In februari 2022 verdween 300 miljard dollar van de Russische centrale bank in één weekend. Rusland had die reserves twintig jaar lang opgebouwd om zich tegen buitenlandse druk te beschermen, en dat bleek volledig tevergeefs. Het grootste deel van dat geld ligt bij Euroclear in Brussel. Nederland, Polen, Spanje en Zweden vroegen begin september aan de Europese Commissie om die 193 miljard alsnog voor Oekraïne in te zetten. Een Russische rechtbank veroordeelde Euroclear ondertussen tot meer dan 200 miljard euro aan schadevergoeding, en de Belgische regering weigert die aansprakelijkheid in haar eentje te dragen.
Twee verhalen, dezelfde basis
Geen regering bekeek dat weekend zo aandachtig als de Chinese. China heeft de grootste reservestapel ter wereld, 3,416 miljard dollar, grotendeels aangehouden in de munt van zijn voornaamste rivaal. Al vijftien jaar bouwt het aan alternatieven: een eigen betaalsysteem (CIPS), een digitale yuan (e-CNY), kredietlijnen voor centrale banken in nood (swaplijnen), en mBridge, het grootste levende experiment om centrale banken rechtstreeks met elkaar te laten afrekenen. De krantenkop schrijft zichzelf: ‘China wil de dollar onttronen en een financiële hegemon worden’.
Maar hoe weet je dat? Een land dat de dollar wil vervangen, bouwt betaalsystemen, koopt goud en sluit kredietlijnen. Een land dat gewoon niet meer afgeperst wil kunnen worden, bouwt precies hetzelfde. Je kan de bouwwerf bekijken zoveel je wil. De stenen verraden de bedoeling niet. Dus telt men de score, en die is vernederend voor China. Na vijftien jaar is de yuan goed voor slechts 2 procent van de wereldreserves, vergelijkbaar met de Canadese of Australische dollar. CIPS verwerkt zo'n 100 miljard dollar per dag; het Amerikaanse CHIPS doet er 2.000 miljard dollar. Bijna iedereen komt tot dezelfde conclusie: China wil de baas worden en het lukt niet. Maar dat scorebord meet of je de nieuwe Verenigde Staten wordt. Over iemand die dat helemaal niet probeert, zegt dat niets.
De test: kijk naar wat er niet gebeurt
Voor mijn masterproef bouwde ik daarom een test die de twee verhalen van elkaar scheidt. De vraag is niet wat China bouwt, maar welke machtszetten voor het grijpen liggen en blijven liggen. Dat blijft moeilijk werk. Je bewijst namelijk nooit wat iemand denkt; je bewijst hoogstens wat wordt nagelaten. En de test moest streng zijn, want China houdt zijn grenzen dicht voor kapitaal via restricties en kapitaalcontroles, en zonder die vrijheid wordt de yuan nooit een munt die landen aan zullen houden. Alleen kan dat even goed onvermogen zijn: Peking vreest dat het kapitaal opengooien zijn eigen banken omverblaast. Dus telden enkel de zetten die niets kosten en die morgen genomen kunnen worden. Ik vond er vier.
Kredieten zonder voorwaarden. China heeft kredietlijnen met 42 landen, goed voor ruim 660 miljard dollar. Het IMF stelt aan zulke leningen eisen: bespaar, hervorm, maak je munt goedkoper. Zo koop je met geld beleid. China vraagt nauwelijks iets terug en schermt zijn klanten juist af van westerse voorwaarden.
Figuur 1: Grootte van bilaterale kredietlijnen met China

De kredietlijnen van de Chinese centrale bank, mei 2026. 42 landen, ruim 660 miljard dollar, vrijwel zonder voorwaarden. Eigen verwerking, data PBoC.
CIPS zet niemand buiten. De Amerikaanse macht bestaat erin dat Washington landen uit het betaalsysteem kan zetten. China heeft diezelfde schakelaar, maar gebruikt die niet. Geen enkele clearingbank of directe deelnemer is ooit geschrapt. Het omgekeerde gebeurt juist. Turkse banken sloten aan in 2018, na Amerikaanse sancties. Iraanse banken in 2019, nadat Washington het kernakkoord opblies. Wit-Rusland in 2022, nadat de EU drie Wit-Russische banken op de zwarte lijst had gezet. Van 9 directe deelnemers in 2016 naar 210 vandaag. Zo gedraagt een wapen zich niet.
Leningen in dollar. De kredieten van de Nieuwe Zijderoute staan vaak in dollars in plaats van in yuan. Dat is vreemd voor wie zijn munt wil opdringen: laat je anderen erin lenen en terugbetalen, dan creëer je blijvende vraag naar je eigen geld. China laat dat liggen.
mBridge heeft geen midden. Amerikaanse macht komt uit knelpunten, want bijna elke dollar passeert langs een handvol Amerikaanse instellingen. Wie een nieuw systeem bouwt met zichzelf in dat midden, kopieert dit gewoon. Bij mBridge draait elk van de vier stichtende centrale banken een eigen validerende node, en is de controle dus niet enkel bij China.
Wat dit betekent voor Brussel
Wie een wapen bouwt, bouwt ook de trekker. China bouwde het wapen en liet de trekker weg. Het goud vertelt hetzelfde verhaal: van ongeveer 600 ton in 2008 naar 2.346 ton in juni 2026, en zie vooral waar de lijn na februari 2022 opnieuw begint te stijgen. Goud in eigen kluizen kan niemand bevriezen, en daarom is het juist zo gunstig voor China.
Figuur 2 — Officiële Chinese goudvoorraad in ton

Van ongeveer 600 ton in 2008 naar 2.346 ton in juni 2026, goed voor 8,9 procent van de Chinese reserves. De stippellijn markeert de bevriezing van de Russische reserves. De sprongen zijn bekendmakingen, geen aankoopmomenten. Eigen verwerking, data World Gold Council.
Dat onderscheid is niet academisch, en hier zeker niet. Elke keer dat Europa overweegt om die 193 miljard aan te spreken, bevestigt het wat Peking al vermoedde: geld dat in andermans systeem ligt, is geleend vertrouwen. Lees je China als een land dat de wereld wil overnemen, dan kom je uit bij uitsluiten en ontkoppelen. Alleen is uitsluiting precies wat afscherming dringend maakt. Zo maakt het Westen waar het bang voor is. Mijn test meet een bedoeling op één moment, niet voor altijd. De trekker van wat een wapen kan zijn, is op dit moment weggelaten, niet onmogelijk gemaakt. Maar ze vertelt je wel wanneer je fout zat. Zie je over vijf jaar dat Peking toch voorwaarden aan zijn kredieten hangt, of dat iemand van CIPS gooit, dan is er iets veranderd. En dan weet je het op tijd.
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