EU-koolstofgrenscorrectie: geen legaliteitsevaluatie zonder WHO-kwalificatie
In het kader van de EU Green Deal heeft de EU zich ertoe verbonden om tegen 2050 het eerste klimaatneutrale continent te worden. In de zomer van 2021 bracht de Europese Commissie een aantal voorstellen voor regelgeving uit, gericht op het bereiken van deze ambitieuze klimaatdoelstelling. Wellicht het meest spraakmakende voorstel betreft de introductie van een EU mechanisme voor koolstofgrenscorrectie. Overeenkomstig de gewone wetgevingsprocedure, dienen de Raad van de EU en het Europees Parlement overeenstemming te bereiken inzake het voorstel van de Commissie. Er werd reeds een akkoord bereikt in de Raad. Het Europees Parlement en de Raad dienen nu nog overeenstemming te bereiken over de finale tekst.
1. Rationale
De strenge Europese regels inzake koolstofprijsstelling, waarbij voornamelijk kan worden gedacht aan het Europese Emissiehandelssysteem, verhogen de kosten voor Europese ondernemingen en brengen aldus hun concurrentievermogen in gedrang. Daarnaast sporen deze regels Europese ondernemingen aan om hun koolstofintensieve productie te verhuizen naar landen met milde of geen koolstofbeperkingen. Het akkoord van Parijs, dat enkel voorziet in een systeem van vrijwillige inzet voor koolstofreductie, lijkt aan te tonen dat het opleggen van bindende koolstofbeperkingen op internationaal niveau politiek onhaalbaar is. EU-koolstofgrenscorrectie vormt dan ook het antwoord van de Europese wetgever op bezwaren inzake concurrentievermogen en koolstoflekkage bij afwezigheid van een globale koolstofprijs. Onder dit mechanisme zou aan EU-importeurs een kost worden opgelegd die overeenstemt met de kost die aan Europese producenten opgelegd wordt ten gevolge van het EU-emissiebeleid. Op die manier ontstaat een ‘level playing field’, ondanks de grote verschillen inzake koolstofbeperkingen tussen EU en niet-EU landen.
2. Een handelsbelemmering
Een dergelijke maatregel beïnvloedt evenwel de internationale handel en dient bijgevolg in overeenstemming te zijn met de regels opgelegd door de Wereldhandelsorganisatie (WHO). Hoewel het doel van duurzame ontwikkeling uitdrukkelijk wordt erkend in de preambule van de overeenkomst tot oprichting van de WHO, is de WHO geen milieu-maar een handelsorganisatie.
Een schending van de WHO-regels zou de Europese regelgeving ter zake niet ongeldig maken. Na het volgen van de WHO-geschillenbeslechtsingsprocedure, zou een ontevreden handelspartner evenwel toestemming kunnen verwerven om handelssancties te treffen tegen de EU. Daarnaast is het respect voor de WHO-regels van politiek en economisch belang voor de EU. De EU heeft het grootste handelsvolume ter wereld. Het overtreden van de WHO-regels zou kunnen leiden tot politieke conflicten die de liberalisering van de handel zouden kunnen belemmeren. Bovendien zou de EU, die zich opwerpt als ‘klimaatleider’, geen bewonderenswaardig voorbeeld stellen indien het WHO-verplichtingen zou schenden om milieudoelstellingen te realiseren.
3. De kwalificatievraag
De WHO-regels inzake grenscorrectie voor belastingmaatregelen en die voor regelgevingsmaatregelen verschillen evenwel, zodat, alvorens de legaliteit van het Europese mechanisme kan worden onderzocht, moet worden bepaald of het mechanisme een fiscale maatregel of een gewone wetgevingsmaatregel uitmaakt.
Om de kwalificatievraag te beantwoorden, moet vooreerst worden gekeken naar het Europees Emissiehandelssysteem. Het voorstel inzake grenscorrectie betreft immers de uitbreiding van deze regeling naar geïmporteerde producten. Het is evenmin duidelijk of de verplichting om emissierechten te verwerven in het kader van het EU Emissiehandelssysteem, gekwalificeerd moet worden als een fiscale of een gewone wetgevingsmaatregel op WHO-niveau. Op Europees niveau lijken noch het Emissiehandelssysteem, noch het mechanisme voor koolstofgrenscorrectie, als fiscale maatregelen te worden beschouwd. Dit kan worden afgeleid uit de rechtsgrond van de regelingen, de benamingen ervan en uit rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie. Bijgevolg is, anders dan voor fiscale maatregelen, geen unanimiteit vereist voor de aanname van het voorstel inzake koolstofgrenscorrectie. Dat deze systemen intern niet worden beschouwd als fiscale maatregelen, belet niet dat zij op het niveau van de WHO wel als dusdanig zouden kunnen worden gekwalificeerd. De economische impact van het mechanisme is bepalend voor de WHO-kwalificatie ervan. Europese normen en rechtspraak kunnen niettemin dienen als interpretatiebronnen in het kader van een WTO-geschillenbeslechtingsprocedure.
Uit een analyse van de doctrine en het rapport van de GATT Werkgroep inzake fiscale aanpassingen aan de grens, lijkt het systeem voor koolstofgrenscorrectie, in tegenstelling tot de interne kwalificatie ervan, wél te kwalificeren als een fiscale maatregel. De argumenten van auteurs die deze kwalificatie afwijzen, steunen vooral op het systeem van gratis toewijzing van emissierechten en de mogelijkheid om emissierechten te verhandelen. Hoewel onder het EU Emissiehandelsysteem emissierechten inderdaad verhandelbaar waren en een aantal emissierechten gratis werden toegewezen aan Europese producenten, wordt het mechanisme voor koolstofgrenscorrectie, zoals voorgesteld door de Commissie, niet gekenmerkt door deze eigenschappen.
4. De legaliteitsbeoordeling
Dat het mechanisme eerder lijkt te moeten worden gekwalificeerd als belastingmaatregel, kan enigszins voordelig kan zijn voor de legaliteit van het mechanisme. De legaliteit van het mechanisme wordt echter vooral in het gedrang gebracht door het feit dat de maatregel productieprocessen beoogt in plaats van fysieke inputs van producten. Daarnaast brengen een reeks bepalingen in de Algemene Overeenkomst betreffende tarieven en handel (GATT) die gelden voor zowel fiscale als gewone wetgevingsmaatregelen, de legaliteit van het mechanisme in gedrang. Zo mogen handelsmaatregelen niet discrimineren tussen eigen en buitenlandse producten, of tussen producten afkomstig van verschillende handelspartners. Het mechanisme kan als discriminerend worden beschouwd tegenover buitenlandse producten in die zin dat deze buitenlandse producten mogelijk ‘in het algemeen’ worden gekenmerkt door een hogere koolstofvoetafdruk. Bovendien vertonen het Emissiehandelssysteem voor Europese producenten en het koolstofgrensmechanisme voor importeurs enkele verschillen. Door te voorzien in vrijstellingen en verlagingen, is het ook mogelijk dat het mechanisme discrimineert tussen verschillende handelspartners.
Schendingen van de bepalingen van de GATT kunnen onder bepaalde voorwaarden worden gerechtvaardigd indien ze onder de algemene uitzonderingen voorzien in die overeenkomst vallen. Enkele van deze uitzonderingen bieden ruimte voor milieumaatregelen. Echter, omdat in het voorstel van de Commissie onvoldoende rekening wordt gehouden met de omstandigheden in ontwikkelingslanden en omdat de inkomsten van het mechanisme niet exclusief zouden worden gebruikt voor klimaatdoeleinden, maar grotendeels het algemene EU budget zouden spijzen, lijkt niet voldaan aan de toepassingsvoorwaarden van deze uitzonderingen. Bovendien doet ook het extraterritoriale karakter van de maatregel de vraag rijzen of het mechanisme überhaupt wel in aanmerking komt voor rechtvaardiging.
Samengevat lijkt het mechanisme, ongeacht van de kwalificatie ervan, een discriminerende wetgevingsmaatregel die niet in aanmerking komt voor rechtvaardiging en bijgevolg in strijd is met de WHO-regels.
Bibliografie
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• TRACHTMAN, J.P., “WTO law constraints on border tax adjustment and tax credit mechanisms to reduce the competitive effects of carbon taxes”, National Tax Journal 2017, vol. 70, no. 2, 469-494.
• VAN ASSELT, H. and BREWER, T., “Addressing competitiveness and leakage concerns in climate policy: An analysis of border adjustment measures in het US and the EU”, Energy Policy 2010, vol. 38, no. 1, 42- 51.
• WOERDMAN, E. and KOTZAMPASAKIS, M., “Linking the EU ETS with California’s Cap-and-Trade Program: A law and economics assessment”, CEREM 2020, vol. 4, no. 4, 9-45.
• ZHU, Z., “A Discussion on the Legitimacy of Carbon Tariffs under the WTO”, J. WTO & CHINA 2015, vol. 5, no. 2, 86-94.
3.4. Background, working and briefing papers
• BACCHUS, J., “Legal Issues with the European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism”, CATO Briefing Paper 2021, no. 125, https://www.cato.org/briefing-paper/legal-issues-european-carbonborder-adjustment-mechanism#conclusion.
• BACCHUS, J., “Special Report: The Case for a WTO Climate Waiver”, Centre for International Governance Innovation 2017, https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/NEWEST%20Clim ate%20Waiver%20-%20Bacchus.pdf.
• BARTELS, L., “The Inclusion of Aviation in the EU ETS: WTO Law Considerations”, ICTDS - Trade and Sustainable Energy Series 2012, no. 6, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/144532/the-inclusion-of-aviation-in-theeu-ets-wto-law-considerations.pdf.
• GOULDER, L.H. and SCHEIN, A., “Carbon Taxes v. Cap and Trade: A Critical Review”, NBER Working Paper 2013, no. 19338, https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w19338/w19338.pdf.
• ISMER, R. and NEUHOFF, K., “Border Tax Adjustments: A Feasible way to Address Nonparticipation in Emission Trading”, CMI Working Paper 2004, no. 36, 75 https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/388/EP36.pdf?s equence=1&isAllowed=y.
• JEGOU, I., “Competitiveness and Climate Change Policies: Is There a Case for Restrictive Unilateral Trade Measures?”, ICTSD information note 2009, no. 16, https://seors.unfccc.int/applications/seors/attachments/get_attachment?c ode=KPE7FAH5YPDAXMDD7FBCCUMLCBASK2P2.
• LOW, P., MARCEAU, G. and REINAUD, J., “The Interface between the trade and climate change regimes: scoping the issues”, Staff Working Paper ERSD 2011, no. 1, https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201101_e.pdf.
• MARCU, A. and DYBKA, D., “Status of the Border Carbon Adjustments’ international developments”, ERCST 2021, https://ercst.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/08/Update-on-developments-in-the-internationaljurisdictions-on-the-Border-Carbon-Adjustments.pdf.
• MEHLING, M., VAN ASSELT, H., DAS, K., DOEGE, S. and VERKUIJL, C., “Designing Border Carbon Adjustments for Enhanced Climate Action”, Climate Strategies 2017, https://climatestrategies.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/CS_report-Dec-2017-4.pdf.
• PAUWELYN, J., “U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and Options of International Trade Law”, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Solutions Working Paper 2007, no. 07/02, https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/u.s.- federal-climate-policy-and-competitiveness-concerns-the-limits-andoptions-of-international-trade-law-paper.pdf.
• PRAG, A., “The Climate Challenge and Trade: Would border carbon adjustments accelerate or hinder climate action?”, OECD Background Paper for the 39th Round Table on Sustainable Development 2020, https://www.oecd.org/sdroundtable/papersandpublications/The%20Climate%20Challenge%20and %20Trade...%20background%20paper%20RTSD39.pdf.
3.5. Reports, surveys and statistics
• Vivid Economics and Ecofys, Carbon leakage prospects under Phase III of the EU ETS and beyond – report prepared for DECC, 2014, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uplo ads/attachment_data/file/318893/carbon_leakage_prospects_under_phas e_III_eu_ets_beyond.pdf.
• Climate Action Network Europe, The lack of evidence for carbon leakage, 2014, http://www.old.caneurope.org/docman/emissions-tradingscheme/2333-eu-2030-briefing-on-lack-of-evidence-for-carbon-leakagefebruary-2014/file.
• UNEP, Emissions Gap Report 2020, https://www.unep.org/emissions-gapreport-2020.
• European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, Economic assessment of Carbon Leakage and Carbon Border Adjustment, 2020, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2861/02958.
• Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Expert survey on the perception of the planned EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism in Asia Pacific, 2021, https://www.kas.de/documents/265079/265128/EU+Carbon+Border+Adj 76 ustment+Mechanism.pdf/fed1d5a4-4424-c450-a1b9- b7dbd3616179?version=1.1&t=1615356593906.
• Eurostat, International trade in goods, 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php?title=International_trade_in_goods#The_three_large st_global_players_for_international_trade:_EU.2C_China_and_the_USA, 2021.
3.6. Guides
• WTO Analytical Index: Guide to WTO Law and Practice – GATT 1994, Article III (Jurisprudence), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/gatt1994_art3_ jur.pdf.
3.7. Statements
• Joint NGO statement on the CBAM, 13 December 2021, no. 5, https://9tj4025ol53byww26jdkao0x-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wpcontent/uploads/Joint-NGO-statement-on-CBAM-proposal.pdf.
3.8. News articles
• BAUER-BABEF, C., “African countries deem EU carbon border levy ‘protectionist’”, EURACTIV 2021, https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/developingcountries-deem-eu-carbon-border-levy-protectionist/.
• KURMAYER, N.J., “EU industry shuns carbon border levy, calls for export rebates”, EURACTIV 2021, https://www.euractiv.com/section/energyenvironment/news/eu-industry-shuns-carbon-border-levy-backs-exportrebates-instead/.
• LO, J., “Emerging economies share ‘grave concern’ over EU plans for a carbon border tax”, Climate Home News 2021, https://www.climatechangenews.com/2021/04/09/emerging-economiesshare-grave-concern-eu-plans-carbon-border-tax/.
• WEISMAN, J. and DAVENPORT, C., “Democrats Consider Adding Carbon Tax To Budget Bill”, New York Times 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/24/us/politics/carbon-taxdemocrats.html.
3.9. Web posts
• CARB, FAQ Cap-and-Trade Program, https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/resources/documents/faq-cap-and-tradeprogram#ftn22.
• European Commission, Carbon Border Adjustment mechanism: Questions and Answers, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_3661.
• European Commission, Increasing the ambition of EU emission trading, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/eu-action/european-green-deal/deliveringeuropean-green-deal/increasing-ambition-eu-emissions-trading_en 77
• UNFCCC, About carbon pricing, https://unfccc.int/about-us/regionalcollaboration-centres/the-ciaca-initiative/about-carbon-pricing#eq-5.
• World Bank, Pricing carbon, https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/pricing-carbon
