 and Vice admiral Ijūin Gorō 伊集院五郎. From his hometown the Oka clan had also joined.[[151]](#footnote-152) Behind these high standing individuals and imperial tokens stood the funerary master followed by a gun carriage which was carrying Hirose coffin wrapped in black cloth, followed by three commanders and three lieutenant-commanders, and finally Hirose’s bereaved family which was led by his twelve-year-old niece Keiko 馨子 who can be seen with a white ribbon in her hair, a white top and a white hakama in *Figure 4* following the cart as chief mourner holding the hand of her great uncle Etō Atsuo 衛藤敦夫.[[152]](#footnote-153) Behind her was Hirose’s brother and Keiko’s father Hirose Katsuhiko 広瀬勝比古 (1862-1920) which is likely one of the two men behind Keiko in *Figure 4*.[[153]](#footnote-154) Foreigners too attended the procession including various diplomats as well as over a hundred representatives of foreign newspapers.[[154]](#footnote-155) Over the course of the day, the procession would start at the building of the Naval Officer Aid Society, pass Ginza 銀座, go through the Yamashita Gate (*Yamashita-mon* 山下門) to the Imperial Hotel in Hibiya 日比谷, then turned left to the Club of Peers (*Kazoku kaikan* 華族会館) along the Hibiya park (*Hibiya kōen* 日比谷公園), and arrive at the gate of the Navy Ministry. From there on the procession would pass through the General Head Quarters and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, depart again from in front of the German Envoy through the Akasaka-gate (*Akasaka-mon* 赤坂門) before it then arrived at its destination at the Aoyama Funeral Hall (*Aoyama saijō* 青山斎場).[[155]](#footnote-156)



Figure 4. Hirose Takeo's coffin.

In the Aoyama Funeral Hall military personnel, government officials, foreign journalists, the British envoy in addition to the American consul attended the funeral. A prayer (*saibun* 祭文) was recited by the Master of Religious Ceremonies (*saishu* 斎主), as women in black formal clothing (*kuromon tsuki* 黒紋付き) wept. However, one of the guests of honor, the poor, elderly mother of Sugino felt overwhelmed by the attendance. As she was wearing her shabby, worn clothing, she felt out of place and, therefore, hesitated to enter the hall. In a display of compassion towards the old woman, Ogasawara comforted her and led her inside despite her worrying. That she did not dare to enter the hall is a clear indication of the magnificence of the funeral as well as the status of the attendants.[[156]](#footnote-157) The procession and Hirose’s funeral saw massive attention in newspapers, with articles describing in depth the road that was taken, listed who attended, the things that were said, and illustrations to provide visual material to audiences.[[157]](#footnote-158) With this, the funeral of Hirose marks one of the key ceremonies in the mediatized enshrinement with the implicit endorsement of the masses, foreigners, the elites and members of the imperial family.

## 4.3 Hirose’s Tale of Martial Bravery – the Malleability of Facts and Details

Before moving to Hirose’s legacy long after his death and mediatized enshrinement as Japan’s first modern war god, the specific parts of his tale of martial bravery, meaning what exactly constituted his legacy as well as how it was utilized, need to be discussed. When it comes to his origin story, even the circumstances of the Second Attempted Naval Blockade are foggy at best, which is understandable as military operations always have a stress factor that originates in the inevitable response of the enemy.[[158]](#footnote-159) For the Naval Blockade, this meant the attempt to evacuate the *Fukui-maru* the Japanese Navy had planned to sink its ship at the small opening to the sea in front of Port Arthur while avoiding enemy bullets. As a result, although there is little doubt that Hirose died by a Russian bullet when trying to board the rescue boat after looking for Sugino Magoshichi 杉野孫七 (1867-1904), what he was doing on the ship and his motives are essentially lost to history.[[159]](#footnote-160) It was then the people who were present at his death and staff of the General Headquarters who carried the responsibility to fill in the gaps. When looking at the initial disseminated material, the following can be inferred.


Following the first articles published on 30 March, an editorial in the *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* began its interpretation of Hirose’s death by putting death in war in a bigger framework.[[160]](#footnote-161) The article starts by noting that “death not necessarily leads to a great achievement” (*shi wa kanarazushimo kō narazu* 死は必ずしも功ならず) and that this is even truer with military men. “However, greatness is often followed by death”, the article promptly continues mentioning that “this is true within the world of naval matters, as was the case with Horatio Nelson”.[[161]](#footnote-162) In mentioning Hirose alongside the British Naval Hero Nelson the editorial might have tried to put the two side by side in order to stress the significance of his death to its readers and perhaps to frame Hirose’s death in a cosmopolitan way as it called Nelson the “great pioneer” (*daisendatsu* 大先達). His bravery was not limited to the mission where he died, but in the greater framework of his bravery which was to join a “suicide squad” twice. That he then lost his life during the second attempt was then, in the words of Tōgō an embodiment of the values of the samurai, which as already discussed was the opposite of the customs of Japan’s old warrior class.[[162]](#footnote-163)

Hirose had famously died while searching for his inferior, the Chief warrant-officer Sugino on the sinking *Fukui-maru*. After searching the ship three times, Hirose finally blew the search off, but was hit by enemy bullets when trying to board the escape vessel. This act was then colored in patriotic terms throughout a variety of articles in newspapers, school books, magazines, et cetera. For one, his concern for his underling was portrayed as a parental-like concern for his child (subordinate) like that of a mother.[[163]](#footnote-164) This was seen by the Navy as a suitable moral foundation for its sailors, it meant that superiors were ought to follow the set of moral values that Hirose symbolized: Humane consideration (*jin* 仁) for his subordinates.[[164]](#footnote-165) Hirose’s death, furthermore, was placed within the greater framework of the Russo-Japanese War, in that he was part of a group of people that would finish their mission, whether they had to return to Port Arthur “three, five or ten times, they would not stop until they accomplished their goal”.[[165]](#footnote-166) In other words, with Hirose as a center piece, the values of strong teamwork, deemed to be quintessential for a modern navy, were shown to achieve greatness at Port Arthur.

Yet, when considering what happened to Hirose, it becomes clear that his heroic act might have been more reckless and had less to do with caring for an underling than was admitted. For one, the fact that Hirose was shot is a rather blunt reminder of the circumstances that the crew of the *Fukui-maru* found itself in. The Japanese Navy was deep in enemy territory, and, while the rest of the crew was waiting for Hirose to board the escape vessel, were under attack by the Russians. Furthermore, he, allegedly, searched the ship three times which took a long time which increased the risk for other members to fall victim to the enemy’s retaliation. Moreover, Hirose might not have worried for a subordinate, but a friend. Newspapers following the Attempted Naval Blockade mention a variety of names alongside Hirose and Sugino, yet it was only Sugino he looked for.[[166]](#footnote-167) This rumor did make rounds as, for instance, in the national daily *Yorozu Chōhō* 萬朝報 which roughly two weeks after Hirose’s death on 11 April published a rough criticism on Hirose’s foolishness as something that was only done because he and Sugino were friends. As a result, the article states, “[…] it is not regrettable as a friend, as a human and also not as a general”.[[167]](#footnote-168) This kind of criticism of favoritism clouding the commander’s judgment, however, seems to have been a fringe case as, such as can be seen below, his legacy was a strong and persistent one.[[168]](#footnote-169) It does show, however, that there was a layer of criticism surrounding the creation of Hirose’s tale.

To furthermore say that the two had a parent-child-like relationship is also essentially problematic, as Sugino was two years older. While one could argue that this parent-child relationship originates from a hierarchical difference and was not based on age, this is still symbolic and not grounded in reality. In an editorial in the *Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞, like many other articles, Tōgō’s report on what happened during the Second Attempted Naval Blockade was used as a baseline for judging Hirose’s bravery.[[169]](#footnote-170) Famously, Tōgō referred to Hirose as a “model soldiers”, and stressed how in his love for his subordinate one cannot help but feel how he acted in the spirit of the great commanders of old.[[170]](#footnote-171) Yet, this love for his underling was not the most crucial part of Hirose’s *bidan*. Only half of the messages of condolence that were written in honor of Hirose mentioned Sugino’s death, and later in moral education an anecdote was used where the Commander kept a promise to a child when he was warry whether he would return alive.[[171]](#footnote-172) It is clear that, while Sugino constituted the origin for Hirose, it was not the focus of his identity as *gunshin*. Hirose essentially represented more than care for his underling. As Shimazu notes, he represented a cosmopolitan figure respected by other naval powers, who also expressed strong patriotic sentiments.

Hirose expressed strong masculinity to the point where he was considered a “bad boy” (*akutarō* 悪太郎) within the navy, especially during his days at the Navy Academy.[[172]](#footnote-173) There exist many anecdotes that present him as a very masculine individual. Famously, he was a passionate practitioner of Judō, and would often go barefoot to his dojo, even in the winter. He would scold his peers when they complained about the cold, calling them “gutless” (*dajakusha* 懦弱者), and when he was in Russia, he was not shy to get involved in a “competitions of strength” (*kakuryoku* 角力).[[173]](#footnote-174) All of these episodes within his life, aside from showing his masculinity, also serve to illustrate his social skills rather than depicting his as a stern soldier.[[174]](#footnote-175) These anecdotes fueled the intermediary period between his death and his funeral, familiarizing audiences with the person and to a certain extent making them fall in love with him.[[175]](#footnote-176) When contrasted with the apotheosis of new heroes in future armed conflicts, the initial emergence of Hirose was not guided by a hatred towards the enemy nor to contrast Japanese society with it, but guided by genuine compassion towards a loveworthy individual.[[176]](#footnote-177) Furthermore, he might have also been seen as a handsome individual that one might call nowadays “cool”. Visual attractiveness, after all, is a not to be underestimated feature of an icon. A “brocade” (*nishiki-e* 錦絵)created by Kobayashi Kiyochika 小林清親, in which he emphasized Hirose searching the ship that is being torn to pieces around him in a composed fashion. This is the rule, not the exception, when it came to representing Hirose. Consider the following illustration used in a children’s picture book.



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Figure 5. Hirose searching for Sugino.

The esthetic dimension of the Hirose legacy must not be forgotten. For one, this presentation of him searching for Sugino in extreme conditions without even breaking a sweat and in regal composure is arguably a crucial part in his iconography.[[177]](#footnote-178) His masculinity is enhanced by his physical attractiveness, *Figure 1*, for instance, shows Hirose with nicely groomed facial hair in Western style and in a modern uniform, adhering to norms set by the contemporary notion of civilization and by transitive properties represents these characteristics as part of the identity of the Japanese Navy.[[178]](#footnote-179) It might come as no surprise that this made Hirose more than just a tool for moral and language education. In a textbook for drawing classes for the middle school, Hirose can be seen in a chapter on learning how to draw faces, adorning a whole page himself.




Figure 6. Hirose used as an example in drawing class.

Most of these tropes originated quite early and persisted up until the 1930s, where the tale of Hirose had achieved a kind of legendary status. While he exhibited the characteristics of an inherently modern hero, he was also considered to be the embodiment of old martial valor. Tōgō’s description mentioned above fits this interpretation. Hirose, despite his depiction in school books as mainly a military man, displayed prolific writing skills. Most famously, with his poem *Shichishō Hōkoku* 七生報国 Hirose referred to the words of the legendary samurai Kusunoki Masashige, the first part of the first line, *Shichishō* (literally meaning: to be reborn seven times), being a reference to Kusunoki swearing together with his brother that they would be reborn seven times to then serve the Emperor, and it was these words that, again, found itself discussed in the messages of condolence at his funeral.[[179]](#footnote-180)

His connection with the warrior did not stop there for some, as one author noted when talking about the actions of both: “Between the Kenmu 建武 and Meiji period, more than six hundred years may lie in between, but nonetheless, the loyalty, which is an outpouring of the true Japanese soul, is the same”.[[180]](#footnote-181) The construction of Hirose’s Shintō shrine in 1935 brought a new opportunity with it to solidify Hirose as Kusunoki’s modern incarnation. While the event surrounding his Shintō shrine is discussed in a following chapter, the symbolism connecting those two must be noted. The construction of Hirose’s shrine was completed on 25 May 1935, the same day as the 600th anniversary of Kusunoki’s death was celebrated, and while in the end this greater celebration might have harmed the publicity surrounding the shrine, the day was deliberately chosen to solidify the connection between the two. The Support Association for the Construction of Hirose’s Shrine published a biography of Hirose, by then one of many, in which the preface called it “truly a strange fate that this day is the same day where Kusunoki died heroic at Minatogawa”.[[181]](#footnote-182) It is of course doubtfull that the head of the Support Association was not aware of such an important occasion and more likely that time and effort went to the aligning of the two events. To further stress the connection between Hirose and Kusunoki the work made some far sought speculations. For example, it tried to find an origin for Hirose’s first name and attributed it to Hirose’s father’s fondness of poetry. The idea was that Hirose father must have thought of Hirose’s first name, when reminiscing about Kusunoki, how it drew this connection or how it knew Hirose’s thought process is unclear.[[182]](#footnote-183)


From the above can be derived that the story of Hirose was a very malleable and multifaceted one, he was used as a part of Navy cosmopolitan politics, moral, language and art education and over the course of the 1930s was reconsidered as new biographies brought other aspects of his life into the light.

## 4.4 In Memory of a Commander – Hirose Takeo from the 1920s - 1930s

4.4.1 A Surge in the Arts and Letters

After his death, the literary world saw a surge in works dealing with Hirose’s life: poem bundles, musical pieces meant for *biwa*, et cetera.[[183]](#footnote-184) With the end of the initial mourning of the Russo-Japanese War wearing off, however, in the 1920s and the increasing mythical nature of the era, Hirose too became a theme that was rediscovered in a new context. The below graph gives an oversight of how Hirose was dealt with in newspapers. While far from perfect, as it can only use two sets of data and only looks at newspaper articles, it can serve as a proof of concept. For one it shows the stark difference between the initial boom and the longterm development of the tale. In other words, it gives an insight into how consumption patterns of audiences change. Which raises the question of how the consumption of Hirose’s tale changed as the initial image of him, which was contained in public consciousness, faded away.

The change from the initial attention that Hirose received during his emergence, towards the low burning trend that can be observed in *Graph 1* is a natural result of the initial sense of novelty wearing off. Essentially, there are only so many new stories that can emerge from a single incident. The initial burst of coverage, naturally, occurs in the first year, notably the most in the first month, which for Hirose means the end of March and start of April, and constitutes the largest part of newspaper coverage. The small surge in the after the Russo-Japanese war might be due to the debate pertaining to Hirose’s statue, especially in the 1909-10 period when his statue in Tōkyō was built and unveiled. 1926 saw a project by the studio Shōchiku 松竹 that attracted quite some attention. This, alongside Hirose becoming increasingly discussed in literature, his 25th death anniversary in 1928 and the construction of his Jinja in the 1930s marks a turn towards a second boom.[[184]](#footnote-185) Finally, the period that starts in 1930 and increases over the course of the shows the link between Hirose with commemorative efforts surrounding the Russo-Japanese War. What needs to be noted is that Hirose’s novelty peaks during his initial media event, and that he later turns into a cultural relic.

 Graph 1. Articles Pertaining to Hirose from 1904-45.[[185]](#footnote-186)

Hirose had seen some mild success as a movie theme, finding himself in four movies, one in 1910 by studio Yoshizawa Shōten 吉沢商店, a studio Nikkatsu 日活 feature in 1919, a studio Teikine 帝キネ one in 1924, the one that arguably drew most attention was Shōchiku’s *Gunshin Hirose Chūsa* 軍神広瀬中佐. The movie was filled with symbolism, as, for instance, in the part dedicated to his time in Russia anecdotes were used to justify Japan’s concern for Korea and China or show his filial piety to the news of his father’s death.[[186]](#footnote-187) Concerning its production, studio Shōchiku announced on 10 March that it was recruiting actors for its project, stating that they were also looking for foreigners to play the role of Russians.[[187]](#footnote-188) The resulting movies were quite a success and over the course of May of the same year found itself published, for instance, as a series of so-called “on-paper movies” (*shijō eiga* 紙上映画) from the 16th to 24th in the *Yomiuri Shinbun*.[[188]](#footnote-189) A brilliant part of advertisement for the movies was done in newspapers where one large banner spanning the entire width of the page with in the middle the words “Backed by the Navy Ministry - War God Hirose Takeo” (*Kaigunshō kōen gunshin, Hirose chūsa* 海軍省後援　軍神広瀬中佐) told audiences that the movie was technically impressive as the studio had borrowed naval vessels from the Navy. For the Navy too this was a commercial stunt as they exerted soft power at home.[[189]](#footnote-190) The scene was shot in the Tōkyō bay on the Battleship Kongō (*kongō-kan* 金剛艦) which the “Popularization Committee” (*fukyū-kai* 普及会) of the Navy Ministry had provided. Afterwards, when in June the film was about to be released it was scheduled to hit the screen in various theaters at the same time.[[190]](#footnote-191)

As part of this second boom, Hirose was reconsidered in a variety of biographical works.[[191]](#footnote-192) For many people, Hirose had been a person which they usually encountered in textbooks, meaning a static *bidan* that only highlighted Hirose as a military figure with a few standard tales.[[192]](#footnote-193) This new wave of biographies put Hirose’s personality further into the light. Of the biographies that could be acquired, two stood out: *Shichishō Hōkoku – Hirose chūsa* (七生報国　広瀬中佐 “Return Seven Times to Serve the Country, Commander Hirose”) and *Gunshin Hirose chūsaden* 軍神広瀬中佐伝 (The Tale of the War God Commander Hirose). The two pieces are interesting because of the people involved in their writing. *Shichishō hōkoku* had a preface written by Admiral Takarabe and an epitaph written by Fleet Admiral Tōgō.[[193]](#footnote-194) *Gunshin Hirose chūsaden* had a preface written by Admiral Arima Ryōkitsu 有馬良橘 (1861-1944), who also fulfilled the role of the president of the Support Association for the Construction of the Hirose Shrine and was head priest (*gūji* 宮司) at the Meiji Shrine, as well as a councilor at the Privy Council (Sūmitsuin枢密院). The piece itself was written by Captain Arima Nariura 有馬成浦. The interesting part is what role these military figures fulfill when authoring or coauthoring these works, as they did not necessarily engage in these projects as military personnel but as private individuals. Content wise the two works follow a rather standard layout: Following the front cover, an array of images pertaining to Hirose, in addition to optional calligraphic epitaphs, usually one written by Tōgō, are listed giving some visual material to go along with the work. Before the table of contents usually some prefaces are written by the people mentioned on the front cover, after which the table of contents gives a chronological account of Hirose’s life. His childhood and the household he grew up in is analyzed thoroughly spending extra attention on his father and grandmother, his younger years and young adult years are described before then turning to his time at the Naval Academy. Following this are then not only accounts of his time on the various navigation missions he went on, but also from his time in Russia before then moving towards the wars he joined. Usually ending with his funeral and initial commemorative efforts and providing a compilation of his works.[[194]](#footnote-195)

Shortly after his death, there had already been an initiative by people from his hometown which in a similar way gave a complete view of Hirose. At the time, however, as official narratives in schoolbooks were dominant to private endeavors. Three decades later, biographies made use of the same methods as that primary one, often resorting to it as the primary source for anecdotal information and presenting Hirose to readers by means of his own writings. This includes his literary works as well as his correspondence with family members. As already exemplified in a previous chapter, there were some creative liberties and reimaginations of what Hirose represented, mainly expressed in the preface but also not absent in the main text. Examples of this include his birthday which was dubbed “a birth with deep significance” (*igi fukaki seitan* 意義深き生誕) by Arima as the day of his birth, when interpreted according to the Japanese calendar (*wareki* 和暦), would after the Russo-Japanese War become Navy Day.[[195]](#footnote-196)

4.4.2 Hirose’s Statues

Among the pieces that aimed at immortalizing Hirose’s valor, his statue built at Manseibashi 万世橋 in Sudachō 須田町 in Tōkyō sticks out. The way it depicts Hirose standing tall in the middle of a plaza which had small crowds looking up at him became an iconic landscape in Tōkyō, being featured in postcards, photo booklets, magazines, newspaper articles and was even featured in Mizoguchi Kenji’s 溝口健二 film “The Tōkyō March” (*Tōkyō kōshin-kyoku* 東京行進曲).[[196]](#footnote-197) It is clear that the statue had been connected with Tōkyō over the course of the Meiji, Taishō and early Shōwa period. Yet, while it was arguably the most outstanding one, it was not the only nor the first statue of Hirose.[[197]](#footnote-198) In fact, until the end of the Second World War, three statues built in Gifu, Ōita, and Tōkyō were on display in public spaces.[[198]](#footnote-199)

Arguably the third major part of the initial media event pertaining to Hirose’s death, albeit drawn out over the course of many years, was the construction of his statues. Shortly after his death, discussion about how to physically eternalize and commemorate Hirose began to take place in print media and among Navy staff.[[199]](#footnote-200) In newspapers Hirose’s colleagues expressed their intent to build a statue in the capital so that coming generation would remember and admire him as an outstanding example of an imperial soldier.[[200]](#footnote-201) While the statues became the definite answer to the question of commemorating, various ideas were discussed in print media, ideas ranging from simple poems to changing the name of his birth town to “Hirose Town” (*Hirose-chō* 広瀬町) were thrown around.[[201]](#footnote-202) A letter from a reader in the *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*, for instance, made a case for casting the commander’s likeness in bronze discussing in length the perfect location for such a project, which naturally would be the center of a metropolis (*Tsūyū daito* 通邑大都), and the necessary decorations, which according to him would be a poem and a text honoring Hirose featuring below the statue.[[202]](#footnote-203)

He was outright subscribing to Western ideas on how to commemorate national heroes.[[203]](#footnote-204) Aside from a statue, he called for Hirose’s name being taken and given to streets or gardens (*en’yū* 園囿) and for places where his statues were built to be renamed to “Hirose Street” (*Hirose-dōri* 広瀬通) or “Hirose Park” (*Hirose-en* 広瀬園), et cetera.[[204]](#footnote-205) This call for a Western way to depict the newly fallen hero was nothing new nor revolutionary, ever since the Meiji Restauration, bronze statues of newly reinterpreted folk heroes, deemed to be useful for a national narrative of a modern nation, popped up all over Japan, and mark a contrast with the native habits of commemorating individuals.[[205]](#footnote-206) The idea first found its way into Japan through the likes of Ōkuma Ujihiro 大熊氏広 (1856-1934), who in 1893 finished his statue of Ōmura Masujirō 大村益次郎 (1824-1869) in 1893. From there on statues of Japan’s new modern heroes Kusunoki Masashige, Ninomiya Sontoku 二宮尊徳 (1787-1856), Saigō Takamori 西郷隆盛 (1828-1877) in 1898 Ueno.[[206]](#footnote-207)

Already three days after the second attempt at a naval blockade at Port Arthur, commissioned officers at the Navy Ministry made proposals to collect money to build a statue in his honor, as widespread support of the undertaking meant popular engagement.[[207]](#footnote-208) This quickly became a matter which newspaper companies allied themselves with.[[208]](#footnote-209) When it was decided to try to build a statue in Tōkyō, his former colleagues initially considered Hibiya park as a suitable location for a statue since the park had a lake which could symbolically stand for Port Arthur.[[209]](#footnote-210) However, as permission to build in Hibiya was refused, as part of post-war anger at the result of the war, the location was changed to Manseibashi.[[210]](#footnote-211) The statue in Tōkyō would eventually be erected in 1910, five years after the plan surfaced. In the meantime, smaller projects to eternalize Hirose were on the move.

On January 1906 it was announced that a “life-sized” statue of Hirose was planned to be erected in a park in the town of Takayama in the previous domain of Hida (*Hida no kuni* 飛騨の国) in Gifu Prefecture where Hirose had spent his childhood.[[211]](#footnote-212) The bust was shipped on 24 January while at the same day at the Wakyō School outside Kandabashi (*Kandabashi soto wakyō gakudō* 神田橋外和強学堂) in Tōkyō a “convoy ceremony” (*gosō-shiki* 護送式) was held at which high ranking military personnel such as Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō, Vice admiral Kimotsuki Kaneyuki 肝付兼行, Hirose’s brother Hirose Katsuhiko and Major General Oshigami Morizō 押上森蔵 attended, the last being from the former Hida province.[[212]](#footnote-213) At the ceremony some speeches were held by the attending high ranking military personnel and the creator of the sculpture Masakiyo Kahō 正清華峰, before finally a chorus of girls from the *Joshi ongaku denshū-sho* 女子音楽伝習所 performed, after which attendants offered a branch from a sacred tree adorned with white paper strips (*tamagushi* 玉串) to the statue. When the ceremony ended there was a buffet before the sculpture was sent off.[[213]](#footnote-214) The statue arrived at last at its destination a few weeks later on 16 February.[[214]](#footnote-215) Accordingly, a welcome ceremony was held, with a follow-up unveiling ceremony where Hirose’s bereaved family was invited.[[215]](#footnote-216)

Ten days after the Takayama statue arrived at its destination, the construction of another life-sized statue was announced, this time to be erected in Hirose’s home town in Ōita Prefecture.[[216]](#footnote-217) The person put in charge with casting the statue was Watanabe Nagao 渡辺長男 (1874-1952), who incidentally knew Hirose when they were young, and who would later go on to create the Manseibashi sculpture too.[[217]](#footnote-218) Three months later, on 25 May the statue was scheduled to arrive in Taketa after being sent from Tōkyō the day prior.[[218]](#footnote-219) It would, however, take a whole year before the statue was finally revealed in an unveiling ceremony, on 14 May 1907.[[219]](#footnote-220) As can be seen from the image below, the statue was placed within the Yamashita 山下 park and depicted him in a rather regal posture. The statue bore a, presumably, metal plate with the inscription *Shichishō hōkoku*, referring to the poem which he wrote shortly before the Second Attempted Naval Blockade.[[220]](#footnote-221)



Figure 7. The Hirose Statue in Taketa, Ōita.

While the two prior statues were built earlier and sent to locations with strong personal connections to Hirose himself, the media attention they received was rather minor compared to the statue built in Tōkyō at least when looking at Tōkyō based articles. The statues in Taketa and Takayama were comparatively small in size, being intended to be life-sized, the one in Taketa, for instance, was only 180 centimeters in height.[[221]](#footnote-222)

A year after the Taketa statue was unveiled, Manseibashi was decided upon as the construction site of the Tōkyō statue.[[222]](#footnote-223) As stated before, Watanabe, who had previously been entrusted with the Taketa statue, had been announced a half year prior that he had been entrusted by the Navy volunteers, the individuals behind organizing the construction, to also work on the Manseibashi statue.[[223]](#footnote-224) After he had created a prototype, the casting of the real statue was done by Okazaki Sessei 岡崎雪聲 (1854-1921).[[224]](#footnote-225) In an interview published in the magazine *The Graphic* Watanabe spoke about the creation process of the statue.[[225]](#footnote-226) Stressing the fact that he ended up constructing the sculpture due to ties with Hirose’s birthplace. He gave the names of Navy personnel that were enthusiastic about the statue such as Rear Admiral Takarabe and Captain Mori. He talked about the details of his work, for one the explaining his decisions regarding the height of the two individuals, which he used to stress the glorious dimension of the two. Watanabe made Sugino’s height approximately 3.3 metres (*ichijō isshaku* 一丈一尺) 0.3 metres smaller than Hirose. The implications this carries are rather straightforward as it is a small enough difference to not overshadow Sugino, but together with the positioning of the two characters represent the dynamic between the two. He stressed, furthermore, that he did not want to merely present Hirose in an aesthetic way, but deemed a manner that properly expressed his character to be more appropriate to convey his significance to future generations. The eventual posture was one of three that had been chosen by the Naval General Staff.[[226]](#footnote-227)




Figure 8. "Hirose’s Statue at Manseibashi shortly after unveiling ceremony 1911.

*Figure 8* was likely taken shortly after it was unveiled on 29 May 1910 and shows people looking up to Hirose.[[227]](#footnote-228) Iconographically speaking, Hirose’s statue was built to present the commander calm, composed and regal in the face of calamity striking, with Sugino at the bottom of the base.[[228]](#footnote-229) The statue was funded by around 10,000 people who collectively donated 26,450 yen.[[229]](#footnote-230) There were two major events that guided the unveiling of Hirose’s statue. Firstly, 27 May 1910 marked the fifth anniversary of the Battle of the Sea of Japan (*Nihonkai kaisen* 日本海海戦), a decisive battle for the Japanese Navy, which presented a great opportunity to also celebrate Japan’s first *gunshin*. The unveiling of the Manseibashi statue was announced to the public quite early, as newspapers on 5May told Japanese audiences the unveiling would occur on 27 May, the same day where the Navy would hold its special day of celebration.[[230]](#footnote-231) A day later, however, on 6 May, Edward VII, the British King, died which essentially became an Anglo-Japanese matter, as on 20 May, in the Trinity Cathedral of Tōkyō, a Memorial Service in honor of the late King was held. This led to the Imperial Household being caught up in a period of mourning, and as Navy Day fell into the mourning period, it had to be canceled, despite the Navy’s ambition to make it “a day that should not be forgotten” (*kono wasuru bekarazaru hi* この忘るべからざる日).[[231]](#footnote-232) Out of respect for the mourning period, volunteers in the Kanda district exclaimed their intent to postpone the unveiling of Hirose’s statue so that it fell outside the mourning period of the Imperial Court.[[232]](#footnote-233)

This rescheduling, however, raises the question of whether the unveiling of the Manseibashi statue became an Anglo-Japanese or a cosmopolitan concern for the Navy and the volunteers. This paper argues that at least the cosmopolitan dimension of May 1910 should also be taken into account when discussing the unveiling of the statue. As the month May 1910 does seem to feature some Anglo-Japanese events, such as the Anglo-Japanese Exhibition (*Nichi-ei hakuran-kai* 日英博覧会) of 14 May, along with the above-mentioned memorial service, it does seem like it must have been an opportunity for the Navy to promote itself as part of the already scheduled Anglo-Japanese events. As part of the institutional identity of the Navy, rescheduling the unveiling might have been politically beneficial for the Naval Forces.[[233]](#footnote-234) Whatever the case, on 29 May, a day with horrible weather, Hirose’s statue found itself in the middle of a sea of umbrellas, still covered in red-white striped cloth.[[234]](#footnote-235) While the internal celebration at the Navy Ministry was allegedly quite sober, the people of the Kanda 神田 district had a lavish celebration in honor of Hirose.[[235]](#footnote-236) The ceremony saw members of three different imperial families, Tōgō, Hirose’s bereaved family, the Navy Minister as well as participants of the initial Naval Blockade attempts.[[236]](#footnote-237) The unveiling was accompanied by a set of addresses by the likes of the aforementioned Tōgō, Hirose’s brother Katsuhiko and Takarabe.[[237]](#footnote-238)

Despite its splendor, however, the location of Hirose’s statue quickly became problematic. When Hirose’s statue was erected at Manseibashi, there had not even been a station. As, over the years, the area around Manseibashi developed, discussion pertaining to the location of Hirose too began to take shape. From esthetic concerns to mere practical ones, the location of the statue became increasingly subject to criticism.[[238]](#footnote-239) Not only that, social life too became busier, especially after Japanese society became more liberal in during the Taishō period, and the public memory of the Russo-Japanese War fell into ruin as people were more caught up with their individual lives.[[239]](#footnote-240) Hirose’s statue, in the end, became an obstacle which the area needed to build around or was impossible to work with, for instance, the Railroad Ministry (*Tetsudō-shō* 鉄道省) withdrew itself from extending a line from Ryōgokubashi Station (*Ryōgokubashi-eki* 両国橋駅) to Manseibashi Station citing the statue as one of the reasons.[[240]](#footnote-241) Overall, the Hirose statue began being considered a hinder to development and naturally voices emerged discussing the possibility to perhaps move the statue entirely.[[241]](#footnote-242) In the end, a whole discussion about relocating the statue was held in outlets of mass media yet the statue remained where it was.[[242]](#footnote-243)

At the end of the 1920s, the Manseibashi statue found itself again as part of elaborate commemorative events, bringing the memory of the Russo-Japanese War back with it. 27 May 1930 marked the 25th anniversary of the end of the Russo Japanese War, and a large pageantry was consequently organized for the occasion. Amongst a procession of cars dressed up as naval vessels, and marching bands, a hundred trees were to be planted near the statue by sixteen members of the Veteran Association (*Zaigō gunjin rengō-kai* 在郷軍人連合会) after they held a ceremony themselves.[[243]](#footnote-244) It seems that the Manseibashi attracted comparably little attention, the 30th anniversary, however, was a different story. Over the course of the 1930s, it becomes clear that the Manseibashi statue shifted from being an obstacle to becoming a place where the past meets the present as the place was redefined as a location deeply associated with militarist pageantry. This is largely due to Hirose, as a person, too becoming more prevalent in public consciousness. The 30th anniversary of Hirose’s death was celebrated in Tōkyō with a ceremony in front of the Manseibashi statue. At 7 o’ clock on the morning, more than 150 members of the Tōkyō Navy Boy Scouts (*Tōkyō kaigun shōnen-dan* 東京海軍少年団) gathered at the statue to clean it over a span of one and a half hours.[[244]](#footnote-245) From 10 o’clock onwards a ceremony was held which was attended by high ranking Navy staff, the remaining families of Hirose and Sugino, as well as one of the remaining members of the original Attempted Naval Blockade. Afterwards, the attendants made up a large parade which would go from the Yasukuni Shrine with the destination being Hirose’s grave in Tōkyō.[[245]](#footnote-246)

The way that Hirose’s Manseibashi statue was treated over the course of several decades serves as reference to how the idea of Hirose might have been handled in the abstract space of collective memory. It is, as of the writing of this paper not clear how the other two statues were treated over the same period, but it must be noted that the situation of these other statues was radically different. For one they were placed in a less problematic location, a statue inside of a park is less an obstacle for development than a statue that is built on a plaza that over the course of two decades saw rapid development. By being built in such a public and busy environment it forced people to confront the Manseibashi statue itself and how they valued its existence. On the other hand, the statues that were built in parks did not pose a problem, and therefore did not need to be confronted. It is also a truism that Navy-related commemorative events will, for the most part, concentrate itself in the capital due to that location’s symbolic nature as the heart of the empire. Moreover, the statues in Takayama and Taketa were, arguably, less impressive than the Manseibashi one, both in size and symbolism.

4.4.3 Hirose’s Shinto Shrine in Taketa

Roughly thirty years after the first statue was built, Japan’s first *gunshin* was finally enshrined in his own Shintō shrine. It was not unheard of for *gunshin* to be properly enshrined themselves, as discussed above, Nogi was already enshrined a few times before the Hirose shrine was conceived. The first substantial discussion regarding building a shrine for Hirose and Tachibana arose in July 1928. On the 26th, the *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* and *Yomiuri Shinbun* reported that the Home Minister Mochizuki Keisuke 望月圭介 (1867-1941) had informally sought after the approval of the cabinet ministers for such an undertaking.[[246]](#footnote-247) Even though the Bureau for Shrine Affairs investigated the matter and concluded that it would be possible to erect a shrine, it was still considered an unprecedented case (*zenzen zenrei ga nai* 全然前例がない). That it was outright dubbed an unprecedented case is peculiar as there were precedents of military personnel being enshrined such as Nogi, who had been enshrined multiple times. and Kodama Gentarō who had been enshrined without even being considered a *gunshin*. Yet, this stresses the fact that there was something fundamentally different between the first two *gunshin* and Nogi and Kodama. In other words, the enshrinement of Nogi might have to be seen as separate from his status as *gunshin*. Part of this could be explained through Japan’s shift to a mass society, as the decision followed popular opinion. This in contrast to many of Hirose’s former classmates who were against the building of a shrine, as to them it was understandably odd that the person who they had graduated with together would suddenly become a proper deity. People in Taketa too had, before the construction was decided, stated that deifying someone ought to be something that occurs naturally and is not something which people should artificially make, and that, if one were to fail it could hurt the morality of the person.[[247]](#footnote-248)

As part of commemorative efforts, in November 1933 the city of Taketa began the construction of the Hirose shrine and the project was finished more than a year later on 25 May 1935.[[248]](#footnote-249) Although the day for Hirose’s proper enshrinement was chosen for its strong symbolical meaning, it might have stood in the shadow of the related event.[[249]](#footnote-250) Whereas Hirose’s tale turned thirty, Kusunoki’s 600th anniversary was arguably a more important celebration. While one can find mentions of Kusunoki in Hirose’s enshrinement, this was not the case the other way around, because of the causality between the two, Hirose was regarded as an incarnation of Kusunoki, but Kusunoki was not seen as a premodern instance of Hirose. At the same time the celebration suffered from an extreme local nature. Despite mass media’s potential to overcome the initial boundaries of locality, a shrine built in a remote location might have made it a less lucrative news story or less relatable to national audiences. However, the fact that the obscure town of Taketa saw itself featured in newspapers far from home, albeit in a limited manner and, therefore contrary to expectation, is an indication regarding how important Hirose’s enshrinement was. For audiences living in Kyūshū, for instance, the enshrinement might have been more relatable, but the further off the epicenter, the harder it becomes to connect to the event.[[250]](#footnote-251) Which could have work complementary with the celebration of the 600th anniversary of Kusunoki, which was held closer to Ōsaka, Tōkyō and other northern parts of Japan.

Whatever the case, Taketa itself dedicated an entire week to Hirose starting on 24 March at 10 o’ clock with a purification ceremony (*kiyoharai-sai* 清秡祭), various smaller festivals and a celebration for the new shrine (*shinden-sai* 新殿祭).[[251]](#footnote-252) The following day would then be in honor of the enshrinement festival (*chinza-sai* 鎮座祭), the 26th was dedicated to the “Festival for the Report Given to Nobility Regarding the Prefectural Shrine Ranking” (*Kensha bekkaku hōkoku-sai* 県社列格奉告祭), through which the shrine officially became ranked as a prefectural shrine, and was followed by the first annual festival the next day, after which, until the 30th, lavish celebrations were held throughout the town.[[252]](#footnote-253) The celebration virtually transformed the small town of Taketa into a place of festivities starting at the train station. There an approximately fifteen-meter (fifty *shaku* 尺) tall Shintō gate (*torii* 鳥居) had been erected. This was followed with the whole town being decorated with artificial flowers, imperial flags, and celebratory flyers.[[253]](#footnote-254) At night, the town was turned into a light spectacle with votive lanterns. Aside from the enshrinement, the town also saw a Navy exhibition, a firework display, a paper lantern procession for elementary and middle school children, et cetera. All these events occurred exactly in the one week where Hirose’s shrine was celebrated and acted as complementary events deliberately designed to adorn the main event.

Ōita newspapers featured an array of memories by Hirose’s bereaved family, his sister that had allegedly last seen him in the Ōita city Beppu 別府, or his relations with other high standing military personnel and former peers. With the start of the event on 24 May, the *Ōita Shinbun* 大分新聞 printed an appendix (*furoku* 付録) for its publication filled with collages dedicated to their local deity.[[254]](#footnote-255) The first page was dedicated to iconic scenes of the event, featuring the sanctuary (*shinden* 神殿), Hirose’s former house, his Taketa grave, etc. On page four, older photographs show Hirose in various points of his life, including his time at the Naval Academy (*heigakkō* 兵学校), before and during his stay in Russia, and a commemorative photograph taken after the First Attempted Naval Blockade. Further in the appendix, on page seven, a picture of the Manseibashi statue surrounded by what appears to be the Navy Boy Scouts was featured.[[255]](#footnote-256)

Naturally as the president of the Support Committee for the Construction of the Hirose Shrine (*Hirose jinja sōken hōsan-kai* 広瀬神社創建奉賛会) Admiral Arima visited Taketa for the festivities.[[256]](#footnote-257) During his visit, he attended the enshrinement ceremony of Hirose, as well as the “Festival for the Report Given to Nobility Regarding the Prefectural Shrine Ranking” to then talk about Hirose and stress the link with Kusunoki.[[257]](#footnote-258) Other representatives that were present at the enshrinement ceremony included Rear Admiral Kobayashi Sōnosuke 小林宗之助 as representative of the Navy Minister Ōsumi Mineo 大角岑生, and the adoptive heir of Hirose Katsuhiko, Commander Hirose Sueto 広瀬末人 as representative of the Commander in Chief of the Naval Fleet Alliance Takahashi Sankichi 高橋三吉.[[258]](#footnote-259) Furthermore, more than 350 guards of honor (*gijōhei* 儀仗兵) from three vessels, which Hirose himself had commanded, arrived in Taketa early on the morning of the 24th.[[259]](#footnote-260) From the station the troops formed a procession adorned by the Navy flag. The procession went through the park where the Taketa statue was built, to then go and pay respect at Hirose’s Taketa grave and the house where he was born.[[260]](#footnote-261) Afterwards, the procession would continue into the town itself where they would make their way to the shrine. The main event on the 25th, the formal enshrinement of Hirose at his newly built shrine, saw a massive crowd participating. The morning edition of the *Ōita Shinbun* featured a photograph of the scene where a massive parade of people carrying small Imperial flags can be seen.[[261]](#footnote-262)

As part of the enshrinement process two relics were collected and brought to the shrine on the day of the enshrinement by the Prefectural Governor Taguchi Yasuyuki 田口易之 (1883-1965) and the Head of General Affairs Kosaka 小坂.[[262]](#footnote-263) The relics consisted of a mirror (*okagami* 御鏡) which allegedly had been worshiped by the Hirose family as a deity, and a longsword (*chōtō* 長刀) which had previously been in the possession of Hirose and was donated by the widow of Captain Mizobe Yōroku 溝部洋六 (1881-1919) who had received the sword from the Hirose family.[[263]](#footnote-264) The sword had then been modified by Arima, who engraved the blade with the phrase *shichishō hōkoku*.[[264]](#footnote-265) The relics arrived in Beppu 別府 on 23 May at 2 o’clock in the afternoon and were provided by the Tōkyō branch of the Support Association.[[265]](#footnote-266)

While he was initially against the enshrinement, Takarabe too attended the enshrinement and even gave an interview in which he reminisced over his time with Hirose at the Naval Academy.[[266]](#footnote-267) He talked about how the construction was a result of “voice of the whole nation” (*kokumin zentai no koe* 国民全体の声) and how he, as someone who knew Hirose, could not contain his joy. Afterwards, he told reporters of how Hirose became interested in jūdō 柔道 which he dated back to 1884-85 when, according to him, foreign ideas had extended their “evil influence” on Japanese popular conscience (*gairai shisō no aku eikyō* 外来思想の悪影響), and that Hirose had felt a need to develop an unaffected and sincere character (*shitsujitsu gōken no kifū* 質実剛健の気風). This he did by entering the jūdō division of the Kōdōkan 講道館 dōjō, where he later invited Takarabe to join him. After a while the two had impressed their superior with their dedication and were appointed to function as arbiters when a fight would break out. Allegedly, Hirose had taken that appointment as an opportunity when he told his the superior that “it was a shame that there was no training ground in this flippant Japan of today where one can study the old way of the samurai” (*kono keichō fuhaku na kyō no nihon korai no bushido o manabu no ni budōjō no nai no wa ikan da* この軽佻浮薄な今日の日本古来の武士道を学ぶのに武道場のないは遺憾だ).[[267]](#footnote-268) That he came to embrace the construction of the Shintō shrine, as well as contributing to the event by showing up and holding interviews might seem contradicting to his initial response to the matter. However, times had changed and the call by the masses to construct a shrine had become too overwhelming to avoid an enshrinement. As a result, it is imaginable that not only admitting but embracing the construction might have been the optimal path for Takarabe and his peers.

In this shift towards events that commemorated Japan’s past, the image of Hirose might have shifted from a cosmopolitan, patriotic figure to one that connects more deeply to the Empire. Thirty years after the initial faits accompli at Port Arthur Hirose’s significance to Japanese audiences had been recontextualized due to the concurrent political and social waves. During the 1930s, Hirose’s statue became steadily more important and regained its significance as a hotspot for commemorative events and militarist pageantry. The fact that he only received his shrine so late is an indication of the structural characteristics of Japanese society at the time as well as how religion was initially unnecessary to *gunshin* as discussed above. Compared to the initial event, in which Hirose was more celebrated as a loveworthy person, in the 1930s his image shifted towards being a fragment of imperial identity, and in this, Hirose functioned as a mirror for Japanese society.[[268]](#footnote-269)

# 5 The “Three Brave Bombing Heroes”

## 5.1 Introduction to the “Three Brave Bombing Heroes”

The *Nikudan San’yūshi*, also called the *Bakudan San’yūshi*,refers to a so-called “suicide squad” consisting of three young sappers by the names of Eshita Takeji 江下武二, Kitagawa Susumu 北川丞 and Sakue Inosuke 作江伊之助.[[269]](#footnote-270) The *San’yūshi* were combat engineers part of the 18th battalion (*Dai-jū hachi daitai* 第十八大隊) coming from Kurume 久留米 in Fukuoka 福岡 prefecture belonging to the 24th mixed brigade (*Konsei dai ni jū yon ryodan* 混成第二十四旅団) and lost their lives during a battle at Miaohangzhen (廟行鎮 or 廟巷鎮 in Japanese: *Byōkōchin*). All three men were twenty-three years old when they died and had been drafted only a few months prior they were dispatched to Shanghai.




Figure 9. The Three Brave Gunshin. Left to right: Kitagawa Susumu, Sakue Inosuke and Eshita Takeji.

A few months after the Manchurian Incident broke out, following a buildup of frustration against anti-Japanese boycotts, the editorial of a Chinese newspaper that insulted the Japanese Emperor and an attack on a group of five Nichiren 日蓮 sect Buddhist monks, and to also avert the international community’s attention away from what was happening in Manchuria, the First Shanghai Incident (*Dai-ichiji Shanhai jihen* 第一次上海事変) broke out on 28 January 1932.[[270]](#footnote-271) While being limited in its scope, the Shanghai Incident rapidly turned into a harsh armed conflict, much to the embarrassment of the Japanese military which, allegedly, was under the delusion that they would be able to take over Shanghai in merely four hours.[[271]](#footnote-272) Instead, the Japanese Army found itself in a deadlock against Chinese 19th Route Army (*Shi-jiu-lu-jun* 十九路軍, in Japanese: *jū ku rogun*) in a conflict that would take months to end. By the end of February, Japan desperately needed a way out of this disastrous situation as it could not advance further due to the barbed wire defenses that the Chinese side had erected.

Eventually, it was decided that the best way to deal with the barrier was to utilize sappers. Before that, ideas such as using planes to drop bombs on the enemy or the barbed wire defenses were formulated, but due to the enemy being able to quickly recover and the fact that an attempt to destroy the barrier would require multiple hundreds of bombs being dropped, these ideas were scrapped.[[272]](#footnote-273) The duty to open a road for Japan’s troops to advance fell to thirty-six men from Kurume. Of the thirty-six men that constituted the Kurume men, eventually, eight lost their lives including the *San’yūshi*. Two days later, the three men were promoted to the rank of Private First-class (*jōtōhei* 上等兵), and shortly afterwards, promoted again to Corporal making it one of just a hand full of double promotions in Japanese history.[[273]](#footnote-274) These three men inspired arguably one of the largest media events of the 1930s, carrying strong implications for the perceived “Japanese identity” and resulting in massive financial gain for interest groups.[[274]](#footnote-275)

## 5.2 Synopsis of the Initial Media Attention

5.2.1 The First Few Weeks

The *San’yūshi* arose in a time when the Manchurian and First Shanghai Incidents received massive media attention and, more importantly, when the “brave deeds” of Japan’s soldiers at the front filled Japanese newspapers.[[275]](#footnote-276) Making it so that nearly all newspapers that covered the *San’yūshi’*s initial report put the story alongside a collage of other soldiers that had met their end at the front.[[276]](#footnote-277) Meaning that before they were “discovered” there was nothing that really set the three men aside from hundreds of other men. What was exceptional, however, was the reaction to the *San’yūshi* as their legacy turned into arguably the most popular *bidan* of the early 1930s. The first reports on the *San’yūshi* followed shortly after the incident proper at Miaohangzhen in the early morning of 22 February 1932.[[277]](#footnote-278) It took approximately two days for their names to be made public on the morning of 24 February.[[278]](#footnote-279) Over the course of another day, various other newspapers began to pick up the same story as it started to accumulate momentum. Initial headlines made use of sensational exclamations, as was common practice at the time, such as the *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* starting with a “Long Live the Emperor” (*‘Tennō heika banzai’* 「天皇陛下万歳」), the *Nishibu Mainichi Shinbun* 西部毎日新聞 focusing on their accomplishment stating “They Crushed the Barbed Wire Defenses as Human Bullets” (*Nikudan de tetsujōmō o gekiha su* 肉弾で鉄条網を撃破す) or the *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* that exclaimed how “Not a Single Piece of their Flesh Remains” (*Niku ippen o tomezu* 肉一片を留めず).[[279]](#footnote-280) Closer to their homes, the initial response by newspapers went as follows: The *Fukuoka Nichinichi Shinbun* 福岡日日新聞 drew upon imperial memory saying that “this must be compared to the Port Arthur Blockade Corps” (*Ryojun heisoku-tai ni hi su beki* 旅順閉塞隊に比すべき) whereas the *Ōita Shinbun*, similarly to the *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*, put the focus on them as “Kyūshū men” (*Kyūshū danji* 九州男児) and how they “chilled the courage of the enemy” (*Tekitan o samukarashimeta* 敵胆を寒からしめた).[[280]](#footnote-281)

This initial burst of sensational headlines was promptly followed by donations made by audiences throughout the entire country to aid the impoverished families of the three sappers. Over the course of only two days a sum exceeding 14,000 yen, which was a considerable sum at the time, was collected by over forty initiatives.[[281]](#footnote-282) This trend of donations continued for more than a week and such generous acts by groups of people were frequently reported on in newspapers. It was not only the large sums that gathered attention, but the smaller sums often donated by children usually to a local military office were also quite popular. In the *Ōita Shinbun*, right beneath an article talking about the “enormous sum of money” (*bakudai naru genkin* 莫大なる現金) donated by more than ten organizations, a smaller article can be found on two children from Niage 荷揚 town who had brought four yen to the local military police squad which the children wanted to donate to the bereaved families of the three sappers.[[282]](#footnote-283) These articles were designed to tug at the readers’ heartstrings, emphasizing the cuteness and pureness of these children, sometimes describing the scene where the children gave the soldier an envelope with the money inside as they wore their school backpacks (*randoseru* ランドセル) likely emphasizing that they were going or just went to school. Aside from that, newspapers were likewise often filled with articles that list down which group or individual had contributed how much.[[283]](#footnote-284)

Amidst the chaos of war abroad and newspaper companies scrambling to find gems in the mountain of information that came from the front, misinformation was unavoidable. A few days after initial reports were printed, news arrived that the “Three Brave Bombing Heroes” might have actually been the “Eight Brave Bombing Heroes” (*Bakudan Hachiyūshi* 爆弾八勇士). The story broke at the start of March when some newspapers devoted a segment to the remaining five men. The *Kyūshū Nippō* 九州日報 and the *Tōkyō Asahi*, as well as the *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* all devoted space in their papers to the remaining five men. The most elaborate article comes from the *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*, which featured an article titled “the reveal of both brave bombing heroes” (*Bakudan ryōyūshi o dashi* 爆弾両勇士を出し), which put the focus on two of the five men, Kozaki Kiyoshi 小崎清 and Hashida Masayoshi 林田正喜 with the faces of all five men neatly presented in a vertical line next to the article.[[284]](#footnote-285) Articles discussing new “heroes” often utilized accounts of bereaved family members, and it was with that that the families of Kozaki and Hashida were featured.

In one of those interviews, the older brother of Hashida spoke over their late father, who himself had served in the Russo- and Germanic-Japanese Wars (*Nichidoku sensō* 日独戦争) in addition to Hashida’s own military career.[[285]](#footnote-286) The brother felt pride as his father, he himself and his brother all were of use to the country.[[286]](#footnote-287) The older brother of Kozaki too spoke out, albeit in a more critical manner, on how his brother was not featured in the initial reports. He told newspapers that he and his family had not even known that he was selected for a “suicide squad” until a letter Kozaki had written arrived right before his “heroic act”. When Kozaki’s family saw the *San’yūshi* being featured in newspapers, they wondered why Kozaki was not featured on the same page. At the same time, he seemed to have taken solace in the thought that Kozaki must have been satisfied with the fact that they had succeeded.[[287]](#footnote-288) However, these reports seem to have been rather minor, and despite this addition, the *San’yūshi* remained a fixed term and the other five were for the most part neglected.

Only a few days after their deaths, newspapers announced a project to commemorate the death of the three brave men. A contest was held by both the *Tōkyō* and *Ōsaka Asahi Shinbun* 大阪朝日新聞and the *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* to create a song with the goal to eternally remember their exploits. The *Tōkyō* and *Ōsaka Asahi Shinbun* announced its competition for the “Song of the Three Brave Bullet Heroes” (*Nikudan San’yūshi no uta* 肉弾三勇士の歌) on 28February, set its deadline for 10 March and declared it would award its winners with five hundred, two hundred and one hundred yen for first, second and third place respectively.[[288]](#footnote-289) The *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* announced its own contest for the “Song of the Three Brave Bombing Heroes” (*Bakudan San’yūshi no uta* 爆弾三勇士の歌) simultaneous to its rival with the same deadline, in contrast, however, only mentioned a five hundred yen award for its winner. The results for both contests would be announced a few weeks later on 15 March.[[289]](#footnote-290) In response to the contest, Japanese audiences feverously composed and submitted songs, and despite limits set on one submission per person by the *Asahi Shinbun*, the *Asahi Shinbun* reported having received 124,561 entries, while the *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* too reported staggering numbers with 84,177 entries.[[290]](#footnote-291)

Despite the similarities in the contests, the winners it produced had composed radically different songs. The winner of the Asahi contest was Nakano Chikara 中野力, a person from Nagasaki 長崎 Prefecture in Kyūshū.[[291]](#footnote-292) That its winner was from Nagasaki was dubbed an “unexpected fate” (*gūzen no kien* 偶然の奇縁) by the *Asahi Shinbun* as it meant that the winner of their contest came from the same place which had born two of Japan’s new heroes.[[292]](#footnote-293) The melody was written by the composer Yamada Kōsaku 山田耕作 (1886-1965) who had composed a slow, dramatic eulogy for the entry. In an interview, he stated that he wanted to include three important meanings within his song. Firstly, it tried to be a “song of praise” (*sanka* 賛歌), while secondly trying to mourn the “loyal death” of the three men, and lastly, he wanted the song to also function as a “patriotic march” (*aikoku kōshin-kyoku* 愛国行進曲). Furthermore, with this work he expressed his criticism to what he called the “old era” (*fun-jidai* 舊時代) of war songs. These songs, according to him, were filled with “long sounds” (*chōon* 長音), yet in a time of modernized warfare he called for “shorter sounds” (*tan’on* 短音) which he deemed more appropriate for war songs. As he rendered his beliefs in his work, and to this end designed the song easy to sing for Japanese audiences.[[293]](#footnote-294)

The winner of the Tōkyō Nichinichi Contest was the husband of the famous poet Yosano Akiko 与謝野晶子 (1876-1942), the poet Yosano Tekkan 与謝野鉄幹 (1873-1935) together with Tsuji Junji 辻順治, a member of the Toyama Army School Band (*Rikugun toyama gakkō rakutai* 陸軍戸山学校楽隊), as the composer. The song generally was more upbeat than the song of the *Asahi Shinbun* and tried to reconstruct the battlefield on which the sappers had lost their lives by beginning with the sound of guns in the distance followed up by a drumroll which imitated machine gun fire.[[294]](#footnote-295) Yosano talked in an interview about how he had been shocked by the initial reports, something which seems to have been a trend with artists rendering the *San’yūshi* in their works.[[295]](#footnote-296) He had then written the first two verses spontaneously, but when he heard a contest would be held he continued writing. He did, however, voice his regrets that he did not have enough time to perfect his song, yet lauded himself for having poured his energy in lauding the emperor as well as the *San’yūshi* for giving their bodies as a token for the hopes of the people. Furthermore, he too voiced some criticism on war songsas he believed that war songsup until then had mostly lacked any literary character and that he aimed for that trait in his song.[[296]](#footnote-297) Both songs were presented, naturally, with lyrics and the necessary music sheets for Japanese audiences to enjoy and perform themselves, likely spreading the influence of the song, as well as the idea behind it, in the process. A few days later, the songs were pressed into vinyl and sold commercially, in addition to being the subject of performances organized by the newspaper companies.[[297]](#footnote-298)

The legacy of the *San’yūshi* was, like many *bidan*,not a homogeneous, unitary tale, but branched out into origin stories and epilogues. One of these stories comes from a child who had found himself at the center of such a prologue. The story of the boy Ietani Kazuo 家谷計男 (often titled “the bloodied handkerchief of the Kurume train station” *Kurume ekitō chizome no hankachi* 久留米駅頭血染めのハンカチ) refers to an alleged encounter between a boy and Eshita Takeji at the Kurume station shortly before the troops departed for Shanghai. Allegedly the boy struck up a conversation with one of the soldiers who seemed like he was lost in his thoughts. The boy was fascinated with the soldier and yelled at him: “Hey! Kill one of the [Chinese] soldiers for me” (*oooi heitai-san, xxx hei hitori gurai wa koroshite kite kudasai yo* お―い兵隊さん、XXX兵一人ぐらいは殺して来て下さいよ). The soldier heard the boy’s request and lauded him on his words of encouragement. Despite this, he told the boy, with a tear glistening in his eye, that he would likely not return alive. The soldier asked the boy for his name and address, gave him a silver coin worth fifty *sen* which Ietani should use to buy school supplies, a pack of *Homare* 誉 brand cigarettes for Ietani’s father and a handkerchief which he had, moments prior, turned into a memento by cutting his finger and dipping his blood in it.[[298]](#footnote-299)

The story took an interesting turn shortly before the news of the *San’yūshi* broke when a letter arrived at the Ietani household. Kazuo’s parents had been a little disappointed that their son had not asked the soldier for his name, but when the letter arrived, and they learned the name of the mysterious man, they decided to send him “condolence packets” (*imon bukuro* 慰問袋) and when he would return triumphantly, they would welcome him back home. Yet, when they then learned that Eshita was one of Japan’s new heroes they were shocked and went to visit the family of Eshita instead.[[299]](#footnote-300) This is an example of how these tales were presented, written often in dialogue form, sometimes even describing the inner worlds and impressions of its characters. At the start of the story the troops are cheered on by bystander that were shouting *banzai* at the top of their lungs, essentially creating a glorious scenery filled with uniforms and imperial flags. This scenery is then seemingly contrasted with the sorrow of the hero who is aware of his fate and accepted it, this is rendered in him creating a memento from his own blood. It is this merging of heroic and tragic themes that is characteristic of *sensō bidan*. The story also enjoys a very humane character when Eshita gave the boy some money to buy school supplies, essentially stressing that this soldier was also an exemplary citizen who was invested in the future generations.

Despite that the reactions by parts of Japanese society to the *San’yūshi* are discussed in the following chapters, there was one particularly noteworthy instance of responses to the three sappers. Three reporters, Hew Bayes (*Hyū Baiasu* ヒュー・バイアス) from the New York Times, James Young (*Jēmusu Yangu* ジェームス・ヤング) of The Hearst newspaper, and Don Brown (*Don Braun* ドン・ブラウン) of the Chicago Daily News drew attention when they voiced their views on the *San’yūshi* on 26 February 1932.[[300]](#footnote-301) While their opinions only constituted a minuscule, almost negligible, part of the initial reports, eventually they were frequently cited in biographical works to demonstrate “how foreigners looked at the *San’yūshi*”.[[301]](#footnote-302) Interestingly, these three journalists were likewise often the ones quoted when discussing foreign interest in the *San’yūshi*, despite there allegedly being similar opinions from other countries such as France, Germany, and Italy.[[302]](#footnote-303) Exceptionalism was the most dominant factor both in the opinions of the foreign journalists as well as the people discussing these journalists. One biographical work began its segment on the journalists with asking how the *San’yūshi* were seen by foreign journalists “who’s understanding of the Japanese spirit was considerably poor” (*hikakuteki nihon seishin ni rikai no toboshii* 比較的日本精神に理解の乏しい).[[303]](#footnote-304)

Phrases such as Young describing how foreigners often hear that “Japanese soldiers are not merely ordinary humans that carry weapons and wear khaki colored military clothes”, Bayes saying he thinks that it is possible to say that Japanese soldiers have a “resolute attitude regarding death” (*shi ni tai suru kanzen taru taido* 死に対する敢然たる態度) and Brown stating that the “ordinary foreigner does not doubt the bravery of Japanese soldiers” (*ippan gaikokujin toshite nihon heishi no yūki o utagau mono wa nai* 一般外国人として日本兵士の勇気を疑う者は無い) were then “contextualized” by Japanese authors to give insights in how the *San’yūshi* were perceived by foreigners. Contextualization was often done by reiterating and elaborating on the journalists’ opinions and defining these feelings with terms such as the “Japanese Warrior Code of Chivalry” or the “Japanese Soul”.[[304]](#footnote-305) It is important to note that this is cannot be compared to Hirose’s cosmopolitan appeal, but rather exemplifies trends to justify the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents at a time where the Lytton commission was investigating the hostilities between China and Japan. Foreigners agreeing with the *San’yūshi* were essentially presented as agreeing with what was happening on the Chinese mainland. Simultaneously, these opinions heavily subscribed to and further propagated exceptionalism when it came to Japan and its military.

Over the course of the first week, the idea of the *San’yūshi* had amassed already quite some renown, and in some sporadic instances had become a baseline from which one could evaluate other acts of martial bravery. A week after the *San’yūshi* had appeared, on 3 March, the *Asahi Shinbun* reported on three sailors that had died in a similar fashion to the Army’s *San’yūshi* and exclaimed that their “great achievement” rivaled that of the three sappers.[[305]](#footnote-306) The *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* even referred to them as the “Navy’s Three Brave Heroes” (*Kaigun no San’yūshi* 海軍の三勇士), making use of the fresh memory of the *San’yūshi* to contextualize what these other three men potentially could represent.[[306]](#footnote-307) Similarly, a story broke of a Corporal by the name Ketsujō Mitsuo 結城三夫 based on a letter that he had sent from a field hospital. During the assault by the *San’yūshi* he was the squad leader of a “destruction squad” (*hakai-han* 破壊班). He and his squad succeeded in opening paths in three places, but not before he was hit with three bullets himself. The entire eastern division had been without food and water for two days. In the meantime, Ketsujō had been unconscious for twelve hours yet regained conscious a while later when he awoke after being unconscious for twelve hours after a counterattack when he heard voices shout *banzai*. One of his last acts consisted of him writing the above-mentioned letter to his family that would arrive on 5 March in his hometown. He had, however, already been declared dead by the Headquarter of the 20th Division on 1 March. His bravery in opening roads for the troops to advance, as well as his tenacity and perhaps the rumor that he had awoken at the sound of people shouting *banzai* led to one article claiming in its subheading, was “something which ought to be compared to the Three Brave Bullet Heroes” (*Nikudan San'yūshi ni hi su beki kōseki* 肉弾三勇士に比すべき功績).[[307]](#footnote-308)

When looking at the way that reports on the *San’yūshi* dealt with Japan’s new heroes, a pattern becomes apparent. There was a tendency, or it was at least common practice, to emphasize someone’s accomplishments by referring to and contextualizing them with previous, acknowledged “brave deeds” and “brave men”. As with Hirose, this served several purposes. On the one hand it creates the illusion of an overarching plot or continuity within martial bravery which, in the case of Japan, could refer to the dominant exceptionalist ideas that Japanese people possess a certain “Japanese spirit” (*Yamatodamashii* 大和魂) or naturally adhere to the “samurai code of chivalry” (*bushidō* 武士道). Reciprocally, it also served to provide what might have been deemed to be substantial background information, meaning that the new “brave act” was a natural result of a long history of “brave deeds”. Furthermore, this background information then might have fed into sensational media strategies. The same phenomenon can be observed with Hirose, as he was referred to as the “incarnation of Kusunoki” or in instances where Tōgō’s respect for Hirose was emphasized, there was a fringe case too where Hirose was referred to as the Nelson of the East. The *San’yūshi*,on their turn, were again contextualized to Japanese audiences by means of referring to the past, as discussed above.

5.2.2 The Original Militarized Mothers

With the emergence of the *San’yūshi*, a considerable amount of attention went to the bereaved families. This is because the “heroic act” that the *San’yūshi* achieved was thought to have originated in the structure of their families. For one, large parts of money donated to the *San’yūshi* was aimed to aid their impoverished families. Nonetheless, the family of Eshita, on 8 March had allegedly sent an envelope filled with two thousand yen to the Asahi Newspaper Company as they felt sorry for the bereaved families of the other five men that had been neglected.[[308]](#footnote-309) The bereaved families were poor, which according to Confucian ideas was the perfect environment to develop internal loyalty to each other.[[309]](#footnote-310) The Confucian concepts of “Loyalty” (*chū* 忠) and “Filial Piety” (*kō* 孝) had merged together in the fiction of the “national body” (*kokutai* 国体) and “family-state” (*kazoku kokka* 家族国家) as “the unison of Loyalty and Filial Piety” (*chū-kō-itchi* 忠孝一致). In the national fiction, the Emperor was at the same time the father of all his subjects who all find their lineage, albeit very distant manner, with the imperial family. As a result, they were ought to act loyal to him as their ruler but also as their parent figure. Poor families constituted the prime example of this relation, as the parents in these families had to work extra hard to make by and to give their children all that they need. For this extra effort, the children were ought to feel more grateful and therefore acted more loyal to their parents.[[310]](#footnote-311)

In publications, the families of the three men became windows to the personalities of the three sappers. Over the course of the first week, they were interviewed by various outlets. These interviews, in some cases, built the foundation which defined the parent-child relation. The mother of Eshita stated in an interview with the *Kyūshū Nippō* that “no parent can stand to lose his or her child”, after she recollected the moment when Eshita made up his mind to enter military service, “but the moment I realized that it had been for the country I thought to myself that he had properly given his life”.[[311]](#footnote-312) Kitagawa’s older brother, whom himself was a soldier but had not been sent to the front, said that “the death of my brother was likely no mistake” (*otōto no senshi wa yomoya machigai dewa arimasen* 弟の戦死はよもや間違いではありません). He continued talking about their late father who himself had served in the First Sino- and Russo-Japanese Wars. This, he stated, filled him with pride that “two generations in his family had served the Emperor” (*oyako ni dai go hōkō* 親子二代御奉公).[[312]](#footnote-313) During the interview, the mother of Kitagawa allegedly had a stouthearted composure and had not shed a single tear.

Among this interest towards the families of the *San’yūshi*, it was perhaps their mothers that came to play a central role. Furthermore, it was the coverage of the mothers that laid the foundation for a critical theme in later wartime propaganda and storytelling. As articles and magazines presented the image of the *San’yūshi* as models for the Imperial Army, another part of the event, almost as important as the death of the three sappers itself, began to take shape as a future model for mothers in Japan. The “militarized mother” (*gunkoku no haha* 軍国の母), a mother who raised her son as a sacrifice to the nation, which became a distinct trope in Pacific-War-era movies found its origin in Sakue Matsu 作江まつ, Kitagawa Matsu 北川まつ, and Eshita Taki 江下たき.[[313]](#footnote-314) A militarized mother is a woman that raises her son to be an outstanding soldier and who, while sad to send off her son to the front, is proud when her son loses his life in service to the country. They are women that like, for instance, the mother of Kitagawa, who tell their son to “not die a meaningless death but die in a meritorious deed” (*inujini wa suru na kō o tatete shindekoi* 犬死はするな功を立てゝ死んでこい).[[314]](#footnote-315)

The three mothers were invited to head to the capital as it was deemed that they needed to go to the Yasukuni Shrine to pray for their sons. The invitation came from the *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun*.[[315]](#footnote-316) They arrived in Tōkyō at 2 o’clock in the afternoon on 12 March together with other members of their families.[[316]](#footnote-317) The families were firstly invited to visit an exhibition on the Shanghai Incident which the *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* Company had organized. The exhibition featured a model of the barbed wire defenses that the *San’yūshi* had given their life for to destroy, military clothes and even the handkerchief which had allegedly the blood of one of the *San’yūshi* on it. In the evening, they were invited to attend the screening of a movie based on the exploits of the *San’yūshi*, together with two other members of the bereaved families, where they wept as they saw the deaths of their sons reenacted on screen.[[317]](#footnote-318)

Figure 10. The three mothers visit Tōkyō; On the left: the three mothers standing in front of the Imperial Palace; On the right: the three mothers receive Saishiryō 祭粢料 from the Army Minister.

The next morning, at 6 o’clock they went to Imperial Palace, where they worshipped the location and the Emperor from afar (*yōhai* 遥拝). Afterwards, they visited the Meiji Shrine (*Meiji jingū* 明治神宮) where they were guided by the chief priest Arima and where they were allowed to offer a *tamagushi*.[[318]](#footnote-319) At the shrine, the three mothers had the chance to meet the 12th division commander of the Kurume division General Isomura 磯村, a meeting which one work described as a “dramatic scene” (*gekiteki shīn* 劇的シーン).[[319]](#footnote-320) Afterwards, they finally went to the Yasukuni Shrine where they held a silent prayer (*mokutō* 黙祷) and wished the late-*San’yūshi* happiness in the next world (*meifuku* 冥福). The last shrine they visited was the Nogi Shrine at Shinsaka 新坂. Next, they went to see a memorial service at the Aoyama Funeral Hall and attended a Buddhist memorial service (*hōyō* 法要) at the Tsukiji Hongan temple (*Tsukiji hongan-ji* 築地本願寺). Finally, they took a car to the official residence of prime minister Inukai. However, when they arrived, his secretary came out and informed the three women that the prime minister had contracted a cold and that he could not meet them, despite that he had looked forward to it. Instead, he bestowed upon all three a calligraphic work reading “The Great Deeds of [our] Ancestors, For a Thousand Years Immortal” (*iretsu senshū fuma* 遺烈千秋不磨).[[320]](#footnote-321)

On the 14th, the three women, along with the rest of the family that had tagged along, were invited to the Imperial Household (*Kunaishō* 宮内省) where they met the vice-minister of the Imperial Household Sekiya Teizaburō 関屋貞三郎 (1875-1950) and received “funeral gifts from the Imperial Household” (*saishiryō* 祭粢料) overhanded by the Army Minister Araki Sadao 荒木貞夫 (1877-1966), the scene depicted by *Figure 10* on the right. The three mothers, along with the rest of their families returned home on 16 March, the day after the results of the *Nikudan San’yūshi no uta* and *Bakudan San’yūshi no uta* contest had been announced. The three mothers had expressed, once again, gratitude for the recognition their sons had received from Japanese audiences, and that to them “no higher honor exists” (*kono ue no kōei wa arimasen* この上の光栄はありません).[[321]](#footnote-322)

This display of generosity from the side of the newspaper companies that had invited the three mothers, the officials that welcomed them, guided them around, and bestowed gifts upon them, as well as the broadcasting and documentation of the three mothers’ participation in the cult of the fallen and state ideology along with their accounts on the deeds of their sons solidified the three mothers as crucial parts of the *San’yūshi* legacy. It also underscored the official recognition of the achievements of the *San’yūshi*.

5.2.3 The Statues of the *San’yūshi*

As discussed above, the *San’yūshi* were included in, as was custom, the religious cult of the fallen in Japan. They were not an exceptional case regarding this, although the interest in the enshrinement concerning the above-mentioned case of inviting their mothers to partake in the rites of the cult of the fallen, arguably was. As with Hirose, the *San’yūshi* legacy did express itself in an irreligious manner too, among which the construction of a statue. Over the course of two years, the *San’yūshi* were eternalized in bronze in two locations. The first was built in Kurume, as that was the location where the home unit belonged to, while the second one was then built in Tōkyō.

Building the Kurume statue was a project started by the mayor of Kurume, the head of the Kurume chamber of commerce and the divisional officer of the Kurume branch of the Imperial Veteran’s Society (*Teikoku zaigō gunjin-kai* 帝国在郷軍人会), who created the “Association for National Defense” (*kokubō gikai* 国防義会).[[322]](#footnote-323) While many other ways to commemorate their “bravery” had been proposed, building bronze statues, which had become common practice since the Meiji period, was one of the few that was actually realized. The project was financed by the “Funds for Honoring the Three Brave Bombing Heroes” (*Bakudan San’yūshi kenshō-kin* 爆弾三勇士顕彰金), money collected by the city of Kurume and a project that began a week after the deaths of the three men was made public, on 1 March.[[323]](#footnote-324) Most of the money came from the association itself as well as the 18th sapper battalion with the rest of the money mostly coming from schools, veteran associations, chambers of commerce, et cetera, from all over the country, with a large part of the donations originating in Kitakyūshū 北九州.[[324]](#footnote-325) The construction of the statue was entrusted to the creativity of three men who were originally from Fukuoka themselves. Matsuo Kaoru松尾薫, the designer of the model, Toyoda Katsuaki 豊田勝秋, who cast the final product, and Kawahara Tsunekichi 川原常吉 who made the pedestal.[[325]](#footnote-326)

Before the unveiling ceremony in Fukuoka, the final product was presented in a small procession through Tōkyō itself where it was pulled by a tractor through Shōwa Avenue (*Shōwa doori* 昭和通り) during the morning of 25 May 1933. It was transported to the Shiodome 汐留 train station from which it would be transported to the front of the town hall of Kurume city.[[326]](#footnote-327) That the statue came from Tōkyō was not part of a planned procession in which the statue traveled through the country, but rather a result of logistics. Toyoda was originally from Fukuoka, but as he stated in an interview published in the popular youth magazine *Shōnen kurabu* (少年倶楽部 “Boys Club”), after he took the job he “[…] returned back to the capital charged with this mission […]” ([…] *shimei o obite kikyō shimasu* […] […]使命を帯びて帰京します[…]).[[327]](#footnote-328)

The approximately four-ton statue (1,000 *kan* 貫) arrived in Kurume on the 31st and was unveiled with a lavish ceremony.[[328]](#footnote-329) The statue presents the three sappers in their final moments planting the bomb between the barbed wire defenses in a dynamic pose.[[329]](#footnote-330) Before the unveiling of the statue, the same association funded another commemorative project which more broadly honored the deaths of all men that had died at Miaohangzhen. Fittingly titled the “Commemorative Tower of the Brave Men of the Destructive Blast” (*Bakuha yūshi kinen-tō* 爆破勇士記念塔), the monument was unveiled in Kurume on 7 May with a ceremony that saw, in addition to many local high-ranking military personnel, the bereaved families of the aforementioned *Bakudan Hachiyūshi*. The motives behind the construction of the monument are of this writing not entirely clear. However, the attendance of not only the families of the three sappers, but all eight “brave men” indicates public recognition of all soldiers, or at least an attempt to remind people to look at the broader picture.[[330]](#footnote-331)

In Tōkyō, on 20 April 1932, a member of the upper and lower house by the name of Kanasugi Eigorō 金杉英五郎 worked as a promotor to kickstart a campaign to construct a statue at the Seishō temple (*Seishō-ji* 青松寺). He had worked to receive a permit from the Tōkyō Metropolitan Police and formulated the plan to collect 20,000 yen from all over Japan over a period of two years to fund the project.[[331]](#footnote-332) Not everyone’s intentions were pure regarding this as it did not take long for people to take this as an opportunity for self-enrichment, as the Yomiuri reported not even half a day later that there already had been people that had forged a campaign that officials confirmed to be suspicious. Allegedly, some people had forged a list with the names of all ministers and other famous individuals under which they left space for people to make new donations. With this, they went to a variety of places asking for donations ranging from twenty *sen* 銭 to twenty yen.[[332]](#footnote-333)

An association for the construction of the bronze statue (*dōzō kensetsu-kai* 銅像建設会) was established on 17 May 1932, the same day when part of the remains (*bunkotsu* 分骨) of the *San’yūshi* arrived in Tōkyō for a funeral at the Seishō temple. At one o’clock in the afternoon, a solemn Buddhist funeral was held at the temple, with an hour later a grand “first meeting ceremony” (*hakkai-shiki* 発会式) to celebrate the establishment of the association.[[333]](#footnote-334) Two years later, on 22 February 1934, the second anniversary of the death of the three men, a grand unveiling ceremony for the Seishō temple statue was held.[[334]](#footnote-335) The statue was modeled by the sculptor Nitta Tōtarō 新田藤太郎 (1888-1980) and cast by the metal worker Ōjima Jo’un 大島如雲 and was approximately 2.15 meters (7 *shaku* and 1 *sun*) tall. It was unveiled one hour after a Buddhist memorial service was held by the ten-year-old grandchild of Kanasugi, the committee chairman, who was allowed to tug the rope that kept the cloth over the statue.[[335]](#footnote-336) The unveiling was attended by, among others, both Army Minister Hayashi Senjūrō 林銑十郎 (1876-1943) and Navy Minister Ōsumi Mineo, the prefectural governor Kōsaka Masayasu 香坂昌康, as well as a crowd of circa two thousand people.[[336]](#footnote-337) The statue was built directly above the grave of the *San’yūshi* where their remains, which the temple had received two years prior, had been buried. The people that visited the temple had donated more than a hundred yen in monetary offerings which were later donated to the First Garrison Hospital in Ushigome 牛込.[[337]](#footnote-338)



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Figure 11. Illustration of the statue of the Three Brave Bombing Heroes at Seishō-ji here used as educational material in a picture book aimed at children.[[338]](#footnote-339)

The statues of the *San’yūshi* did not seem to have attracted the same amount of attention as the Hirose statues, yet they did fulfill similar functions. They are irreligious methods to consolidate the image of national heroes and became a place where the First Shanghai Incident was remembered. However, as the period between the First Shanghai Incident until the end of the Second World War was too short and, if one were to accept the trajectory of a Fifteen Year War (*Jū go nen sensō* 十五年戦争), too consistent, meaning that hostilities did not die down enough for the era of the Manchurian and First Shanghai Incident to be considered “completed”, for it to turn into a place where a past era could be remembered. Meaning that, together with Japan’s loss in the Second World War and the radical break with the prewar era and the loss of these physical landmarks, the *San’yūshi* failed to become a proper “realm of memory” despite having had potential. This potential can be seen in the handling of the image *San’yūshi* in, for instance, schoolbooks or in later organized Buddhist memorial services at the *Seishō-ji*.[[339]](#footnote-340)

Similar to Hirose, the process of deification followed almost exclusively irreligious mechanisms. The media events discussed above constitute crucial parts in the construction of the *San’yūshi* legacy. Not only were the initial reports important in solidifying the image of the three men, but they also placed them within this network of valorous deeds. Official recognition was embodied in the invitation of the three mothers, and the funding and construction of statues as well as the submission of thousands of songs underscore the level of popular support that the tale of the three men received.

## 5.3 Reactions from Different Parts of Society – Praise and Capitalism

5.3.1 Magazines, Food and Commercial Culture – Pervasiveness and Popularity

The reaction from the commercial sector to the death of the *San'yūshi* was more volatile than at the death of Hirose and illustrates the state of the media mix at the time.[[340]](#footnote-341) When Hirose died, newspapers were the dominant form of disseminating information on him and the main instance that broadcasted the ensuing media event. Aside from that, the tale of Hirose found its rendition in instances of high culture such as *biwa* pieces or poetry, or as part of the construction of a national narrative in textbooks, and while the *San’yūshi* too were rendered in similar ways, they fueled a commercial, popular event that exceeded that of Hirose’s. Wilson claims that apathy to what happened on the mainland was more prevalent than one might think, yet, this stance becomes difficult to maintain when looking at the sheer abundance and pervasiveness of the *San’yūshi* legacy. Granted, this pervasiveness was bound to be stronger in cities than in rural areas, as cities are more likely to attract commercial capital, nevertheless, it was also not absent in rural areas.

Shortly after the death of the *San’yūshi* multiple film studios vowed and began to compete to produce the first *San’yūshi* themed feature, and as the market for *San’yūshi* features was saturated, studios iterated on the idea.[[341]](#footnote-342) The whole production process of movies itself was heavily mediatized with updates on the projects being periodically printed in newspapers.[[342]](#footnote-343) Renditions of the legacy also found itself in traditional arts which were then broadcasted by radio stations, which dramatically increased audiences for the struggling industry.[[343]](#footnote-344) Shortly after the first features were published newspapers were quick to proclaim that performance arts and the film industry had entered a new era which they dubbed the “Era of the Three Brave Men” (*San’yūshi jidai* 三勇士時代).[[344]](#footnote-345) Similar to ordinary broadcasted performances, a larger cross-platform event was scheduled to be broadcasted on 16 March where three radio stations on the proposal of the Ōsaka station, one in Tōkyō, one in Ōsaka and one in Fukuoka collaborated to produce the “Evening of the Three Brave Men” (*San’yūshi no yū* 三勇士の夕).[[345]](#footnote-346) The spectacle would start at 7:30 in the evening with the performance of a play written by the playwright Inoue Masao 井上正夫 (1881-1950) and was aired by Tōkyō stations in real time as it was performed at the *Meiji-za*明治座 theater in Tōkyō. Afterwards, from Fukuoka, a *biwa* piece written by an upcoming artist by the name Aramaki Kyokkō 荒牧旭弘as well as the impressions of the boy Ietani Kazuo, were broadcasted from Fukuoka. The event ended with a “sung narrative” (*naniwabushi* 浪花節)performance by Miyakawa Shōan 宮川松安 in Ōsaka. Before airing the performances, newspapers provided a preview, reminding audiences of the spectacle, alongside photographs of the performers, providing visual material to a primarily audio-based program.[[346]](#footnote-347)

The story of the *San’yūshi* was picked up by a variety of magazines that utilized the sensational appeal of the three men to promote their own products and publications. This includes specialized magazines discussing the details of the incident, such as the magazine *Kagaku to kōgyō – Science & Industry* (科学と工業 – Science & Industry, “Science and Industry – Science & Industry”) whichfeatured a piece in its April edition of the same year discussing everything that was known at the time about the bomb that the men had carried. The piece, placed in its section for “The Science of Current Affairs” (*Jiji no kagaku* 時事の科学), began with an obligatory summary of the events that led to the death of the three soldiers and comparing their bravery with that of Tachibana Shūta and introducing them as the “Three Men that Protected the Country” (*gokoku no San’yūshi* 護国の三勇士). The article proceeds to explain how favorable a bomb of its type was to break the defenses of the Chinese army, reasons which have been discussed in a previous chapter, before it goes in-depth on the gunpowder used.[[347]](#footnote-348) It claims the powder was specially made for the tube, mainly consisting of picric acid (*pikurin-san* ピクリン酸). Usually, the two-meter-long tubes were carried by only one person, yet after some failed attempts it was decided by superiors that three soldiers were likelier to succeed in their mission than one, in the same logic that three people need to be hit three times before falling rather than just once. The tube itself was a makeshift one and was made of bamboo instead of the steel ones that were used elsewhere at the front and, as a result, the bomb was of inferior making and a little less effective.[[348]](#footnote-349)

The women’s magazine *Fujokai* (婦女界, “The World of Women”) featured in its April edition the script of a play written by the playwright Matsui Shōō 松居松翁 which had already been performed at the theater *Meiji-za*.[[349]](#footnote-350) Two months later it provided its readers with a recipe for “Three Brave Men Bowl of Rice with Food on Top” (*San’yūshi donburi* 三勇士丼).[[350]](#footnote-351) Other women’s magazines featured interviews with the mothers of the *San’yūshi* and in turn, helped to construe to the trope of militarized mothers.[[351]](#footnote-352) The language of the *San’yūshi* quickly crept into daily language in urban areas. Expressions that make reference to, for instance, the effectiveness of the *San’yūshi’*s strategy proved to be an effective way for emphasizing or exaggeration. A women’s magazine claimed her relationship advice was more effective than the strategy of the *San’yūshi* themselves, in a similar fashion saying that one “was a valorous bomb” for someone meant being infatuated with the person.[[352]](#footnote-353) Similarly, when days were hard, one could say that “these days my life is really a valorous bomb”.[[353]](#footnote-354)

At the same time, industries and smaller businesses were drawn to the *San’yūshi* fever by the prospect of patriotic and nationalist fueled profits. The Kirin Beer Company used the image of the *San’yūshi* in a commercial where the three sappers can be seen charging into barbed wires carrying a beer bottle instead of the bomb. Another similar commercial, perhaps with a racist undertone incorporated, came from a company producing camphor oil. The illustration used in the commercial shows the three sappers spraying bugs with the company’s product, stating that the product “eradicates harmful insects that are the intermediary of dreadful contagious diseases” (*osoru beki densenbyō o baikai suru gaichū o bokumetsu seraretashi* 恐るべき伝染病を媒介する害虫を撲滅せられたし). Considering that the *San’yūshi* were fighting Chinese troops in Shanghai and were then depicted eradicating bugs together with the above text could be mistaken or intended as dehumanizing language aimed at the enemy.[[354]](#footnote-355) Again, it was not only the large firms that took advantage of the craze, but there were also numerous examples of small, presumably independent businesses that marketed their products and services according to the newest trends. Restaurants began serving *San’yūshi* inspired dishes, such as a restaurant in the Mie 三重 prefecture that took the opportunity to serve two dishes, one being “Human Bullet Sushi” (*Nikudan Sushi* 肉弾寿司) and “Three Brave Men Sushi” (*San’yūshi sushi* 三勇士寿司) or a restaurant in Kyōto 京都 that served “Three Brave Men Udon” (*San’yūshi udon* 三勇士うどん).[[355]](#footnote-356) Other examples include Kurume based sake producers creating *San’yūshi* sake or food shops making “Sanyūshisteam dumplings” (*San’yūshi manjū* 三勇士饅頭).[[356]](#footnote-357) What is true for society was naturally also true for its younger generation, the “little citizens” for whom the incidents at the Chinese mainland became a daily theme, often in the most “harmless” of ways. This further increased after the story of the *San’yūshi* gained popularity, the language of war entered children’s fantasy on the playground and sometimes their stomachs through war-themed merchandise. Such items include “Three Brave Men Chocolate” (*San’yūshi chokorēto* 三勇士チョコレート) or “Three Brave Men Caramel” (*San’yūshi kyarameru* 三勇士キャラメル).[[357]](#footnote-358) Playgrounds became battlefields with building blocks turning into barbed wire defenses or forts, and hats made from aluminum became makeshift steel helmets.[[358]](#footnote-359) Back home, children magazines would provide children with new stories, comics or other things like posters of the *San’yūshi* for them to further their interest.[[359]](#footnote-360) The above mentioned trends illustrate the pervasiveness of the *San’yūshi* phenomenon.

5.3.2 The “Three Brave Men” and the “Japanese Identity”

The reaction to the *San’yūshi* was, while enormously successful as a commercial phenomenon, not exclusively of commercial nature. Aside from leading to massive amounts of donations, mountains of submissions to song contests and a “new era” in performance arts, the *San’yūshi* were widely discussed in outlets of mass media on a technical, social and ideological level. The impressions (*kansō* 感想) of a variety of individuals coming from different parts of society and different age groups were frequently featured as material to legitimize the military exploits on the mainland as well as to define what constitutes the “Japanese soul” or the “Japanese identity”.

The impressions of certain groups, especially children, were highly valued and became themselves subject to mediatization as implicit justification and approval of the *San’yūshi*. The donations coming from children has already been discussed above, these stories usually consist of children donating a rather small amount of money to their local military officials, yet it was the pureness of these acts that became the focal point of articles. Naturally, the tale of the *San’yūshi* was discussed in schools, often during moral education. Children were asked to write their impressions on the *San’yūshi* down in so-called “Essays on Impressions” (*kansō-bun* 感想文), and while the aim of these exercises were mostly of pedagogic nature, trying to get children to reflect on themselves and the world, those same essays found themselves back on printed paper read by the larger public.[[360]](#footnote-361) In this form, the essays became, to the average reader, accurate representations of how the “little citizens” (*shō-kokumin* 小国民) saw the exploits of the brave men. This perceived appreciation of the *San’yūshi* by the next generation was considered a necessity by some, as moral education was deemed to be desperately in need of the potential lessons that could be derived from the *San’yūshi*.[[361]](#footnote-362)

Among these impressions coming from children, three instances were printed in the *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. In Tōkyō, the Hibiya elementary school (*Hibiya shōgakkō* 日比谷小学校) had discussed the topic of “bravery” (*chūgi* 忠義) based on the “reality of the ‘Three Brave Bullet Heroes’” (*‘Nikudan San’yūshi’ no jijitsu* 「肉弾三勇士」の事実) with their third-grade students during ethics class (*shūshin* 修身). The forty-eight students then were asked to write essays on their thoughts that were afterwards submitted to the Army Minister Araki. A commissioned officer in charge then read the essays and was, allegedly, moved to tears by what he read that three of the essays simply had to be published in newspapers.[[362]](#footnote-363) The themes explored in these essays include how the three men must have felt on the moment of their death (*kokoromochi* 心持), how the children shed tears when thinking about their bravery, what kind of people their parents must have been, et cetera. A remarkable statement came from one of the children that stated that “up until now there have already died a considerable number of soldiers, but to do it in such a great manner was a first” (*ima made zuibun heitai-san ga shinimashita ga sonna erai kata wa hajimete desu* 今までずいぶん兵たいさんが死にましたがそんなえらい方ははじめてです).[[363]](#footnote-364) Which is a prime example of how problematic the contrast was between the attention that the *San’yūshi* received compared to the rest of the men at the front. Despite this, there was a considerable amount of voices reminding Japanese audiences that the *San’yūshi* were not the only heroes that the war had produced. Most of the children’s knowledge on national heroes likely came, if not from children’s magazines, from the education system, and as such one child remarked that he thought the *San’yūshi* were “more admirable than Commander Hirose from Ethics [class]” (*shūshin* (*shūshin*) *no Hirose chūsa yori erai to omoimashita* しゅうしん（修身)の広瀬中佐よりえらいと思いました).

A similar instance was printed in the *Fukuoka Nichinichi Shinbun*. An elementary school in the city of Ōmuta 大牟田 had their students think about the *San’yūshi* during a similar class and asked them to write their opinions down. One of the children reported that he had already felt quite sad hearing the news of so many soldiers losing their lives. He had, however, spontaneously reacted with a *banzai* the moment he had heard the achievement of the three men. Another child lauded their achievement by stating that they had saved Japan and that he thought the *San’yūshi* were the most excellent soldiers that had lost their lives at the front. Again, one of the children compared the achievement of the three brave men to the exploits of Hirose Takeo and the rest of the blockade crew. However, the child emphasized, perhaps critically, that back then the soldiers were able to return safely by boat, whereas “this time” (*kono toki* この時) they were simply not able to return alive. He likely implied that the *San’yūshi* were braver or had stronger resolve than Japan’s other military heroes, and pointed at the contrast between the sudden, spontaneous death of Hirose and Tachibana compared to the willing act of self-sacrifice of the three sappers. Furthermore, the child stated that a similar death in battle would likely not happen a second time.[[364]](#footnote-365) Another child again reiterated the point one of his classmates had raised, which was that the act of the *San’yūshi* was more excellent than that of Hirose. Moreover, he was astounded by the fact that all thee men were “Kyūshū men”. The rest of the essays include children being grateful that they can sleep in peace and study thanks to the three men, and that they shed tears when writing their essays. Many of the children were also seemingly inspired by the exploits and stated they too wanted to serve the country when they grew up.

What is significant about these articles is not the essays written by children itself, as it is hard to determine how they really felt about the achievement of the three men. They might have simply competed for a good grade or wanted to impress the teacher or other adults. This, however, does not matter for the articles because the essays are stripped of their pedagogic and educational dimension and presented as representations of the inner world of children. In other words, these essays, misrepresented as they are and hyped up with sensationalist sentences as “what kind of reaction did the heroic death [of the three men] cause in the hearts of the little citizens” (*[San’yūshi no] hisō na senshi ga shō-kokumin no mune ni donna ni hankyō o ataeta ka* [三勇士の]悲壮な戦死が小国民の胸にどんなに反響を与えたか), became gateways for adults to the inner workings of children and furthered the justification of the exploits of Japan’s new heroes.[[365]](#footnote-366)

The reaction to the *San’yūshi* by children does, however, not compare with the interpretations of the *San’yūshi’*sachievements that were printed in and disseminated by reviews (*hyōron zasshi* 評論雑誌). The emergence of the *San’yūshi* tale was taken as an opportunity to define what constitutes to be Japanese. As discussed above, there was an international dimension to the legacy of the *San’yūshi*. This was not limited to the initial response as more than a year later there were still small instances of foreign praise. An article in the magazine *Gunji to gijutsu* (軍事と技術 “Military Matters and Techonology”) featured one account in an article titled “The Three Brave Bullet Heroes Are Even Now Jumping in America, the Country of the Dollar” that had been published a few months prior in an issue in the *New York Evening Journal*.[[366]](#footnote-367) The article featured the original English article titled “These Are Japanese Fighters: Such People Win Wars” which in itself featured an article published in the magazine *Time*, titled “Three Human Bombs”.[[367]](#footnote-368) The *New York Evening Journal’*s article is a piece that heavily relies on exoticism, discussing patriotism stating that “All young men of fighting nations mean it [when they say that dying for your country is the most beautiful fate,] but few mean it exactly AS THE JAPANESE (sic!) mean it”.[[368]](#footnote-369) The article of *Gunji to gijutsu* then continues to translate the English articles to Japanese, making the English content accessible to Japanese audiences, carefully dissecting the English and “contextualizing” what each phrase means.

At home, the nationalist response is perhaps best represented by the collection of texts submitted to the nationalist (*kokusui shugi* 国粋主義) review *Nihon oyobi nihonjin* (日本及日本人 “Japan and the Japanese”) which featured a considerable number of articles with impressions and thoughts on the *San’yūshi* in their “Praising the Souls of the Three Brave Men” (*San’yūshi ryūkon-gō* 三勇士留魂號) issue. The magazine begins with its usual advertisements before getting to its epigraph titled “The Departed Herolike Souls of the Three Brave Bombing Heroes” (*Bakudan San’yūshi no eikon kihaku* 爆弾三勇士の英魂毅魄). It begins with defining the “three great things that warriors ought to forget when going to the battlefield” (*bushi no sanbō* 武士の三忘). The three things being that: a warrior ought to forget his family when he leaves the house, ought to forget his self when looking at the battlefield, and ought to forget his own life when looking at the enemy. The article then proceeds to define tasks of the father and mother within a family for the education of their children by means of these three points to raise the “soul of a samurai” (*shikon* 士魂). This is all to raise a warrior that serves the country and the emperor, as he will not expect to return alive. The first paragraph ends with praising the Japanese soldiers saying that they are by default “loyal, brave and heroic” (*chūyū giretsu* 忠勇義烈). The second and last paragraph talks about the *San’yūshi* in rather standard terms, talking about the incident, their bravery, et cetera.

The main bulk of the magazine lies in its fifty-page segment titled “Impressions Regarding the Three Brave Bombing Heroes” (*Bakudan San’yūshi ni tai suru kansō* 爆弾三勇士に對する感想). The magazine introduces the segment by saying that “it was the company’s goal to mourn the souls of the Three Brave Heroes and that they had collected appeals from eager writer all over the country”. Opinions were collected based on three categories. A contribution to the segment was ought to either express an opinion regarding the death of the three sappers and investigate its heroic, tragic dimension, it could also serve to contribute ideas to eternally praise and worship the *San’yūshi* or serve to rouse the minds of the people.[[369]](#footnote-370) Due to the sheer abundance of articles, only a few are discussed below. Among the authors were military officials, former politicians, members of nobility, poets and thinkers. For instance, one of the authors, count Yanagiwara Yoshimitsu 柳原義光, argued in his contribution for a better way to “stir the minds of the Japanese people”.[[370]](#footnote-371) He was a proponent for the construction of a bronze statue, but as they were limited by their locality he thought of them as suboptimal to spread the image of the *San’yūshi.* A better way, he argued, would be to have the government issue stamps with the likeness of the three sappers on them. In this way their image and valiant deeds would be spread far and wide over the empire. However, his idea did not seem to have found a listening ear as no stamps with a *San’yūshi* motive seem to exist. Another author thought about eternalizing the three mens in more practical ways by using public funds to build three planes, each one being named after one of the three sappers.[[371]](#footnote-372) Would the conflict with China not die down then, the author argued, the planes would serve in a possible conflict with America, which he saw as one of the causes for the problems in China. Another author had a similar idea, but then more fittingly argued for the construction of three bomber planes (*Bakugekiki* 爆撃機).[[372]](#footnote-373)

One author made reference to the Swiss legend of Arnold von Winkelried who, allegedly, at the Battle of Sempach in 1386 had played a similar role as the *San’yūshi* in Shanghai, namely opening a path for his army to advance sacrificing himself in the process.[[373]](#footnote-374) The legend of Wrinkelried found itself disputed a year later, when an article on 6 November 1933 in the British newspaper *The Morning Post* was published where a letter by Sir Reginald Jonathan expressed its disappointment that it was nothing more than a legend. The discussion around Wrinkelried, which was caused by the British historian Sir Charles Oman, according to Reginald, might have reminded British audiences of a similar instance which, as far as he knew, “the truth of which […] has never been disputed.[[374]](#footnote-375) Bessho, whose essay had introduced its readers to the legend of the Swiss soldier, quickly further discussed the nature of the *San’yūshi’*s sacrifice saying that “if the thought of protecting your country is not included within the hearts of Japanese, then such a thing would not promptly appear”.[[375]](#footnote-376) Another author discussed the heroic nature of the *San’yūshi*, describing it as a natural result of the “Japanese soul” which since times of old led to Japanese sacrificing themselves for the good of the country, “a characteristic that was not rare”. Despite the abundance of that feature, he expressed his criticism towards the materialist civilization (*yuibutsu bunmei* 唯物文明) which had dyed the hearts of men with an individualist (*kojin shugi teki* 個人主義的) trend of thoughts which had led to a state where such individuals were extremely rare.[[376]](#footnote-377)

Another separate volume of *Nihon Oyobi Nihonjin* featured an article with a peculiar line of thinking discussing the *San’yūshi* in the light of international trends towards fascism. Over the course of a few pages, the article explored the fascist dimension of the valor of the *San’yūshi*. The author began his article by talking about how fascism had become quite a popular thought in newspapers, magazines and literary works, yet stated that it was merely a fashionable thing and would fade like all other “imported thoughts” (*yunyū shisō* 輸入思想).[[377]](#footnote-378) He spends more than two pages on fascism before talking about the main point of his article: the *San’yūshi*. He asked the question whether the achievement of the three brave men must be seen in a fascist light and attempted to dismiss that by stating that the *San’yūshi* might not even have heard of fascism.[[378]](#footnote-379) He tried to substantiate his claim by referring to the former issue of *Nihon Oyobi Nihonjin* in which multiple essays on the *San’yūshi* were published. These essays, as discussed above, claim that the acts of the *San’yūshi* found their origin in an ancient and inherent trait of “the Japanese”. Despite the quantity of the essays, they rarely do add new insights into the *San’yūshi* and mostly adhere to the rhetoric of the above-mentioned examples. When authors did offer new proposals on how to honor the *San’yūshi*, these ideas were seldom explored. Similar to Bessho, the author seems to, perhaps secretly, subscribe to the subject of comparison, yet stresses the exceptional dimension of the three men.

The *San’yūshi* were a phenomenon that occurred at a time of intense military activity at the Chinese mainland where it fought over Japanese interests, at home where it captured the hearts of the people with splendid pageantry and where its grasp on Japanese society increased with increased militarization and political terrorism by rogue individuals. The image of the three men caused a frenzy in Japanese audiences in a matter of days and fueled an event that spanned multiple weeks. They were, however, not the only driving force of society at the time, nor were they the first or only new war hero, and emerged according to preset trends.

# 6 Conclusion

The above paper discussed ideas on *gunshin*, the mediatized enshrinement of Hirose Takeo and the *Nikudan San’yūshi’*s as part of the Japanese pantheon of deified war heroes and their significance within Japanese society. While this paper hoped to find a substantial link between the two instances it focused on, it must admit that no such link exists, which still proves to be a valuable finding in itself. As a result, it posed a challenge to properly adhere to the set time frame proposed in the introduction. However, by focusing on two unrelated instances of the same phenomenon, it became clear that both Hirose Takeo and the *Bakudan San’yūshi* were valorized by similar social mechanisms, albeit in different time periods and therefore different media environments. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that while considerable variations occurred between the “worship” of Hirose and the *San’yūshi*, Hirose’s apotheosis formed the groundwork for the *San’yūshi* and later *gunshin’*sworship. Material analyzed during this research, furthermore indicated that initial reports on the objects of interest were contextualized or stressed the significance of them by referring to acknowledged instances of martial bravery. With Hirose this was most noticeably done by comparing him to Kusunoki Masashige and in one fringe case to Horatio Nelson. In the case of the *San’yūshi*,examples can be found where they are compared to previous heroes, mostly heroes from the Russo-Japanese War such as Hirose and Tachibana, and where they themselves became reference material for new instances of martial bravery shortly after their popularity increased. Contextualization was done by stressing that it is not just a soldier dying but dying in a matter which was deemed to be consistent with modern myths and former heroes.

Whether the practice of contextualization was rife enough to be recognized as a substantial practice is still unclear, yet the material analyzed suggests that such a practice expresses a complementary functionality to the cult of the fallen with regard to justifying armed conflict and confirming the identity of the group by presenting a continuity in concepts such as the “Japanese soul”, the “samurai code of chivalry” and the “Japanese spirit”. It is important to note that these myths were always discussed as existing independently from the hero in question, but also in a manner that emphasized that these myths formed the origin for their bravery. The propagation of these tales through mass media, meaning the mediatized enshrinement of gunshin, is crucial in the construction of national myths because it is through this creation process that the identity of the Japanese citizen is confirmed. In other words, as the national hero is born and Japanese audiences, through means of mass media, witnesses the birth, the identity of the Japanese citizen in relation to the national hero is established. Furthermore, with the persistence and propagation of myths like the "Japanese soul" these myths formed cornerstones within the self-identification. On a related note it needs to be stated that these comparisons are rarely, by modern standards, logical or accurate, the way that Hirose and Kusunoki died, for example, are different and occurred in different contexts, meaning that these comparisons are based on subjective criteria that work to maintain symbolism at the cost of accuracy.

It is clear that the Japanese military enjoyed a high standing within Japanese society in periods when military heroes were popular, but in what direction the arrow of causality points, or if it points both ways or not could not be determined from this research, although a reciprocal nature seems to be the most convincing thesis. As a part of the irreligious cult of the fallen, *gunshin* complemented the religious cult of the fallen embodied by institutions like the Yasukuni Shrine, and were “enshrined” by means of broadcasting key events concerning to their tales of martial bravery through mass media, the response to it by Japanese audiences and utilization by interest groups. While the members of the *gunshin* pantheon also constitute instances within the religious cult of the fallen, meaning that they were, for instance, enshrined in the Yasukuni shrine, this identity needs to be seen as separate and practically heterogenous to their counterparts within the aforementioned religious practices.

Media events, the phenomenon that ended up being the driving force for enshrining Japan’s modern deities, are far from homogeneous events. Despite being able to connect the nation, they still exhibit occasionally fractured characteristics and transcend locality without fully escaping their local significance. This means that a media event overall can be compared to a giant mosaic of different events on different levels merging together to an overarching media event. Media events include small factions within the event along with larger players and make local events accessible to larger audiences than would be feasible without mass media. The media landscape determines the extent and speed with which an event propagates through society. While many soldiers, especially in the 1930s became subject to mediatization, only few of them attained the status of a national hero. This apotheosis was guided by social forces within Japanese society, meaning the reciprocal relation between valorization of the war dead and the morale of Japanese audiences. One of the reasons why this paper’s main case studies saw such success was due to their emergence occurring in periods of comparatively little bloodshed and high morale, resulting in a period where the war dead can be utilized to justify armed conflict. As for the origin of the concept of *gunshin*, while there might be a cultural origin within Japan’s history itself, this research is still uncertain about a direct continuation of the thoughts behind deifying humans in premodern times compared to modern times. That deification was not out of the ordinary, however, could have served as a basis for the concept.

As discussed above, regarding Hirose, the key events that led to his enshrinement as part of the pantheon of national heroes were guided by interest groups, in this case high ranking Navy officers. These key events comprised events such as his death at Port Arthur, his funeral, the construction of his statues, and later the construction of his shrine as well as his rediscovery in performance art and literature. Whereas Hirose at the start of his *gunshin* legacy constituted a transnational, cosmopolitan personality, his funeral being attended by foreign representatives and others as wel as the unveiling of his Manseibashi statue finding itself in the midst of a key moment for Anglo-Japanese relations. In the light of political, economic, social and cultural transformations during the late 1920s and early 1930s, however, this shifted to a more nationalist interpretation. His tale was rediscovered during the late 1920s as the initial mourning for the Russo-Japanese War subsided, and the physical locations where he was commemorated turned from an obstacle into a place where acts of militarist pageantry were held and where Japanese audiences met again with their imperial past. As calls for proper enshrinement grew, Hirose, for the first time, became an independent Japanese deity in the religious sense. The shrine too turned into a place where the nation’s and citizen’s identity was confirmed. The construction of the tale of Hirose was accompanied by quite some creative freedom as it was rendered many times with the focus on radically different parts over the course of thirty years. This shows how versatile his tale was, as well as how the importance of symbolism eclipses the need for accuracy. An example of this can be found in the lengths that some authors went to find a link between Kusunoki and Hirose.

Like with Hirose, the *San’yūshi’*s enshrinement was carried out by key events broadcasted by means of mass media. As the three men’s legacy was cut short by Japan’s defeat at the end of the Second World War, it is hard to determine whether they too would have turned into a realm of memory for the Shanghai incident. There was a possibility for this to happen as commemorative events for the First Shanghai Incident happened a few years after the incident with the focus on the *San’yūshi*. Just as with Hirose, the legacy of the *San’yūshi* initially found itself discussed within the framework of previous instances of martial bravery before quickly being recognized as a proper, independent instance itself. After their deaths at Miaohangzhen, the three men promptly found itself at the center of a highly mediatized and commercialized society, becoming an icon with which ordinary people could relate themselves to and being nearly ubiquitous throughout most of urban life if not Japanese society as a whole. The amount of recognition virtually eclipsed all other instances of martial bravery to the point where some voices attempted to remind Japanese audiences that other soldiers too were as brave as these three men. The key events that constituted their enshrinement were their deaths at Miaohangzhen, the official recognition embodied in the invitation of the bereaved families to visit Tōkyō and the construction of the two statues. Aside from being rendered in a variety of popular culture instances and being commercialized by small and large businesses, the *San’yūshi* became an object of a national discussion on the identity of “the Japanese” and found itself rendered in society’s daily life.

While this research, due to restrictions of time and text length, had a bias towards Tōkyō based material, had to be limited to only two instances of *gunshin* that turned out to be quite popular, and in addition had to work with an inconvenient temporal frame, it can serve as a basis to further explore the irreligious cult of the fallen and other instances of *gunshin*.

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12. Articles Pertaining to Hirose from 1904-45.

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*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Gaikoku kisha wa kaku miru, nihon seishin no kyokuchi, ‘Shi ni tai suru kanzen taru taido’ o, taimusu no Baiasu-shi gekishō” 外国記者はかく見る　日本精神の極致　「死に対する敢然たる態度」を　タイムス紙のバイアス氏激賞. Morning edition, 26 February 1932. p. 7.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Gunjin chokuyu kashi go jū shūnen kinen-bi meiji taitei no go-ikun zenkoku rikukaigun butai de, kyō ogosoka ni kinen-shiki” 軍人勅諭下賜五十周年記念日 明治大帝の御遺訓 全国陸海軍部隊で、きょう厳かに記念式. Morning edition, 4 January 1932 年. p. 3.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Gunkoku ni dai no bidan ‘hataraite shinde koi, inujini wa suru na’, kenage na Kitagawa ittōhei no haha” 軍国二代の美談　「働いて死んで来い　犬死はするな」　健気な北川一等兵の母. Evening edition, 27 February 1932. p. 2.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Gunkoku no haru kyō no shukuten sōkan! Sora ni gin’yoku no bunretsu-shiki karei! Riku ni gunrakutai no kōshin” 軍国の春けふの祝典 壮観！空に銀翼の分列式 華麗！陸に軍楽隊の行進”. Morning edition, 24 April 1932. p. 11.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Gunshin dōzō jomaku-shiki Fūu chū no jomaku, Tōgō taishō naku, Hirose chūsa dōzō jomaku-shiki” 軍神銅像除幕式　風雨中の除幕　東郷大将泣く　広瀬中佐銅像除幕式. Morning edition, 30 May 1910. p. 3.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Gunshin Hirose chūsa, kyō san jū nen shikiten, dōzō no moto de seidai ni” 軍神広瀬中佐、けふ卅年式典　銅像の下で盛大に. Evening edition, 28 March 1934. p. 2.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Gunshin Hirose chūsa” 軍神広瀬中佐. Morning edition, 30 March 1904. p. 1.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Gunshin ryō-chūsa o matsuru jinja kenritsu, chikaku jitsugen kakugi demo sansei to kesshita ga, shinrei nanode shinchō ni” 軍神両中佐を祭る神社建立、近く実現　閣議でも賛成と決したが、新例なので慎重に. Morning edition, 26 July 1928. p. 11.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Gūzen no kien, ni yūshi o dashita Nagasaki kara tōsen, Igai to suru Nakano Chikara-shi” 偶然の奇縁　二勇士を出した長崎から当選　以外とする中野氏. Morning edition, 15 March 1932. p. 3.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Hirose chūsa dōzō jomaku-shiki (Ōita)” 広瀬中佐銅像除幕式 (大分). Morning edition, 14 May 1907. p. 2.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Hirose chūsa dōzō jomaku-shiki” 広瀬中佐銅像除幕式. Morning edition, 11 May 1907. p. 3.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Hirose chūsa dōzō kensetsu shui-sho” 広瀬中佐銅像建設趣意書. Morning edition, 22 April 1904. p. 3.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Hirose chūsa dōzō kensetsu-chi kettei” 広瀬中佐銅像建設地決定. Morning edition, 27 November 1908. p. 4.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Hirose chūsa dōzō mae ni, kinen no shoku-ju hyaku hon, rikujō gunkan no teito kōshin no nigiwai” 広瀬中佐銅像前に、記念の植樹百本　陸上軍艦の帝都行進の賑い. Evening edition, 28 May 1930. p. 1.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Hirose chūsa dōzō, nesshin dōjō-sei” 広瀬中佐銅像　熱心同情生. Morning edition, 1 April 1904. p. 2.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Hirose chūsa gyodai ni hairu” 広瀬中佐御題に入る. Morning edition, 6 April 1904. p. 2.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Hirose chūsa igai Shinjuku teishajō tōchaku no kōkei” 広瀬中佐遺骸新橋停車場到着の光景. Morning edition, 6 April 1904. p. 1.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Hirose chūsa no dōzō (Gifu)” 広瀬中佐の銅像 (岐阜). Morning edition, 16 February 1906. p. 2.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Hirose chūsa no dōzō (ichi wa Manseibashi no hotori) Watanabe Nagao-shi kushin-dan” 広瀬中佐の銅像 (位置は万世橋の畔)　渡辺長男氏苦心談, Morning edition, 27 December 1908. p. 4.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Hirose chūsa no dōzō (Ōita)” 広瀬中佐の銅像 (大分). Morning edition, 25 May 1906. p. 4.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Hirose chūsa no dōzō gosō-shiki” 広瀬中佐の銅像護送式. Morning edition, 24 January 1906. p. 6.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Hirose chūsa no dōzō seisō, kaigun shōnen-dan no hōshi” 広瀬中佐の銅像清掃　海洋少年団の奉仕. Morning edition, 28 March 1932. p. 7.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Hirose chūsa no dōzō” 広瀬中佐の銅像. Morning edition, 26 February 1906. p. 3.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Hirose chūsa no sōgi, chokushi, suikōsha, gogo ichi ji shukkan endō, Aoyama bochi, oyobi kōkai no saibun, kaisō-sha” 広瀬中佐の葬儀　勅使　水交社　午後一時出棺　沿道　青山墓地　及後会の祭文　会葬者. Morning edition, 14 April 1904. p. 1.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Hirose chūsa no sōgi, zōi, shukkan, boshimei, hakadokoro, gyōretsu, gijōhei, zatsuji” 広瀬中佐の葬儀　贈位　出棺　墓誌銘　墓所　行列　儀仗兵　雑事. Morning edition, 13 April 1904. p. 2.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Hirose kaigun chūsa sōgi gahō (Aoyama bochi saijō)” 広瀬海軍中佐葬儀画報（青山墓地斎場). Morning edition, 15 April 1904. p. 3.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Honnen no kaigun kinen-bi” 本年の海軍記念日. Morning edition, 13 May 1910. p. 2.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Honsha kenshō boshū tōsen uta happyō, ‘Nikudan San’yūshi no uta’ san hen, ōbo sōsū jitsu ni jū ni man yon sen tsū, toku ni nitō o ni hen to su” 本社懸賞募集当選歌発表　「肉弾三勇士の歌」三篇　応募総数実に十二万四千通　特に二等を二篇とす. Morning edition, 15 March 1932. p. 3.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Honsha sentei, Nikudan San’yūshi no uta, happyō ensō-kai” 本社選定　肉弾三勇士の歌　発表演奏会. Morning edition, 15 March 1932. p. 3.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Hyōban no mohan seinen, ‘honnin mo sa zo manzoku deshō…’ to Kozaki ittōhei izoku yorokobu” 評判の模範青年　「本人もさぞ満足でしょう…」と小崎一等兵遺族喜ぶ. Morning edition, 2 March 1932. p. 5.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Jūrai no kanrei o yaburi San’yūshi o gochō ni shōshin, kūzen no onshō ni yokuse shimu, izoku imon gikin ichi man en toppa” 従来の慣例を破り三勇士を伍長に昇進　空前の恩賞に浴せしむ　遺族慰問義金一万円突破. Evening edition, 27 February 1932. p. 2.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Kenshō boshū, Nikudan San’yūshi no uta” 懸賞募集　肉弾三勇士の歌. Morning edition, 28 February 1932. p. 3.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Kirin bīru” キリンビール. Morning edition, 22 April 1932. p. 9.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Kōgyōkai o agete San’yūshi jidai, ginmaku ni, butai ni” 興行界を挙げて三勇士時代　銀幕に、舞台に. Morning edition, 3 March 1932. p. 7.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Ko-Hirose chūsa dōzō hassō-shiki no keijō” 故広瀬中佐銅像発送式の景況. Morning edition, 25 January 1906. p. 6.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Mondai no Sudachō kotoshi chū ni toriatsukai, Hirosechūsa no dōzō ga mittsudomoe no yakkai mo atsukai” 問題の須田町今年中に取払ひ　広瀬中佐の銅像が　三ッ巴の厄介もの扱ひ. Evening edition, 2 September 1922. p. 2.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Naikoku denpō, Hirose chūsa (Kōbe)” 内国電報　広瀬中佐（神戸). Morning edition, 5 April 1904. p. 1.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Nikudan San’yūshi no dōzō, gaitō kōshin” 肉弾三勇士の銅像、街頭行進. Morning edition, 26 May 1933. p. 3.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Nikudan San’yūshi no dōzō jomaku-shiki, kyō kyokō saru” 肉弾三勇士の銅像除幕式　きょう挙行さる. Evening edition, 23 February 1934. p. 2.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Nikudan San’yūshi no hōyō” 肉弾三勇士の法要. Evening edition, 19 February 1937. p. 3.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Nogi shogun shinpitsu no ‘gunjin chokuyu’ Rikugun kinen-bi ni haifu” 乃木将軍真筆の「軍人勅諭」 陸軍記念日に配布. Morning edition, 1 March 1931. p. 11.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Oyanagi tōki-ten gunshin Hirose chūsa dōzō mokei” 小柳陶器店　軍神広瀬中佐銅像模型. Morning edition, 14 August 1904. p. 8.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Oyanagi tōki-ten gunshin Hirose chūsa hanshin dōzō” 小柳陶器店　軍神広瀬中佐　半身銅像. Morning edition, 23 May 1904. p. 8.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Pari de mo, dōzō to basho no hinan” 巴里でも　銅像と場所の非難. Morning edition, 6 July 1921. p. 6.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Rajio/ kokunan taji no toki, gunjin chokuyu no seishi o kōshō suru Tōgō gensui kon’ya no kinen hōsō, kōji machi gensui-tei kara chūkei” ラジオ／国難多事の時、軍人勅諭の聖旨を高唱する東郷元帥今夜の記念放送、麹町元帥邸から中継. Morning edition, 4 January 1932. p. 5.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “San suihei bakushi, sensha-tai no tame bakuha sagyō-chū, teki no jirai bakuhatsu shite” 三水兵爆死　戦車隊の為獏は作業中　敵の地雷爆発して. Morning edition, 3 March 1932. p. 7.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “San’yūshi no haha naku, ginmaku ni wa ga ko bakushi no ato o tomurau, honsha no eiga o mite” 三勇士の母泣く　銀幕にわが子爆死の跡を弔ふ　本社の映画を見て. Morning edition, 13 March 1932. p. 7.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “San’yūshi no yū, jū roku nichi yoru san hōsō-kyoku de” 三勇士の夕　十六日夜三放送局で. Morning edition, 11 March 1932. p. 11.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Shi gatsu gejun ni rikukaigun de dai shukuten gunjin chokuyu go jū shūnen kinen-bi ni, ichi dai-kokumin undō keikaku” 四月下旬に陸海軍で大祝典軍人勅諭五十周年記念に、一大国民運動計画. Evening edition, 24 January 1932. p. 2.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Shisha no kunkō / Shasetsu” 死者の勲功／社説. Morning edition, 30 March 1904. p. 2.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Shō-kokumin no atama ni eijita San’yūshi ‘namida ga deru hodo erai hito’ Hibiya shōgakkō ni nensei ga kangeki shita kansō-bun” 小国民の頭に映じた三勇士「涙が出る程豪い人」日比谷小学校二年生が感激した感想文. Morning edition, 27 February 1932. p. 7.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Yatto ochitsuku gunshin no dōzō, hidoi genjō kara sukuwarete shin-kōen e” やっと落つく軍神の銅像　ひどい現状から救われて新公園へ. Evening edition, 14 January 1930. p. 2.

*Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* 東京朝日新聞. “Zen kaigun no kikin de Hirose jinja o sōken, Ōita-ken no kiji ni” 全海軍の寄金で広瀬神社を建設　大分県の生地に. Morning edition, 26 November 1933. p. 11.

*Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* 東京日日新聞. “‘Bakudan San’yūshi no uta’ Happyō, Ittō wa shidan no rōtaika, Ōbo hachi man yon sen amaru hen-chū kara, Erabareta Yosano-san sono ta” 「爆弾三勇士の歌」発表　一等は詩壇の老大家　応募八万四千余篇中から　選ばれた与謝野さん其他. Morning edition, 15 March 1932. p. 6.

*Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* 東京日日新聞. “Kaigun no San’yūshi, tetsujōmō hakai-chū bakushi” 海軍の三勇士　鉄条網破壊中爆死. Morning edition, 3 March 1932. p. 11.

*Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* 東京日日新聞. “Kangeki mo arata ni, ima sara nagara tōsen no ei o ninatte, Yosano Hirose shi no dan” 感激も新に　今更乍ら当選の栄をになって　与謝野寛氏の談. Morning edition, 15 March 1932. p. 6.

*Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* 東京日日新聞. “Kansha arata ni shinobu, gunshin, Hirose chūsa, kyō san jū shūnen kinen-sai” 感謝新に偲ぶ　軍神、広瀬中佐　けふ卅周年記念祭. Evening edition, 28 March 1934. p. 2.

*Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* 東京日日新聞. “Kemudashi hennōyū no iryoku” 煙出片脳油の偉力. Evening edition, 1 May 1932. p. 2.

*Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* 東京日日新聞. “Kenshō boshū, Bakudan San’yūshi no uta” 懸賞募集　爆弾三勇士の歌. Morning edition, 28 February 1932. p. 2.

*Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* 東京日日新聞. “Ko-Hirose chūsa meiyo hyōshō no shakoku” 故広瀬中佐名誉表彰の社告. Morning edition, 31 March 1904. p. 3.

*Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* 東京日日新聞. “Omoide no shinajina ni, omowazu jibo no namida, honsha shusai Shanhai-ten o miru” 憶ひ出の品々に　思はず慈母の涙　本社主催上海展を見る. Morning edition, 13 March 1932. p. 11.

*Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞. “[shasetsu] Hirose chūsa no senshi” [社説]広瀬中佐の戦死. Morning edition, 30 March 1904, p. 2.

*Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞. “[Yomiuri-shō] kaigunshō no yūshi hakki ni yoru ko-Hirose chūsa no dōzō, Watanabe Nagao ga genkei seisaku-chū” ［よみうり抄］海軍省の有志発起による故広瀬中佐の銅像、渡辺長男が原型製作中. Morning edition, 29 May 1908. p. 1.

*Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞. “Aa Bakudan San’yūshi, Shiba Seishō-ji ni dōzō kansei su, Tōkyō” ああ爆弾三勇士　芝青松寺に銅像完成す／東京. Evening edition, 9 February 1934. p. 2.

*Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞. “Chokuyu kashi go jū nen kinen-bi kyō rikukai ryōshō kara no seishi hōtei ni shitashiku seichoku o tamau hoka” 勅諭下賜五十年記念日 きょう陸海両相からの誓詞奉呈に親しく聖勅を賜う ほか. Morning edition, 4 January 1932. p. 2.

*Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞. “Eiga ‘gunshin Hirose chūsa’, ‘haha yo koishi/denkikan’” 映画「軍神広瀬中佐」「母よ恋し」／電気館. Morning edition, 23 May 1926. p. 3.

*Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞. “Gunkoku no eikō koko ni kagayaku kyō gunjin chokuyu kashi kinen shukuten” 軍国の栄光ここに輝く きょう軍人勅諭下賜記念祝典. Evening edition, 24 April 1932. p. 1.

*Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞. “Heisoku kesshitai fushōsha no keika ryōkō, Hirose chūsa no ihin tōchaku/Sasebo-den” 閉塞決死隊負傷者の経過良好▽広瀬中佐の遺品到着／佐世保電. Morning edition, 2 March 1904. p. 2.

*Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞. “Hirose chūsa issei jōei” 広瀬中佐一斉上映. Morning edition, 1 June 1926. p. 5.

*Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞. “Hirose chūsa no dōzō kensetsu e kaigun-shō shōkō-ra bokin hajimeru” 広瀬中佐の銅像建設へ　海軍省将校ら募金始める. Morning edition, 30 March 1904. p. 2.

*Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞. “Hirose chūsa no sōgi wa jū san nichi ni – Hirose chūsa no dōzō kensetsu-chi” 広瀬中佐の葬儀は十三日に▽広瀬中佐の銅像建設地. Morning edition, 6 April 1904. p. 2.

*Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞. “Hirose Takeo, Takarabe Takeshi no sōbetsu-kai/kōdōkannai hakkinin” 広瀬武夫　財部彪の送別会／講道館内発起人. Morning edition, 3 July 1897. p. 6.

*Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞. “Kanda-ku Sudachō ni kensetsu-chū no Hirose chūsa no dōzō, Kaigun kinen-bi no ni jū shichi nichi ni jomaku-shiki” 神田須田町に建設中の広瀬中佐の銅像　海軍記念日の廿七日に除幕式. Morning edition, 5 May 1910. p. 3.

*Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞. “Ko-Hirose chūsa no kinenbutsu wa dōzō ni kimaru” 故広瀬中佐の記念物は銅像に決まる. Morning edition, 3 April 1904. p. 6.

*Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞. “Koibito ni sukuwareru Hirose chūsa, dōzō no iten-saki o yatto sazukaru, Tōkyō, Ōtechō ni” 恋人に救われる広瀬中佐　銅像の移転先をやっと授かる　東京・大手町に. Morning edition, 19 December 1929. p. 7.

*Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞. “Nihon de hajimete no gaijin ekisutora, ‘Hirose chūsa’ satsuei de Shōchiku ga boshū” 日本で初めての外人エキストラ　「広瀬中佐」撮影で松竹が募集. Morning edition, 10 March 1926. p. 5.

*Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞. “Ryō-gunshin, shōwa yomigaette aku-shisō yoke no kami ni Hirose, Tachibana, kokusui naishō ga kakugi e hōkoku” 両軍神、昭和に甦って悪思想よけの神に広瀬・橘神社　国粋内相が閣議へ報告. Morning edition, 26 July 1928. p. 7.

*Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞. “Ryojun heisoku san jū shūnen, seidai na kinen-shiki, kyō Hirose chūsa dōzō mae de” 旅順閉塞卅周年　盛大な記念式　きょう広瀬中佐銅像前で. Evening edition, 28 March 1934. p. 2.

*Yomiuri Shinbun* 読売新聞. “Ryojun heisoku-tai no yūshi, gunshin, Hirose chūsa no tōshindai dōzō o yukari no chi, takayama ni kenritsu” 旅順閉塞隊の勇士、軍神・広瀬中佐の等身大銅像をゆかりの地、高山に建立. Morning edition, 1 January 1906. p. 3.

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1. \* This paper uses the updated Monumenta Nipponica Stylesheet of September 2018, but with some alterations specifically made for this paper. When first mentioned, Japanese terms are translated into English, with the original Japanese term added between brackets both in its romanized and original form. In some cases, the original Japanese term might be used instead of its English translation depending on the frequency that it is used, when it is a crucial term for this research and/or if it saves space. Furthermore, this paper sometimes abbreviates titles of primary material within the main text and footnotes to enhance readability of the text, but not before it has been presented in its entirety first. East Asian names are, when first mentioned given with the original characters, written according to East Asian customs, meaning that the family name is given prior to the personal name. On a related note, outdated *kanji* within names are converted to modern *kanji* and after a first mention the name will be abbreviated to only the last name. The only exception to the aforementioned rules is East Asian authors who publish in English. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. This paper disagrees with the translation of the word *gunshin* as “war god”. While the significance of the term is discussed below, it is important to note that this paper refers from here on to *gunshin* as either “Japanese deified war heroes” or to the original Japanese term. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, p. 106, 111. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. From here on, this paper will refer to *sensō bidan* and *gunkoku bidan* simply as *bidan*. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Nishizumi Kojirō, 1914-1938, was a tank commander that died during the Battle of Xuzhou (in Japanese: *joshū kaisen* 徐州会戦) and became known as a *gunshin*. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. Nakauchi, *Gunkoku bidan to kyōkasho*; Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. Ueno, *Tennō heika banzai – Bakudan San’yūshi josetsu*. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. High, *The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years’ War, 1931-1945*; Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. The Japanese military ranking nomenclature does not distinguish between army (*rikugun* 陸軍) and navy (*kaigun* 海軍) ranks. Meaning that, for instance, a *shōsa* can refer to a major of the army or a lieutenant commander of the navy. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. Hirose Takeo is often referred to as Commander Hirose (*Hirose chūsa* 広瀬中佐). Hirose was originally written using *Hirose* 廣瀬 or *Hirose* 廣瀨. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. The *Nikudan San’yūshi* are also referred to as the *Bakudan San’yūshi* or “Three Brave Bombing Heroes”. From here onwards this paper will refer to them as the *San’yūshi* in the interest of uniformity, as well as there being a lack of consensus as to how best translate *Nikudan San’yūshi*. Silverberg refers to them as the “Three Valorous Bombs”, Young as the “Three Human Bullets”, and High as the “Three Human Bomb Patriots”. This paper only uses different version for the sake of avoiding needless repetition. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. High, *The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years’ War, 1931-1945*, p. 35-36; Silverberg, *Erotic Grotesque Nonsense: The Mass Culture of Japanese Modern Times*, p. 123; Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, p. 77. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. i-v. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. Isao, “Shifting contours of memory and history, 1904–1980”, p. 357-58. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. Dickinson, “Commemorating the War in Post-Versailles Japan”, p. 541-42. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. Tobe, *Gyakusetsu no guntai*, p. 172. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. Orbach, “Culture of Disobedience: Rebellion and Defiance in the Japanese Army, 1860-1931”, p. 5; Ibid., p. 166-67, 172-73. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. Tobe, *Gyakusetsu no guntai*, p. 167; Nogi Maresuke, 1849-1912, was a general of the Japanese Imperial Army. After the Meiji Restauration, he underwent a French-style military education. In 1871 he was promoted to the rank of Major and fought in the Satsuma Rebellion as regimental commander where he lost a battle flag. As a result, he considered taking his own life as retribution, but gave up the idea after the Emperor forbade him. He, furthermore, was the leader of a disastrous but successful campaign at Port Arthur in which he lost a considerable amount of men. After the death of the Meiji Emperor, he took his life together with his wife on 13 January 1912, the same day as the funeral of the Emperor. After his death he was added to the *gunshin* pantheon. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. Ibid., p. 166. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. Nagai Hideo 永井秀夫. “Fukoku kyōhei” 富国強兵. In *Nihon daihyakka zensho (Nipponika)* 日本大百科全書, Shōgakukan Inc. Japan Knowledge; Orbach, “Culture of Disobedience: Rebellion and Defiance in the Japanese Army, 1860-1931”, p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. Tobe, *Gyakusetsu no guntai*, p. 165; This is not to say that there was harmonious cooperation between the military and politics. Up until the Russo-Japanese War, if political policy had set its mind on something, the military often could only conform. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. Tobe, *Gyakusetsu no guntai*, p. 164-70; While on paper the military only pledged its loyalty to the Emperor, and only carried out his demands, in practice this meant that the military had to respond to the government in which the Emperor had put its trust; Note that homogenous does not mean harmonious, and that political dominance refers to political decisions overriding military ones. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. Tobe, *Gyakusetsu no guntai*, p. 172-73. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. Ibid., p. 200-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. Ibid., p. 206-7; Duus and Scheiner, “Chapter 13: Socialism, Liberalism, and Marxism, 1901-1931”, p. 678; This discussion was not confined to the military, as democratic liberals also played with the idea of militarism and imperialism compatible with democracy (*minponshugi* 民本主義). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. Tobe, *Gyakusetsu no guntai*, p. 206-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. Peattie, “Chapter 5: The Japanese colonial empire, 1895–1945”, p. 229; Tobe, *Gyakusetsu no guntai*, p. 158-60, 233-35, 242-43. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. Tobe, *Gyakusetsu no guntai*, p. 158-60; Hara, “Hara Kei nikki”, p. 297. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. Tobe, *Gyakusetsu no guntai*, p. 225, 230-31. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. Dunscomb, *Japan's Siberian Intervention, 1918–1922: 'A Great Disobedience against the People'*, p. 107-9; Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. “Rondon kaigun gunshuku jōyaku” ロンドン海軍軍縮条約. In *Kokushi daijiten* 国史大辞典. Yoshikawa kobunkan Inc. Japan Knowledge; Tobe, *Gyakusetsu no guntai*, p. 233-36; “Washinton kaigun gunshuku jōyaku” ワシントン海軍軍縮条約. In *Nihon daihyakka zensho (Nipponica)* 日本大百科全書（ニッポニカ). Shogakukan Inc. Japan Knowledge; Tobe, *Gyakusetsu no guntai*, p. 233-35, 242-43. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. Tobe, *Gyakusetsu no guntai*, p. 251. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. Ibid., p. 245-48. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. Ibid., p. 251. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. Ibid., p. 251-52; *Kaikōsha kiji* was a monthly publication issued by the “Army Officer’s Aid Society” (*Kaikōsha* 偕行社). The Navy had a similar organization called the “Naval Officer’s Aid Society” (*Suikōsha* 水交社). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. Orbach, “Culture of Disobedience: Rebellion and Defiance in the Japanese Army, 1860-1931”, p. 3-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. Nakamura, “Chapter 9: Depression, Recovery, and War, 1920-1945”, p. 454. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. Berger, “Chapter 3: Politics and mobilization in Japan, 1931–1945”, p. 101-2; Tobe, *Gyakusetsu no guntai*, p. 259. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
41. Berger, “Chapter 3: Politics and mobilization in Japan, 1931–1945”, p. 101-2; Eguchi, *Jū go nen sensō no kaimaku – manshū jihen kara ni, ni roku jiken e*, p. 22-23; Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, p. 88; The Manchuria and Mongolia were first called Japan’s lifeline in a speech given by Matsuoka Yōsuke 松岡洋右 when criticizing the Shidehara cabinet (*Shidehara naikaku* 幣原内閣) for their poor handling of the “Manchuria-Mongolian Problem” (*Manmō mondai* 満蒙問題). The idea of a “lifeline” quickly became a popular catchphrase in commercials. For instance, a commercial for coughdrops made by the pharmaceutical company Ryūkakusan 龍角散 would refer to the throat as “the lifeline for the body”. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
42. Katō, *Soredemo, nihonjin wa ‘sensō’ o eranda*, p. 268-69; Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, p. 3-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
43. Katō, *Soredemo, nihonjin wa ‘sensō’ o eranda*, p. 271-72. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
44. Ibid., p. 272-73. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
45. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
46. High, *The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years’ War, 1931-1945*, p. 20; Ibid., p. 260-63; Tōbe Ryōichi, *Gyakusetsu no guntai*, p. 257; Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931-33*, p. 2-3, 217; Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, p. 156-161. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
47. Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, p. 90-93; Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 230-63. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
48. Kim, “Cure for Empire: The ‘Conquer-Russia-Pill’, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, and the Making of Patriotic Japanese, 1904-45”, p. 260. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
49. Eppstein, “12. School Songs, The War, And Nationalist Indoctrination in Japan”, p. 185-186; Nakauchi, *Gunkoku bidan to kyōkasho*, p. 124-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
50. Nakauchi, *Gunkoku bidan to kyōkasho*, p. 33-37. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
51. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 252-53. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
52. Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, p. 92-95. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
53. Ibid., p. 33-34. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
54. Ibid., p. 3-4, 89-90; Louise Young cites the articles of the magazine *Ie no hikari* that use old phrases mourning the number of lives and money that Japan spent on, what these articles claim, was intended for gaining control over Manchuria. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
55. Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, p. 91. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
56. Orbach, “Culture of Disobedience: Rebellion and Defiance in the Japanese Army, 1860-1931”, p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
57. Ibid., p. 3-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
58. Sneider, “Action and Oratory: The Trials of the of the May 15th Incident of 1932”, p. 1-2; Ibid., p. 3-4. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
59. Tobe, *Gyakusetsu no guntai*, p. 260-61; The *Sakura-kai’*s manifesto, for instance, listed what they saw as corruption of politics, the capitalist’s neglect for the populace, the hardships on the countryside and the lacking patriotism of students. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
60. Dickinson, “Commemorating the War in Post-Versailles Japan”, p. 534-35; Isao, “Shifting contours of memory and history, 1904–1980”, p. 361-63. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
61. Isao, “Shifting contours of memory and history, 1904–1980”, p. 361-63. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
62. “Kaigun kinen-bi” 海軍記念日. In *Nihon daihyakka zensho (Nipponica)* 日本大百科全書（ニッポニカ), Shōgakukan Inc. Japan Knowledge;“Rikugun kinen-bi” 陸軍記念日. In *Nihon daihyakka zensho (Nipponica)* 日本大百科全書（ニッポニカ), Shōgakukan Inc. Japan Knowledge. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
63. Bōei-shō bōei kenkyū-sho. “Meiji jū go nen ichi gatsu yokka rikukai gunjin ni tamawari taru chokuyu haiju go jū shūnen o mukaete”. Ref.C15120151900. 1 February 1932. JACAR. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
64. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Shi gatsu gejun ni rikukaigun de dai shukuten gunjin chokuyu go jū shūnen kinen-bi ni, ichi dai-kokumin undō keikaku”. 24 January 1932. p. 2; *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Gunjin chokuyu kashi go jū shūnen kinen-bi meiji taitei no go-ikun zenkoku rikukaigun butai de, kyō ogosoka ni kinen-shiki”. 4 January 1932 年. p. 3; *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Gunkoku no haru kyō no shukuten sōkan! Sora ni gin’yoku no bunretsu-shiki karei! Riku ni gunrakutai no kōshin”. 24 April 1932. p. 11; *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “Chokuyu kashi go jū nen kinen-bi kyō rikukai ryōshō kara no seishi hōtei ni shitashiku seichoku o tamau hoka”. 4 January 1932. p. 2; *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “Gunkoku no eikō koko ni kagayaku kyō gunjin chokuyu kashi kinen shukuten”. 24 April 1932. p. 1; Bōei-shō bōei kenkyū-sho. “Kōbun bikō shōwa nana nen C gisei maki hachi”. Ref.C05021978100. April 1932. JACAR. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
65. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Rajio/ kokunan taji no toki, gunjin chokuyu no seishi o kōshō suru Tōgō gensui kon’ya no kinen hōsō, kōji machi gensui-tei kara chūkei”. 4 January 1932. p. 5; *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Nogi shogun shinpitsu no ‘gunjin chokuyu’ Rikugun kinen-bi ni haifu”. 1 March 1931. p. 11; Tōgō Heihachirō 1847-1934, was an admiral of the Japanese Imperial Navy and served the Navy during the Meiji and Taishō periods. He led ships during the Boshin War, the First Sino-Japanese War, and attained almost legendary status both at home and abroad after his decisive victory during the Battle of the Japanese Sea on 27 May 1905, being afterwards dubbed the “Nelson of the East” (*Tōyō no Neruson* 東洋のネルソン). He became fleet admiral in April 1913; Tōgō’s voice was recorded because he was already at an advanced age, and therefore precautions were taken in case he might get sick or worse. At the time he was 82 years old. He passed away two years later. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
66. High, *The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years’ War, 1931-1945*, p. 26-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
67. Ibid.; Satō, *Fashisto-teki kōkyō-sei – sōryoku-sen taisei no media-gaku*, p. 189, 196-97. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
68. High, *The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years’ War, 1931-1945*, p. 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
69. Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931-33*, p. 4-5; Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, p. 113-14. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
70. Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931-33*, p. 30-32; Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, p. 83-86. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
71. High, *The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years’ War, 1931-1945*, p. 21-22. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
72. Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931-33*, p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
73. Ibid., p. 69, 217; On a related note, throughout her book, Wilson opposes apathetic reactions against feverous reactions to what happened in Manchuria, and while she hammers on the idea that nuance is key, opposing these two extremes, focusing on one and using it as a “true” representation of Japanese audiences is the same fallacy that she accuses other scholars of. It stands to further reason that apathy does not even constitute an opposition to war fever, as apathy does not contend and challenge war fever. Quite the opposite, apathetic reactions to the Manchurian Crisis, the, de facto, rebellious war acts in Manchuria could be a silent acknowledgement that everything that occurs ought to happen. Wilson herself admits that pacifism, or left-wing opposition to what was happening did not occur, since the whole faction was weak and demoralized. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
74. Note that this paper refers to other national heroes who, despite falling outside the category of *gunshin*, still constitute part of an irreligious cult of the fallen. An example of this could be Kusunoki Masashige, Kikuchi Kohei 木口小平 or other historical warriors that are recontextualized in modern Japan. This should also only refer to individuals associated with martial bravery or other war related achievements; Kikuchi was an Army trumpeter during the First Sino-Japanese War who was found dead on the battlefield with his trumpet still at his lips. He can arguably be considered a proto-type to *gunshin* as his story was added to the ethics class textbooks. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
75. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. i. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
76. Shimazu, Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War, p. 199; Bōei-shō bōei kenkyū-sho. “Meiji yon jū san nen, Hirose kaigun chūsa dōzō kensetsu shorui, kan san tome”. Ref.C11081428400. 27 March 1904. p. 1-8. JACAR. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
77. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. xii. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
78. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 213. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
79. Tachibana Shūta, 1865-1904, was a soldier of the Japanese Imperial Army. He became Japan’s second *gunshin* after he died during the Battle of Liaoyang (in Japanese: *Ryōyō Kaisen* 遼陽会戦) when trying to limit casualties by charging at the enemy. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
80. Yui Masaomi 由井正臣. “Nogi Maresuke” 乃木希典. *Nihon daihyakka zensho (Nipponica)* 日本大百科全書（ニッポニカ), Shōgakukan. Japan Knowledge; “Tachibana Shūta” 橘周太. *Nihon jinmei daijiten* 日本人名大辞典, Kōdansha. Japan Knowledge;Tachibana Shūta, 1865-1904 was a Major (*shōsa* 少佐) of the Japanese Imperial Army, born in the Hizen Province (present day Nagasaki Prefecture), who died in a battle at Liaoyang (*Ryōyō* 遼陽). Posthumously he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant colonel and became Japan’s second *gunshin*. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
81. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. xii. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
82. Ueno, *Tennō heika banzai – Bakudan San’yūshi josetsu*, p. 11-12. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
83. Ibid; It might also be a comment added by a reader who disagreed with the publication. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
84. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 189; Another example of vagueness pertaining to the *San’yūshi’*s *gunshin* status can be found in the *Nihonshi Daijiten* 日本史大辞典 which provides contradicting information on this issue. In its entry for the *San’yūshi* it states that the three are not *gunshin* whereas the entry for *gunshin* does list them as examples. The entries are written by different authors, but it exemplifies the ambiguity. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
85. Satō, *Fashisto-teki kōkyō-sei – sōryoku-sen taisei no media-gaku*, p. 189. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
86. Minami, *Taishō bunka: 1905 – 1927*, p. 269-383.; Ibid.; Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 261. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
87. Takano, *Bushi shinkaku-ka no kenkyū*, p. 6, 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
88. Ibid., p. 3-6; *Hitogami* is a problematic term, as *hitogami* is used to both refer to *Hitogami* in the broad sense of all divine beings that relate to humans be it, as described above, a personified natural phenomenon, a possessed human or in the narrow sense of a living or deceased human being who was lifted to godhood. This paper distinguishes between these two terms by writing the broader term as a capitalized *Hitogami* and the narrow terms with a lower-case *hitogami*. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
89. Takano, *Bushi shinkaku-ka no kenkyū*, p. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
90. Ibid., p. 7-8; Ōishi Yoshi (1659-1703) was the leader of the group of the so called “forty-seven ronin” (*shi jū shichi shi* 四十七士) who caused the Akō Incident (*Akō jiken* 赤穂事件) in which the group avenged the death of their master. He was ordered to commit ritual suicide (*seppuku* 切腹). [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
91. Takano, *Bushi shinkaku-ka no kenkyū*, p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
92. Ibid., p. 6-7, 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
93. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
94. Ibid.; Satō Hiroo, *‘Shinkoku nihon’ kiki kara chūse, soshite nashonarizumu e*, p. 52-53, 62-70, 205-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
95. Takano, *Bushi shinkaku-ka no kenkyū*, p. 65; Katō Kiyomasa was a general during the Azuchi-Momoyama period (1558-1600) and lived from 1562-1611. He served under Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉, one of the three unifiers of Japan. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
96. These emphasis signs were used early in newspapers as a way of “underscoring” important information. These marks include the following one: ●, ◎, ○, ﹅, ﹆, et cetera, and were used alongside eachother and usually put in the space where otherwise *furigana* was added to display the reading for a still considerably illiterate audience. The marks used in the article were the black dot. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
97. The reading *gunshin*, however, is a Chinese based reading (*on’yomi* 音読み) of the characters while *ikusagami* is the Japanese reading (*kun’yomi* 訓読み). [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
98. Bōei-shō bōei kenkyū-sho. “Meiji yon jū san nen, Hirose kaigun chūsa dōzō kensetsu shorui, kan san tome”. Ref.C11081428400. 27 March 1904. p. 2. JACAR. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
99. Ibid., p. 1-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
100. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Gunshin Hirose chūsa”. 30 March 1904. p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
101. Schölz, *“Die Gefallenen besänftigen und ihre Taten rühmen": Gefallenenkult und politische Verfasstheit in Japan seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, p. 37. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
102. Ibid., p. 38; For a complete description and exploration of the phenomenon refer to Schölz. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
103. Schölz, *“Die Gefallenen besänftigen und ihre Taten rühmen": Gefallenenkult und politische Verfasstheit in Japan seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, p. 161. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
104. The possibility of foreign influences, for instance, in the making of the first *gunshin* in the early stages of a globalizing world must not be ruled out, but a proper analysis of this unfortunately exceeds the scope of this research. [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
105. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 182-87. [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
106. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 197-208. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
107. This paper refers to the act of transmitting an event by means of mass media as “broadcasting” regardless of the involvement of television of radio, as the term best suitable to talk about “media events” in the context of “current events”. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
108. High, *The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years’ War, 1931-1945*, p. 26. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
109. Ibid., p. 26-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
110. Dayan and Katz, *Media events*, p. 1-14; Wū, “Media ibento-ron no saikōchiku”, p. 175; The work of Dayan and Katz deals with a narrower conception of media events, in that it only focusses on the festive occasions and ceremonies. Famously dealing with coronation, conquest and contest, this tends to be too exclusive as it ignores the mediatization of calamities. While they do acknowledge their narrow focus, this still needs to be addressed. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
111. Wū, “Media ibento-ron no saikōchiku”, p. 175. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
112. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
113. While it is true that the death of this paper’s main study objects was not planned, it stands to reason that, as is further discussed below, the main bulk of the media event is of planned nature. Meaning that there are interest groups that understand how to utilize the death of one or more individuals, and attention surrounding it, for their own economic gain, marketing purposes or other interests. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
114. Wū, “Media ibento-ron no saikōchiku”, p. 176-77; Profit could, for instance, be generated directly by charging money for the event, or utilize the event for marketing purposes. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
115. Wū, “Media ibento-ron no saikōchiku”, p. 177. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
116. Ibid., p. 180. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
117. Ibid., p. 176-77. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
118. High, *The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years’ War, 1931-1945*, p. 26-39; Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 230-63; Wū, “Media ibento-ron no saikōchiku”, p. 177; Note that events can also do the exact opposite, as a scandal, for instance, can potentially lead to negative outcomes. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
119. Wū, “Media ibento-ron no saikōchiku”, p. 178. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
120. This becomes clear when considering the construction of Hirose’s Shinto shrine, see below. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
121. Wū, “Media ibento-ron no saikōchiku”, p. 175. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
122. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 231. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
123. Wū, “Media ibento-ron no saikōchiku”, p. 176. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
124. “Nogi jinja” 乃木神社. In *Nihon kokugo daijiten* 日本国語大辞典, Shōgakukan Inc. Japan Knowledge. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
125. Kodama Gentarō, 1852-1906, was an Army general born in the Tokuyama 徳山 domain as eldest son of the feudal retainer. He was promoted to general after the Russo-Japanese War and had previously worked as the Army minister from 1900-2 and later in 1903 as both the Minister of Internal Affairs and Minister of Education. He succumbed to illness in 1906. He has been enshrined in a shrine in Fujisawa 藤沢 city in the Kanagawa 神奈川 prefecture in 1918. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
126. Schölz, *“Die Gefallenen besänftigen und ihre Taten rühmen": Gefallenenkult und politische Verfasstheit in Japan seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, p. 38, 117. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
127. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 48-63. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
128. Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, p. 76. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
129. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
130. Ibid; Jordan, *China’s Trial by Fire: The Shanghai War of 1932*, p. 189-90. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
131. Arima, *Gunshin Hirose chūsa-den*, p. 6-13; Sasamoto, *Hirose Takeo kara no ehagaki*, p. 152. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
132. Ida, *Shichishō hōkoku Hirose chūsa*, p. 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
133. Sasamoto, *Hirose Takeo kara no ehagaki*, p. 153; *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “Hirose Takeo, Takarabe Takeshi no sōbetsu-kai/kōdōkannai hakkinin”. 3 July 1897. p. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
134. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
135. Sasamoto, *Hirose Takeo kara no ehagaki*, p. 153; Ibid.; *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “Hirose Takeo, Takarabe Takeshi no sōbetsu-kai/kōdōkannai hakkinin”. 3 July 1897. p. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
136. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 214; Sasamoto, *Hirose Takeo kara no ehagaki*, p. 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
137. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 200; Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 23-25; Which is not to say that popular recognition of Hirose was not an important factor. It is certainly a fact that the tale of Hirose found a stable footing within Japanese audiences. Yet it is more than what Yamamuro calls a “whirlpool of sympathy” (*kyōkan no uzu* 共感の渦). [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
138. Fujiwara Akira 藤原彰. “Gunji seido” 軍事制度. In *Kokushi daijiten* 国史大辞典, Yoshikawa kobunkan Inc. Japan Knowledge, Accessed April 12, 2019; Kobayashi Tatsuo 小林竜夫. “Kaigun kakuchō mondai” 海軍拡張問題. In *Kokushi daijiten* 国史大辞典, Yoshikawa kobunkan Inc. Japan Knowledge, Accessed April 12, 2019; Up until the Russo-Japanese War, the Navy was essentially subject to the Army’s instructions in case of war, meaning that if the Army came up with a strategy, the Navy had no other option than to follow. This changed in 1903 with the amendment to the “Imperial Headquarters Regulations” (*Daihonei jōrei* 大本営条例). [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
139. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 200-1. [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
140. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 6-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
141. Ogasawara Naganari, 1867-1958, was a vice admiral of the Japanese Imperial Navy and the official Navy historian. He became viscount in 1884 and graduated from the Naval Academy in 1887. During the Russo-Japanese War, he worked at the Naval General Staff. He was a close confidant to Tōgō Heihachirō and famously adept at influencing naval public relations. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
142. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 204. [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
143. Ibid., p. 201-2. [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
144. *Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbun*. “Heisoku go no Fukui-maru kesshitai”. 12 April 1904. p. 7; The man in the middle was the engineer of the ship who had been wounded and was therefore wrapped up. [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
145. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Naikoku denpō, Hirose chūsa (Kōbe)”. 5 April 1904. p. 1; *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa igai Shinjuku teishajō tōchaku no kōkei”. 6 April 1904. p. 1; *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “Heisoku kesshitai fushōsha no keika ryōkō, Hirose chūsa no ihin tōchaku/Sasebo-den”. 2 March 1904. p. 2; *Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbun*. “Sasebo raiden, ko-Hirose chūsa no ibutsu”. 3 April 1904. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
146. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 205. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
147. Ibid., p. 204-5. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
148. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa gyodai ni hairu”. 6 April 1904. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
149. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 206. [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
150. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa no sōgi, chokushi, suikōsha, gogo ichi ji shukkan endō, Aoyama bochi, oyobi kōkai no saibun, kaisō-sha”. 14 April 1904. p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
151. The original spelling of Oka in Japanese could not be determined. [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
152. Sasamoto, *Hirose Takeo kara no ehagaki*, p. 71, 155; Ibid.; Itō Sukeyuki, 1843-1914, also known as Itō Yūkō, was born in Kagoshima and participated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet (*Rengō kantai shirei chōkan* 聯合艦隊司令長官) and during the Russo-Japanese War he fulfilled the role of the Navy Chief of Staff of the Imperial Headquarters (*Dai-hon’ei kaigun bakuryōchō* 大本営海軍幕僚長); Ijūin Gorō, 1852-1921, was born in Kagoshima and participated in the Taiwan Expedition (*Taiwan shuppei* 台湾出兵) of 1874; Yamamoto Gonnohyōe, also called Yamamoto Gonbee, 1852-1933, was a naval officer and a politician. He fought in the Anglo-Satsuma War and later the Boshin War, and was a firm -proponent of the policy to conquer Korea by military force and pushed for an aggressive strategy to take on China during the First Sino-Japanese War; Taniguchi Naomi, 1870-1941, born in Hiroshima, was a naval officer from the Meiji period until the Early Shōwa period. He fought in the First Sino-Japanese War and became staff officer of the Second Armada and quickly rose to staff officer of the Naval General Staff. [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
153. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 206. [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
154. Schölz, *“Die Gefallenen besänftigen und ihre Taten rühmen": Gefallenenkult und politische Verfasstheit in Japan seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, p. 198-99. [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
155. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 206; *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa no sōgi, zōi, shukkan, boshimei, hakadokoro, gyōretsu, gijōhei, zatsuji”. 13 April 1904. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
156. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
157. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose kaigun chūsa sōgi gahō (Aoyama bochi saijō)”. 15 April 1904. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
158. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 26-27. [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
159. Ibid., p. 28. [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
160. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Shisha no kunkō / Shasetsu”. 30 March 1904. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
161. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, 215; *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun*. “Ko-Hirose chūsa meiyo hyōshō no shakoku”. 31 March 1904. p. 3; Horatio Nelson, 1758-1805, was a British admiral who fought in the French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars. [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
162. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Shisha no kunkō / Shasetsu”. 30 March 1904. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
163. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 25-28. [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
164. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 213; Ibid., p. 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
165. Ida, *Shichishō hōkoku Hirose chūsa*, p. 154. [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
166. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 24-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
167. Ibid., p. 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
168. This research could not find a similar instance calling the two sailors’ friends or discussing their friendship in a critical manner. This seems to indicate that, while some people were aware of this, it did not lead to long term consequences for the *bidan*. [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
169. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 7-8; Again, this stresses the framework in which Hirose’s death must have been judged. [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
170. *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “[shasetsu] Hirose chūsa no senshi”. 30 March 1904, p. 2; As discussed above, Tōgō referring to “the commanders of old” was a reinvention of the actual relationship a lord and his retainer had. [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
171. Nakauchi, *Gunkoku bidan to kyōkasho*, p. 100-102; Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 36-37. [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
172. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 36-37. [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
173. Ibid., p. 14-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
174. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
175. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 200-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
176. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 82-83. [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
177. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 217. [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
178. Him having a groomed Western-style mustache was also crucial for the image of the Navy, as it was also a sign of being civilized. [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
179. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 36-37. [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
180. Ishida, *Ume no motsu kōkoku-sei*, p. 23. [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
181. Arima, *Gunshin Hirose chūsa-den*, p. 1; The preface was written by the president of the Support Association, Admiral Arima. [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
182. Arima, *Gunshin Hirose chūsa-den*, p. 10-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
183. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 64. [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
184. Nakauchi, *Gunkoku bidan to kyōkasho*, 124-25; 25th death anniversary according to Japanese conventions. [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
185. Regarding the creation of the above graph, this type of statistical analysis is, as of the writing of this paper, only possible with the *Yomidasu* for *Yomiuri Shinbun* and *Kikuzō* for the *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* and occasionally the *Ōsaka Asahi Shinbun*, depending on the amount of digitized, processed and labelled material,databases, as those are the only two databases that this paper could access that provided a useful dataset of their articles. However, as the data acquired from these databases rely primarily on proper labeling done by the providers of the databanks, there is a possibility of usage of faulty or imperfect search terms or improperly labeled material. It can, however, serve as a proof of concept of how newspapers dealt with the topic of Hirose. [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
186. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 223; As Shimazu already analyzed the themes of the movie, this paper only gives a synopsis. [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
187. *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “Nihon de hajimete no gaijin ekisutora, ‘Hirose chūsa’ satsuei de Shōchiku ga boshū”. 10 March 1926. p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
188. *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “Shijō eiga ‘Hirose chūsa’=1/Kichida Hyakusuke”. 10 March 1926. p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
189. *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “Eiga ‘gunshin Hirose chūsa’, ‘haha yo koishi/denkikan’”. 23 May 1926. p. 3; For the sake of keeping the catchiness of the title, this paper opted for the problematic “war god” translation of *gunshin*, as the adopted translation in this paper is too drawn out or would not fit within the title of a commercial sold movie. [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
190. *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa issei jōei”. 1 June 1926. p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
191. Nakauchi, *Gunkoku bidan to kyōkasho*, 124-25. [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
192. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
193. The compiler of the work was a man by the name Ida Rinroku, no substantial information on him could be found. [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
194. Ida, *Shichishō hōkoku Hirose chūsa*, p. 1-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
195. Arima, *Gunshin Hirose chūsa-den*, p. 1; It needs to be noted that, when comparing both works, Ida’s book seems to be far more objective than Arima’s writing. [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
196. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 74; Mizoguchi Kenji 溝口健二. *Tōkyō kōshin-kyoku* 東京行進曲. 1929, 00:01:12-00:01:18; *Tōkyō kōshin-kyoku* is a black and white silent film released in 1929 and based on the novel of Kikuchi Kan 菊池寛. The music accompanying the film shares the name of the movie and was originally sung by Satō Chiyako 佐藤千夜子. While static images, both illustrations and photographs, of Hirose’s statue make it seem like the statue is at the center of everyone’s attention with people in shot looking up at the statue, *Tōkyō kōshin-kyoku* shows likely a more realistic depiction of people going along their own business not paying a single second to look at the statue. It must be noted however that this is also likely due to the movie being produced in 1929 instead of right after the unveiling ceremony. [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
197. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Oyanagi tōki-ten gunshin Hirose chūsa hanshin dōzō”. 23 May 1904. p. 8; *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Oyanagi tōki-ten gunshin Hirose chūsa dōzō mokei”. 14 August 1904. p. 8; Regarding Hirose’s image as a commercial good, there were stores that took Hirose’s death as an opportunity by selling busts of Hirose. One store selling busts and portraits of Hirose could be found in the district of Kyōbashi 京橋 and had a advertised itself in the *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
198. Ida, *Shichishō hōkoku Hirose chūsa*, p. 184-87; Aside from Tōkyō, the other two statues seem to have been rebuilt after the war. [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
199. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 208. [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
200. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa dōzō kensetsu shui-sho”. 22 April 1904. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
201. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa dōzō, nesshin dōjō-sei”. 1 April 1904. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
202. Ibid.; One problem with letters from the readers is that the so-called “reader” might be an employee at the newspaper company itself. Considering that the letter praises the company this possibility should not be excluded. [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
203. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 64-66. [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
204. A Topography of Modern Japanese Bronze Statuary - Personality Cult in Modern Japan. http://statues.japanesehistory.de/index.html; *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa dōzō, nesshin dōjō-sei”. 1 April 1904. p. 2; While instances of postcards and the inclusion of photographs in picture booklets featuring the Taketa and Takayama statues do exist, the amount of available material featuring the Manseibashi statue compared to depictions of the other statues seem to hint at a trend. Still, this might be due to a Tōkyō bias. [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
205. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 208. [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
206. “Dōzō” 銅像. In Nihon hyakka zensho (Nipponica) 日本百科全書（ニッポニカ), Shogakukan Inc. Japan Knowledge. [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
207. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 208; *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa no dōzō kensetsu e kaigun-shō shōkō-ra bokin hajimeru”. 30 March 1904. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
208. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 210; Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 66-67; *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Gunshin dōzō jomaku-shiki Fūu chū no jomaku, Tōgō taishō naku, Hirose chūsa dōzō jomaku-shiki”. 30 May 1910. p. 3; *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun*. “Ko-Hirose chūsa meiyo hyōshō no shakoku”. 31 March 1904. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
209. *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “Ko-Hirose chūsa no kinenbutsu wa dōzō ni kimaru”. 3 April 1904. p. 6; *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa no sōgi wa jū san nichi ni – Hirose chūsa no dōzō kensetsu-chi”. 6 April 1904. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
210. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 68-69. [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
211. Ibid., p. 64; *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa no dōzō gosō-shiki”. 24 January 1906. p. 6; *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “Ryojun heisoku-tai no yūshi, gunshin, Hirose chūsa no tōshindai dōzō o yukari no chi, takayama ni kenritsu”. 1 January 1906. p. 3; When looking at the remaining images of the Takayama statue as well as the postwar substitute that can be found nowadays, it is clear that a bust was meant. However, the bust had likely accurate proportions, so in that sense it might have passed as lifelike, or initial reportings were made without being aware of the true size of the sculpture; It must be noted that the statues, similarly to other statues of military icons, were purged after the end of the Second World War. Aside from the Tōkyō statue, the other two were rebuilt decades after the war, albeit inconsistent with the original sculptures, and in the case of the Taketa statue, to commemorate the TV series *Saka no ue no kumo* (坂の上の雲, “Clouds Above the Hills”). [↑](#footnote-ref-212)
212. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa no dōzō gosō-shiki”. 24 January 1906. p. 6; Kimotsuki Kaneyuki, 1853-1922, was a Meiji and Taishō period politician and military official with the rank of vice-admiral (*chūjō* 中将). In 1872 he entered the Navy Ministry, in 1888 he became Head of Waterways (*Suiro buchō* 水路部長), and in 1904 he became head of the Navy Educational Facilities (*Kaigun Dai-gakkō* 海軍大学校). He became mayor of Ōsaka city in 1913 and was a member of the House of Lords (*kizoku-in* 貴族院); Oshigami Morizō, 1855-1927, was a lieutenant general (*chūjō* 中将) and a historian of local history. [↑](#footnote-ref-213)
213. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Ko-Hirose chūsa dōzō hassō-shiki no keijō”. 25 January 1906. p. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-214)
214. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa no dōzō (Gifu)”. 16 February 1906. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-215)
215. Ibid.; This research was unable to find substantial information on the sculpture’s creator. [↑](#footnote-ref-216)
216. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa no dōzō”. 26 February 1906. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-217)
217. Ibid.; *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa no dōzō (ichi wa Manseibashi no hotori) Watanabe Nagao-shi kushin-dan”. 27 December 1908. p. 4; Watanabe Nagao was a sculptor born in Ōita prefecture on 2 April 1874. He graduated from the Tōkyō School of Fine Arts (*Tōkyō bijutsu gakkō* 東京美術学校). [↑](#footnote-ref-218)
218. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa no dōzō (Ōita)”. 25 May 1906. p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
219. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa dōzō jomaku-shiki”. 11 May 1907. p. 3; *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa dōzō jomaku-shiki (Ōita)”. 14 May 1907. p. 2; The ceremony was allegedly a huge success with more than a hundred people attending. [↑](#footnote-ref-220)
220. Narashima, *Shōnen gunshin Hirose chūsa*, p 416-17; Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 197. [↑](#footnote-ref-221)
221. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 64. [↑](#footnote-ref-222)
222. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa dōzō kensetsu-chi kettei”. 27 November 1908. p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-223)
223. *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “[Yomiuri-shō] kaigunshō no yūshi hakki ni yoru ko-Hirose chūsa no dōzō, Watanabe Nagao ga genkei seisaku-chū”. 29 May 1908. p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-224)
224. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 67; Okazaki, born in 1854, studied casting in Tōkyō and became a skilled smith who would make a name for himself when he displayed his work at the Third National Industrial Fair (*Dai-san-kai naikoku kangyō hakuran-kai* 第三回内国勧業博覧会) in 1890. He would later go on handling the casting of some of the earliest modern statues in Japan including the Kusunoki Masashige statue in front of the Imperial Palace in Tōkyō as well as the statue of Saigō Takamori in the Ueno park. He died in 1921. [↑](#footnote-ref-225)
225. Watanabe Nagao. “Hirose chūsa no dōzō”. *The Graphic*. 1 June 1910. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-226)
226. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 208. [↑](#footnote-ref-227)
227. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 69; *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa dōzō jomaku-shiki”. 5 May 1910, p. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-228)
228. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 208. [↑](#footnote-ref-229)
229. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 67. [↑](#footnote-ref-230)
230. *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “Kanda-ku Sudachō ni kensetsu-chū no Hirose chūsa no dōzō, Kaigun kinen-bi no ni jū shichi nichi ni jomaku-shiki”. 5 May 1910. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-231)
231. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 67; *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Honnen no kaigun kinen-bi”. 13 May 1910. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-232)
232. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Honnen no kaigun kinen-bi”. 13 May 1910. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-233)
233. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 214. [↑](#footnote-ref-234)
234. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 70-71; Watanabe Nagao. “Hirose chūsa no dōzō”. *The Graphic*. 1 June 1910. p. 1-7; “Hirose chūsa dōzō jomaku-shiki no kōkei”. *The Navy – kaigun* Vol.5, August 1910. p. 10-11. [↑](#footnote-ref-235)
235. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 70-71. [↑](#footnote-ref-236)
236. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-237)
237. Shimazu, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 208-212; Ibid.; For an in-depth analysis of the unveiling ceremony refer to Yamamuro and Shimazu’s work. [↑](#footnote-ref-238)
238. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Mondai no Sudachō kotoshi chū ni toriatsukai, Hirosechūsa no dōzō ga mittsudomoe no yakkai mo atsukai”. 2 September 1922. p. 2; *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Pari de mo, dōzō to basho no hinan”. 6 July 1921. p. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-239)
239. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 74-75. [↑](#footnote-ref-240)
240. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Mondai no Sudachō kotoshi-chū ni toriharai, Hirose chūsa no dōzō ga, mitsudomoe no yakkai mono atsukai”. 2 September 1922. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-241)
241. *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “Koibito ni sukuwareru Hirose chūsa, dōzō no iten-saki o yatto sazukaru, Tōkyō, Ōtechō ni”. 19 December 1929. p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-242)
242. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Yatto ochitsuku gunshin no dōzō, hidoi genjō kara sukuwarete shin-kōen e”. 14 January 1930. p. 2; *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Chichi oya o toite ichi man en kifu, Hirose chūsa dōzō iten ni kuru Mejiro chūgakusei no bidan”. 19 January 1930. p. 7; However, there is a peculiar set of newspaper articles that indicate that there was a plan to move the statue, up until the point that a location had been found. The statue was planned to be relocated to the newly built Kandabashi park (*Kandabashi kōen* 神田橋公園). The project was undertaken by a company from the Aoyamakita 青山北 town of the Akasaka 赤坂 district. The son of the manager Mura Katsugorō 村勝五郎 was an avid visitor of the statue, and, as a result, his father felt compelled to donate 10,000 yen to the project himself. Yet, as far as this research could determine, the Manseibashi statue never moved, as no extra mention of the new location could be determined, in fact in later commemorative events the same scenery of Hirose’s Manseibashi statue keeps reappearing. There seems also to be no notice of a cancellation of the project, therefore it is puzzling what these articles actually pertain to. One of the reasons cited was the poor surroundings where the statue found itself at the time. [↑](#footnote-ref-243)
243. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa dōzō mae ni, kinen no shoku-ju hyaku hon, rikujō gunkan no teito kōshin no nigiwai”. 28 May 1930. p. 1; It is not clear what is meant with the “vicinity” of the statue, as only a few years prior complaints of Hirose’s statue hindering transport around it were prevalent. [↑](#footnote-ref-244)
244. *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “Ryojun heisoku san jū shūnen, seidai na kinen-shiki, kyō Hirose chūsa dōzō mae de”. 28 March 1934. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-245)
245. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Gunshin Hirose chūsa, kyō san jū nen shikiten, dōzō no moto de seidai ni”. 28 March 1934. p. 2; *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun*. “Kansha arata ni shinobu, gunshin, Hirose chūsa, kyō san jū shūnen kinen-sai”. 28 March 1934. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-246)
246. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Gunshin ryō-chūsa o matsuru jinja kenritsu, chikaku jitsugen kakugi demo sansei to kesshita ga, shinrei nanode shinchō ni”. 26 July 1928. p. 11; *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “Ryō-gunshin, shōwa yomigaette aku-shisō yoke no kami ni Hirose, Tachibana, kokusui naishō ga kakugi e hōkoku”. 26 July 1928. p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-247)
247. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 184-85. [↑](#footnote-ref-248)
248. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Zen kaigun no kikin de Hirose jinja o sōken, Ōita-ken no kiji ni”. 26 November 1933. p. 11; Note that while there are many shrines with the name Hirose Jinja, Hirose Takeo is only enshrined in Taketa’s shrine. [↑](#footnote-ref-249)
249. The *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun* had, on 25 May 1935, only two articles dedicated to Hirose, but eight to Kusunoki, amongst which was an announcement for a radio special. When Hirose did make an appearance in newspapers outside Ōita, it seems that it was mostly in the framework of the thirty-year anniversary of the Russo-Japanese War. [↑](#footnote-ref-250)
250. *Fukuoka Nichinichi Shinbun*. “Hirose jinja chinza-sai, kiwamete seidaini shikkō”. 26 May 1935. p. 2; *Kyūshū Nippō*. “Hirose jinja mitamashiro, okagami, o-ken taketa e, asu sakan na chinza-sai, shodai shashi wa gunshin no jūtei”. 24 May 1935. p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-251)
251. *Ōita Shinbun*. “Isshū kan nigiwai, nuku gōka na hōshuku zue! Kettei shita moyooshi mono”. 25 May 1935. p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-252)
252. Shimazu, Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War, p. 225; *Ōita Shinbun*. “Hirose jinja chinza-sai, iyoiyo ni jū yon nichi kara san jū nichi made seidai ni”. 24 May 1935. p. 1; The same article has a part dedicated to the contractors that were hired for the building of the shrine. The group was called the “Yamada group” (*Yamada-gumi* 山田組) which, according to the article, had a long history in constructing shrines and temples. While being originally stationed in Ōsaka, they had worked themselves to national fame for the craft; While this research was able to get hold of many entries of the *Ōita Shinbun*, the reconstruction of the media event as it occurred in Ōita is destined to be incomplete as many pages were missing. One problem, for instance, is that while a picture of the Manseibashi statue is featured in collages of iconic images and locations relating to the event, the Taketa statue, while being in Ōita, is not. While one could argue that this was done due to the Manseibashi being arguably more impressive, it might also be the case that it was featured in for this paper unavailable material. [↑](#footnote-ref-253)
253. *Ōita Shinbun*. “Isshūkan nigiwai, nuku hōka na hōshuku zue! Kettei shita moyooshi mono”. 24 May 1935. p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-254)
254. *Ōita Shinbun*. “Hirose jinja sōken kinen-gō”. 24 May 1935. p. 1-7; Incidentally, the first page of the appendix, on the bottom side featured a banner advertising a commemorative books series, consisting of six volumes filled with “deeply emotional true stories” (*kangeki jitsuwa* 感激実話). The banner features the title of the first book in the series titled “Offer Yourself for the Empire” (*kōkoku ni mi o sasagete* 皇国に身を捧げて) which might be a reference to Hirose and his poem; The collages consist of a photographs of Hirose when he was in different stages within his life, his grave, the shrine and its *torii* 鳥居, the house where he was born, et cetera. [↑](#footnote-ref-255)
255. *Ōita Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa no dōzō”. 24 May 1935. p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-256)
256. *Ōita Shinbun*. “Dai ni no Nankō toshite tsukushita Hirose chūsa, Arima taishō raiken shite kataru”. 25 May 1935. p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-257)
257. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-258)
258. *Ōita Shinbun*. “Iyoiyo futaake no Hirose jinja chinza-sai, chōno no meishi, gijōhei o mukaete, kūzen no seigi”. 24 May 1935. p. 4; Kobayashi Sōnosuke, 1886-1975, was a vice-admiral of the Japanese Imperial Navy and served until 1942; Ōsumi Mineo, 1876-1941, was a military official from the Meiji period until the Shōwa period. He served in the Naval General Staff, as naval officer in France and as commandant of the Third Squadron. He served as Navy minister during the Inukai, Saitō, and Okata Cabinets; Takahashi Sankichi, 1882-1966, was a military official during the Meiji and Early Shōwa period. He served as divisional leader on the ship Shikima during the Battle of the Yellow Sea and the Battle of the Sea of Japan. In 1926 he became chief of staff of the Combined Fleet. [↑](#footnote-ref-259)
259. *Ōita Shinbun*. “Chōno no meishi o mukae, Hirose jinja chinza-sai, gijōhei mo sanretsu, sōgon no seigi, waki kaeru Taketa-machi”. 26 May 1935. p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-260)
260. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-261)
261. *Ōita Shinbun*. “Hirose jinja chinza-sai gahō”. 26 May 1935. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-262)
262. *Ōita Shinbun*. “Hirose jinja no mitamashiro to fuku-saishin”. 24 May 1935. p. 3; This paper was unable to confirm Kosaka’s identity, nor the proper reading of his name or his first name. [↑](#footnote-ref-263)
263. Mizube Yōroku, 1881-1919, was a staff officer at the Naval General Staff and a teacher at the Navy Educational Facilities. [↑](#footnote-ref-264)
264. *Ōita Shinbun*. “Hirose jinja no mitamashiro to fuku-saishin”. 24 May 1935. p. 3; The article wrote *shichishō hōkoku* as “七生報告” which is clearly a misprint as this “spelling” of *shichishō hōkoku* makes no sense, at least not when pertaining to Hirose. [↑](#footnote-ref-265)
265. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-266)
266. *Ōita Shinbun*. “Heigakkō no dōjō wa, ko-chūsa ga umi no oya, Takarabe taishō no tsuikai-dan”. 26 May 1935. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-267)
267. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-268)
268. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hirose chūsa no dōzō seisō, kaigun shōnen-dan no hōshi”. 28 March 1932. p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-269)
269. Since their divine status has already been discussed in a previous chapter, it suffices here to shortly reiterate that, while controversial, this paper considers them part of the pantheon of Japanese deified war heroes; While it is useful to discuss Hirose on a personal level, the existence of the *San’yūshi*, similarly to the *Kyūgunshin*, reduces the individual identity of each soldier to a part of the overarching phenomenon; A *kesshi-tai* literally means a “certain death squad” and does not necessarily require its members to perish during their mission, but estimates their chance at returning alive to be very low. [↑](#footnote-ref-270)
270. Jordan, *China’s Trial by Fire: The Shanghai War of 1932*, p. 1-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-271)
271. Ibid., p. 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-272)
272. Ishiguro and Kimura, *Aa gunshin Nikudan San’yūshi*, p. 9-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-273)
273. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Jūrai no kanrei o yaburi San’yūshi o gochō ni shōshin, kūzen no onshō ni yokuse shimu, izoku imon gikin ichi man en toppa”. 27 February 1932. p. 2; Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 194-95. [↑](#footnote-ref-274)
274. Ueno, *Tennō heika banzai – Bakudan San’yūshi josetsu*, p. 47. [↑](#footnote-ref-275)
275. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 193-95. [↑](#footnote-ref-276)
276. *Fukuoka Nichinichi Shinbun*福岡日日新聞; *Kyūshū Nippō* 九州日報; *Ōita Shinbun* 大分新聞. [↑](#footnote-ref-277)
277. Nakauchi, *Gunkoku bidan to kyōkasho*, p. 75; Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 189-91; Ueno, *Tennō heika banzai – Bakudan San’yūshi josetsu*, p. 137-38. [↑](#footnote-ref-278)
278. Ueno, *Tennō heika banzai – Bakudan San’yūshi josetsu*, p. 138; *Kyūshū Nippō*. “Hahaue no kao mo miraremai”. 25 February 1932. p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-279)
279. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 190; Ueno, *Tennō heika banzai – Bakudan San’yūshi josetsu*, p. 138. [↑](#footnote-ref-280)
280. *Fukuoka Nichinichi Shinbun*. “Ryojun heisoku-tai ni hi su beki, sōretsu San’yūshi no senshi, bakuyaku o mi ni tsukete, teki no tetsujōmō ni odorikonde bakushi”. 25 February 1932. p. 2; *Ōita Shinbun*. “Tekitan o samukarashimeta, kesshi no Kyūshū danji, bakudan o shintai ni musubitsukete, tetsujōmō o toppa bakushi”. 25 February 1932. p. 2; *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Aa kono gisei kōi, Kyūshū danji no kimo no futosa, kangeki no namida Miyawaki shōsa kataru”. 24 February 1932. p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-281)
281. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 193-95. [↑](#footnote-ref-282)
282. *Hōshū Shinbun*. “Chokin o, San’yūshi he, kanshin na ni jidō”. 1 March 1932. p. 4; *Ōita Shinbun*. “Nikudan San’yūshi e, kangeki no chōi-kin, Ōita rentai-ku shirei-bu e, kenka kara zokuzoku atsumaru”. 1 March 1932. p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-283)
283. *Fukuoka Nichinichi Shinbun*. “*San’yūshi irei-kin*”. 4 March 1932. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-284)
284. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Bakudan ryōyūshi o dashi zenson o agete banzai, Nagasaki kenka ni izoku o tou”. 2 March 1932. p. 5; No articles talking about the remaining three men, Noguchi Kōhei 野口好平, Shiga Naoji 志賀直治, and Sakai Eiichi 坂井栄一 could be found. The reason why these men’s families were not featured is unknown. [↑](#footnote-ref-285)
285. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 202-3; The Germanic-Japanese War refers to Japan’s fights with German troops during the First World War (i.e. for instance, the Battle of Tsingtao (*Chintao no tatakai* 青島の戦い)). The idea arose as part of recontextualization of Japan’s participation in the First World War. [↑](#footnote-ref-286)
286. *Kyūshū Nippō*. “Bōfu mo ani mo gunjin, Hayashida jōtōhei no reikei kataru”. 2 March 1932. p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-287)
287. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Hyōban no mohan seinen, ‘honnin mo sa zo manzoku deshō…’ to Kozaki ittōhei izoku yorokobu”. 2 March 1932. p. 5; The same page featured the alleged letter that Kozaki had sent to his family. [↑](#footnote-ref-288)
288. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Kenshō boshū, Nikudan San’yūshi no uta”. 28 February 1932. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-289)
289. *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun*. “Kenshō boshū, Bakudan San’yūshi no uta”. 28 February 1932. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-290)
290. *Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbun*. “Sōretsu muhi! Masa ni kishin o nakashimuru, Bakudan San’yūshi no uta happyō, Hachi man yūyo hen-chū kara erabareta fumetsu no kessaku”. 15 March 1932. p. 6; *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun*. “‘Bakudan San’yūshi no uta’ Happyō, Ittō wa shidan no rōtaika, Ōbo hachi man yon sen amaru hen-chū kara, Erabareta Yosano-san sono ta”. 15 March 1932. p. 6; The *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun* referred to the amount as “literally piling up like a mountain […]” (*mojitoori […] sanseki* 文字通り[…]山積). [↑](#footnote-ref-291)
291. The transliteration of the name might not be accurate, but no further information on the person could be found. [↑](#footnote-ref-292)
292. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Gūzen no kien, ni yūshi o dashita Nagasaki kara tōsen, Igai to suru Nakano Chikara-shi”. 15 March 1932. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-293)
293. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Honsha sentei, Nikudan San’yūshi no uta, happyō ensō-kai”. 15 March 1932. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-294)
294. *Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbun*. “Sakkyoku-sha no kotoba, Rikugun Toyama gakkō gunraku-tai”., 15 March 1932. p. 6; *Ōsaka Mainichi Shinbun*. “Sōretsu muhi! Masa ni kishin o nakashimuru, Bakudan San’yūshi no uta happyō, Hachi man yūyo hen-chū kara erabareta fumetsu no kessaku”. 15 March 1932. p. 6; *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun*. “‘Bakudan San’yūshi no uta’ Happyō, Ittō wa shidan no rōtaika, Ōbo hachi man yon sen amaru hen-chū kara, Erabareta Yosano-san sono ta”. 15 March 1932. p. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-295)
295. Another example of an artist drawing upon this “shock” was the artist and educator Yamamoto Kanae 山本鼎 who ended up painting the scene of the three men carrying their bomb. He too had stated in an interview how inspired he had been by their bravery. To gain funding for his project he visited the leader of the so-called *Kojō Shinbun* 古城新聞 at the Army Ministry who gladly accepted Yamamoto’s offer. The painting would later be gifted by the Asahi Shinbun Company to the Yasukuni Shrine. It needs to be noted that for many artists this was likely an attempt to capitalize on the success of the latest trend; No information on the so-called *Kojō Shinbun* could be found, nor is it certain that the reading is correct. Although, they do seem to have been affiliated with the Army Ministry; No image of the painting could be acquired, nor is there any coverage of a gifting of a painting to the Yasukuni Shrine. [↑](#footnote-ref-296)
296. Rabson, “Yosano Akiko on War: To Give One’s Life or Not: A Question of Which War”, p. 59-60; Watanabe, “Yosano Akiko (josei sakka hyōden shirīzu 2)”, p. 163-64; *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun*. “Kangeki mo arata ni, ima sara nagara tōsen no ei o ninatte, Yosano Hirose shi no dan”. 15 March 1932. p. 6; Yosano Tekkan is also known as Yosano Hiroshi 与謝野寛. His wife, Yosano Akiko is most famous for her anti-war poetry written around the time of the Russo-Japanese War, around the 1930s, however, her poetry took a radical turn praising war and justifying its role in solving international problems. She wrote in June 1932 a poem titled “A Citizens of Japan, a Morning Song” (*Aa nihon kokumin, asa no uta* 嗚呼日本國民朝の歌) for the women’s magazine *Nihon no josei* (日本の女性 “Women of Japan”) in which she praised the exploits of the *San’yūshi*. Rabson has already researched this quite well, and therefore his points will not be reiterated here. However, this paper disagrees with some parts of his translation, more specifically his translation of the verb *odoru* 躍る, which in the original is written with the character for “jumping”. Rabson, however, translates the verse “*tetsujōmō ni odoriiri* 鉄条網に躍り入り” as “dancing through the barbed wire”, using the verb “dancing” (*odoru* 踊る). While it is clear that he aimed at conveying how their exploits were glorified, one could argue that the act of “jumping” was already perceived as glorious. Hence, he overtranslated the poem. [↑](#footnote-ref-297)
297. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Honsha kenshō boshū tōsen uta happyō, ‘Nikudan San’yūshi no uta’ san hen, ōbo sōsū jitsu ni jū ni man yon sen tsū, toku ni nitō o ni hen to su”. 15 March 1932. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-298)
298. *Homare* is a brand of tobacco that was used as supplies by the Japanese Military and was domestically produced. [↑](#footnote-ref-299)
299. Ishiguro and Kimura, *Aa gunshin Nikudan San’yūshi*, p. 183-200. [↑](#footnote-ref-300)
300. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Gaikoku kisha wa kaku miru, nihon seishin no kyokuchi, ‘Shi ni tai suru kanzen taru taido’ o, taimusu no Baiasu-shi gekishō”. 26 February 1932. p. 7; Whether Hew Bayes is spelled like this is unknown. The other two names were easier to derive from their katakana counterparts. [↑](#footnote-ref-301)
301. Ishiguro and Kimura, *Aa gunshin Nikudan San’yūshi*, p. 37-42; Yamato and Kurihara, *Gokoku no kami Nikudan San’yūshi: fu, kakuretaru hachiyūshi no homare*, p. 29-32. [↑](#footnote-ref-302)
302. Ishiguro and Kimura, *Aa gunshin Nikudan San’yūshi*, p. 37; As far as this research could determine, no instance from other countries could be found. Which does not mean that it is unlikely, considering that in 1928 a donation had been made by Rome to commemorate the bravery of the *Byakkotai* (白虎隊, “White Tiger Unit”), a unit belonging to the Aizu faction during the Boshin war and which consisted of adolescent samurai, as a symbol of the greatness of fascism. The donated stone moment stands to this day in the Fukushima 福島 Prefecture. Cases where the *San’yūshi* are discussed in the context of fascism are discussed in a further chapter. [↑](#footnote-ref-303)
303. Yamato and Kurihara, *Gokoku no kami Nikudan San’yūshi: fu, kakuretaru hachiyūshi no homare*, p. 119. [↑](#footnote-ref-304)
304. Ishiguro and Kimura, *Aa gunshin Nikudan San’yūshi*, p. 40; The author, for instance, elaborates on a point made by Brown, where he states that “Their [the three brave men’s] achievement must naturally be valued as that of heroes, moreover this is also likely the culmination of the sacrificial spirit that Japan holds” (*Karera [San’yūshi] no kōi wa tōzen eiyū no sore ni atai subeku, shikamo korekoso nippon no motsu giseiteki seishin no kyokuchi de arō* 彼等[三勇士]の行為は当然英雄のそれに値すべく、然もこれこそ日本のもつ犠牲的の極致だろう) with a simple “…that is how he praises them, but this is the voice that praises the Japanese samurai code of chivalry” (*…to zesshō shiteiru ga, kore mo tōzen no nippon bushido raisan no koe da* …と絶賞しているが、是も当然の日本武士道礼賛の声だ). [↑](#footnote-ref-305)
305. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “San suihei bakushi, sensha-tai no tame bakuha sagyō-chū, teki no jirai bakuhatsu shite”. 3 March 1932. p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-306)
306. *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun*. “Kaigun no San’yūshi, tetsujōmō hakai-chū bakushi”. 3 March 1932. p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-307)
307. *Fukuoka Nichinichi Shinbun*. “Jū ni jikan jinji fusei, futsuka kan nomazu kuwazu, funsen o tsuzuketa”. 7 March 1932. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-308)
308. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Eshita jōtōhei no izoku, kitoku naru mōshide, honsha no kin’ippū dentatsu ni sai shi, ichibu o senshisha e”. 8 March 1932. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-309)
309. Ishiguro and Kimura, *Aa gunshin Nikudan San’yūshi*, p. 79-82, 146-47, 207-211; The family of Eshita was allegedly working as coal miners, while the family of Sakue were mainly farmers. This research was not able to come to a proper understanding what the occupation was of Kitagawa family, but it is known that they lived in a very remote location and were to a certain extent took care of their own needs; Allegedly newspapers had stated that the occupation of the Sakue family was a hybrid form of farmers and fishers. That is not true, as the father was worked as a carpenter first and as a farmer second. The family consisted mainly of farmers. [↑](#footnote-ref-310)
310. High, *The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years’ War, 1931-1945*, p. 37-38; Salomon, “Die Kinder des japanischen Kaiserreichs Gesellschaftliches Interesse für die junge Generation in der Taishō- und der frühen Shōwa-Zeit”, p. 298. [↑](#footnote-ref-311)
311. *Kyūshū Nippō*. “Hahaue no kao mo miraremai”. 25 February 1932. p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-312)
312. *Fukuoka Nichinichi Shinbun*. “Homare no Nikudan San’yūshi no, izoku o chōmon su, tokuha kisha”. 1 March 1932. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-313)
313. High, *The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years’ War, 1931-1945*, p. 39. [↑](#footnote-ref-314)
314. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Gunkoku ni dai no bidan ‘hataraite shinde koi, inujini wa suru na’, kenage na Kitagawa ittōhei no haha”. 27 February 1932. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-315)
315. *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun*. “Omoide no shinajina ni, omowazu jibo no namida, honsha shusai Shanhai-ten o miru”. 13 March 1932. p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-316)
316. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-317)
317. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “San’yūshi no haha naku, ginmaku ni wa ga ko bakushi no ato o tomurau, honsha no eiga o mite”. 13 March 1932. p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-318)
318. Yamato and Kurihara, *Gokoku no kami Nikudan San’yūshi: fu, kakuretaru hachiyūshi no homare*, p. 109-10; The white strips can also be made from cotton. It is not clear what material is used. [↑](#footnote-ref-319)
319. Yamato and Kurihara, *Gokoku no kami Nikudan San’yūshi: fu, kakuretaru hachiyūshi no homare*, p. 109-10; The word used for meeting is *kaikō* 邂逅 and implies an accidental nature, however, it is plausible that the meeting was staged. [↑](#footnote-ref-320)
320. Yamato and Kurihara, *Gokoku no kami Nikudan San’yūshi: fu, kakuretaru hachiyūshi no homare*, p. 110; This episode can be found in the same work under the header “Prime Minister Inukai and the Bereaved Families of the *San’yūshi*” (*Inukai shushō to, San’yūshi izoku* 犬養首相と　三勇士遺族). Why it focusses on Inukai despite the fact that the three women were not even able to meet him raises the question whether there is a layer of criticism towards the prime minister. The title definitely pulls the attention towards Inukai. [↑](#footnote-ref-321)
321. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Asu taikyō suru San’yūshi no haha tachi, honsha no boshū uta ni kansha”. 16 March 1932. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-322)
322. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 241-45. [↑](#footnote-ref-323)
323. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-324)
324. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-325)
325. Ibid.; “Mokei doori ni jitsubutsu ga dekiru”. *Shōnen kurabu*. February 1933. p. 303; There is uncertainty over who created the model. Previous research suggests it was Matsuo, yet an article in *Shōnen kurabu* attributes the model to a model designer named Nakamura Seika 中村星果; Toyoda was a professor at Higher School for Industrial Arts in Tōkyō (*Tōkyō kōtō kōgei gakkō* 東京高等工芸学校); Shortly before the completion of the statue, the *Shōnen kurabu* featured, presumably, a poster as an appendix which it actively advertised as a feature of the issue of the following month. [↑](#footnote-ref-326)
326. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Nikudan San’yūshi no dōzō, gaitō kōshin”. 26 May 1933. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-327)
327. Toyoda Katsuaki. “Nihon kokumin eien no kinen, Bakudan San’yūshi no dōzō”. *Shōnen kurabu*. February 1933. p. 302-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-328)
328. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Nikudan San’yūshi no dōzō, gaitō kōshin”. 26 May 1933. p. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-329)
329. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-330)
330. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 241-45. [↑](#footnote-ref-331)
331. *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “San’yūshi no dōzō kenritsu kyoka sareru”. 21 April 1932. p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-332)
332. *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “San’yūshi o tane ni kifu o kataru/Tōkyō, Nippori”. 21 April 1932. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-333)
333. *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “San’yūshi no bunkotsu miyakoiri, dōzō kensetsu-kai no hakkai-shiki o agu”. 18 May 1932. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-334)
334. *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “Aa Bakudan San’yūshi, Shiba Seishō-ji ni dōzō kansei su, Tōkyō”. 9 February 1934. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-335)
335. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Nikudan San’yūshi no dōzō jomaku-shiki, kyō kyokō saru”. 23 February 1934. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-336)
336. Hayashi Senjūrō, 1876-1943, was an Army official and a politician. He served during the Russo-Japanese War and was Japan’s Army representative at the League of Nations. He became army commander in Korea in 1930 and during the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident he dispatched troops on his own decision. He served as Army Minister during the Saitō and Okada cabinets; Kōsaka Masayasu, 1881-1967, was a bureaucrat during the Taishō and Shōwa period, having served as prefectural governor in Fukushima 福島, Ehime 愛媛, Okayama 岡山, and Aichi 愛知. He became Tōkyō’a prefectural governor in 1932. [↑](#footnote-ref-337)
337. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Nikudan San’yūshi no dōzō jomaku-shiki, kyō kyokō saru”. 23 February 1934. p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-338)
338. The same work aimed at explaining Japanese heroes through bronze statues and featured statues of Kusunoki Masashige, Saigō Takamori and Hirose Takeo. [↑](#footnote-ref-339)
339. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Nikudan San’yūshi no hōyō”. 19 February 1937. p. 3; Nakauchi, *Gunkoku bidan to kyōkasho*, p. 75-76. [↑](#footnote-ref-340)
340. High, *The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years’ War, 1931-1945*, p. 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-341)
341. Ibid., p. 522. [↑](#footnote-ref-342)
342. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Eiga, shibai ni mo kaku-sha daisharin no junbi”. 27 February 1932. p. 7; *Yomiuri Shinbun*. “San’yūshi o eiga-ka, kakusha ga kisotte, Shanhai jihen”. 27 February 1932. p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-343)
343. High, *The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years’ War,* *1931-1945*, p. 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-344)
344. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Kōgyōkai o agete San’yūshi jidai, ginmaku ni, butai ni”. 3 March 1932. p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-345)
345. *Fukuoka Nichinichi Shinbun*. “San’yūshi no yū, zenkoku chūkei”. 16 March 1932. p. 6; *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “San’yūshi no yū, jū roku nichi yoru san hōsō-kyoku de”. 11 March 1932. p. 11; Naturally, the Fukuoka based broadcast station was portrayed as being “most deeply related” (*motto mo yuen fukaki …* 最も由縁深き…). [↑](#footnote-ref-346)
346. *Fukuoka Nichinichi Shinbun*. “San’yūshi no yū, zenkoku chūkei”. 16 March 1932. p. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-347)
347. “Nikudan San’yūshi o meguru: bakuyaku no chishiki”. *Kagaku to kōgyō Science and Industry*. April 1932. p. 52-53. [↑](#footnote-ref-348)
348. “Nikudan San’yūshi o meguru: bakuyaku no chishiki”. *Kagaku to kōgyō Science and Industry*. April 1932. p. 52-53; The article makes it sound like makeshift bombs were nothing unusual as it lists in parenthesis construction lumber as a second way that similar bombs were made; While the article gives some insight into the technical aspects of the bomb it spends most of the article praising the *San’yūshi*. It must be noted that the way it praises the *San’yūshi* includes some praise of the bomb itself, putting some focus on the fact that this act of valor was done by means of a makeshift bomb instead of a standard one. [↑](#footnote-ref-349)
349. “Shanhai no shukunsha, San’yūshi, Matsui Shōō”. *Fujokai*. April 1932. p. 257-67. [↑](#footnote-ref-350)
350. “Ryōri no pēji, San’yūshi donburi no koshiraekata”. *Fujokai*. June 1932. p. 459. [↑](#footnote-ref-351)
351. High, *The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Years’ War, 1931-1945*, p. 39; *Fukuoka Nichinichi Shinbun*. “Fujin sekai, Bakudan San’yūshi no zen izoku o tou”. 18 March 1932. p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-352)
352. Silverberg, *Erotic Grotesque Nonsense: The Mass Culture of Japanese Modern Times*, p. 123 [↑](#footnote-ref-353)
353. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-354)
354. *Tōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun*. “Kemudashi hennōyū no iryoku”. 1 May 1932. p. 2; *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Kirin bīru”. 22 April 1932. p. 9. [↑](#footnote-ref-355)
355. Asahi Shinbun Rekishi Shashin Ākaibu. “Uridashita Nikudan sushi no kanban”. *Ōsaka Asahi Shinbun-sha*. 17 March 1932; Asahi Shinbun Rekishi Shashin Ākaibu. “Nikudan San’yūshi udon”. *Ōsaka Asahi Shinbun-sha*. 1 March 1932. [↑](#footnote-ref-356)
356. Eguchi, *Jū go nen sensō no kaimaku – manshū jihen kara ni, ni roku jiken e*, p. 157; The same thing can be seen with the Manchurian-Mongolian Lifeline Argument or when a Seirogan producer took advantage of Russo-Japanese relations in the mid 1920s to rebrand its product as “Befriend Russia Pills” (*Shinrogan* 親露丸). [↑](#footnote-ref-357)
357. Yamamuro, *Gunshin – kindai nihon ga unda ‘eiyū’-tachi no kiseki*, p. 215-217. [↑](#footnote-ref-358)
358. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-359)
359. Ibid.; Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, p. 72. [↑](#footnote-ref-360)
360. Moore, “From Individual Child to War Youth: The Construction of Collective Experience among Evacuated Japanese Children during World War II.”, p. 341; Aaron Moore has already discussed the significance of writing exercises for children in Japanese daily life and the social implications of writing well. This paper does not repeat his findings. [↑](#footnote-ref-361)
361. Nakauchi, *Gunkoku bidan to kyōkasho*, p. 80-81; Futaara Yoshinori. “Bakudan San’yūshi o shō su”. *Manshū oyobi Shanhai ni tadashiki nihon o miru, fu, kokusai renmei to wa ga ura nanyō*. 1932. p. 170-73. [↑](#footnote-ref-362)
362. *Tōkyō Asahi Shinbun*. “Shō-kokumin no atama ni eijita San’yūshi ‘namida ga deru hodo erai hito’ Hibiya shōgakkō ni nensei ga kangeki shita kansō-bun”. 27 February 1932. p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-363)
363. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-364)
364. *Fukuoka Nichinichi Shinbun*. “Shō-kokumin no mita Nikudan San’yūshi, Ōmuta dai nana kō jidō no, kansō-bun to uta”. 3 March 1932. p. 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-365)
365. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-366)
366. Iida Kōsaku. “Nikudan San’yūshi wa ima mo nao doru no kuni Amerika de odotteiru”. *Gunji to gijutsu*. February 1934. p. 50-53; The article of the *New York Evening Journal* was published on 21 November 1933. When the *Time* article was published is unknown. [↑](#footnote-ref-367)
367. The *Time* article is merely an account of the sappers’ death, it does however end with the phrase “their heroism makes even fierce gods cry” in italics. This likely refers to a Chinese expression *qi gui shen* 泣鬼神 (or *kishin o nakasu* 鬼神を泣かす in Japanese). This phrase is used here likely for several reasons: It helps stressing the heroic nature of the sappers’ death, and adds a hint of exotism. [↑](#footnote-ref-368)
368. Noteworthy is that the article defends Japan’s incursion on the Chinese mainland stating that “Whatever you may think of the Japanese-Chinese War, and its rights and wrongs, which no American can possibly decide. You will look with admiration upon these three members of a Sappers Corps.” [↑](#footnote-ref-369)
369. “Bakudan San’yūshi ni tai suru kansō”. *Nihon oyobi nihonjin*. 15 March 1932. p. 51. [↑](#footnote-ref-370)
370. Yanagiwara Yoshimitsu. “Yamato minzoku no seika”. *Nihon oyobi nihonjin*. 15 March 1932. p. 56; Yanagiwara, 1876-1946, was a Japanese noble, a member of the house of lords and the cousin of the Taishō Emperor. [↑](#footnote-ref-371)
371. Hattori Yoshika. “Gokoku no chūkon o hikōki ni yotte eien ni hyōshō se yo”. *Nihon oyobi nihonjin*. 15 March 1932. p. 98-99; Hattori, 1886-1975 was a poet, a tanka writer and a linguist of the Japanese language; He also proposed building a bronze statue in front of the Yasukuni Shrine. [↑](#footnote-ref-372)
372. Tada Ken’ichi. “Bakugekiki mittsu o tsukure”. *Nihon oyobi nihonjin*. 15 March 1932. p. 74. [↑](#footnote-ref-373)
373. Bessho Umenosuke. “Sūisu no resshi, nihon no yūshi”. *Nihon oyobi nihonjin*. 15 March 1932. p. 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-374)
374. Bōei-shō bōei kenkyū-sho. “Bakudan San’yūshi ni kan suru shinbun tōsho ni kan suru ken”. Ref.C05021978100. November 1933. JACAR. [↑](#footnote-ref-375)
375. Bessho Umenosuke. “Sūisu no resshi, nihon no yūshi”. *Nihon oyobi nihonjin*. 15 March 1932. p. 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-376)
376. Miyada Osamu. “Tsūkai sara ni dai nari”. *Nihon oyobi nihonjin*. 15 March 1932. p. 70. [↑](#footnote-ref-377)
377. Watanuki Nimon. “Fasshizumu kara San’yūshi-shugi e”. *Nihon oyobi nihonjin*. 15 April 1932. p. 35-38; No details on the author could be found. [↑](#footnote-ref-378)
378. The author does, however, contradict himself since he stated at the start of his article that fascism had trended in a variety of media outlets and political circles. [↑](#footnote-ref-379)